John Locke II & David Hume Notes

John Locke - Wikipedia

David Hume - Wikipedia

John Locke was born on 29 August 1632, in a small thatched cottage by the church in Wrington.

An Essay Concerning Human Understanding

BOOK I. NEITHER PRINCIPLES NOR IDEAS ARE INNATE

THE EPISTLE TO THE READER

For the understanding, like the eye, judging of objects only by its own sight,

cannot but be pleased with what it discovers, having less regret for what has escaped it,

because it is unknown. Thus he who has raised himself above the alms-basket, and,

not content to live lazily on scraps of begged opinions, sets his own thoughts on work,

to find and follow truth, will (whatever he lights on) not miss the hunter’s satisfaction;

every moment of his pursuit will reward his pains with some delight;

and he will have reason to think his time not ill spent, even when he cannot much boast of any great acquisition.

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This, Reader, is the entertainment of those who let loose their own thoughts,

and follow them in writing; which thou oughtest not to envy them,

since they afford thee an opportunity of the like diversion, if thou wilt make use of thy own thoughts in reading.

It is to them, if they are thy own, that I refer myself: but if they are taken upon trust from others,

it is no great matter what they are; they are not following truth, but some meaner consideration;

and it is not worth while to be concerned what he says or thinks,

who says or thinks only as he is directed by another. If thou judgest for thyself I know thou wilt judge candidly,

and then I shall not be harmed or offended, whatever be thy censure.

For though it be certain that there is nothing in this Treatise of the truth whereof I am not fully persuaded,

yet I consider myself as liable to mistakes as I can think thee, and know that this book must stand or fall with thee,

not by any opinion I have of it, but thy own. If thou findest little in it new or instructive to thee,

thou art not to blame me for it. It was not meant for those that had already mastered this subject,

and made a thorough acquaintance with their own understandings; but for my own information,

and the satisfaction of a few friends, who acknowledged themselves not to have sufficiently considered it.

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NEITHER PRINCIPLES NOR IDEAS ARE INNATE

1.The way shown how we come by any Knowledge, sufficient to prove it not innate

It is an established opinion amongst some men,

that there are in the understanding certain INNATE PRINCIPLES; some primary notions,

KOIVAI EVVOIAI, characters, as it were stamped upon the mind of man;

which the soul receives in its very first being, and brings into the world with it.

It would be sufficient to convince unprejudiced readers of the falseness of this supposition,

if I should only show (as I hope I shall in the following parts of this Discourse) how men,

barely by the use of their natural faculties may attain to all the knowledge they have,

without the help of any innate impressions; and may arrive at certainty,

without any such original notions or principles. For I imagine any one will easily grant that it would be

impertinent to suppose the ideas of colours innate in a creature to whom God hath given sight,

and a power to receive them by the eyes from external objects: and no less unreasonable would

it be to attribute several truths to the impressions of nature, and innate characters,

when we may observe in ourselves faculties fit to attain as easy and certain knowledge of them

as if they were originally imprinted on the mind.

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But because a man is not permitted without censure to follow his own thoughts in the search of truth,

when they lead him ever so little out of the common road, I shall set down the reasons that made me

doubt of the truth of that opinion, as an excuse for my mistake, if I be in one;

which I leave to be considered by those who, with me, dispose themselves to embrace truth wherever they find it.

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2.General Assent the great Argument.

There is nothing more commonly taken for granted than that there are certain PRINCIPLES,

both SPECULATIVE and PRACTICAL, (for they speak of both), universally agreed upon by all mankind:

which therefore, they argue, must needs be the constant impressions which the souls of men receive

in their first beings, and which they bring into the world with them, as necessarily and really

as they do any of their inherent faculties.

3.Universal Consent proves nothing innate.

This argument, drawn from universal consent, has this misfortune in it, that if it were true in matter of fact,

that there were certain truths wherein all mankind agreed, it would not prove them innate,

if there can be any other way shown how men may come to that universal agreement,

in the things they do consent in, which I presume may be done.

4.not universally assented to.

*“What is is,” and “It is possible for the same Thing to be and not to be,” *

But, which is worse, this argument of universal consent, which is made use of to prove innate principles,

seems to me a demonstration that there are none such: because there are none to which all mankind

give an universal assent. I shall begin with the speculative, and instance in those magnified principles

of demonstration, “Whatsoever is, is,” and “It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be”;

which, of all others, I think have the most allowed title to innate. These have so settled a reputation of maxims

universally received, that it will no doubt be thought strange if any one should seem to question it.

But yet I take liberty to say, that these propositions are so far from having an universal assent,

that there are a great part of mankind to whom they are not so much as known.

5.Not on Mind naturally imprinted, because not known to Children, Idiots, &c.

For, first, it is evident, that all children and idiots have not the least apprehension or thought of them.

And the want of that is enough to destroy that universal assent which must needs be the necessary

concomitant of all innate truths: it seeming to me near a contradiction to say,

that there are truths imprinted on the soul, which it perceives or understands not: imprinting,

if it signify anything, being nothing else but the making certain truths to be perceived.

For to imprint anything on the mind without the mind’s perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible.

If therefore children and idiots have souls, have minds, with those impressions upon them,

THEY must unavoidably perceive them, and necessarily know and assent to these truths;

which since they do not, it is evident that there are no such impressions.

For if they are not notions naturally imprinted, how can they be innate? and if they are notions imprinted,

how can they be unknown? To say a notion is imprinted on the mind, and yet at the same time to say,

that the mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this impression nothing.

No proposition can be said to be in the mind which it never yet knew, which it was never yet conscious of.

For if any one may, then, by the same reason, all propositions that are true,

andthe mind is capable ever of assenting to,

may be said to be in the mind, and to be imprinted: since, if any one can be said to be in the mind,

which it never yet knew, it must be only because it is capable of knowing it;

and so the mind is of all truths it ever shall know. Nay,

thus truths may be imprinted on the mind which it never did,

nor ever shall know; for a man may live long, and die at last in ignorance of many truths which his mind

was capable of knowing, and that with certainty.

So that if the capacity of knowing be the natural impression contended for,

all the truths a man ever comes to know will, by this account, be every one of them innate;

and this great point will amount to no more, but only to a very improper way of speaking;

which, whilst it pretends to assert the contrary,

says nothing different from those who deny innate principles. For nobody, I think, ever denied that the mind

was capable of knowing several truths. The capacity, they say, is innate; the knowledge acquired.

But then to what end such contest for certain innate maxims?

If truths can be imprinted on the understanding without being perceived,

I can see no difference there can be between any truths the mind is CAPABLE

of knowing in respect of their original: they must all be innate or all adventitious: in vain shall a man

go about to distinguish them. He therefore that talks of innate notions in the understanding,

cannot (if he intend thereby any distinct sort of truths) mean such truths to be in the understanding

as it never perceived, and is yet wholly ignorant of.

For if these words “to be in the understanding” have any propriety,

they signify to be understood. So that to be in the understanding, and not to be understood;

to be in the mind and never to be perceived,

is all one as to say anything is and is not in the mind or understanding.

If therefore these two propositions, “Whatsoever is, is,”

and “It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,”

are by nature imprinted, children cannot be ignorant of them: infants, and all that have souls,

must necessarily have them in their understandings, know the truth of them, and assent to it.

6.That men know them when they come to the Use of Reason answered.

To avoid this, it is usually answered, that all men know and assent to them,

WHEN THEY COME TO THE USE OF REASON; and this is enough to prove them innate. I answer:

7.Doubtful expressions, that have scarce any signification, go for clear reasons to those who,

being prepossessed, take not the pains to examine even what they themselves say. For,

to apply this answer with any tolerable sense to our present purpose, it must signify one of these two things:

either that as soon as men come to the use of reason these supposed native inscriptions come to be known

and observed by them; or else, that the use and exercise of men’s reason, assists them

in the discovery of these principles, and certainly makes them known to them.

8.If Reason discovered them, that would not prove them innate.

If they mean, that by the use of reason men may discover these principles,

and that this is sufficient to prove them innate; their way of arguing will stand thus,

viz. that whatever truths reason can certainly discover to us, and make us firmly assent to,

those are all naturally imprinted on the mind; since that universal assent, which is made the mark of them,

amounts to no more but this, — that by the use of reason we are capable to come to a certain knowledge

of and assent to them; and, by this means, there will be no difference between the maxims

of the mathematicians, and theorems they deduce from them: all must be equally allowed innate;

they being all discoveries made by the use of reason,

and truths that a rational creature may certainly come to know, if he apply his thoughts rightly that way.

9.It is false that Reason discovers them.

But how can these men think the use of reason necessary to discover principles that are supposed innate,

when reason (if we may believe them) is nothing else but the faculty of deducing unknown truths

from principles or propositions that are already known? That certainly can never be thought innate

which we have need of reason to discover; unless, as I have said, we will have all the certain truths

that reason ever teaches us, to be innate. We may as well think the use of reason necessary to make our eyes

discover visible objects, as that there should be need of reason, or the exercise thereof,

to make the understanding see what is originally engraven on it, and cannot be in the understanding

before it be perceived by it. So that to make reason discover those truths thus imprinted, is to say,

that the use of reason discovers to a man what he knew before:

and if men have those innate impressed truths originally,

and before the use of reason, and yet are always ignorant of them till they come to the use of reason,

it is in effect to say, that men know and know them not at the same time.

10.No use made of reasoning in the discovery of these two maxims.

It will here perhaps be said that mathematical demonstrations, and other truths that are not innate,

are not assented to as soon as proposed, wherein they are distinguished from these maxims

and other innate truths. I shall have occasion to speak of assent upon the first proposing,

more particularly by and by. I shall here only, and that very readily, allow, that these maxims

and mathematical demonstrations are in this different: that the one have need of reason, using of proofs,

to make them out and to gain our assent; but the other, as soon as understood, are,

without any the least reasoning, embraced and assented to. But I withal beg leave to observe,

that it lays open the weakness of this subterfuge, which requires the use of reason for the discovery

of these general truths: since it must be confessed that in their discovery there is no use made of reasoning at all.

And I think those who give this answer will not be forward to affirm that the knowledge of this maxim,

“That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,” is a deduction of our reason.

For this would be to destroy that bounty of nature they seem so fond of, whilst they make the knowledge

of those principles to depend on the labour of our thoughts. For all reasoning is search,

and casting about, and requires pains and application. And how can it with any tolerable sense be supposed,

that what was imprinted by nature, as the foundation and guide of our reason,

should need the use of reason to discover it?

11.And if there were this would prove them not innate.

Those who will take the pains to reflect with a little attention on the operations of the understanding,

will find that this ready assent of the mind to some truths, depends not, either on native inscription,

or the use of reason, but on a faculty of the mind quite distinct from both of them, as we shall see hereafter.

Reason, therefore, having nothing to do in procuring our assent to these maxims,

if by saying, that “men know and assent to them, when they come to the use of reason,”

be meant, that the use of reason assists us in the knowledge of these maxims, it is utterly false;

and were it true, would prove them not to be innate.

12.The coming of the Use of Reason not the Time we come to know these Maxims.

If by knowing and assenting to them “when we come to the use of reason,” be meant,

that this is the time when they come to be taken notice of by the mind;

and that as soon as children come to the use of reason, they come also to know and assent

to these maxims; this also is false and frivolous. First, it is false; because it is evident these maxims

are not in the mind so early as the use of reason; and therefore the coming to the use of reason

is falsely assigned as the time of their discovery. How many instances of the use of reason

may we observe in children, a long time before they have any knowledge of this maxim,

“That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be?” And a great part of illiterate people

and savages pass many years, even of their rational age, without ever thinking on this

and the like general propositions. I grant, men come not to the knowledge of these general

and more abstract truths, which are thought innate, till they come to the use of reason;

and I add, nor then neither. Which is so, because, till after they come to the use of reason,

those general abstract ideas are not framed in the mind, about which those general maxims are,

which are mistaken for innate principles, but are indeed discoveries made and verities introduced

and brought into the mind by the same way, and discovered by the same steps,

as several other propositions, which nobody was ever so extravagant as to suppose innate.

This I hope to make plain in the sequel of this Discourse. I allow therefore,

a necessity that men should come to the use of reason before they get the knowledge

of those general truths; but deny that men’s coming to the use of reason is the time of their discovery.

13.By this they are not distinguished from other knowable Truths.

In the mean time it is observable, that this saying that men know and assent to these maxims

“when they come to the use of reason,” amounts in reality of fact to no more but this,

— that they are never known nor taken notice of before the use of reason,

but may possibly be assented to some time after, during a man’s life; but when is uncertain.

And so may all other knowable truths, as well as these which therefore have no advantage

nor distinction from other by this note of being known when we come to the use of reason;

nor are thereby proved to be innate, but quite the contrary.

14.If coming to the Use of Reason were the Time of their Discovery, it would not prove them innate.

But, secondly, were it true that the precise time of their being known and assented to were,

when men come to the use of reason; neither would that prove them innate.

This way of arguing is as frivolous as the supposition itself is false. For, by what kind of logic

will it appear that any notion is originally by nature imprinted in the mind in its first constitution,

because it comes first to be observed and assented to when a faculty of the mind,

which has quite a distinct province, begins to exert itself? And therefore the coming to the use of speech,

if it were supposed the time that these maxims are first assented to,

(which it may be with as much truth as the time when men come to the use of reason,)

would be as good a proof that they were innate, as to say they are innate because men assent to them

when they come to the use of reason. I agree then with these men of innate principles,

that there is no knowledge of these general and self-evident maxims in the mind,

till it comes to the exercise of reason: but I deny that the coming to the use of reason is the precise time

when they are first taken notice of; and if that were the precise time, I deny that it would prove them innate.

All that can with any truth be meant by this proposition,

that men ‘assent to them when they come to the use of reason,’ is no more but this,

— that the making of general abstract ideas, and the understanding of general names,

being a concomitant of the rational faculty, and growing up with it, children commonly get not those general ideas,

nor learn the names that stand for them, till, having for a good while exercised their reason about familiar

and more particular ideas, they are, by their ordinary discourse and actions with others,

acknowledged to be capable of rational conversation. If assenting to these maxims,

when men come to the use of reason, can be true in any other sense, I desire it may be shown;

or at least, how in this, or any other sense, it proves them innate.

15.The Steps by which the Mind attains several Truths.

The senses at first let in PARTICULAR ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet,

and the mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the memory,

and names got to them. Afterwards, the mind proceeding further, abstracts them,

and by degrees learns the use of general names. In this manner the mind comes to be furnished

with ideas and language, the MATERIALS about which to exercise its discursive faculty.

And the use of reason becomes daily more visible, as these materials that give it employment increase.

But though the having of general ideas and the use of general words and reason usually grow together,

yet I see not how this any way proves them innate. The knowledge of some truths, I confess,

is very early in the mind; but in a way that shows them not to be innate. For, if we will observe,

we shall find it still to be about ideas, not innate, but acquired; it being about those first

which are imprinted by external things, with which infants have earliest to do,

which make the most frequent impressions on their senses. In ideas thus got,

the mind discovers that some agree and others differ, probably as soon as it has any use of memory;

as soon as it is able to retain and perceive distinct ideas. But whether it be then or no, this is certain,

it does so long before it has the use of words; or comes to that which we commonly call “the use of reason.”

For a child knows as certainly before it can speak the difference between the ideas of sweet

and bitter (i.e. that sweet is not bitter), as it knows afterwards (when it comes to speak) that wormwood

and sugarplums are not the same thing.

16.Assent to supposed innate truths depends on having clear and distinct ideas

of what their terms mean, and not on their innateness.

A child knows not that three and four are equal to seven, till he comes to be able to count seven,

and has got the name and idea of equality; and then, upon explaining those words, he presently assents to,

or rather perceives the truth of that proposition. But neither does he then readily assent

because it is an innate truth, nor was his assent wanting till then because he wanted the use of reason;

but the truth of it appears to him as soon as he has settled in his mind the clear and distinct ideas

that these names stand for. And then he knows the truth of that proposition upon the same ground

and by the same means, that he knew before that a rod and a cherry are not the same thing;

and upon the same ground also that he may come to know afterwards “That it is impossible for the same thing

to be and not to be,” as shall be more fully shown hereafter. So that the later it is before any one comes

to have those general ideas about which those maxims are; or to know the signification of those generic terms

that stand for them; or to put together in his mind the ideas they stand for; the later also will it be

before he comes to assent to those maxims; — whose terms, with the ideas they stand for,

being no more innate than those of a cat or a weasel he must stay till time

and observation have acquainted him with them; and then he will be in a capacity

to know the truth of these maxims,

upon the first occasion that shall make him put together those ideas in his mind,

and observe whether they agree or disagree, according as is expressed in those propositions.

And therefore it is that a man knows that eighteen and nineteen are equal to thirty-seven,

by the same self-evidence that he knows one and two to be equal to three:

yet a child knows this not so soon as the other; not for want of the use of reason,

but because the ideas the words eighteen nineteen, and thirty-seven stand for, are not so soon got,

as those which are signified by one, two, and three.

17.Assenting as soon as proposed and understood, proves them not innate.

This evasion therefore of general assent when men come to the use of reason, failing as it does,

and leaving no difference between those supposed innate and other truths that are afterwards acquired

and learnt, men have endeavoured to secure an universal assent to those they call maxims, by saying,

they are generally assented to as soon as proposed, and the terms they are proposed in understood:

seeing all men, even children, as soon as they hear and understand the terms, assent to these propositions,

they think it is sufficient to prove them innate. For, since men never fail

after they have once understood the words, to acknowledge them for undoubted truths,

they would infer, that certainly these propositions were first lodged in the understanding, which,

without any teaching, the mind, at the very first proposal immediately closes with and assents to,

and after that never doubts again.

18.If such an Assent be a Mark of Innate, then “that one and two are equal to three,

that Sweetness if not Bitterness,” and a thousand the like, must be inate.

In answer to this, I demand whether ready assent given to a proposition,

upon first hearing and understanding the terms, be a certain mark of an innate principle?

If it be not, such a general assent is in vain urged as a proof of them: if it be said that it is a mark of innate,

they must then allow all such propositions to be innate which are generally assented to as soon as heard,

whereby they will find themselves plentifully stored with innate principles. For upon the same ground,

viz. of assent at first hearing and understanding the terms, that men would have those maxims pass for innate,

they must also admit several propositions about numbers to be innate;

and thus, that one and two are equal to three,

that two and two are equal to four, and a multitude of other the like propositions in numbers,

that everybody assents to at first hearing and understanding the terms,

must have a place amongst these innate axioms. Nor is this the prerogative of numbers alone,

and propositions made about several of them; but even natural philosophy, and all the other sciences,

afford propositions which are sure to meet with assent as soon as they are understood.

That “two bodies cannot be in the same place” is a truth that nobody any more sticks at than at these maxims,

that “it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,”

that “white is not black,” that “a square is not a circle,”

that “bitterness is not sweetness.”

These and a million of such other propositions, as many at least as we have distinct,

ideas of, every man in his wits, at first hearing, and knowing, what the names stand for, must necessarily assent to.

If these men will be true to their own rule, and have assent at first hearing and understanding the terms

to be a mark of innate, they must allow not only as many innate proposition as men have distinct ideas,

but as many as men can make propositions wherein different ideas are denied one of another.

Since every proposition wherein one different idea is denied of another,

will as certainly find assent at first hearing and understanding the terms as this general one,

“It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,”

or that which is the foundation of it and is the easier understood of the two, “The same is not different”;

by which account they will have legions of innate propositions of this one sort, without mentioning any other But,

since no proposition can be innate unless the ideasabout which it is be innate,

this will be to suppose all our ideas of colours, sounds, tastes, figure, &c.,

innate, than which there cannot be anything more opposite to reason and experience.

Universal and ready assent upon hearing and understanding the terms is, I grant, a mark of self-evidence;

but self-evidence, depending not on innate impressions, but on something else,

(as we shall show hereafter,) belongs to several propositions

which nobody was yet so extravagant as to pretend to be innate.

19.Such less general Propositions known before these universal Maxims.

Nor let it be said, that those more particular self-evident propositions, which are assented to at first hearing,

as that “one and two are equal to three,” that “green is not red,” &c., are received as the consequences

of those more universal propositions which are looked on as innate principles; since any one,

who will but take the pains to observe what passes in the understanding, will certainly find that these,

and the like less general propositions, are certainly known, and firmly assented to by those

who are utterly ignorant of those more general maxims; and so,

being earlier in the mind than those (as they are called) first principles, cannot owe to them

the assent wherewith they are received at first hearing.

23.The Argument of assenting on first hearing,
is upon a false supposition of no precedent teaching.

There is, I fear, this further weakness in the foregoing argument,

which would persuade us that therefore those maxims are to be thought innate,

which men admit at first hearing; because they assent to propositions which they are not taught,

nor do receive from the force of any argument or demonstration,

but a bare explication or understanding of the terms.

Under which there seems to me to lie this fallacy, that men are supposed not to be taught

nor to learn anything DE NOVO; when, in truth, they are taught,

and do learn something they were ignorant of before. For, first, it is evident that they have learned the terms,

and their signification; neither of which was born with them.

But this is not all the acquired knowledge in the case:

the ideas themselves, about which the proposition is, are not born with them, no more than their names,

but got afterwards. So that in all propositions that are assented to at first hearing, the terms of the proposition,

their standing for such ideas, and the ideas themselves that they stand for, being neither of them innate,

I would fain know what there is remaining in such propositions that is innate.

For I would gladly have any one name that proposition whose terms or ideas were either of them innate.

We BY DEGREES get ideas and names, and LEARN their appropriated connexion one with another;

and then to propositions made in such, terms, whose signification we have learnt,

and wherein the agreement or disagreement we can perceive in our ideas when put together is expressed,

we at first hearing assent; though to other propositions, in themselves as certain and evident,

but which are concerning ideas not so soon or so easily got, we are at the same time no way capable of assenting.

For, though a child quickly assents to this proposition, “That an apple is not fire,”

when by familiar acquaintance he has got the ideas of those two different things distinctly imprinted on his mind,

and has learnt that the names apple and fire stand for them; yet it will be some years after, perhaps,

before the same child will assent to this proposition,

“That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be”;

because that, though perhaps the words are as easy to be learnt, yet the signification of them being more large,

comprehensive, and abstract than of the names annexed to those sensible things the child hath to do with,

it is longer before he learns their precise meaning,

and it requires more time plainly to form in his mind those general ideas they stand for. Till that be done,

you will in vain endeavour to make any child assent to a proposition made up of such general terms;

but as soon as ever he has got those ideas, and learned their names,

he forwardly closes with the one as well as the other of the forementioned propositions:

and with both for the same reason; viz. because he finds the ideas he has in his mind to agree or disagree,

according as the words standing for them are affirmed or denied one of another in the proposition.

But if propositions be brought to him in words which stand for ideas he has not yet in his mind,

to such propositions, however evidently true or false in themselves, he affords neither assent nor dissent,

but is ignorant. For words being but empty sounds, any further than they are signs of our ideas,

we cannot but assent to them as they correspond to those ideas we have, but no further than that.

But the showing by what steps and ways knowledge comes into our minds;

and the grounds of several degrees of assent, being; the business of the following Discourse,

it may suffice to have only touched on it here, as one reason that made me doubt of those innate principles.

24.Not innate because not universally assented to.

To conclude this argument of universal consent, I agree with these defenders of innate principles,

— that if they are innate, they must needs have universal assent.

For that a truth should be innate and yet not assented to, is to me as unintelligible as for a man

to know a truth and be ignorant of it at the same time. But then, by these men’s own confession,

they cannot be innate; since they are not assented to by those who understand not the terms;

nor by a great part of those who do understand them, but have yet never heard nor thought of those propositions;

which, I think, is at least one half of mankind. But were the number far less,

it would be enough to destroy universal assent, and thereby show these propositions not to be innate,

if children alone were ignorant of them.

NO INNATE PRACTICAL PRINCIPLES

2.Faith and Justice not owned as Principles by all Men.

Whether there be any such moral principles, wherein all men do agree,

I appeal to any who have been but moderately conversant in the history of mankind,

and looked abroad beyond the smoke of their own chimneys.

Where is that practical truth that is universally received, without doubt or question, as it must be if innate?

JUSTICE, and keeping of contracts, is that which most men seem to agree in.

This is a principle which is thought to extend itself to the dens of thieves,

and the confederacies of the greatest villains;

and they who have gone furthest towards the putting off of humanity itself,

keep faith and rules of justice one with another. I grant that outlaws themselves do this one amongst another:

but it is without receiving these as the innate laws of nature.

They practise them as rules of convenience within their own communities:

but it is impossible to conceive that he embraces justice as a practical principle who acts fairly

with his fellow-highwayman, and at the same time plunders or kills the next honest man he meets

with Justice and truth are the common ties of society; and therefore even outlaws and robbers,

who break with all the world besides, must keep faith and rules of equity amongst themselves;

or else they cannot hold together. But will any one say, that those that live by fraud or rapine

have innate principles of truth and justice which they allow and assent to?

5.Instance in keeping Compacts

That men should keep their compacts is certainly a great and undeniable rule in morality.

But yet, if a Christian, who has the view of happiness and misery in another life,

be asked why a man must keep his word, he will give this as a reason: — Because God,

who has the power of eternal life and death, requires it of us. But if a Hobbist be asked why?

he will answer: — Because the public requires it, and the Leviathan will punish you if you do not.

And if one of the old philosophers had been asked, he would have answered:

— Because it was dishonest, below the dignity of a man, and opposite to virtue,

the highest perfection of human nature, to do otherwise.

6.Virtue generally approved not because innate, but because profitable.

Hence naturally flows the great variety of opinions concerning moral rules which are to be found among men,

according to the different sorts of happiness they have a prospect of, or propose to themselves;

which could not be if practical principles were innate,

and imprinted in our minds immediately by the hand of God.

I grant the existence of God is so many ways manifest,

and the obedience we owe him so congruous to the light of reason,

that a great part of mankind give testimony to the law of nature:

but yet I think it must be allowed that several moral rules may receive from mankind a very general approbation,

without either knowing or admitting the true ground of morality; which can only be the will and law of a God,

who sees men in the dark, has in his hand rewards and punishments,

and power enough to call to account the proudest offender. For, God having, by an inseparable connexion,

joined virtue and public happiness together,

and made the practice thereof necessary to the preservation of society,

and visibly beneficial to all with whom the virtuous man has to do;

it is no wonder that every one should not only allow, but recommend and magnify those rules to others,

from whose observance of them he is sure to reap advantage to himself.

He may, out of interest as well as conviction, cry up that for sacred, which, if once trampled on and profaned,

he himself cannot be safe nor secure. This, though it takes nothing from the moral

and eternal obligation which these rules evidently have,

yet it shows that the outward acknowledgment men pay to them in their words proves not that

they are innate principles: nay, it proves not so much as that men assent to them inwardly in their own minds,

as the inviolable rules of their own practice; since we find that self-interest, and the conveniences of this life,

make many men own an outward profession and approbation of them,

whose actions sufficiently prove that they very little consider the Lawgiver that prescribed these rules;

nor the hell that he has ordained for the punishment of those that transgress them.

8.Conscience no Proof of any innate Moral Rule.

To which I answer, that I doubt not but, without being written on their hearts, many men may,

by the same way that they come to the knowledge of other things, come to assent to several moral rules,

and be convinced of their obligation. Others also may come to be of the same mind, from their education,

company, and customs of their country; which persuasion, however got, will serve to set conscience on work;

which is nothing else but our own opinion or judgment of the moral rectitude or gravity of our own actions;

and if conscience be a proof of innate principles, contraries may be innate principles;

since some men with the same bent of conscience prosecute what others avoid.

14.Those who maintain innate practical Principles tell us not what they are.

The difference there is amongst men in their practical principles is

so evident that I think I need say no more to evince, that it will be impossible to find any

innate moral rules by this mark of general assent; and it is enough to make one suspect

that the supposition of such innate principles is but an opinion taken up at pleasure;

since those who talk so confidently of them are so sparing to tell us WHICH THEY ARE.

This might with justice be expected from those men who lay stress upon this opinion;

and it gives occasion to distrust either their knowledge or charity, who,

declaring that God has imprinted on the minds of men the foundations of knowledge and the rules of living,

are yet so little favourable to the information of their neighbours, or the quiet of mankind,

as not to point out to them which they are, in the variety men are distracted with. But, in truth,

were there any such innate principles there would be no need to teach them.

Did men find such innate propositions stamped on their minds,

they would easily be able to distinguish them from other truths that they afterwards learned

and deduced from them; and there would be nothing more easy than to know what, and how many, they were.

There could be no more doubt about their number than there is about the number of our fingers;

and it is like then every system would be ready to give them us by tale. But since nobody,

that I know, has ventured yet to give a catalogue of them,

they cannot blame those who doubt of these innate principles; since even they

who require men to believe that there are such innate propositions, do not tell us what they are.

It is easy to foresee, that if different men of different sects should go about to give us a list

of those innate practical principles, they would set down only such as suited their distinct hypotheses,

and were fit to support the doctrines of their particular schools or churches;

a plain evidence that there are no such innate truths. Nay, a great part of men are so far from finding

any such innate moral principles in themselves, that, by denying freedom to mankind,

and thereby making men no other than bare machines, they take away not only innate,

but all moral rules whatsoever, and leave not a possibility to believe any such,

to those who cannot conceive how anything can be capable of a law that is not a free agent.

And upon that ground they must necessarily reject all principles of virtue,

who cannot put MORALITY and MECHANISM together,

which are not very easy to be reconciled or made consistent.

20.Objection, Innate Principles may be corrupted, answered.

Nor will it be of much moment here to offer that very ready but not very material answer, viz.

that the innate principles of morality may, by education, and custom,

and the general opinion of those amongst whom we converse, be darkened,

and at last quite worn out of the minds of men. Which assertion of theirs, if true,

quite takes away the argument of universal consent,

by which this opinion of innate principles is endeavoured to be proved;

unless those men will think it reasonable that their private persuasions, or that of their party,

should pass for universal consent; — a thing not unfrequently done, when men,

presuming themselves to be the only masters of right reason,

cast by the votes and opinions of the rest of mankind as not worthy the reckoning.

And then their argument stands thus:— “The principles which all mankind allow for true, are innate;

those that men of right reason admit, are the principles allowed by all mankind; we, and those of our mind,

are men of reason; therefore, we agreeing, our principles are innate”;

— which is a very pretty way of arguing, and a short cut to infallibility.

For otherwise it will be very hard to understand how there be some principles which all men do acknowledge

and agree in; and yet there are none of those principles which are not, by depraved custom and ill education,

blotted out of the minds of many men: which is to say, that all men admit, but yet many men do deny

and dissent from them. And indeed the supposition of SUCH first principles will serve us to very little purpose;

and we shall be as much at a loss with as without them, if they may, by any human power —

such as the will of our teachers, or opinions of our companions — be altered or lost in us:

and notwithstanding all this boast of first principles and innate light, we shall be as much in the dark

and uncertainty as if there were no such thing at all: it being all one to have no rule,

and one that will warp any way; or amongst various and contrary rules, not to know which is the right.

But concerning innate principles, I desire these men to say, whether they can or cannot, by education and custom,

be blurred and blotted out; if they cannot, we must find them in all mankind alike,

and they must be clear in everybody; and if they may suffer variation from adventitious notions,

we must then find them clearest and most perspicuous nearest the fountain, in children and illiterate people,

who have received least impression from foreign opinions. Let them take which side they please,

they will certainly find it inconsistent with visible matter of fact and daily observation.

22.How men commonly come by their Principles.

This, however strange it may seem, is that which every day’s experience confirms; and will not,

perhaps, appear so wonderful, if we consider the ways and steps by which it is brought about;

and how really it may come to pass, that doctrines that have been derived from

no better original than the superstition of a nurse, or the authority of an old woman, may,

by length of time and consent of neighbours, grow up to the dignity of PRINCIPLES in religion or morality.

For such, who are careful (as they call it) to principle children well,

(and few there be who have not a set of those principles for them, which they believe in,)

instil into the unwary, and as yet unprejudiced, understanding, (for white paper receives any characters,)

those doctrines they would have them retain and profess. These being taught them as soon as they have

any apprehension; and still as they grow up confirmed to them, either by the open profession or

tacit consent of all they have to do with; or at least by those of whose wisdom, knowledge,

and piety they have an opinion, who never suffer those propositions to be otherwise mentioned

but as the basis and foundation on which they build their religion and manners, come, by these means,

to have the reputation of unquestionable, self-evident, and innate truths.

23.Principles supposed innate because we do not remember when we began to hold them.

To which we may add, that when men so instructed are grown up, and reflect on their own minds,

they cannot find anything more ancient there than those opinions, which were taught them

before their memory began to keep a register of their actions,

or date the time when any new thing appeared to them; and therefore make no scruple to conclude,

that those propositions of whose knowledge they can find in themselves no original,

were certainly the impress of God and nature upon their minds, and not taught them by any one else.

These they entertain and submit to, as many do to their parents with veneration;

not because it is natural: nor do children do it where they are not so taught; but because,

having been always so educated, and having no remembrance of the beginning of this respect,

they think it is natural.

24.How such principles come to be held.

This will appear very likely, and almost unavoidable to come to pass,

if we consider the nature of mankind and the constitution of human affairs;

wherein most men cannot live without employing their time in the daily labours of their callings;

nor be at quiet in their minds without SOME foundation or principle to rest their thoughts on.

There is scarcely any one so floating and superficial in his understanding,

who hath not some reverenced propositions, which are to him the principles

on which he bottoms his reasonings, and by which he judgeth of truth and falsehood,

right and wrong; which some, wanting skill and leisure, and others the inclination,

and some being taught that they ought not to examine,

there are few to be found who are not exposed by their ignorance, laziness, education,

or precipitancy, to TAKE THEM UPON TRUST.

25.Further explained.

This is evidently the case of all children and young folk; and custom, a greater power than nature,

seldom failing to make them worship for divine what she hath inured them to bow their minds

and submit their understandings to, it is no wonder that grown men,

either perplexed in the necessary affairs of life, or hot in the pursuit of pleasures,

should not seriously sit down to examine their own tenets; especially when one of their principles is,

that principles ought not to be questioned. And had men leisure, parts, and will,

who is there almost that dare shake the foundations of all his past thoughts and actions,

and endure to bring upon himself the shame of having been a long time wholly in mistake and error?

Who is there hardy enough to contend with the reproach which is everywhere prepared for those

who dare venture to dissent from the received opinions of their country or party?

And where is the man to be found that can patiently prepare himself to bear the name of whimsical,

sceptical, or atheist; which he is sure to meet with,

who does in the least scruple any of the common opinions?

And he will be much more afraid to question those principles, when he shall think them, as most men do,

the standards set up by God in his mind, to be the rule and touchstone of all other opinions.

And what can hinder him from thinking them sacred, when he finds them the earliest of all his own thoughts,

and the most reverenced by others?

26.A worship of idols.

It is easy to imagine how, by these means, it comes to pass that men worship the idols

that have been set up in their minds; grow fond of the notions they have been long acquainted with there;

and stamp the characters of divinity upon absurdities and errors; become zealous votaries to bulls and monkeys,

and contend too, fight, and die in defence of their opinions. Dum solos credit habendos esse deos,

quos ipse colit. For, since the reasoning faculties of the soul, which are almost constantly,

though not always warily nor wisely employed, would not know how to move,

for want of a foundation and footing, in most men, who through laziness or avocation do not,

or for want of time, or true helps, or for other causes, cannot penetrate into the principles of knowledge,

and trace truth to its fountain and original, it is natural for them, and almost unavoidable,

to take up with some borrowed principles; which being reputed and presumed to be the evident proofs of other things,

are thought not to need any other proof themselves. Whoever shall receive any of these into his mind,

and entertain them there with the reverence usually paid to principles, never venturing to examine them,

but accustoming himself to believe them, because they are to be believed, may take up,

from his education and the fashions of his country, any absurdity for innate principles;

and by long poring on the same objects, so dim his sight as to take monsters lodged

in his own brain for the images of the Deity, and the workmanship of his hands.

27.Principles must be examined.

By this progress, how many there are who arrive at principles which they believe innate may be easily observed,

in the variety of opposite principles held and contended for by all sorts and degrees of men.

And he that shall deny this to be the method wherein most men proceed to the assurance

they have of the truth and evidence of their principles, will perhaps find it a hard matter

any other way to account for the contrary tenets, which are firmly believed, confidently asserted,

and which great numbers are ready at any time to seal with their blood. And, indeed,

if it be the privilege of innate principles to be received upon their own authority, without examination,

I know not what may not be believed, or how any one’s principles can be questioned.

If they may and ought to be examined and tried, I desire to know how first and innate principles can be tried;

or at least it is reasonable to demand the MARKS and CHARACTERS whereby the genuine innate principles

may be distinguished from others: that so, amidst the great variety of pretenders,

I may be kept from mistakes in so material a point as this. When this is done,

I shall be ready to embrace such welcome and useful propositions; and till then I may with modesty doubt;

since I fear universal consent, which is the only one produced,

will scarcely prove a sufficient mark to direct my choice, and assure me of any innate principles.

From what has been said, I think it past doubt, that there are no practical principles wherein all men agree;

and therefore none innate.

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OTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING INNATE PRINCIPLES, BOTH SPECULATIVE AND PRACTICAL.

1.Principles not innate, unless their Ideas be innate

Had those who would persuade us that there are innate principles not taken them together in gross,

but considered separately the parts out of which those propositions are made, they would not, perhaps,

have been so forward to believe they were innate. Since, if the IDEAS which made up those truths were not,

it was impossible that the PROPOSITIONS made up of them should be innate,

or our knowledge of them be born with us. For, if the ideas be not innate,

there was a time when the mind was without those principles; and then they will not be innate,

but be derived from some other original. For, where the ideas themselves are not, there can be no knowledge,

no assent, no mental or verbal propositions about them.

2.Ideas, especially those belonging to Principles, not born with children

If we will attentively consider new-born children, we shall have little reason to think that

they bring many ideas into the world with them. For, bating perhaps some faint ideas of hunger,

and thirst, and warmth, and some pains, which they may have felt in the womb,

there is not the least appearance of any settled ideas at all in them;

especially of IDEAS ANSWERING THE TERMS WHICH MAKE UP THOSE UNIVERSAL

PROPOSITIONS THAT ARE ESTEEMED INNATE PRINCIPLES. One may perceive how,

by degrees, afterwards, ideas come into their minds; and that they get no more, nor other,

than what experience, and the observation of things that come in their way, furnish them with;

which might be enough to satisfy us that they are not original characters stamped on the mind.

3.Impossibility and Identity not innate ideas

“It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be,”

is certainly (if there be any such) an innate PRINCIPLE. But can any one think, or will any one say,

that “impossibility” and “identity” are two innate IDEAS? Are they such as all mankind have,

and bring into the world with them? And are they those which are the first in children,

and antecedent to all acquired ones? If they are innate, they must needs be so.

Hath a child an idea of impossibility and identity, before it has of white or black, sweet or bitter?

And is it from the knowledge of this principle that it concludes, that wormwood rubbed on the nipple hath

not the same taste that it used to receive from thence? Is it the actual knowledge of IMPOSSIBILE EST

IDEM ESSE, ET NON ESSE, that makes a child distinguish between its mother and a stranger;

or that makes it fond of the one and flee the other? Or does the mind regulate itself and its assent

by ideas that it never yet had? Or the understanding draw conclusions from principles

which it never yet knew or understood? The names IMPOSSIBILITY and IDENTITY stand for two ideas,

so far from being innate, or born with us, that I think it requires great care and attention to form them right

in our understandings. They are so far from being brought into the world with us,

so remote from the thoughts of infancy and childhood, that I believe,

upon examination it will be found that many grown men want them.

9.The name of God not universal or obscure in meaning.

But had all mankind everywhere a notion of a God, (whereof yet history tells us the contrary,)

it would not from thence follow, that the idea of him was innate. For, though no nation were to be found

without a name, and some few dark notions of him,

yet that would not prove them to be natural impressions on the mind; no more than the names of fire,

or the sun, heat, or number, do prove the ideas they stand for to be innate;

because the names of those things, and the ideas of them, are so universally received

and known amongst mankind. Nor, on the contrary, is the want of such a name,

or the absence of such a notion out of men’s minds, any argument against the being of a God;

any more than it would be a proof that there was no loadstone in the world,

because a great part of mankind had neither a notion of any such thing nor a name for it;

or be any show of argument to prove that there are no distinct and various species of angels,

or intelligent beings above us, because we have no ideas of such distinct species, or names for them.

For, men being furnished with words, by the common language of their own countries,

can scarce avoid having some kind of ideas of those things whose names those they converse

with have occasion frequently to mention to them. And if they carry with it the notion of excellency,

greatness, or something extraordinary; if apprehension and concernment accompany it;

if the fear of absolute and irresistible power set it on upon the mind,

— the idea is likely to sink the deeper, and spread the further;

especially if it be such an idea as is agreeable to the common light of reason,

and naturally deducible from every part of our knowledge, as that of a God is.

For the visible marks of extraordinary wisdom and power appear so plainly in all the works of the creation,

that a rational creature, who will but seriously reflect on them, cannot miss the discovery of a Deity.

And the influence that the discovery of such a Being must necessarily have on the minds

of all that have but once heard of it is so great, and carries such a weight of thought and communication with it,

that it seems stranger to me that a whole nation of men should be anywhere found

so brutish as to want the notion of a God, than that they should be without any notion of numbers, or fire.

10.Ideas of God and idea of Fire.

The name of God being once mentioned in any part of the world, to express a superior, powerful, wise,

invisible Being, the suitableness of such a notion to the principles of common reason,

and the interest men will always have to mention it often, must necessarily spread it far and wide;

and continue it down to all generations: though yet the general reception of this name,

and some imperfect and unsteady notions conveyed thereby to the unthinking part of mankind,

prove not the idea to be innate; but only that they who made the discovery had made a right use of their reason,

thought maturely of the causes of things, and traced them to their original;

from whom other less considering people having once received so important a notion,

it could not easily be lost again.

11.Idea of God not innate.

This is all could be inferred from the notion of a God,

were it to be found universally in all the tribes of mankind, and generally acknowledged,

by men grown to maturity in all countries. For the generality of the acknowledging of a God, as I imagine,

is extended no further than that; which, if it be sufficient to prove the idea of God innate,

will as well prove the idea of fire innate; since I think it may be truly said,

that there is not a person in the world who has a notion of a God, who has not also the idea of fire.

I doubt not but if a colony of young children should be placed in an island where no fire was,

they would certainly neither have any notion of such a thing, nor name for it,

how generally soever it were received and known in all the world besides;

and perhaps too their apprehensions would be as far removed from any name, or notion, of a God,

till some one amongst them had employed his thoughts to inquire into the constitution and causes of things,

which would easily lead him to the notion of a God; which having once taught to others, reason,

and the natural propensity of their own thoughts, would afterwards propagate, and continue amongst them.

17.Odd, low, and pitiful ideas of God common among men.

This was evidently the case of all Gentilism. Nor hath even amongst Jews, Christians, and Mahometans,

who acknowledged but one God, this doctrine, and the care taken in those nations

to teach men to have true notions of a God, prevailed so far

as to make men to have the same and the true ideas of him.

How many even amongst us, will be found upon inquiry to fancy him in the shape of a man sitting in heaven;

and to have many other absurd and unfit conceptions of him?

Christians as well as Turks have had whole sects owning and contending earnestly for it,

— that the Deity was corporeal, and of human shape: and though we find few now amongst us

who profess themselves Anthropomorphites, (though some I have met with that own it,)

yet I believe he that will make it his business may find amongst the ignorant

and uninstructed Christians many of that opinion. Talk but with country people, almost of any age,

or young people almost of any condition, and you shall find that,

though the name of God be frequently in their mouths,

yet the notions they apply this name to are so odd, low, and pitiful,

that nobody can imagine they were taught by a rational man; much less that they were characters written

by the finger of God himself. Nor do I see how it derogates more from the goodness of God,

that he has given us minds unfurnished with these ideas of himself, than that he hath sent us

into the world with bodies unclothed; and that there is no art or skill born with us.

For, being fitted with faculties to attain these, it is want of industry and consideration in us,

and not of bounty in him, if we have them not. It is as certain that there is a God,

as that the opposite angles made by the intersection of two straight lines are equal.

There was never any rational creature that set himself sincerely to examine the truth of these propositions

that could fail to assent to them; though yet it be past doubt that there are many men, who,

having not applied their thoughts that way, are ignorant both of the one and the other.

If any one think fit to call this (which is the utmost of its extent) UNIVERSAL CONSENT,

such an one I easily allow; but such an universal consent as this proves not the idea of God,

any more than it does the idea of such angles, innate.

20.No Propositions can be innate, since no Ideas are innate.

Whatever then we talk of innate, either speculative or practical, principles,

it may with as much probability be said, that a man hath 100 pounds sterling in his pocket,

and yet denied that he hath there either penny, shilling, crown,

or other coin out of which the sum is to be made up; as to think that certain PROPOSITIONS are innate

when the IDEAS about which they are can by no means be supposed to be so.

The general reception and assent that is given doth not at all prove, that the ideas expressed in them are innate;

for in many cases, however the ideas came there, the assent to words expressing

the agreement or disagreement of such ideas, will necessarily follow. Every one that hath a true idea of GOD

and WORSHIP, will assent to this proposition, ‘That God is to be worshipped,’

when expressed in a language he understands; and every rational man that hath not thought on it to-day,

may be ready to assent to this proposition to-morrow; and yet millions of men may be well

supposed to want one or both those ideas to-day. For, if we will allow savages, and most country people,

to have ideas of God and worship, (which conversation with them will not make one forward to believe,)

yet I think few children can be supposed to have those ideas, which therefore they must begin

to have some time or other; and then they will also begin to assent to that proposition,

and make very little question of it ever after. But such an assent upon hearing,

no more proves the IDEAS to be innate, than it does that one born blind

(with cataracts which will be couched to-morrow) had the innate ideas of the sun, or light, or saffron,

or yellow; because, when his sight is cleared, he will certainly assent to this proposition,

“That the sun is lucid, or that saffron is yellow.” And therefore,

if such an assent upon hearing cannot prove the ideas innate,

it can much less the PROPOSITIONS made up of those ideas.

If they have any innate ideas, I would be glad to be told what, and how many, they are.

23.Difference of Men’s Discoveries depends upon the different Application of their Faculties.

To conclude: some ideas forwardly offer themselves to all men’s understanding;

and some sorts of truths result from any ideas, as soon as the mind puts them into propositions:

other truths require a train of ideas placed in order, a due comparing of them, and deductions made with attention,

before they can be discovered and assented to. Some of the first sort, because of their general and easy reception,

have been mistaken for innate: but the truth is, ideas and notions are no more born with us than arts and sciences;

though some of them indeed offer themselves to our faculties more readily than others;

and therefore are more generally received: though that too be according as the organs of our bodies

and powers of our minds happen to be employed; God having fitted men with faculties and means to discover,

receive, and retain truths, according as they are employed.

The great difference that is to be found in the notions of mankind is,

from the different use they put their faculties to.

Whilst some (and those the most) taking things upon trust, misemploy their power of assent,

by lazily enslaving their minds to the dictates and dominion of others,

in doctrines which it is their duty carefully to examine, and not blindly, with an implicit faith, to swallow;

others, employing their thoughts only about some few things, grow acquainted sufficiently with them,

attain great degrees of knowledge in them, and are ignorant of all other,

having never let their thoughts loose in the search of other inquiries. Thus,

that the three angles of a triangle are quite equal to two right ones is a truth as certain as anything can be,

and I think more evident than many of those propositions that go for principles; and yet there are millions,

however expert in other things, who know not this at all,

because they never set their thoughts on work about such angles.

And he that certainly knows this proposition may yet be utterly ignorant of the truth of other propositions,

in mathematics itself, which are as clear and evident as this; because, in his search of those mathematical truths,

he stopped his thoughts short and went not so far.

The same may happen concerning the notions we have of the being of a Deity. For, though there be no truth

which a man may more evidently make out to himself than the existence of a God,

yet he that shall content himself with things as he finds them in this world,

as they minister to his pleasures and passions,

and not make inquiry a little further into their causes, ends, and admirable contrivances,

and pursue the thoughts thereof with diligence and attention, may live long without any notion of such a Being.

And if any person hath by talk put such a notion into his head, he may perhaps believe it;

but if he hath never examined it, his knowledge of it will be no perfecter than his, who having been told,

that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, takes it upon trust,

without examining the demonstration; and may yield his assent as a probable opinion,

but hath no knowledge of the truth of it; which yet his faculties, if carefully employed,

were able to make clear and evident to him. But this only, by the by,

to show how much OUR KNOWLEDGE DEPENDS UPON THE RIGHT USE OF THOSE POWERS

NATURE HATH BESTOWED UPON US, and how little upon SUCH INNATE PRINCIPLES AS ARE IN VAIN

SUPPOSED TO BE IN ALL MANKIND FOR THEIR DIRECTION;

which all men could not but know if they were there, or else they would be there to no purpose.

And which since all men do not know, nor can distinguish from other adventitious truths,

we may well conclude there are no such.

24.Men must think and know for themselves.

What censure doubting thus of innate principles may deserve from men,

who will be apt to call it pulling up the old foundations of knowledge and certainty, I cannot tell;

— I persuade myself at least that the way I have pursued, being conformable to truth,

lays those foundations surer. This I am certain, I have not made it my business either to quit

or follow any authority in the ensuing Discourse. Truth has been my only aim;

and wherever that has appeared to lead, my thoughts have impartially followed,

without minding whether the footsteps of any other lay that way or not.

Not that I want a due respect to other men’s opinions; but, after all, the greatest reverence is due to truth:

and I hope it will not be thought arrogance to say, that perhaps we should make greater progress

in the discovery of rational and contemplative knowledge, if we sought it in the fountain,

IN THE CONSIDERATION OF THINGS THEMSELVES;

and made use rather of our own thoughts than other men’s to find it.

For I think we may as rationally hope to see with other men’s eyes, as to know by other men’s understandings.

So much as we ourselves consider and comprehend of truth and reason,

so much we possess of real and true knowledge. The floating of other men’s opinions in our brains,

makes us not one jot the more knowing, though they happen to be true. What in them was science,

is in us but opiniatrety; whilst we give up our assent only to reverend names, and do not, as they did,

employ our own reason to understand those truths which gave them reputation.

Aristotle was certainly a knowing man, but nobody ever thought him so because he blindly embraced,

and confidently vented the opinions of another. And if the taking up of another’s principles,

without examining them, made not him a philosopher, I suppose it will hardly make anybody else so.

In the sciences, every one has so much as he really knows and comprehends. What he believes only,

and takes upon trust, are but shreds; which, however well in the whole piece,

make no considerable addition to his stock who gathers them. Such borrowed wealth, like fairy money,

though it were gold in the hand from which he received it, will be but leaves and dust when it comes to use.

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BOOK II. OF IDEAS

OF IDEAS IN GENERAL, AND THEIR ORIGINAL.

1.Idea is the Object of Thinking.

Every man being conscious to himself that he thinks; and that which his mind is applied

about whilst thinking being the IDEAS that are there, it is past doubt that men have in their minds several ideas,

— such as are those expressed by the words whiteness, hardness, sweetness, thinking, motion, man, elephant,

army, drunkenness, and others: it is in the first place then to be inquired, HOW HE COMES BY THEM?

I know it is a received doctrine, that men have native ideas, and original characters,

stamped upon their minds in their very first being. This opinion I have at large examined already; and,

I suppose what I have said in the foregoing Book will be much more easily admitted,

when I have shown whence the understanding may get all the ideas it has;

and by what ways and degrees they may come into the mind;

— for which I shall appeal to every one’s own observation and experience.

2.All Ideas come from Sensation or Reflection.

Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas:

— How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store

which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety?

Whence has it all the MATERIALS of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word,

from EXPERIENCE. In that all our knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself.

Our observation employed either, about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations

of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings

with all the MATERIALS of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge,

from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.

6.Observable in Children.

He that attentively considers the state of a child, at his first coming into the world,

will have little reason to think him stored with plenty of ideas, that are to be the matter of his future knowledge.

It is BY DEGREES he comes to be furnished with them. And though the ideas of obvious

and familiar qualities imprint themselves before the memory begins to keep a register of time or order,

yet it is often so late before some unusual qualities come in the way, that there are few men

that cannot recollect the beginning of their acquaintance with them. And if it were worth while,

no doubt a child might be so ordered as to have but a very few, even of the ordinary ideas,

till he were grown up to a man. But all that are born into the world, being surrounded

with bodies that perpetually and diversely affect them, variety of ideas, whether care be taken of it or not,

are imprinted on the minds of children. Light and colours are busy at hand everywhere,

when the eye is but open; sounds and some tangible qualities fail not to solicit their proper senses,

and force an entrance to the mind; — but yet, I think, it will be granted easily, that if a child were kept

in a place where he never saw any other but black and white till he were a man, he would

have no more ideas of scarlet or green, than he that from his childhood never tasted an oyster,

or a pine-apple, has of those particular relishes.

7.Men are differently furnished with these, according to the different Objects they converse with.

Men then come to be furnished with fewer or more simple ideas from without,

according as the objects they converse with afford greater or less variety;

and from theoperations of their minds within, according as they more or less reflect on them.

For, though he that contemplates the operations of his mind, cannot but have plain and clear ideas of them;

yet, unless he turn his thoughts that way, and considers them ATTENTIVELY,

he will no more have clear and distinct ideas of all the operations of his mind,

and all that may be observed therein,

than he will have all the particular ideas of any landscape, or of the parts and motions of a clock,

who will not turn his eyes to it, and with attention heed all the parts of it. The picture, or clock may be so placed,

that they may come in his way every day; but yet he will have but a confused idea

of all the parts they are made up of, till he applies himself with attention, to consider them each in particular.

8.Ideas of Reflection later, because they need Attention.

And hence we see the reason why it is pretty late before most children get ideas of the operations

of their own minds; and some have not any very clear or perfect ideas of the greatest part of

them all their lives. Because, though they pass there continually, yet, like floating visions,

they make not deep impressions enough to leave in their mind clear, distinct, lasting ideas,

till the understanding turns inward upon itself, reflects on its own operations,

and makes them the objects of its own contemplation. Children when they come first into it,

are surrounded with a world of new things which, by a constant solicitation of their senses,

draw the mind constantly to them; forward to take notice of new, and apt to be delighted

with the variety of changing objects. Thus the first years are usually employed and diverted in looking abroad.

Men’s business in them is to acquaint themselves with what is to be found without;

and so growing up in a constant attention to outward sensations, seldom make any considerable

reflection on what passes within them, till they come to be of riper years; and some scarce ever at all.

9.The Soul begins to have Ideas when it begins to perceive.

To ask, at what TIME a man has first any ideas, is to ask, when he begins to perceive;

— HAVING IDEAS, and PERCEPTION, being the same thing. I know it is an opinion,

that the soul always thinks, and that it has the actual perception of ideas in itself constantly,

as long as it exists; and that actual thinking is as inseparable from the soul as actual extension is from the body;

which if true, to inquire after the beginning of a man’s ideas is the same as to inquire

after the beginning of his soul. For, by this account, soul and its ideas, as body and its extension,

will begin to exist both at the same time.

10.The Soul thinks not always; for this wants Proofs.

But whether the soul be supposed to exist antecedent to, or coeval with,

or some time after the first rudiments of organization, or the beginnings of life in the body,

I leave to be disputed by those who have better thought of that matter.

I confess myself to have one of those dull souls, that doth not perceive itself always to contemplate ideas;

nor can conceive it any more necessary for the soul always to think, than for the body always to move:

the perception of ideas being (as I conceive) to the soul, what motion is to the body; not its essence,

but one of its operations. And therefore, though thinking be supposed never so much the proper action of the soul,

yet it is not necessary to suppose that it should be always thinking, always in action. That, perhaps,

is the privilege of the infinite Author and Preserver of all things, who “never slumbers nor sleeps”;

but is not competent to any finite being, at least not to the soul of man. We know certainly,

by experience, that we SOMETIMES think; and thence draw this infallible consequence,

— that there is something in us that has a power to think.

But whether that substance PERPETUALLY thinks or no,

we can be no further assured than experience informs us. For, to say that actual thinking is essential to the soul,

and inseparable from it, is to beg what is in question, and not to prove it by reason;

— which is necessary to be done, if it be not a self-evident proposition But whether this,

“That the soul always thinks,” be a self-evident proposition, that everybody assents to at first hearing,

I appeal to mankind. It is doubted whether I thought at all last night or no.

The question being about a matter of fact, it is begging it to bring, as a proof for it, an hypothesis,

which is the very thing in dispute: by which way one may prove anything,

and it is but supposing that all watches, whilst the balance beats, think, and it is sufficiently proved,

and past doubt, that my watch thought all last night. But he that would not deceive himself,

ought to build his hypothesis on matter of fact, and make it out by sensible experience,

and not presume on matter of fact, because of his hypothesis, that is, because he supposes it to be so;

which way of proving amounts to this, that I must necessarily think all last night,

because another supposes I always think, though I myself cannot perceive that I always do so.

But men in love with their opinions may not only suppose what is in question, butallege wrong matter of fact.

How else could any one make it an inference of mine, that a thing is not,

because we are not sensible of it in our sleep? I do not say there is no SOUL in a man,

because he is not sensible of it in his sleep; but I do say, he cannot THINK at any time,

waking or sleeping, without being sensible of it. Our being sensible of it is not necessary to anything

but to our thoughts; and to them it is; and to them it always will be necessary,

till we can think without being conscious of it.

11.It is not always conscious of it.

I grant that the soul, in a waking man, is never without thought, because it is the condition of being awake.

But whether sleeping without dreaming be not an affection of the whole man, mind as well as body,

may be worth a waking man’s consideration; it being hard to conceive that anything should think

and not be conscious of it. If the soul doth think in a sleeping man without being conscious of it,

I ask whether, during such thinking, it has any pleasure or pain, or be capable of happiness or misery?

I am sure the man is not; no more than the bed or earth he lies on.

For to be happy or miserable without being conscious of it, seems to me utterly inconsistent and impossible.

Or if it be possible that the SOUL can, whilst the body is sleeping, have its thinking, enjoyments,

and concerns, its pleasures or pain, apart, which the MAN is not conscious of nor partakes in,

— it is certain that Socrates asleep and Socrates awake is not the same person;

but his soul when he sleeps, and Socrates the man, consisting of body and soul,

when he is waking, are two persons: since waking Socrates has no knowledge of,

or concernment for that happiness or misery of his soul, which it enjoys alone by itself whilst he sleeps,

without perceiving anything of it; no more than he has for the happiness or misery of a man in the Indies,

whom he knows not. For, if we take wholly away all consciousness of our actions and sensations,

especially of pleasure and pain, and the concernment that accompanies it,

it will be hard to know wherein to place personal identity.

14.That men dream without remembering it, in vain urged.

It will perhaps be said, — That the soul thinks even in the soundest sleep, but the MEMORY retains it not.

That the soul in a sleeping man should be this moment busy a thinking,

and the next moment in a waking man not remember nor be able to recollect one jot of all those thoughts,

is very hard to be conceived, and would need some better proof than bare assertion to make it be believed.

For who can without any more ado, but being barely told so, imagine that the greatest part of men do,

during all their lives, for several hours every day, think of something, which if they were asked,

even in the middle of these thoughts, they could remember nothing at all of? Most men, I think,

pass a great part of their sleep without dreaming. I once knew a man that was bred a scholar,

and had no bad memory, who told me he had never dreamed in his life,

till he had that fever he was then newly recovered of,

which was about the five or six and twentieth year of his age.

I suppose the world affords more such instances: at least every one’s acquaintance

will furnish him with examples enough of such as pass most of their nights without dreaming.

25.In the Reception of simple Ideas, the Understanding is for the most part passive.

In this part the understanding is merely passive; and whether or no it will have these beginnings,

and as it were materials of knowledge, is not in its own power. For the objects of our senses do,

many of them, obtrude their particular ideas upon our minds whether we will or not;

and the operations of our minds will not let us be without, at least, some obscure notions of them.

No man can be wholly ignorant of what he does when he thinks. These simple ideas,

when offered to the mind, the understanding can no more refuse to have, nor alter when they are imprinted,

nor blot them out and make new ones itself, than a mirror can refuse, alter,

or obliterate the images or ideas which the objects set before it do therein produce.

As the bodies that surround us do diversely affect our organs, the mind is forced to receive the impressions;

and cannot avoid the perception of those ideas that are annexed to them.

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OF SIMPLE IDEAS.

1.Uncompounded Appearances.

The better to understand the nature, manner, and extent of our knowledge,

one thing is carefully to be observed concerning the ideas we have;

and that is, that some of them, are SIMPLE and some COMPLEX.Though the qualities

that affect our senses are, in the things themselves, so united and blended, that there is no separation,

no distance between them; yet it is plain, the ideas they produce in the mind enter by the senses simple;

and unmixed. For, though the sight and touch often take in from the same object, at the same time,

different ideas; — as a man sees at once motion and colour;

the hand feels softness and warmth in the same piece of wax: yet the simple ideas thus united in the same subject,

are as perfectly distinct as those that come in by different senses.

The coldness and hardness which a man feels in a piece of ice being as distinct ideas in the mind

as the smell and whiteness of a lily; or as the taste of sugar, and smell of a rose.

And there is nothing can be plainer to a man than the clear and distinct perception he has of those simple ideas;

which, being each in itself uncompounded, contains in it nothing but ONE UNIFORM APPEARANCE,

OR CONCEPTION IN THE MIND, and is not distinguishable into different ideas.

2.The Mind can neither make nor destroy them.

These simple ideas, the materials of all our knowledge, are suggested and furnished to the mind

only by those two ways above mentioned, viz. sensation and reflection.

When the understanding is once stored with these simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare,

and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety, and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas.

But it is not in the power of the most exalted wit, or enlarged understanding,

by any quickness or variety of thought, to INVENT or FRAME one new simple idea in the mind,

not taken in by the ways before mentioned: nor can any force of the understanding DESTROY those that are there.

The dominion of man, in this little world of his own understanding being much

what the same as it is in the great world of visible things; wherein his power, however managed by art and skill,

reaches no farther than to compound and divide the materials that are made to his hand;

but can do nothing towards the making the least particle of new matter,

or destroying one atom of what is already in being. The same inability will every one find in himself,

who shall go about to fashion in his understanding one simple idea,

not received in by his senses from external objects,

or by reflection from the operations of his own mind about them.

I would have any one try to fancy any taste which had never affected his palate;

or frame the idea of a scent he had never smelt: and when he can do this,

I will also conclude that a blind man hath ideas of colours, and a deaf man true distinct notions of sounds.

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OF SIMPLE IDEAS OF SENSE.

FIRST, then, There are some which come into our minds BY ONE SENSE ONLY.

SECONDLY, There are others that convey themselves into the mind BY MORESENSES THAN ONE.

THIRDLY, Others that are had from REFLECTION ONLY.

FOURTHLY, There are some that make themselves way, and are suggested to the mind

BY ALL THE WAYS OF SENSATION AND REFLECTION.

We shall consider them apart under these several heads.Ideas of one Sense.

There are some ideas which have admittance only through one sense,

which is peculiarly adapted to receive them. Thus light and colours, as white, red, yellow, blue;

with their several degrees or shades and mixtures, as green, scarlet, purple, sea-green, and the rest,

come in only by the eyes. All kinds of noises, sounds, and tones, only by the ears.

The several tastes and smells, by the nose and palate. And if these organs, or the nerves

which are the conduits to convey them from without to their audience in the brain,

— the mind’s presence-room (as I may so call it) —

are any of them so disordered as not to perform their functions, they have no postern to be admitted by;

no other way to bring themselves into view, and be perceived by the understanding.

The most considerable of those belonging to the touch, are heat and cold, and solidity: all the rest,

consisting almost wholly in the sensible configuration, as smooth and rough; or else,

more or less firm adhesion of the parts, as hard and soft, tough and brittle, are obvious enough.

2.Few simple Ideas have Names.

I think it will be needless to enumerate all the particular simple ideas belongin to each sense.

Nor indeed is it possible if we would; there being a great many more of them belonging to most

of the senses than we have names for. The variety of smells, which are as many almost,

if not more, than species of bodies in the world, do most of them want names.

Sweet and stinking commonly serve our turn for these ideas,

which in effect is little more than to call them pleasing or displeasing; though the smell

of a rose and violet, both sweet, are certainly very distinct ideas. Nor are the different tastes,

that by our palates we receive ideas of, much better provided with names. Sweet, bitter, sour, harsh,

and salt are almost all the epithets we have to denominate that numberless variety of relishes,

which are to be found distinct, not only in almost every sort of creatures,

but in the different parts of the same plant, fruit, or animal. The same may be said of colours and sounds.

I shall, therefore, in the account of simple ideas I am here giving, content myself to set down

only such as are most material to our present purpose,

or are in themselves less apt to be taken notice of though they are very frequently

the ingredients of our complex ideas; amongst which, I think, I may well account solidity,

which therefore I shall treat of in the next chapter.

IDEA OF SOLIDITY.

6.What Solidity is.

If any one asks me, WHAT THIS SOLIDITY IS, I send him to his senses to inform him.

Let him put a flint or a football between his hands, and then endeavour to join them, and he will know.

If he thinks this not a sufficient explication of solidity, what it is, and wherein it consists;

I promise to tell him what it is, and wherein it consists, when he tells me what thinking is,

or wherein it consists; or explains to me what extension or motion is, which perhaps seems much easier.

The simple ideas we have, are such as experience teaches them us; but if, beyond that,

we endeavour by words to make them clearer in the mind,

we shall succeed no better than if we went about to clear up the darkness of a blind man’s mind by talking;

and to discourse into him the ideas of light and colours. The reason of this I shall show in another place.

SOME FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING OUR SIMPLE IDEAS OF SENSATION.

3.We may have the ideas when we are ignorant of their physical causes.

A painter or dyer who never inquired into their causes hath the ideas of white and black,

and other colours, as clearly, perfectly, and distinctly in his understanding, and perhaps more distinctly,

than the philosopher who hath busied himself in considering their natures,

and thinks he knows how far either of them is, in its cause, positive or privative;

and the idea of black is no less positive in his mind than that of white,

however the cause of that colour in the external object may be only a privation.

14.They depend on the primary Qualities.

What I have said concerning colours and smells may be understood also of tastes and sounds,

and other the like sensible qualities; which, whatever reality we by mistake attribute to them,

are in truth nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us;

and depend on those primary qualities, viz. bulk, figure, texture,

and motion of parts and therefore I call them SECONDARY QUALIT

16.Examples.

Flame is denominated hot and light; snow, white and cold; and manna, white and sweet,

from the ideas they produce in us. Which qualities are commonly thought to be the same

in those bodies that those ideas are in us, the one the perfect resemblance of the other,

as they are in a mirror, and it would by most men be judged very extravagant if one should say otherwise.

And yet he that will consider that the same fire that, at one distance produces in us the sensation of warmth,

does, at a nearer approach, produce in us the far different sensation of pain,

ought to bethink himself what reason he has to say — that this idea of warmth,

which was produced in him by the fire, is ACTUALLY IN THE FIRE; and his idea of pain,

which the same fire produced in him the same way, is NOT in the fire.

Why are whiteness and coldness in snow, and pain not,

when it produces the one and the other idea in us; and can do neither,

but by the bulk, figure, number, and motion of its solid parts?

OF PERCEPTION.

2.Reflection alone can give us the idea of what perception is.

What perception is, every one will know better by reflecting on what he does himself,

when he sees, hears, feels, &c., or thinks, than by any discourse of mine.

Whoever reflects on what passes in his own mind cannot miss it. And if he does not reflect,

all the words in the world cannot make him have any notion of it.

3.Arises in sensation only when the mind notices the organic impression.

This is certain, that whatever alterations are made in the body, if they reach not the mind;

whatever impressions are made on the outward parts, if they are not taken notice of within,

there is no perception. Fire may burn our bodies with no other effect than it does a billet,

unless the motion be continued to the brain, and there the sense of heat, or idea of pain,

be produced in the mind; wherein consists actual perception.

12.Perception in all animals.

Perception, I believe, is, in some degree, in all sorts of animals;

though in some possibly the avenues provided by nature for the reception of sensations are so few,

and the perception they are received with so obscure and dull,

that it comes extremely short of the quickness and variety of sensation which is in other animals;

but yet it is sufficient for, and wisely adapted to,

the state and condition of that sort of animals who are thus made.

So that the wisdom and goodness of the Maker plainly appear in all the parts of this stupendous fabric,

and all the several degrees and ranks of creatures in it.

13.According to their condition.

We may, I think, from the make of an oyster or cockle, reasonably conclude that it has not so many,

nor so quick senses as a man, or several other animals; nor if it had, would it,

in that state and incapacity of transferring itself from one place to another, be bettered by them.

What good would sight and hearing do to a creature that cannot move itself to or from the objects

wherein at a distance it perceives good or evil? And would not quickness of sensation

be an inconvenience to an animal that must lie still where chance has once placed it,

and there receive the afflux of colder or warmer, clean or foul water, as it happens to come to it?

14.Decay of perception in old age.

But yet I cannot but think there is some small dull perception,

whereby they are distinguished from perfect insensibility. And that this may be so,

we have plain instances, even in mankind itself.

Take one in whom decrepit old age has blotted out the memory of his past knowledge,

and clearly wiped out the ideas his mind was formerly stored with, and has,

by destroying his sight, hearing, and smell quite, and his taste to a great degree,

stopped up almost all the passages for new ones to enter; or if there be some of the inlets yet half open,

the impressions made are scarcely perceived, or not at all retained.

How far such an one (notwithstanding all that is boasted of innate principles) is in his knowledge

and intellectual faculties above the condition of a cockle or an oyster, I leave to be considered.

And if a man had passed sixty years in such a state, as it is possible he might, as well as three days,

I wonder what difference there would be, in any intellectual perfections,

between him and the lowest degree of animals.

OF RETENTION.

2.Memory.

The other way of retention is, the power to revive again in our minds those ideas which, after imprinting,

have disappeared, or have been as it were laid aside out of sight. And thus we do,

when we conceive heat or light, yellow or sweet, — the object being removed. This is MEMORY,

which is as it were the storehouse of our ideas. For,

the narrow mind of man not being capable of having many ideas under view and consideration at once,

it was necessary to have a repository, to lay up those ideas which, at another time, it might have use of.

But, our IDEAS being nothing but actual perceptions in the mind, which cease to be anything;

when there is no perception of them;

this laying up of our ideas in the repository of the memory signifies no more but this,

— that the mind has a power in many cases to revive perceptions which it has once had,

with this additional perception annexed to them, that IT HAS HAD THEM BEFORE.

And in this sense it is that our ideas are said to be in our memories, when indeed they are actually nowhere;

— but only there is an ability in the mind when it will to revive them again,

and as it were paint them anew on itself, though some with more, some with less difficulty;

some more lively, and others more obscurely. And thus it is, by the assistance of this faculty,

that we are said to have all those ideas in our understandings which,

though we do not actually contemplate yet we CAN bring in sight, and make appear again,

and be the objects of our thoughts, without the help of those sensible qualities which first imprinted them there.

3.Attention, Repetition, Pleasure and Pain, fix Ideas.

Attention and repetition help much to the fixing any ideas in the memory.

But those which naturally at first make the deepest and most lasting impressions,

are those which are accompanied with pleasure or pain. The great business of the senses being,

to make us take notice of what hurts or advantages the body, it is wisely ordered by nature,

as has been shown, that pain should accompany the reception of several ideas; which,

supplying the place of consideration and reasoning in children,

and acting quicker than consideration in grown men,

makes both the old and young avoid painful objects with that haste which is necessary for their preservation;

and in both settles in the memory a caution for the future.

4.Ideas fade in the Memory.

Concerning the several degrees of lasting, wherewith ideas are imprinted on the memory,

we may observe, — that some of them have been produced in the understanding

by an object affecting the senses once only, and no more than once; others,

that have more than once offered themselves to the senses, have yet been little taken notice of:

the mind, either heedless, as in children, or otherwise employed, as in men intent only on one thing;

not setting the stamp deep into itself. And in some, where they are set on with care and repeated impressions,

either through the temper of the body, or some other fault, the memory is very weak.

In all these cases, ideas in the mind quickly fade, and often vanish quite out of the understanding,

leaving no more footsteps or remaining characters of themselves than shadows do flying over fields of corn,

and the mind is as void of them as if they had never been there.

5.Causes of oblivion.

Thus many of those ideas which were produced in the minds of children, in the beginning of their sensation,

(some of which perhaps, as of some pleasures and pains, were before they were born, and others in their infancy,)

if in the future course of their lives they are not repeated again, are quite lost,

without the least glimpse remaining of them. This may be observed in those who by some mischance

have lost their sight when they were very young;

in whom the ideas of colours having been but slightly taken notice of,

and ceasing to be repeated, do quite wear out; so that some years after,

there is no more notion nor memory of colours left in their minds, than in those of people born blind.

The memory of some men, it is true, is very tenacious, even to a miracle.

But yet there seems to be a constant decay of all our ideas, even of those which are struck deepest,

and in minds the most retentive; so that if they be not sometimes renewed,

by repeated exercise of the senses, or reflection on those kinds of objects which at first occasioned them,

the print wears out, and at last there remains nothing to be seen. Thus the ideas, as well as children,

of our youth, often die before us: and our minds represent to us those tombs to which we are approaching;

where, though the brass and marble remain, yet the inscriptions are effaced by time,

and the imagery moulders away. The pictures drawn in our minds are laid in fading colours;

and if not sometimes refreshed, vanish and disappear.

How much the constitution of our bodies are concerned in this;

and whether the temper of the brain makes this difference,

that in some it retains the characters drawn on it like marble, in others like freestone,

and in others little better than sand, I shall here inquire;

though it may seem probable that the constitution of the body does sometimes influence the memory,

since we oftentimes find a disease quite strip the mind of all its ideas,

and the flames of a fever in a few days calcine all those images to dust and confusion,

which seemed to be as lasting as if graved in marble.

8.Two defects in the Memory, Oblivion and Slowness.

Memory, in an intellectual creature, is necessary in the next degree to perception.

It is of so great moment, that, where it is wanting, all the rest of our faculties are in a great measure useless.

And we in our thoughts, reasonings, and knowledge, could not proceed beyond present objects,

were it not for the assistance of our memories; wherein there may be two defects: —

First, That it loses the idea quite, and so far it produces perfect ignorance. For,

since we can know nothing further than we have the idea of it, when that is gone, we are in perfect ignorance.

Secondly, That it moves slowly, and retrieves not the ideas that it has, and are laid up in store,

quick enough to serve the mind upon occasion. This, if it be to a great degree, is stupidity;

and he who, through this default in his memory, has not the ideas that are really preserved there,

ready at hand when need and occasion calls for them, were almost as good be without them quite,

since they serve him to little purpose. The dull man, who loses the opportunity,

whilst he is seeking in his mind for those ideas that should serve his turn,

is not much more happy in his knowledge than one that is perfectly ignorant.

It is the business therefore of the memory to furnish to the mind those dormant ideas

which it has present occasion for; in the having them ready at hand on all occasions,

consists that which we call invention, fancy, and quickness of parts.

OF DISCERNING, AND OTHER OPERATIONS OF THE MIND

1.No Knowledge without Discernment.

Another faculty we may take notice of in our minds is that of DISCERNING and DISTINGUISHING

between the several ideas it has. It is not enough to have a confused perception of something in general.

、Unless the mind had a distinct perception of different objects and their qualities,

it would be capable of very little knowledge,

though the bodies that affect us were as busy about us as they are now,

and the; mind were continually employed in thinking.

On this faculty of distinguishing one thing from another depends the evidence and certainty of several,

even very general, propositions, which have passed for innate truths; — because men,

overlooking the true cause why those propositions find universal assent,

impute it wholly to native uniform impressions;

whereas it in truth depends upon this clear discerning faculty of the mind,

whereby it PERCEIVES two ideas to be the same, or different. But of this more hereafter.

7.Brutes compound but little.

In this also, I suppose, brutes come far short of man. For, though they take in, and retain together,

several combinations of simple ideas, as possibly the shape, smell,

and voice of his master make up the complex idea a dog has of him, or rather are so many distinct marks

whereby he knows him; yet I do not think they do of themselves ever compound them,

and make complex ideas. And perhaps even where we think they have complex ideas,

it is only one simple one that directs them in the knowledge of several things,

which possibly they distinguish less by their sight than we imagine.

For I have been credibly informed that a bitch will nurse, play with, and be fond of young foxes,

as much as, and in place of her puppies,

if you can but get them once to suck her so long that her milk may go through them.

And those animals which have a numerous brood of young ones at once,

appear not to have any knowledgeof their number; for though they are mightily concerned for

any of their young that are taken from them whilst they are in sight or hearing,

yet if one or two of them be stolen from them in their absence, or without noise,

they appear not to miss them, or to have any sense that their number is lessened.

8.Naming.

When children have, by repeated sensations, got ideas fixed in their memories,

they begin by degrees to learn the use of signs. And when they have got the skill to apply the organs

of speech to the framing of articulate sounds, they begin to make use of words,

to signify their ideas to others. These verbal signs they sometimes borrow from others,

and sometimes make themselves, as one may observe among the new and unusual names children

often give to things in the first use of language.

9.Abstraction.

The use of words then being to stand as outward mark of our internal ideas,

and those ideas being taken from particular things,

if every particular idea that we take up should have a distinct name, names must be endless.

To prevent this, the mind makes the particular ideas received from particular objects to become general;

which is done by considering them as they are in the mind such appearances,

— separate from all other existences, and the circumstances of real existence, as time, place,

or any other concomitant ideas. This is called ABSTRACTION,

whereby ideas taken from particular beings become general representatives of all of the same kind;

and their names general names, applicable to whatever exists conformable to such abstract ideas.

Such precise, naked appearances in the mind, without considering how, whence,

or with what others they came there, the understanding lays up (with names commonly annexed to them)

as the standards to rank real existences into sorts, as they agree with these patterns,

and to denominate them accordingly. Thus the same colour being observed to-day in chalk or snow,

which the mind yesterday received from milk, it considers that appearance alone,

makes it a representative of all of that kind; and having given it the name WHITENESS,

it by that sound signifies the same quality wheresoever to be imagined or met with;

and thus universals, whether ideas or terms, are made.

10.Brutes abstract not.

If it may be doubted whether beasts compound and enlarge their ideas that way to any degree;

this, I think, I may be positive in, — that the power of abstracting is not at all in them;

and that the having of general ideas is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes,

and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain to.

For it is evident we observe no footsteps in them of making use of general signs for universal ideas;

from which we have reason to imagine that they have not the faculty of abstracting,

or making general ideas, since they have no use of words, or any other general signs.

13.Difference between Idiots and Madmen.

In fine, the defect in naturals seems to proceed from want of quickness, activity,

and motion in the intellectual faculties, whereby they are deprived of reason; whereas madmen,

on the other side, seem to suffer by the other extreme.

For they do not appear to me to have lost the faculty of reasoning,

but having joined together some ideas very wrongly, they mistake them for truths;

and they err as men do that argue right from wrong principles. For, by the violence of their imaginations,

having taken their fancies for realities, they make right deductions from them.

Thus you shall find a distracted man fancying himself a king, with a right inference require suitable attendance,

respect, and obedience: others who have thought themselves made of glass,

have used the caution necessary to preserve such brittle bodies.

Hence it comes to pass that a man who is very sober, and of a right understanding in all other things,

may in one particular be as frantic as any in Bedlam; if either by any sudden very strong impression,

or long fixing his fancy upon one sort of thoughts, incoherent ideas have been cemented together so powerfully,

as to remain united. But there are degrees of madness, as of folly;

the disorderly jumbling ideas together is in some more, and some less.

In short, herein seems to lie the difference between idiots and madmen:

that madmen put wrong ideas together, and so make wrong propositions,

but argue and reason right from them; but idiots make very few or no propositions, and reason scarce at all.

COMPLEX IDEAS OF SIMPLE MODES: — AND FIRST, OF THE SIMPLE MODES OF IDEA OF SPACE.

18.Different meanings of substance.

I endeavour as much as I can to deliver myself from those fallacies which we are apt to put upon ourselves,

by taking words for things. It helps not our ignorance to feign a knowledge where we have none,

by making a noise with sounds, without clear and distinct significations. Names made at pleasure,

neither alter the nature of things, nor make us understand them,

but as they are signs of and stand for determined ideas.

And I desire those who lay so much stress on the sound of these two syllables, SUBSTANCE,

to consider whether applying it, as they do, to the infinite, incomprehensible God, to finite spirits,

and to body, it be in the same sense; and whether it stands for the same idea,

when each of those three so different beings are called substances. If so, whether it will thence follow

— that God, spirits, and body, agreeing in the same common nature of substance,

differ not any otherwise than in a bare different MODIFICATION of that substance; as a tree and a pebble,

being in the same sense body, and agreeing in the common nature of body,

differ only in a bare modification of that common matter, which will be a very harsh doctrine.

If they say, that they apply it to God, finite spirit, and matter,

in three different significations and that it stands for one idea when God is said to be a substance;

for another when the soul is called substance; and for a third when body is called so;

— if the name substance stands for three several distinct ideas,

they would do well to make known those distinct ideas,

or at least to give three distinct names to them, to prevent in so important a notion the confusion

and errors that will naturally follow from the promiscuous use of so doubtful a term;

which is so far from being suspected to have three distinct,

that in ordinary use it has scarce one clear distinct signification.

And if they can thus make three distinct ideas of substance, what hinders why another may not make a fourth?

19.Substance and accidents of little use in Philosophy.

They who first ran into the notion of ACCIDENTS, as a sort of real beings that needed something to inhere in,

were forced to find out the word SUBSTANCE to support them.

Had the poor Indian philosopher (who imagined that the earth also wanted something to bear it up)

but thought of this word substance, he needed not to have been at the trouble to find an elephant to support it,

and a tortoise to support his elephant: the word substance would have done it effectually.

And he that inquired might have taken it for as good an answer from an Indian philosopher,

— that substance, without knowing what it is, is that which supports the earth,

as take it for a sufficient answer and good doctrine from our European philosophers,

— that substance, without knowing what it is, is that which supports accidents.

So that of substance, we have no idea of what it is, but only a confused obscure one of what it does.

IDEA OF DURATION AND ITS SIMPLE MODES.

3.Nature and origin of the idea of Duration.

To understand TIME and ETERNITY aright, we ought with attention to consider

what idea it is we have of DURATION, and how we came by it.

It is evident to any one who will but observe what passes in his own mind,

that there is a train of ideas which constantly succeed one another in his understanding,

as long as he is awake. Reflection on these appearances of several ideas one after another in our minds,

is that which furnishes us with the idea of SUCCESSION:

and the distance between any parts of that succession,

or between the appearance of any two ideas in our minds, is that we call DURATION.

For whilst we are thinking, or whilst we receive successively several ideas in our minds,

we know that we do exist; and so we call the existence,

or the continuation of the existence of ourselves, or anything else,

commensurate to the succession of any ideas in our minds, the duration of ourselves,

or any such other thing co-existent with our thinking.

19.The Revolutions of the Sun and Moon, the properest Measures of Time for mankind.

The diurnal and annual revolutions of the sun, as having been, from the beginning of nature,

constant, regular, and universally observable by all mankind, and supposed equal to one another,

have been with reason made use of for the measure of duration.

But the distinction of days and years having depended on the motion of the sun,

it has brought this mistake with it, that it has been thought that motion

and duration were the measure one of another. For men, in the measuring of the length of time,

having been accustomed to the ideas of minutes, hours, days, months, years, &c.,

which they found themselves upon any mention of time or duration presently to think on,

all which portions of time were measured out by the motion of those heavenly bodies,

they were apt to confound time and motion;

or at least to think that they had a necessary connexion one with another.

Whereas any constant periodical appearance, or alteration of ideas,

in seemingly equidistant spaces of duration, if constant and universally observable,

would have as well distinguished the intervals of time, as those that have been made use of.

For, supposing the sun, which some have taken to be a fire,

had been lighted up at the same distance of time that it now every day comes about to the same meridian,

and then gone out again about twelve hours after, and that in the space of an annual revolution

it had sensibly increased in brightness and heat, and so decreased again,

— would not such regular appearances serve to measure out the distances of duration to all that could observe it,

as well without as with motion? For if the appearances were constant, universally observable,

in equidistant periods, they would serve mankind for measure of time as well were the motion away.

IDEA OF NUMBER.

7.Why Children number not earlier.

Thus children, either for want of names to mark the several progressions of numbers,

or not having yet the faculty to collect scattered ideas into complex ones, and range them in a regular order,

and so retain them in their memories, as is necessary to reckoning, do not begin to number very early,

nor proceed in it very far or steadily, till a good while after they are well furnished with good store of other ideas:

and one may often observe them discourse and reason pretty well,

and have very clear conceptions of several other things, before they can tell twenty. And some,

through the default of their memories, who cannot retain the several combinations of numbers,

with their names, annexed in their distinct orders, and the dependence of so long a train of numeral progressions,

and their relation one to another, are not able all their lifetime to reckon,

or regularly go over any moderate series of numbers. For he that will count twenty,

or have any idea of that number, must know that nineteen went before,

with the distinct name or sign of every one of them, as they stand marked in their order; for wherever this fails,

a gap is made, the chain breaks, and the progress in numbering can go no further.

So that to reckon right, it is required, (1) That the mind distinguish carefully two ideas,

which are different one from another only by the addition or subtraction of ONE unit:

(2) That it retain in memory the names or marks of the several combinations, from an unit to that number;

and that not confusedly, and at random, but in that exact order that the numbers follow one another.

In either of which, if it trips, the whole business of numbering will be disturbed,

and there will remain only the confused idea of multitude,

but the ideas necessary to distinct numeration will not be attained to.

OTHER SIMPLE MODES.

7.Why some Modes have, and others have not, Names.

The reason whereof, I suppose, has been this,

— That the great concernment of men being with men one amongst another, the knowledge of men,

and their actions, and the signifying of them to one another, was most necessary;

and therefore they made ideas of ACTIONS very nicely modified, and gave those complex ideas names,

that they might the more easily record and discourse of those things they were daily conversant in,

without long ambages and circumlocutions;

and that the things they were continually to give and receive information

about might be the easier and quicker understood.

That this is so, and that men in framing different complex ideas, and giving them names,

have been much governed by the end of speech in general,

(which is a very short and expedite way of conveying their thoughts one to another),

is evident in the names which in several arts have been found out,

and applied to several complex ideas of modified actions,

belonging to their several trades, for dispatch sake, in their direction or discourses about them.

Which ideas are not generally framed in the minds of men not conversant about these operations.

And thence the words that stand for them, by the greatest part of men of the same language,

are not understood: v. g. COLTSHIRE, DRILLING, FILTRATION, COHOBATION,

are words standing for certain complex ideas, which being seldom in the minds of

any but those few whose particular employments do at every turn suggest them to their thoughts,

those names of them are not generally understood but by smiths and chymists;

who, having framed the complex ideas which these words stand for, and having given names to them,

or received them from others, upon hearing of these names in communication,

readily conceive those ideas in their minds;-as by COHOBATION all the simple ideas of distilling,

and the pouring the liquor distilled from anything back upon the remaining matter, and distilling it again.

Thus we see that there are great varieties of simple ideas, as of tastes and smells, which have no names;

and of modes many more; which either not having been generally enough observed,

or else not being of any great use to be taken notice of in the affairs and converse of men,

they have not had names given to them, and so pass not for species.

This we shall have occasion hereafter to consider more at large, when we come to speak of WORDS.

OF THE MODES OF THINKING.

3.The various degrees of Attention in thinking.

But perhaps it may not be an unpardonable digression, nor wholly impertinent to our present design,

if we reflect here upon the different state of the mind in thinking, which those instances of attention, reverie,

and dreaming, &c., before mentioned, naturally enough suggest. That there are ideas, some or other,

always present in the mind of a waking man, every one’s experience convinces him;

though the mind employs itself about them with several degrees of attention.

Sometimes the mind fixes itself with so much earnestness on the contemplation of some objects,

that it turns their ideas on all sides; marks their relations and circumstances;

and views every part so nicely and with such intention, that it shuts out all other thoughts,

and takes no notice of the ordinary impressions made then on the senses,

which at another season would produce very sensible perceptions:

at other times it barely observes the train of ideas that succeed in the understanding,

without directing and pursuing any of them: and at other times it lets them pass almost quite unregarded,

as faint shadows that make no impression.

4.Hence it is probable that Thinking is the Action, not the Essence of the Soul.

This difference of intention, and remission of the mind in thinking,

with a great variety of degrees between earnest study and very near minding nothing at all, every one,

I think, has experimented in himself. Trace it a little further,

and you find the mind in sleep retired as it were from the senses,

and out of the reach of those motions made on the organs of sense,

which at other times produce very vivid and sensible ideas. I need not, for this,

instance in those who sleep out whole stormy nights, without hearing the thunder, or seeing the lightning,

or feeling the shaking of the house, which are sensible enough to those who are waking.

But in this retirement of the mind from the senses,

it often retains a yet more loose and incoherent manner of thinking, which we call dreaming.

And, last of all, sound sleep closes the scene quite, and puts an end to all appearances.

This, I think almost every one has experience of in himself,

and his own observation without difficulty leads him thus far. That which I would further conclude from hence is,

that since the mindcan sensibly put on, at several times, several degrees of thinking, and be sometimes,

even in a waking man, so remiss, as to have thoughts dim and obscure to that degree

that they are very little removed from none at all; and at last, in the dark retirements of sound sleep,

loses the sight perfectly of all ideas whatsoever: since, I say,

this is evidently so in matter of fact and constant experience, I ask whether it be not probable,

that thinking is the action and not the essence of the soul?

Since the operations of agents will easily admit of intention and remission:

but the essences of things are not conceived capable of any such variation. But this by the by.

OF POWER.

1.This Idea how got.

The mind being every day informed, by the senses,

of the alteration of those simple ideas it observes in things without;

and taking notice how one comes to an end, and ceases to be, and another begins to exist which was not before;

reflecting also on what passes within itself, and observing a constant change of its ideas,

sometimes by the impression of outward objects on the senses, and sometimes by the determination

of its own choice; and concluding from what it has so constantly observed to have been,

that the like changes will for the future be made in the same things, by like agents, and by the like ways,

— considers in one thing the possibility of having any of its simple ideas changed,

and in another the possibility of making that change; and so comes by that idea which we call POWER.

Thus we say, Fire has a power to melt gold, i. e. to destroy the consistency of its insensible parts,

and consequently its hardness, and make it fluid; and gold has a power to be melted;

that the sun has a power to blanch wax, and wax a power to be blanched by the sun,

whereby the yellowness is destroyed, and whiteness made to exist in its room. In which,

and the like cases, the power we consider is in reference to the change of perceivable ideas.

For we cannot observe any alteration to be made in, or operation upon anything,

but by the observable change of its sensible ideas; nor conceive any alteration to be made,

but by conceiving a change of some of its ideas.

11.Voluntary opposed to involuntary.

We have instances enough, and often more than enough, in our own bodies. A man’s heart beats,

and the blood circulates, which it is not in his power by any thought or volition to stop;

and therefore in respect of these motions, where rest depends not on his choice,

nor would follow the determination of his mind, if it should prefer it, he is not a free agent.

Convulsive motions agitate his legs, so that though he wills it ever so much,

he cannot by any power of his mind stop their motion, (as in that odd disease called chorea sancti viti),

but he is perpetually dancing; he is not at liberty in this action, but under as much necessity of moving,

as a stone that falls, or a tennis-ball struck with a racket. On the other side,

a palsy or the stocks hinder his legs from obeying the determination of his mind,

if it would thereby transfer his body to another place. In all these there is want of freedom;

though the sitting still, even of a paralytic, whilst he prefers it to a removal, is truly voluntary.

Voluntary, then, is not opposed to necessary but to involuntary. For a man may prefer what he can do,

to what he cannot do; the state he is in, to its absence or change;

though necessity has made it in itself unalterable.

12.Liberty, what.

As it is in the motions of the body, so it is in the thoughts of our minds: where any one is such,

that we have power to take it up, or lay it by, according to the preference of the mind,

there we are at liberty. A waking man, being under the necessity of having some ideas constantly in his mind,

is not at liberty to think or not to think; no more than he is at liberty,

whether his body shall touch any other or no, but whether he will remove his contemplation from

one idea to another is many times in his choice; and then he is, in respect of his ideas,

as much at liberty as he is in respect of bodies he rests on; he can at pleasure remove himself

from one to another. But yet some ideas to the mind, like some motions to the body,

are such as in certain circumstances it cannot avoid, nor obtain their absence by the utmost effort it can use.

A man on the rack is not at liberty to lay by the idea of pain, and divert himself with other contemplations:

and sometimes a boisterous passion hurries our thoughts, as a hurricane does our bodies,

without leaving us the liberty of thinking on other things, which we would rather choose.

But as soon as the mind regains the power to stop or continue, begin or forbear,

any of these motions of the body without, or thoughts within,

according as it thinks fit to prefer either to the other, we then consider the man as a FREE AGENT again.

13.Wherever thought is wholly wanting

or the power to act or forbear according to the direction of thought, there necessity takes place.

This, in an agent capable of volition, when the beginning or continuation of any action is contrary

to that preference of his mind, is called compulsion; when the hindering or stopping

any action is contrary to his volition, it is called restraint. Agents that have no thought,

no volition at all, are in everything NECESSARY AGENTS.

17.How the will instead of the man is called free.

However, the name FACULTY, which men have given to this power called the will,

and whereby they have been led into a way of talking of the will as acting, may,

by an appropriation that disguises its true sense, serve a little to palliate the absurdity; yet the will,

in truth, signifies nothing but a power or ability to prefer or choose: and when the will,

under the name of a faculty, is considered as it is, barely as an ability to do something,

the absurdity in saying it is free, or not free, will easily discover itself. For,

if it be reasonable to suppose and talk of faculties as distinct beings that can act,

(as we do, when we say the will orders, and the will is free,) it is fit that we should make a speaking faculty,

and a walking faculty, and a dancing faculty, by which these actions are produced,

which are but several modes of motion; as well as we make the will and understanding to be faculties,

by which the actions of choosing and perceiving are produced, which are but several modes of thinking.

And we may as properly say that it is the singing faculty sings, and the dancing faculty dances,

as that the will chooses, or that the understanding conceives; or,

as is usual, that the will directs the understanding, or the understanding obeys or obeys not the will:

it being altogether as proper and intelligible to say that the power of speaking directs the power of singing,

or the power of singing obeys or disobeys the power of speaking.

35.The greatest positive Good determines not the Will, but present Uneasiness alone.

It seems so established and settled a maxim, by the general consent of all mankind, that good,

the greater good, determines the will, that I do not at all wonder that,

when I first published my thoughts on this subject I took it for granted; and I imagine that, by a great many,

I shall be thought more excusable for having then done so,

than that now I have ventured to recede from so received an opinion. But yet, upon a stricter inquiry,

I am forced to conclude that GOOD, the GREATER GOOD, though apprehended and acknowledged to be so,

does not determine the will, until our desire, raised proportionably to it, makes us uneasy in the want of it.

Convince a man never so much, that plenty has its advantages over poverty; make him see and own,

that the handsome conveniences of life are better than nasty penury: yet, as long as he is content with the latter,

and finds no uneasiness in it, he moves not; his will never is determined to any action that shall bring him out of it.

Let a man be ever so well persuaded of the advantages of virtue,

that it is as necessary to a man who has any great aims in this world, or hopes in the next, as food to life:

yet, till he hungers or thirsts after righteousness, till he FEELS AN UNEASINESS in the want of it,

his WILL will not be determined to any action in pursuit of this confessed greater good;

but any other uneasiness he feels in himself shall take place, and carry his will to other actions. On the other side,

let a drunkard see that his health decays, his estate wastes; discredit and diseases, and the want of all things,

even of his beloved drink, attends him in the course he follows:

yet the returns of uneasiness to miss his companions, the habitual thirst after his cups at the usual time,

drives him to the tavern, though he has in his view the loss of health and plenty,

and perhaps of the joys of another life: the least of which is no inconsiderable good,

but such as he confesses is far greater than the tickling of his palate with a glass of wine,

or the idle chat of a soaking club. It is not want of viewing the greater good: for he sees and acknowledges it,

and, in the intervals of his drinking hours, will take resolutions to pursue the greater good;

but when the uneasiness to miss his accustomed delight returns,

the greater acknowledged good loses its hold,

and the present uneasiness determines the will to the accustomed action;

which thereby gets stronger footing to prevail against the next occasion,

though he at the same time makes secret promises to himself that he will do so no more;

this is the last time he will act against the attainment of those greater goods. And thus he is,

from time to time, in the state of that unhappy complainer, Video meliora, proboque, deteriora sequor:

which sentence, allowed for true, and made good by constant experience, may in this,

and possibly no other way, be easily made intelligible.

36.Because the Removal of Uneasiness is the first Step to Happiness.

If we inquire into the reason of what experience makes so evident in fact, and examine,

why it is uneasiness alone operates on the will, and determines it in its choice,

we shall find that, we being capable but of one determination of the will to one action at once,

the present uneasiness that we are under does NATURALLY determine the will,

in order to that happiness which we all aim at in all our actions. For,

as much as whilst we are under any uneasiness, we cannot apprehend ourselves happy,

or in the way to it; pain and uneasiness being, by every one,

concluded and felt to be inconsistent with happiness,

spoiling the relish even of those good things which we have:

a little pain serving to mar all the pleasure we rejoiced in. And, therefore,

that which of course determines the choice of our will to the next action will always be

— the removing of pain, as long as we have any left, as the first and necessary step towards happiness.

37.Because Uneasiness alone is present.

Another reason why it is uneasiness alone determines the will, is this: because that alone is present and,

it is against the nature of things, that what is absent should operate where it is not.

It may be said that absent good may, by contemplation, be brought home to the mind and made present.

The idea of it indeed may be in the mind and viewed as present there;

but nothing will be in the mind as a present good, able to counterbalance

the removal of any uneasiness which we are under, till it raises our desire;

and the uneasiness of that has the prevalency in determining the will. Till then,

the idea in the mind of whatever is good is there only, like other ideas, the object of bare unactive speculation;

but operates not on the will, nor sets us on work; the reason whereof I shall show by and by.

How many are to be found that have had lively representations set before their minds

of the unspeakable joys of heaven, which they acknowledge both possible and probable too,

who yet would be content to take up with their happiness here? And so the prevailing uneasiness

of their desires, let loose after the enjoyments of this life, take their turns in the determining their wills;

and all that while they take not one step, are not one jot moved, towards the good things of another life,

considered as ever so great.

38.Because all who allow the Joys of Heaven possible, purse them not

Were the will determined by the views of good, as it appears in contemplation greater or less to the understanding,

which is the state of all absent good, and that which, in the received opinion,

the will is supposed to move to, and to be moved by,

— I do not see how it could ever get loose from the infinite eternal joys of heaven,

once proposed and considered as possible. For, all absent good, by which alone, barely proposed,

and coming in view, the will is thought to be determined, and so to set us on action, being only possible,

but not infallibly certain, it is unavoidable that the infinitely greater possible good should regularly

and constantly determine the will in all the successive actions it directs;

and then we should keep constantly and steadily in our course towards heaven, without ever standing still,

or directing our actions to any other end: the eternal condition of a future state infinitely outweighing

the expectation of riches, or honour, or any other worldly pleasure which we can propose to ourselves,

though we should grant these the more probable to be obtained: for nothing future is yet in possession,

and so the expectation even of these may deceive us.

If it were so that the greater good in view determines the will, so great a good, once proposed,

could not but seize the will, and hold it fast to the pursuit of this infinitely greatest good,

without ever letting it go again: for the will having a power over, and directing the thoughts,

as well as other actions, would, if it were so, hold the contemplation of the mind fixed to that good.

42.All desire Happiness.

If it be further asked, — What it is moves desire? I answer, — happiness, and that alone.

Happiness and misery are the names of two extremes, the utmost bounds whereof we know not;

it is what be in itself good; and what is apt to produce any degree of pain be evil;

yet it often happens that we do not call it so when it comes in competition with a greater of its sort;

because, when they come in competition, the degrees also of pleasure and pain have justly a preference.

So that if we will rightly estimate what we call good and evil, we shall find it lies much in comparison:

for the cause of every less degree of pain, as well as every greater degree of pleasure,

has the nature of good, and vice versa.

44.What Good is desired, what not.

Though this be that which is called good and evil, and all good be the proper object of desire in general;

yet all good, even seen and confessed to be so, does not necessarily move every particular man’s desire;

but only that part, or so much of it as is considered and taken to make a necessary part of HIS happiness.

All other good, however great in reality or appearance, excites not a man’s desires

who looks not on it to make a part of that happiness wherewith he, in his present thoughts,

can satisfy himself. Happiness, under this view, every one constantly pursues,

and desires what makes any part of it: other things, acknowledged to be good, he can look upon without desire,

pass by, and be content without. There is nobody, I think,

so senseless as to deny that there is pleasure in knowledge: and for the pleasures of sense,

they have too many followers to let it be questioned whether men are taken with them or no.

Now, let one man place his satisfaction in sensual pleasures, another in the delight of knowledge:

though each of them cannot but confess, there is great pleasure in what the other pursues;

yet, neither of them making the other’s delight a part of HIS happiness, their desires are not moved,

but each is satisfied without what the other enjoys; and so his will is not determined to the pursuit of it.

But yet, as soon as the studious man’s hunger and thirst make him uneasy, he,

whose will was never determined to any pursuit of good cheer, poignant sauces, delicious wine,

by the pleasant taste he has found in them, is, by the uneasiness of hunger and thirst,

presently determined to eating and drinking, though possibly with great indifferency,

what wholesome food comes in his way. And, on the other side, the epicure buckles to study,

when shame, or the desire to recommend himself to his mistress,

shall make him uneasy in the want of any sort of knowledge. Thus, how much soever men are in earnest

and constant in pursuit of happiness, yet they may have a clear view of good, great and confessed good,

without being concerned for it, or moved by it, if they think they can make up their happiness without it.

Though as to pain, THAT they are always concerned for; they can feel no uneasiness without being moved.

And therefore, being uneasy in the want of whatever is judged necessary to their happiness,

as soon as any good appears to make a part of their portion of happiness, they begin to desire it.

45.Why the greatest Good is not always desired.`

This, I think, any one may observe in himself and others,

— That the greater visible good does not always raise men’s desires in proportion to the greatness it appears,

and is acknowledged, to have: though every little trouble moves us, and sets us on work to get rid of it.

The reason whereof is evident from the nature of our happiness and misery itself. All present pain,

whatever it be, makes a part of our present misery:

but all absent good does not at any time make a necessary part of our present happiness,

nor the absence of it make a part of our misery. If it did, we should be constantly and infinitely miserable;

there being infinite degrees of happiness which are not in our possession. All uneasiness therefore being removed,

a moderate portion of good serve at present to content men;

and a few degrees of pleasure in a succession of ordinary enjoyments, make up a happiness

wherein they can be satisfied. If this were not so, there could be no room for those indifferent

and visibly trifling actions, to which our wills are so often determined,

and wherein we voluntarily waste so much of our lives;

which remissness could by no means consist with a constant determination

of will or desire to the greatest apparent good.

That this is so, I think few people need go far from home to be convinced.

And indeed in this life there are not many whose happiness reaches so far

as to afford them a constant train of moderate mean pleasures, without any mixture of uneasiness;

and yet they could be content to stay here for ever: though they cannot deny,

but that it is possible there may be a state of eternal durable joys after this life,

far surpassing all the good that is to be found here. Nay, they cannot but see that it is more possible

than the attainment and continuation of that pittance of honour, riches, or pleasure which they pursue,

and for which they neglect that eternal state. But yet, in full view of this difference,

satisfied of the possibility of a perfect, secure, and lasting happiness in a future state,

and under a clear conviction that it is not to be had here,

— whilst they bound their happiness within some little enjoyment or aim of this life,

and exclude the joys of heaven from making any necessary part of it,

— their desires are not moved by this greater apparent good,

nor their wills determined to any action, or endeavour for its attainment.

47.Due Consideration raises Desire.

And thus, by a due consideration, and examining any good proposed,

it is in our power to raise our desires in a due proportion to the value of that good,

whereby in its turn and place it may come to work upon the will, and be pursued.

For good, though appearing and allowed ever so great, yet till it has raised desires in our minds,

and thereby made us uneasy in its want, it reaches not our wills;

we are not within the sphere of its activity, our wills being under the determination only of those uneasinesses

which are present to us, which (whilst we have any) are always soliciting, and ready at hand,

to give the will its next determination. The balancing, when there is any in the mind, being only,

which desire shall be next satisfied, which uneasiness first removed. Whereby it comes to pass that,

as long as any uneasiness, any desire, remains in our mind, there is no room for good, barely as such,

to come at the will, or at all to determine it. Because, as has been said,

the FIRST step in our endeavours after happiness being to get wholly out of the confines of misery,

and to feel no part of it, the will can be at leisure for nothing else,

till every uneasiness we feel be perfectly removed: which, in the multitude of wants

and desires we are beset with in this imperfect state, we are not like to be ever freed from in this world.

51.A constant Determination to a Pursuit of Happiness no Abridgment of Liberty.

But to give a right view of this mistaken part of liberty let me ask, — Would any one be a changeling,

because he is less determined by wise considerations than a wise man?

Is it worth the name of freedom to be at liberty to play the fool, and draw shame and misery upon a man’s self?

If to break loose from the conduct of reason, and to want that restraint of examination and judgment

which keeps us from choosing or doing the worse, be liberty, true liberty, madmen and fools are the only freemen:

but yet, I think, nobody would choose to be mad for the sake of such liberty, but he that is mad already.

The constant desire of happiness, and the constraint it puts upon us to act for it, nobody,

I think, accounts an abridgment of liberty, or at least an abridgment of liberty to be complained of.

God Almighty himself is under the necessity of being happy; and the more any intelligent being is so,

the nearer is its approach to infinite perfection and happiness. That, in this state of ignorance,

we short-sighted creatures might not mistake true felicity,

we are endowedwith a power to suspend any particular desire, and keep it from determining the will,

and engaging us in action. This is standing still, where we are not sufficiently assured of the way:

examination is consulting a guide. The determination of the will upon inquiry,

is following the direction of that guide: and he that has a power to act or not to act,

according as SUCH determination directs, is a free agent: such determination abridges not

that power wherein liberty consists. He that has his chains knocked off, and the prison doors set open to him,

is perfectly at liberty, because he may either go or stay, as he best likes,

though his preference be determined to stay,

by the darkness of the night, or illness of the weather, or want of other lodging.

He ceases not to be free; though the desire of some convenience to be had

there absolutely determines his preference, and makes him stay in his prison.

54.Government of our Passions the right Improvement of Liberty.

But if any extreme disturbance (as sometimes it happens) possesses our whole mind,

as when the pain of the rack, an impetuous uneasiness, as of love, anger, or any other violent passion,

running away with us, allows us not the liberty of thought,

and we are not masters enough of our own minds to consider thoroughly and examine fairly;

— God, who knows our frailty, pities our weakness, and requires of us no more than we are able to do,

and sees what was and what was not in our power, will judge as a kind and merciful Father.

But the forbearance of a too hasty compliance with our desires, the moderation and restraint of our passions,

so that our understandings may be free to examine, and reason unbiassed, give its judgment,

being that whereon a right direction of our conduct to true happiness depends;

it is in this we should employ our chief care and endeavours.

In this we should take pains to suit the relish of our minds to the true intrinsic good or ill that is in things;

and not permit an allowed or supposed possible great and weighty good to slip out of our thoughts,

without leaving any relish, any desire of itself there till, by a due consideration of its true worth,

we have formed appetites in our minds suitable to it, and made ourselves uneasy in the want of it,

or in the fear of losing it. And how much this is in every one’s power, by making resolutions to himself,

such as he may keep, is easy for every one to try. Nor let any one say, he cannot govern his passions,

nor hinder them from breaking out, and carrying him into action;

for what he can do before a prince or a great man, he can do alone, or in the presence of God, if he will.

55.How Men come to pursue different, and often evil Courses.

From what has been said, it is easy to give an account how it comes to pass, that,

though all men desire happiness, yet their wills carry them so contrarily; and consequently,

some of them to what is evil. And to this I say, that the various and contrary choices that men

make in the world do not argue that they do not all pursue good;

but that the same thing is not good to every man alike. This variety of pursuits shows,

that every one does not place his happiness in the same thing, or choose the same way to it.

Were all the concerns of man terminated in this life, why one followed study and knowledge,

and another hawking and hunting: why one chose luxury and debauchery, and another sobriety and riches,

would not be because every one of these did NOT aim at his own happiness;

but because their happiness was placed in different things.

And therefore it was a right answer of the physician to his patient that had sore eyes:

— If you have more pleasure in the taste of wine than in the use of your sight,

wine is good for you; but if the pleasure of seeing be greater to you than that of drinking, wine is naught.

60.Our judgment of present Good or Evil always right.

In the first place, I shall consider the wrong judgments men make of FUTURE good and evil,

whereby their desires are misled. For, as to PRESENT happiness and misery,

when that alone comes into consideration, and the consequences are quite removed,

a man never chooses amiss: he knows what best pleases him, and that he actually prefers.

Things in their present enjoyment are what they seem: the apparent and real good are, in this case,

always the same. For the pain or pleasure being just so great and no greater than it is felt,

the present good or evil is really so much as it appears.

And therefore were every action of ours concluded within itself, and drew no consequences after it,

we should undoubtedly never err in our choice of good: we should always infallibly prefer the best.

Were the pains of honest industry, and of starving with hunger and cold set together before us,

nobody would be in doubt which to choose: were the satisfaction of a lust and the joys of heaven offered

at once to any one’s present possession, he would not balance, or err in the determination of his choice.

61.Our wrong judgments have regard to future good and evil only.

But since our voluntary actions carry not all the happiness and misery that depend on them along

with them in their present performance, but are the precedent causes of good and evil,

which they draw after them, and bring upon us, when they themselves are past and cease to be;

our desires look beyond our present enjoyments, and carry the mind out to ABSENT GOOD,

according to the necessity which we think there is of it, to the making or increase of our happiness.

It is our opinion of such a necessity that gives it its attraction: without that,

we are not moved by absent good. For, in this narrow scantling of capacity

which we are accustomed to and sensible of here, wherein we enjoy but one pleasure at once,

which, when all uneasiness is away, is, whilst it lasts, sufficient to make us think ourselves happy,

it is not all remote and even apparent good that affects us. Because the indolency and enjoyment we have,

sufficing for our present happiness, we desire not to venture the change;

since we judge that we are happy already, being content, and that is enough.

For who is content is happy. But as soon as any new uneasiness comes in, this happiness is disturbed,

and we are set afresh on work in the pursuit of happiness.

68.Wrong judgment in considering Consequences of Actions.

(II). As to THINGS GOOD OR BAD IN THEIR CONSEQUENCES,

and by the aptness that is in them to procure us good or evil in the future, we judge amiss several ways.

1. When we judge that so much evil does not really depend on them as in truth there does.

2. When we judge that, though the consequence be of that moment,

3. yet it is not of that certainty, but that it may otherwise fall out,

4. or else by some means be avoided; as by industry, address, change, repentance, &c.

That these are wrong ways of judging, were easy to show in every particular,

if I would examine them at large singly: but I shall only mention this in general, viz.

that it is a very wrong and irrational way of proceeding, to venture a greater good for a less,

upon uncertain guesses; and before a due examination be made, proportionable to the weightiness of the matter,

and the concernment it is to us not to mistake. This I think every one must confess,

especially if he considers the usual cause of this wrong judgment, whereof these following are some: —

69.Causes of this.

(i) IGNORANCE: He that judges without informing himself to the utmost that he is capable,

cannot acquit himself of judging amiss.
(ii) INADVERTENCY: When a man overlooks even that which he does know.

This is an affected and present ignorance, which misleads our judgments as much as the other.

Judging is, as it were, balancing an account, and determining on which side the odds lie.

If therefore either side be huddled up in haste,

and several of the sums that should have gone into the reckoning be overlooked and left out,

this precipitancy causes as wrong a judgment as if it were a perfect ignorance.

That which most commonly causes this is, the prevalency of some present pleasure or pain,

heightened by our feeble passionate nature, most strongly wrought on by what is present.

To check this precipitancy, our understanding and reason were given us, if we will make a right use of them,

to search and see, and then judge thereupon. How much sloth and negligence, heat and passion,

the prevalency of fashion or acquired indispositions do severally contribute, on occasion,

to these wrong judgments, I shall not here further inquire. I shall only add one other false judgment,

which I think necessary to mention, because perhaps it is little taken notice of, though of great influence.

70.Wrong judgment of what is necessary to our Happiness.

All men desire happiness, that is past doubt: but, as has been already observed, when they are rid of pain,

they are apt to take up with any pleasure at hand, or that custom has endeared to them; to rest satisfied in that;

and so being happy, till some new desire, by making them uneasy, disturbs that happiness,

and shows them that they are not so, they look no further; nor is the will determined to any action

in pursuit of any other known or apparent good. For since we find that we cannot enjoy all sorts of good,

but one excludes another; we do not fix our desires on every apparent greater good,

unless it be judged to be necessary to our happiness: if we think we can be happy without it, it moves us not.

This is another occasion to men of judging wrong; when they take not that to be necessary

to their happiness which really is so. This mistake misleads us, both in the choice of the good we aim at,

and very often in the means to it, when it is a remote good. But, which way ever it be,

either by placing it where really it is not, or by neglecting the means as not necessary to it;

— when a man misses his great end, happiness, he will acknowledge he judged not right.

That which contributes to this mistake is the real or supposed unpleasantness of the actions

which are the way to this end; it seeming so preposterous a thing to men,

to make themselves unhappy in order to happiness, that they do not easily bring themselves to it.

OF MIXED MODES.

4.The Name ties the Parts of mixed Modes into one Idea.

Every mixed mode consisting of many distinct simple ideas, it seems reasonable to inquire,

Whence it has its unity; and how such a precise multitude comes to make but one idea;

since that combination does not always exist together in nature? To which I answer,

it is plain it has its unity from an act of the mind, combining those several simple ideas together,

and considering them as one complex one, consisting of those parts; and the mark of this union,

or that which is looked on generally to complete it, is one NAME given to that combination.

For it is by their names that men commonly regulate their account of their distinct species of mixed modes,

seldom allowing or considering any number of simple ideas to make one complex one,

but such collections as there be names for. Thus,

though the killing of an old man be as fit in nature to be united into one complex idea,

as the killing a man’s father; yet, there being no name standing precisely for the one,

as there is the name of PARRICIDE to mark the other, it is not taken for a particular complex idea,

nor a distinct species of actions from that of killing a young man, or any other man.

9.How we get the Ideas of mixed Modes.

There are therefore three ways whereby we get these complex ideas of mixed modes:

— (1) By experience and OBSERVATION of things themselves: thus,

by seeing two men mixed wrestle or fence, we get the idea of wrestling or fencing.

(2) By INVENTION, or voluntary putting together of several simple ideas in our own minds:

so he that first invented printing or etching, had an idea of it in his mind before it ever existed.

(3) Which is the most usual way, by EXPLAINING THE NAMES of actions we never saw,

or motions we cannot see; and by enumerating, and thereby, as it were,

setting before our imaginations all those ideas which go to the making them up,

and are the constituent parts of them. For,

having by sensation and reflection stored our minds with simple ideas,

and by use got the names that stand for them,

we can by those means represent to another any complex idea we would have him conceive;

so that it has in it no simple ideas but what he knows, and has with us the same name for.

For all our complex ideas are ultimately resolvable into simple ideas,

of which they are compounded and originally made up, though perhaps their immediate ingredients,

as I may so say, are also complex ideas. Thus,

the mixed mode which the word LIE stands for is made of these simple ideas:

— (1) Articulate sounds. (2) Certain ideas in the mind of the speaker. (3) Those words the signs of those ideas.

(4)Those signs put together, by affirmation or negation,

otherwise than the ideas they stand for are in the mind of the speaker.

I think I need not go any further in the analysis of that complex idea we call a lie:

what I have said is enough to show that it is made up of simple ideas.

And it could not be but an offensive tediousness to my reader, to trouble him with a

more minute enumeration of every particular simple idea that goes to this complex one;

which, from what has been said, he cannot but be able to make out to himself.

The same may be done in all our complex ideas whatsoever; which, however compounded and decompounded,

may at last be resolved into simple ideas, which are all the materials of knowledge or thought we have,

or can have. Nor shall we have reason to fear that the mind is hereby stinted to too scanty a number of ideas,

if we consider what an inexhaustible stock of simple modes number and figure alone afford us.

How far then mixed modes, which admit of the various combinations of different simple ideas,

and their infinite modes, are from being few and scanty, we may easily imagine. So that,

before we have done, we shall see that nobody need be afraid he shall not have scope

and compass enough for his thoughts to range in, though they be, as I pretend, confined only

to simple ideas, received from sensation or reflection, and their several combinations.

10.Motion, Thinking, and Power have been most modified.

It is worth our observing, which of all our simple ideas have been MOST modified,

and had most mixed ideas made out of them, with names given to them. And those have been these three:

— THINKING and MOTION (which are the two ideas which comprehend in them all action,)

and POWER, from whence these actions are conceived to flow. These simple ideas, I say,

of thinking, motion, and power, have been those which have been most modified;

and out of whose modifications have been made most complex modes, with names to them.

For ACTION being the great business of mankind, and the whole matter about which all laws are conversant,

it is no wonder that the several modes of thinking and motion should be taken notice of,

the ideas of them observed, and laid up in the memory, and have names assigned to them;

without which laws could be but ill made, or vice and disorders repressed.

Nor could any communication be well had amongst men without such complex ideas,

with names to them: and therefore men have settled names, and supposed settled ideas in their minds,

of modes of actions, distinguished by their causes, means, objects, ends, instruments, time, place,

and other circumstances; and also of their powers fitted for those actions: v.g.

BLDNESS is the power to speak or do what we intend, before others, without fear or disorder;

and the Greeks call the confidence of speaking by a peculiar name, [word in Greek]:

which power or ability in man of doing anything, when it has been acquired

by frequent doing the same thing, is that idea we name HABIT; when it is forward,

and ready upon every occasion to break into action, we call it DISPOSITION. Thus,

TESTINESS is a disposition or aptness to be angry.

To conclude: Let us examine any modes of action, v.g. CONSIDERATION and ASSENT,

which are actions of the mind; RUNNING and SPEAKING, which are actions of the body;

REVENGE and MURDER, which are actions of both together,

and we shall find them but so many collections of simple ideas, which, together,

make up the complex ones signified by those names

OF OUR COMPLEX IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES.

2.Our obscure Idea of Substance in general.

So that if any one will examine himself concerning his notion of pure substance in general,

he will find he has no other idea of it at all, but only a supposition of he knows not what SUPPORT

of such qualities which are capable of producing simple ideas in us;

which qualities are commonly called accidents.

If any one should be asked, what is the subject wherein colour or weight inheres, he would have nothing to say,

but the solid extended parts; and if he were demanded, what is it that solidity and extension adhere in,

he would not be in a much better case than the Indian before mentioned who,

saying that the world was supported by a great elephant, was asked what the elephant rested on;

to which his answer was — a great tortoise:

but being again pressed to know what gave support to the broad-backed tortoise,

replied — SOMETHING, HE KNEW NOT WHAT. And thus here,

as in all other cases where we use words without having clear and distinct ideas, we talk like children:

who, being questioned what such a thing is, which they know not, readily give this satisfactory answer,

that it is SOMETHING: which in truth signifies no more, when so used, either by children or men,

but that they know not what; and that the thing they pretend to know, and talk of,

is what they have no distinct idea of at all, and so are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark.

The idea then we have, to which we give the GENERAL name substance, being nothing but the supposed,

but unknown, support of those qualities we find existing,

which we imagine cannot subsist SINE RE SUBSTANTE,

without something to support them, we call that support SUBSTANTIA;

which, according to the true import of the word, is, in plain English, standing under or upholding.

16.No Idea of abstract Substance either in Body or Spirit.

By the complex idea of extended, figured, coloured, and all other sensible qualities,

which is all that we know of it, we are as far from the idea of the substance of body,

as if we knew nothing at all: nor after all the acquaintance and familiarity which we imagine we have with matter,

and the many qualities men assure themselves they perceive and know in bodies,

will it perhaps upon examination be found, that they have any more or clearer primary ideas belonging to body,

than they have belonging to immaterial spirit.

36.No Ideas in our complex ideas of Spirits, but those got from Sensation or Reflection.

This further is to be observed, that there is no idea we attribute to God, bating infinity,

which is not also a part of our complex idea of other spirits. Because, being capable of no other simple ideas,

belonging to anything but body, but those which by reflection we receive from the operation of our own minds,

we can attribute to spirits no other but what we receive from thence:

and all the difference we can put between them, in our contemplation of spirits,

is only in the several extents and degrees of their knowledge, power, duration, happiness, &c.

For that in our ideas, as well of spirits as of other things, we are restrained to

THOSE WE RECEIVE FROM SENSATION AND REFLECTION, is evident from hence,

— That, in our ideas of spirits, how much soever advanced in perfection beyond those of bodies,

even to that of infinite, we cannot yet have any idea of the manner wherein they discover their thoughts

one to another: though we must necessarily conclude that separate spirits,

which are beings that have perfecter knowledge and greater happiness than we,

must needs have also a perfecter way of communicating their thoughts than we have,

who are fain to make use of corporeal signs, and particular sounds;

which are therefore of most general use, as being the best and quickest we are capable of.

But of immediate communication having no experiment in ourselves, and consequently no notion of it at all,

we have no idea how spirits, which use not words, can with quickness;

or much less how spirits that have no bodies can be masters of their own thoughts,

and communicate or conceal them at pleasure, though we cannot but necessarily suppose they have such a power.

37.Recapitulation.

And thus we have seen what kind of ideas we have of SUBSTANCES OF ALL KINDS,

wherein they consist, and how we came by them. From whence, I think, it is very evident,

First, That all our ideas of the several SORTS of substances are nothing but collections of simple ideas:

with a supposition of SOMETHING to which they belong, and in which they subsist;

though of this supposed something we have no clear distinct idea at all.

Secondly, That all the simple ideas, that thus united in one common SUBSTRATUM,

make up our complex ideas of several SORTS of substances,

are no other but such as we have received from sensation or reflection.

So that even in those which we think we are most intimately acquainted with,

and that come nearest the comprehension of our most enlarged conceptions,

we cannot go beyond those simple ideas. And even in those which seem most remote from all we have to do with,

and do infinitely surpass anything we can perceive in ourselves by reflection;

or discover by sensation in other things, we can attain to nothing but those simple ideas,

which we originally received from sensation or reflection; as is evident in the complex ideas we have of angels,

and particularly of God himself.

Thirdly, That most of the simple ideas that make up our complex ideas of substances,

when truly considered, are only POWERS, however we are apt to take them for positive qualities;

v.g. the greatest part of the ideas that make our complex idea of GOLD are yellowness, great weight,

ductility, fusibility, and solubility in AQUA REGIA, &c., all united together in an unknown SUBSTRATUM:

all which ideas are nothing else but so many relations to other substances; and are not really in the gold,

considered barely in itself, though they depend on those real and primary qualities of its internal constitution,

whereby it has a fitness differently to operate, and be operated on by several other substances.

OF COLLECTIVE IDEAS OF SUBSTANCE

3.Made by the Power of composing in the Mind.

These collective ideas of substances the mind makes, by its power of composition,

and uniting severally either simple or complex ideas into one, as it does, by the same faculty,

make the complex ideas of particular substances, consisting of an aggregate of divers simple ideas,

united in one substance. And as the mind, by putting together the repeated ideas of unity,

makes the collective mode, or complex idea, of any number, as a score, or a gross, &c.,

— so, by putting together several particular substances, it makes collective ideas of substances,

as a troop, an army, a swarm, a city, a fleet;

each of which every one finds that he represents to his own mind by one idea, in one view;

and so under that notion considers those several things as perfectly one, as one ship, or one atom.

Nor is it harder to conceive how an army of ten thousand men should make one idea

than how a man should make one idea it being as easy to the mind

to unite into one the idea of a great number of men,

and consider it as one as it is to unite into one particular all the distinct ideas

that make up the composition of a man, and consider them all together as one.

OF RELATION.

6.Relation only betwixt two things.

Whatsoever doth or can exist, or be considered as one thing is positive:

and so not only simple ideas and substances, but modes also, are positive beings:

though the parts of which they consist are very often relative one to another:

but the whole together considered as one thing, and producing in us the complex idea of one thing,

which idea is in our minds, as one picture, though an aggregate of divers parts, and under one name,

it is a positive or absolute thing, or idea. Thus a triangle,

though the parts thereof compared one to another be relative, yet the idea of the whole is a positive absolute idea.

The same may be said of a family, a tune, &c.;

for there can be no relation but betwixt two things considered as two things.

There must always be in relation two ideas or things, either in themselves really separate,

or considered as distinct, and then a ground or occasion for their comparison.

OF CAUSE AND EFFECT, AND OTHER RELATIONS.

6.Absolute Terms often stand for Relations.

So likewise weak and strong are but relative denominations of power,

compared to some ideas we have at that time of greater or less power. Thus, when we say a weak man,

we mean one that has not so much strength or power to move as usually men have,

or usually those of his size have;

which is a comparing his strength to the idea we have of the usual strength of men,

or men of such a size. The like when we say the creatures are all weak things;

weak there is but a relative term, signifying the disproportion there is in the power of God and the creatures.

And so abundance of words, in ordinary speech, stand only for relations (and perhaps the greatest part)

which at first sight seem to have no such signification: v.g. the ship has necessary stores.

NECESSARY and STORES are both relative words;

one having a relation to the accomplishing the voyage intended,

and the other to future use. All which relations, how they are confined to,

and terminate in ideas derived from sensation or reflection, is too obvious to need any explication.

OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY.

1.Wherein Identity consists.

ANOTHER occasion the mind often takes of comparing, is the very being of things, when,

considering ANYTHING AS EXISTING AT ANY DETERMINED TIME AND PLACE,

we compare it with ITSELF EXISTING AT ANOTHER TIME, and thereon form the ideas of IDENTITY

and DIVERSITY. When we see anything to be in any place in any instant of time,

we are sure (be it what it will) that it is that very thing, and not another

which at that same time exists in another place, how like

and undistinguishable soever it may be in all other respects:

and in this consists IDENTITY, when the ideas it is attributed to vary not at all from

what they were that moment wherein we consider their former existence, and to which we compare the present.

For we never finding, nor conceiving it possible, that two things of the same kind should exist

in the same place at the same time, we rightly conclude, that, whatever exists anywhere at any time,

excludes all of the same kind, and is there itself alone. When therefore we demand

whether anything be the SAME or no, it refers always to something that existed such a time in such a place,

which it was certain, at that instant, was the same with itself, and no other.

From whence it follows, that one thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning;

it being impossible for two things of the same kind to be or exist in the same instant,

in the very same place; or one and the same thing in different places. That, therefore, that had one beginning,

is the same thing; and that which had a different beginning in time and place from that,

is not the same, but diverse. That which has made the difficulty about this relation

has been the little care and attention used in having precise notions of the things to which it is attributed.

18.Consciousness alone unites actions into the same Person.

But though the same immaterial substance or soul does not alone, wherever it be, and in whatsoever state,

make the same MAN; yet it is plain, consciousness, as far as ever it can be extended

— should it be to ages past — unites existences and actions very remote in time into the same PERSON,

as well as it does the existences and actions of the immediately preceding moment:

so that whatever has the consciousness of present and past actions,

is the same person to whom they both belong. Had I the same consciousness that I saw the ark and Noah’s flood,

as that I saw an overflowing of the Thames last winter, or as that I write now, I could no more doubt

that I who write this now, that saw the Thames overflowed last winter,

and that viewed the flood at the general deluge, was the same SELF,

— place that self in what SUBSTANCE you please — than that I who write this am the same MYSELF now

whilst I write (whether I consist of all the same substance material or immaterial, or no)

that I was yesterday. For as to this point of being the same self,

it matters not whether this present self be made up of the same or other substances —

I being as much concerned, and as justly accountable for any action that was done a thousand years since,

appropriated to me now by this self-consciousness, as I am for what I did the last moment.

21.Which shows wherein Personal identity consists.

This may show us wherein personal identity consists: not in the identity of substance, but,

as I have said, in the identity of consciousness,

wherein if Socrates and the present mayor of Queenborough agree, they are the same person:

if the same Socrates waking and sleeping do not partake of the same consciousness,

Socrates waking and sleeping is not the same person. And to punish Socrates waking for

what sleeping Socrates thought, and waking Socrates was never conscious of,

would be no more of right, than to punish one twin for what his brother-twin did,

whereof he knew nothing, because their outsides were so like, that they could not be distinguished;

for such twins have been seen.

But yet possibly it will still be objected, — Suppose I wholly lose the memory of some parts of my life,

beyond a possibility of retrieving them, so that perhaps I shall never be conscious of them again;

yet am I not the same person that did those actions, had those thoughts that I once was conscious of,

though I have now forgot them? To which I answer, that we must here take notice what the word Iis applied to;

which, in this case, is the MAN only. And the same man being presumed to be the same person,

I is easily here supposed to stand also for the same person.

But if it be possible for the same man to have distinct incommunicable consciousness at different times,

it is past doubt the same man would at different times make different persons; which, we see,

is the sense of mankind in the solemnest declaration of their opinions,

human laws not punishing the mad man for the sober man’s actions,

nor the sober man for what the mad man did,

— thereby making them two persons: which is somewhat explained by our way of speaking in English

when we say such an one is ‘not himself,’ or is ‘beside himself’; in which phrases it is insinuated,

as if those who now, or at least first used them, thought that self was changed;

the selfsame person was no longer in that man.

22.Difference between Identity of Man and of Person.

But yet it is hard to conceive that Socrates, the same individual man, should be two persons.

To help us a little in this, we must consider what is meant by Socrates, or the same individual MAN.

First, it must be either the same individual, immaterial, thinking substance;

in short, the same numerical soul, and nothing else.

Secondly, or the same animal, without any regard to an immaterial soul.

Thirdly, or the same immaterial spirit united to the same animal.
Now, take which of these suppositions you please,

it is impossible to make personal identity to consist in anything but consciousness;

or reach any further than that does.

For, by the first of them, it must be allowed possible that a man born of different women,

and in distant times, may be the same man. A way of speaking which, whoever admits,

must allow it possible for the same man to be two distinct persons,

as any two that have lived in different ages without the knowledge of one another’s thoughts.

By the second and third, Socrates, in this life and after it, cannot be the same man any way,

but by the same consciousness; and so making human identity to consist

in the same thing wherein we place personal identity,

there will be difficulty to allow the same man to be the same person.

But then they who place human identity in consciousness only, and not in something else,

must consider how they will make the infant Socrates the same man with Socrates after the resurrection.

But whatsoever to some men makes a man, and consequently the same individual man,

wherein perhaps few are agreed, personal identity can by us be placed in nothing but consciousness,

(which is that alone which makes what we call SELF,) without involving us in great absurdities.

OF OTHER RELATIONS.

15.Moral actions may be regarded wither absolutely, or as ideas of relation.

To conceive rightly of moral actions, we must take notice of them under this two-fold consideration.

First, as they are in themselves, each made up of such a collection of simple ideas. Thus drunkenness,

or lying, signify such or such a collection of simple ideas, which I call mixed modes:

and in this sense they are as much POSITIVE ABSOLUTE ideas, as the drinking of a horse,

or speaking of a parrot. Secondly, our actions are considered as good, bad, or indifferent;

and in this respect they are RELATIVE, it being their conformity to,

or disagreement with some rule that makes them to be regular or irregular, good or bad;

and so, as far as they are compared with a rule, and thereupon denominated, they come under relation.

Thus the challenging and fighting with a man, as it is a certain positive mode,

or particular sort of action, by particular ideas, distinguished from all others, is called DUELLING:

which, when considered in relation to the law of God, will deserve the name of sin; to the law of fashion,

in some countries, valour and virtue; and to the municipal laws of some governments, a capital crime.

In this case, when the positive mode has one name, and another name as it stands in relation to the law,

the distinction may as easily be observed as it is in substances, where one name, v.g. MAN,

is used to signify the thing; another, v.g. FATHER, to signify the relation.

OF CLEAR AND OBSCURE, DISTINCT AND CONFUSED IDEAS.

2.Clear and obscure explained by Sight.

The perception of the mind being most aptly explained by words relating to the sight,

we shall best understand what is meant by CLEAR and OBSCURE in our ideas,

by reflecting on what we call clear and obscure in the objects of sight.

Light being that which discovers to us visible objects, we give the name of OBSCURE to that

which is not placed in a light sufficient to discover minutely to us the figure and colours

which are observable in it, and which, in a better light, would be discernible. In like manner,

our simple ideas are CLEAR,

when they are such as the objects themselves from whence they were taken did or might,

in a well-ordered sensation or perception, present them. Whilst the memory retains them thus,

and can produce them to the mind whenever it has occasion to consider them, they are clear ideas.

So far as they either want anything of the original exactness, or have lost any of their first freshness,

and are, as it were, faded or tarnished by time, so far are they obscure. Complex ideas,

as they are made up of simple ones, so they are clear, when the ideas that go to their composition are clear,

and the number and order of those simple ideas that are the ingredients of any complex one is determinate and certain.

3.Causes of Obscurity.

The causes of obscurity, in simple ideas, seem to be either dull organs; or very slight

and transient impressions made by the objects; or else a weakness in the memory,

not able to retain them as received. For to return again to visible objects, to help us to apprehend this matter.

If the organs, or faculties of perception, like wax over-hardened with cold,

will not receive the impression of the seal, from the usual impulse wont to imprint it; or,

like wax of a temper too soft, will not hold it well, when well imprinted;

or else supposing the wax of a temper fit, but the seal not applied with a sufficient force

to make a clear impression: in any of these cases, the print left by the seal will be obscure.

This, I suppose, needs no application to make it plainer.

13.Complex Ideas may be distinct in one Part, and confused in another.

Our complex ideas, being made up of collections, and so variety of simple ones,

may accordingly be very clear and distinct in one part, and very obscure and confused in another.

In a man who speaks of a chiliaedron, or a body of a thousand sides,

the ideas of the figure may be very confused, though that of the number be very distinct;

so that he being able to discourse and demonstrate concerning that part of his complex idea

which depends upon the number of thousand, he is apt to think he has a distinct idea of a chiliaedron;

though it be plain he has no precise idea of its figure, so as to distinguish it, by that,

from one that has but 999 sides: the not observing whereof causes no small error

in men’s thoughts, and confusion in their discourses.

14.This, if not heeded, causes Confusion in our Arguings.

He that thinks he has a distinct idea of the figure of a chiliaedron,

let him for trial sake take another parcel of the same uniform matter, viz. gold or wax of an equal bulk,

and make it into a figure of 999 sides. He will, I doubt not,

be able to distinguish these two ideas one from another, by the number of sides;

and reason and argue distinctly about them, whilst he keeps his thoughts

and reasoning to that part only of these ideas which is contained in their numbers;

as that the sides of the one could be divided into two equal numbers, and of the others not, &c.

But when he goes about to distinguish them by their figure, he will there be presently at a loss,

and not be able, I think, to frame in his mind two ideas, one of them distinct from the other,

by the bare figure of these two pieces of gold; as he could,

if the same parcels of gold were made one into a cube, the other a figure of five sides.

In which incomplete ideas, we are very apt to impose on ourselves, and wrangle with others,

especially where they have particular and familiar names. For,

being satisfied in that part of the idea which we have clear; and the name which is familiar to us,

being applied to the whole, containing that part also which is imperfect and obscure,

we are apt to use it for that confused part,

and draw deductions from it in the obscure part of its signification, as confidently as we do from the other.

15.Instance in Eternity.

Having frequently in our mouths the name Eternity,

we are apt to think we have a positive comprehensive idea of it,

which is as much as to say, that there is no part of that duration which is not clearly contained in our idea.

It is true that he that thinks so may have a clear idea of duration;

he may also have a clear idea of a very great length of duration;

he may also have a clear idea of the comparison of that great one with still a greater:

but it not being possible for him to include in his idea of any duration, let it be as great as it will,

the WHOLE EXTENT TOGETHER OF A DURATION, WHERE HE SUPPOSES NO END,

that part of his idea, which is still beyond the bounds of that large duration he represents to his own thoughts,

is very obscure and undetermined. And hence it is that in disputes and reasonings concerning eternity,

or any other infinite, we are very apt to blunder, and involve ourselves in manifest absurdities.

OF REAL AND FANTASTICAL IDEAS.

2.Simple Ideas are all real appearances of things.

First, Our SIMPLE IDEAS are all real, all agree to the reality of things:

not that they are all of them the images or representations of what does exist;

the contrary whereof, in all but the primary qualities of bodies, hath been already shown.

But, though whiteness and coldness are no more in snow than pain is; yet those ideas of whiteness and coldness,

pain, &c., being in us the effects of powers in things without us,

ordained by our Maker to produce in us such sensations; they are real ideas in us,

whereby we distinguish the qualities that are really in things themselves. For,

these several appearances being designed to be the mark whereby we are to know and distinguish things

which we have to do with, our ideas do as well serve us to that purpose, and are as real distinguishing characters,

whether they be only CONSTANT EFFECTS, or else EXACT RESEMBLANCES of something

in the things themselves: the reality lying in that steady correspondence

they have with the distinct constitutions of real beings. But whether they answer to those constitutions,

as to causes or patterns, it matters not; it suffices that they are constantly produced by them.

And thus our simple ideas are all real and true, because they answer and agree to those powers of things

which produce them on our minds; that being all that is requisite to make them real,

and not fictions at pleasure. For in simple ideas (as has been shown) the mind is wholly confined

to the operation of things upon it, and can make to itself no simple idea, more than what it was received.

4.Mixed Modes and Relations, made of consistent Ideas, are real.

Secondly, MIXED MODES and RELATIONS, having no other reality

but what they have in the minds of men, there is nothing more required to this kind of ideas to make them real,

but that they be so framed, that there be a possibility of existing conformable to them.

These ideas themselves, being archetypes, cannot differ from their archetypes, and so cannot be chimerical,

unless any one will jumble together in them inconsistent ideas. Indeed,

as any of them have the names of a known language assigned to them,

by which he that has them in his mind would signify them to others,

so bare possibility of existing is not enough; they must have a conformity to the ordinary signification

of the name that is given them, that they may not be thought fantastical:

as if a man would give the name of justice to that idea which common use calls liberality.

But this fantasticalness relates more to propriety of speech, than reality of ideas.

For a man to be undisturbed in danger, sedately to consider what is fittest to be done,

and to execute it steadily, is a mixed mode, or a complex idea of an action which may exist.

But to be undisturbed in danger, without using one’s reason or industry, is what is also possible to be;

and so is as real an idea as the other. Though the first of these, having the name COURAGE given to it,

may, in respect of that name, be a right or wrong idea; but the other,

whilst it has not a common received name of any known language assigned to it,

is not capable of any deformity, being made with no reference to anything but itself.

OF ADEQUATE AND INADEQUATE IDEAS.

4.Modes, in reference to settled Names, may be inadequate.

Indeed another coming after, and in conversation learning from him the word COURAGE,

may make an idea, to which he gives the name courage, different from what the first author applied it to,

and has in his mind when he uses it. And in this case,

if he designs that his idea in thinking should be conformable to the other’s idea,

as the name he uses in speaking is conformable in sound to his from whom he learned it,

his idea may be very wrong and inadequate: because in this case,

making the other man’s idea the pattern of his idea in thinking, as the other man’s word

or sound is the pattern of his in speaking, his idea is so far defective and inadequate,

as it is distant from the archetype and pattern he refers it to,

and intends to express and signify by the name he uses for it;

which name he would have to be a sign of the other man’s idea,

(to which, in its proper use, it is primarily annexed,) and of his own, as agreeing to it:

to which if his own does not exactly correspond, it is faulty and inadequate.

10.Substances have innumerable powers not contained in our complex ideas of them

But no one who hath considered the properties of bodies in general, or this sort in particular,

can doubt that this, called GOLD, has infinite other properties not contained in that complex idea.

Some who have examined this species more accurately could, I believe,

enumerate ten times as many properties in gold, all of them as inseparable from its internal constitution,

as its colour or weight: and it is probable,

if any one knew all the properties that are by divers men known of this metal,

there would be an hundred times as many ideas go to the complex idea of gold as any one man yet has in his;

and yet perhaps that not be the thousandth part of what is to be discovered in it.

The changes that that one body is apt to receive, and make in other bodies, upon a due application,

exceeding far not only what we know, but what we are apt to imagine.

Which will not appear so much a paradox to any one who will but consider how far men are yet

from knowing all the properties of that one,no very compound figure, a triangle;

though it be no small number that are already by mathematicians discovered of it.

OF TRUE AND FALSE IDEAS.

1.Truth and Falsehood properly belong to Propositions, not to Ideas

Though truth and falsehood belong, in propriety of speech, only to PROPOSITIONS:

yet IDEAS are oftentimes termed true or false (as what words are there that are not used with great latitude,

and with some deviation from their strict and proper significations?)

Though I think that when ideas themselves are termed true or false, there is still some secret or tacit proposition,

which is the foundation of that denomination: as we shall see, if we examine the particular occasions

wherein they come to be called true or false. In all which we shall find some kind of affirmation or negation,

which is the reason of that denomination. For our ideas, being nothing but bare APPEARANCES,

or perceptions in our minds, cannot properly and simply in themselves be said to be true or false,

no more than a single name of anything can be said to be true or false.

2.Ideas and words may be said to be true, inasmuch as they really are ideas and words.

Indeed both ideas and words may be said to be true, in a metaphysical sense of the word truth;

as all other things that any way exist are said to be true, i.e. really to be such as they exist.

Though in things called true, even in that sense, there is perhaps a secret reference to our ideas,

looked upon as the standards of that truth; which amounts to a mental proposition,

though it be usually not taken notice of.

3.No Idea, as an Appearance in the Mind, either true or false.

But it is not in that metaphysical sense of truth which we inquire here, when we examine,

whether our ideas are capable of being true or false, but in the more ordinary acceptation of those words:

and so I say that the ideas in our minds, being only so many perceptions or appearances there,

none of them are false; the idea of a centaur having no more falsehood in it when it appears in our minds,

than the name centaur has falsehood in it, when it is pronounced by our mouths, or written on paper.

For truth or falsehood lying always in some affirmation or negation, mental or verbal,

our ideas are not capable, any of them, of being false, till the mind passes some judgment on them;

that is, affirms or denies something of them.

4.Ideas referred to anything extraneous to them may be true or false.

Whenever the mind refers any of its ideas to anything extraneous to them,

they are then capable to be called true or false. Because the mind, in such a reference,

makes a tacit supposition of their conformity to that thing; which supposition,

as it happens to be true or false, so the ideas themselves come to be denominated.

The most usual cases wherein this happens, are these following:

7.Names of things supposed to carry in them knowledge of their essences.

If therefore we will warily attend to the motions of the mind,

and observe what course it usually takes in its way to knowledge, we shall I think find,

that the mind having got an idea which it thinks it may have use of either in contemplation or discourse,

the first thing it does is to abstract it, and then get a name to it; ans so lay it up in its storehouse,

the memory, as containing the essence of a sort of things, of which that name is always to be the mark.

Hence it is, that we may often observe that, when any one sees a new thing of a kind that he knows not,

he presently asks, what it is; meaning by that inquiry nothing but the name.

As if the name carried with it the knowledge of the species, or the essence of it;

whereof it is indeed used as the mark, and is generally supposed annexed to it.

8.How men suppose that their ideas must correspond to things, and to the customary meanings of names.

But this ABSTRACT IDEA, being something in the mind, between the thing that exists,

and the name that is given to it; it is in our ideas that both the rightness of our knowledge,

and the propriety and intelligibleness of our speaking, consists.

And hence it is that men are so forward to suppose, that the abstract ideas they have in their minds are

such as agree to the things existing without them, to which they are referred;

and are the same also to which the names they give them do by the use and propriety of

that language belong. For without this double conformity of their ideas,

they find they should both think amiss of things in themselves, and talk of them unintelligibly to others.

9.Simple Ideas may be false, in reference to others of the same Name, but are least liable to be so.

First, then, I say, that when the truth of our ideas is judged of by the conformity they

have to the ideas which other men have, and commonly signify by the same name,

they may be any of them false. But yet SIMPLE IDEAS are least of all liable to be so mistaken.

Because a man, by his senses and every day’s observation, may easily satisfy himself

what the simple ideas are which their several names that are in common use stand for;

they being but few in number, and such as, if he doubts or mistakes in, he may easily rectify

by the objects they are to be found in. Therefore it is seldom that any one mistakes in his names of simple ideas,

or applies the name red to the idea green, or the name sweet to the idea bitter:

much less are men apt to confound the names of ideas belonging to different senses,

and call a colour by the name of a taste, &c. Whereby it is evident that the simple ideas they call

by any name are commonly the same that others have and mean when they use the same names.

10.Ideas of mixed Modes most liable to be false in this Sense.

Complex ideas are much more liable to be false in this respect; and the complex ideas of MIXED MODES,

much more than those of substances; because in substances (especially those which the common

and unborrowed names of any language are applied to) some remarkable sensible qualities, serving

ordinarily to distinguish one sort from another, easily preserve those who take any care in the use of their words,

from applying them to sorts of substances to which they do not at all belong.

But in mixed modes we are much more uncertain; it being not so easy to determine of several actions,

whether they are to be called JUSTICE or CRUELTY, LIBERALITY or PRODIGALITY.

And so in referring our ideas to those of other men, called by the same names, ours may be false;

and the idea in our minds, which we express by the word JUSTICE,

may perhaps be that which ought to have another name.

20.Ideas in themselves neither true nor false.

Any idea, then, which we have in our minds, whether conformable or not to the existence of things,

or to any idea in the minds of other men, cannot properly for this alone be called false.

For these representations, if they have nothing in them but what is really existing in things without,

cannot be thought false, being exact representations of something: nor yet if they have anything

in them differing from the reality of things, can they properly be said to be false representations,

or ideas of things they do not represent. But the mistake and falsehood is:

But are false — 1. When judged agreeable to another Man’s Idea, without beiFirst,

when the mind having any idea, it JUDGES and concludes it the same that is in other men’s minds,

signified by the same name; or that it is conformable to the ordinary received signification

or definition of that word, when indeed it is not: which is the most usual mistake in mixed modes,

though other ideas also are liable to it.

Secondly, When judged to agree to real Existence, when they do not.

(2) When it having a complex idea made up of such a collection of simple ones as nature never puts together,

it JUDGES it to agree to a species of creatures really existing; as when it joins the weight of tin to the colour,

fusibility, and fixedness of gold.

Thirdly, When judged adequate, without being so.

(3) When in its complex idea it has united a certain number of simple ideas that do really exist together

in some sort of creatures, but has also left out others as much inseparable,

it JUDGES this to be a perfect complete idea of a sort of things which really it is not; v.g.

having joined the ideas of substance, yellow, malleable, most heavy, and fusible,

it takes that complex idea to be the complete idea of gold, when yet its peculiar fixedness,

and solubility in AQUA REGIA, are as inseparable from those other ideas, or qualities,

of that body as they are one from another.

Fourthly, When judged to represent the real Essence.

(4) The mistake is yet greater, when I JUDGE that this complex idea contains in it the real essence

of any body existing; when at least it contains but some few of those properties which flow

from its real essence and constitution. I say only some few of those properties;

for those properties consisting mostly in the active and passive powers it has in reference to other things,

all that are vulgarly known of any one body, of which the complex idea of that kind of things is usually made,

are but a very few, in comparison of what a man that has several ways tried

and examined it knows of that one sort of things; and all that the most expert man knows are but a few,

in comparison of what are really in that body, and depend on its internal or essential constitution.

The essence of a triangle lies in a very little compass, consists in a very few ideas: three lines including

a space make up that essence:

but the properties that flow from this essence are more than can be easily known

r enumerated. So I imagine it is in substances; their real essences lie in a little compass,

though the properties flowing from that internal constitution are endless.

OF THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS.

1.Something unreasonable in most Men.

There is scarce any one that does not observe something that seems odd to him,

and is in itself really extravagant, in the opinions, reasonings, and actions of other men.

The least flaw of this kind, if at all different from his own, every one is quick-sighted

enough to espy in another, and will by the authority of reason forwardly condemn;

though he be guilty of much greater unreasonableness in his own tenets and conduct,

which he never perceives, and will very hardly, if at all, be convinced of.

11.Another instance.

A man receives a sensible injury from another, thinks on the man and that action over and over,

and by ruminating on them strongly, or much, in his mind, so cements those two ideas together,

that he makes them almost one; never thinks on the man,

but the pain and displeasure he suffered comes into his mind with it,

so that he scarce distinguishes them, but has as much an aversion for the one as the other.

Thus hatreds are often begotten from slight and innocent occasions,

and quarrels propagated and continued in the world.

12.A third instance.

A man has suffered pain or sickness in any place; he saw his friend die in such a room:

though these have in nature nothing to do one with another,

yet when the idea of the place occurs to his mind, it brings (the impression being once made)

that of the pain and displeasure with it: he confounds them in his mind,

and can as little bear the one as the other.

13.Why Time cures some Disorders in the Mind, which Reason cannot cure.

When this combination is settled, and while it lasts, it is not in the power of reason to help us,

and relieve us from the effects of it. Ideas in our minds, when they are there,

will operate according to their natures and circumstances.

And here we see the cause why time cures certain affections, which reason, though in the right,

and allowed to be so, has not power over, nor is able against them to prevail with those

who are apt to hearken to it in other cases. The death of a child that was the daily delight of its mother’s eyes,

and joy of her soul, rends from her heart the whole comfort of her life,

and gives her all the torment imaginable: use the consolations of reason in this case,

and you were as good preach ease to one on the rack, and hope to allay, by rational discourses,

the pain of his joints tearing asunder. Till time has by disuse separated the sense of that enjoyment and its loss,

from the idea of the child returning to her memory, all representations, though ever so reasonable,

are in vain; and therefore some in whom the union between these ideas is never dissolved,

spend their lives in mourning, and carry an incurable sorrow to their graves.

14.Another instance of the Effect of the Association of Ideas.

A friend of mine knew one perfectly cured of madness by a very harsh and offensive operation.

The gentleman who was thus recovered, with great sense of gratitude

and acknowledgment owned the cure all his life after, as the greatest obligation he could have received;

but, whatever gratitude and reason suggested to him, he could never bear the sight of the operator:

that image brought back with it the idea of that agony which he suffered from his hands,

which was too mighty and intolerable for him to endure.

15.More instances.

Many children, imputing the pain they endured at school to their books they were corrected for,

so join those ideas together, that a book becomes their aversion, and they are never reconciled

to the study and use of them all their lives after; and thus reading becomes a torment to them,

which otherwise possibly they might have made the great pleasure of their lives.

There are rooms convenient enough, that some men cannot study in, and fashions of vessels,

which, though ever so clean and commodious, they cannot drink out of,

and that by reason of some accidental ideas which are annexed to them, and make them offensive;

and who is there that hath not observed some man to flag at the appearance,

or in the company of some certain person not otherwise superior to him, but because,

having once on some occasion got the ascendant, the idea of authority and distance

goes along with that of the person, and he that has been thus subjected, is not able to separate them.

16.A curious instance.

Instances of this kind are so plentiful everywhere, that if I add one more,

it is only for the pleasant oddness of it. It is of a young gentleman, who, having learnt to dance,

and that to great perfection, there happened to stand an old trunk in the room where he learnt.

The idea of this remarkable piece of household stuff had so mixed itself with the turns

and steps of all his dances, that though in that chamber he could dance excellently well,

yet it was only whilst that trunk was there; nor could he perform well in any other place,

unless that or some such other trunk had its due position in the room.

If this story shall be suspected to be dressed up with some comical circumstances,

a little beyond precise nature, I answer for myself

that I had it some years since from a very sober and worthy man, upon his own knowledge,

as I report it; and I dare say there are very few inquisitive persons who read this,

who have not met with accounts, if not examples, of this nature, that may parallel, or at least justify this.

BOOK III. OF WORDS

OF THE SIGNIFICATION OF WORDS.

2.Words, in their immediate Signification, are the sensible Signs of his Ideas who uses them.

The use men have of these marks being either to record their own thoughts,

for the assistance of their own memory; or, as it were, to bring out their ideas,

and lay them before the view of others: words, in their primary or immediate signification,

stand for nothing but THE IDEAS IN THE MIND OF HIM THAT USES THEM,

how imperfectly soever or carelessly those ideas are collected from the things

which they are supposed to represent.

When a man speaks to another, it is that he may be understood: and the end of speech is, that those sounds,

as marks, may make known his ideas to the hearer.

That then which words are the marks of are the ideas of the speaker:

nor can any one apply them as marks, immediately, to anything else but the ideas that he himself hath:

for this would be to make them signs of his own conceptions, and yet apply them to other ideas;

which would be to make them signs and not signs of his ideas at the same time;

and so in effect to have no signification at all. Words being voluntary signs,

they cannot be voluntary signs imposed by him on things he knows not.

That would be to make them signs of nothing,

sounds without signification. A man cannot make his words the signs either of qualities in things,

or of conceptions in the mind of another, whereof he has none in his own. Till he has some ideas of his own,

he cannot suppose them to correspond with the conceptions of another man; nor can he use any signs for them:

for thus they would be the signs of he knows not what, which is in truth to be the signs of nothing.

But when he represents to himself other men’s ideas by some of his own,

if he consent to give them the same names that other men do, it is still to his own ideas;

to ideas that he has, and not to ideas that he has not.

OF GENERAL TERMS.

2.That every particular Thing should have a Name for itself is impossible.

First, It is impossible that every particular thing should have a distinct peculiar name. For,

the signification and use of words depending on that connexion

which the mind makes between its ideas and the sounds it uses as signs of them, it is necessary,

in the application of names to things, that the mind should have distinct ideas of the things,

and retain also the particular name that belongs to every one, with its peculiar appropriation to that idea.

But it is beyond the power of human capacity to frame and retain distinct ideas of all the particular things

we meet with: every bird and beast men saw; every tree and plant that affected the senses,

could not find a place in the most capacious understanding.

If it be looked on as an instance of a prodigious memory, that some generals have been able to

call every soldier in their army by his proper name, we may easily find a reason

why men have never attempted to give names to each sheep in their flock,

or crow that flies over their heads; much less to call every leaf of plants,

or grain of sand that came in their way, by a peculiar name.

20.Recapitulation.

To conclude. This is that which in short I would say, viz. that all the great business of GENERA and SPECIES,

and their ESSENCES, amounts to no more but this: — That men making abstract ideas,

and settling them in their minds with names annexed to them, do thereby enable themselves to consider things,

and discourse of them, as it were in bundles, for the easier and readier improvement

and communication of their knowledge, which would advance but slowly were their words

and thoughts confined only to particulars.

OF THE NAMES OF SIMPLE IDEAS.

8.Instances: Scholastic definitions of Motion.

The not observing this difference in our ideas, and their names, has produced that eminent trifling in the schools,

which is so easy to be observed in the definitions they give us of some few of these simple ideas.

For, as to the greatest part of them, even those masters of definitions were fain to leave them untouched,

merely by the impossibility they found in it. What more exquisite jargon could the wit of man invent,

than this definition:— ‘The act of a being in power, as far forth as in power;’

which would puzzle any rational man,

to whom it was not already known by its famous absurdity,

to guess what word it could ever be supposed to be the explication of. If Tully,

asking a Dutchman what BEWEEGINGE was, should have received this explication in his own language,

that it was ‘actus entis in potentia quatenus in potentia;’ I ask whether any one can imagine he could thereby

have understood what the word BEWEEGINGE signified,

or have guessed what idea a Dutchman ordinarily had in his mind, and would signify to another,

when he used that sound?

OF THE NAMES OF SUBSTANCES.

3.The nominal and real Essence different.

For, though perhaps voluntary motion, with sense and reason, joined to a body of a certain shape,

be the complex idea to which I and others annex the name MAN,

and so be the nominal essence of the species so called: yet nobody will say that complex idea is the real essence

and source of all those operations which are to be found in any individual of that sort.

The foundation of all those qualities which are the ingredients of our complex idea,

is something quite different: and had we such a knowledge of that constitution of man;

from which his faculties of moving, sensation, and reasoning, and other powers flow,

and on which his so regular shape depends, as it is possible angels have, and it is certain his Maker has,

we should have a quite other idea of his essence than what now is contained in our definition of that species,

be it what it will: and our idea of any individual man would be as far different from what it is now,

as is his who knows all the springs and wheels and other contrivances within of the famous clock at Strasburg,

from that which a gazing countryman has of it, who barely sees the motion of the hand,

and hears the clock strike, and observes only some of the outward appearances.

13.The Nominal Essence that of the Species, as conceived by us, proved from Water and Ice.

But to return to the species of corporeal substances.

If I should ask any one whether ice and water were two distinct species of things,

I doubt not but I should be answered in the affirmative: and it cannot be denied but he

that says they are two distinct species is in the right. But if an Englishman bred in Jamaica,

who perhaps had never seen nor heard of ice, coming into England in the winter,

find the water he put in his basin at night in a great part frozen in the morning, and,

not knowing any peculiar name it had, should call it hardened water;

I ask whether this would be a new species to him, different from water? And I think it would be answered here,

It would not be to him a new species, no more than congealed jelly, when it is cold,

is a distinct species from the same jelly fluid and warm; or than liquid gold in the furnace

is a distinct species from hard gold in the hands of a workman. And if this be so,

it is plain that OUR DISTINCT SPECIES are NOTHING BUT DISTINCT COMPLEX IDEAS,

WITH DISTINCT NAMES ANNEXED TO THEM.

It is true every substance that exists has its peculiar constitution, whereon depend those sensible qualities

and powers we observe in it; but the ranking of things into species

(which is nothing but sorting them under several titles) is done by us according to the ideas

that WE have of them: which, though sufficient to distinguish them by names,

so that we may be able to discourse of them when we have them not present before us;

yet if we suppose it to be done by their real internal constitutions,

and that things existing are distinguished by nature into species, by real essences,

according as we distinguish them into species by names, we shall be liable to great mistakes.

39.How Genera and Species are related to naming.

How much the making of species and genera is in order to general names;

and how much general names are necessary, if not to the being, yet at least to the completing of a species,

and making it pass for such, will appear, besides what has been said above concerning ice and water,

in a very familiar example. A silent and a striking watch are but one species,

to those who have but one name for them: but he that has the name WATCH for one,

and CLOCK for the other, and distinct complex ideas to which those names belong,

to HIM they are different species. It will be said perhaps,

that the inward contrivance and constitution is different between these two,

which the watchmaker has a clear idea of. And yet it is plain they are but one species to him,

when he has but one name for them. For what is sufficient in the inward contrivance to make a new species?

There are some watches that are made with four wheels, others with five;

is this a specific difference to the workman? Some have strings and physics, and others none;

some have the balance loose, and others regulated by a spiral spring, and others by hogs’ bristles.

Are any or all of these enough to make a specific difference to the workman,

that knows each of these and several other different contrivances in the internal constitutions of watches?

It is certain each of these hath a real difference from the rest; but whether it be an essential,

a specific difference or no, relates only to the complex idea to which the name watch is given:

as long as they all agree in the idea which that name stands for,

and that name does not as a generical name comprehend different species under it,

they are not essentially nor specifically different. But if any one will make minuter divisions,

from differences that he knows in the internal frame of watches,

and to such precise complex ideas give names that shall prevail; they will then be new species,

to them who have those ideas with names to them,

and can by those differences distinguish watches into these several sorts;

and then WATCH will be a generical name.

But yet they would be no distinct species to men ignorant of clock-work,

and the inward contrivances of watches, who had no other idea but the outward shape and bulk,

with the marking of the hours by the hand.

For to them all those other names would be but synonymous terms for the same idea,

and signify no more, nor no otherthing but a watch. Just thus I think it is in natural things.

Nobody will doubt that the wheels or springs (if I may so say) within,

are different in a RATIONAL MAN and a CHANGELING; no more than that

there is a difference in the frame between a DRILL and a CHANGELING.

But whether one or both these differences be essential or specifical,

is only to be known to us by their agreement or disagreement with the complex idea

that the name man stands for: for by that alone can it be determined whether one, or both,

or neither of those be a man.

OF THE IMPERFECTION OF WORDS.

22.This should teach us Moderation in imposing our own Sense of old Authors.

Sure I am that the signification of words in all languages, depending very much on the thoughts,

notions, and ideas of him that uses them, must unavoidably be of great uncertainty

to men of the same language and country. This is so evident in the Greek authors,

that he that shall peruse their writings will find in almost every one of them, a distinct language,

though the same words. But when to this natural difficulty in every country, there shall be

added different countries and remote ages, wherein the speakers and writers had very different notions,

tempers, customs, ornaments, and figures of speech, &c.,

every one of which influenced the signification of their words then, though to us now they are lost and unknown;

it would become us to be charitable one to another in our interpretations or misunderstandings

of those ancient writings; which, though of great concernment to be understood,

are liable to the unavoidable difficulties of speech, which (if we except the names of simple ideas,

and some very obvious things) is not capable, without a constant defining the terms,

of conveying the sense and intention of the speaker, without any manner of doubt and uncertainty to the hearer.

And in discourses of religion, law, and morality, as they are matters of the highest concernment,

so there will be the greatest difficulty.

OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS.

2.First, Words are often employed without any, or without clear Ideas.

FIRST, In this kind the first and most palpable abuse is, the using of words without clear and distinct ideas;

or, which is worse, signs without anything signified. Of these there are two sorts: — I.

Some words introduced without clear ideas annexed to them, even in their first original.

One may observe, in all languages, certain words that, if they be examined,

will be found in their first original, and their appropriated use, not to stand for any clear and distinct ideas.

These, for the most part, the several sects of philosophy and religion have introduced.

For their authors or promoters, either affecting something singular,

and out of the way of common apprehensions, or to support some strange opinions,

or cover some weakness of their hypothesis, seldom fail to coin new words, and such as,

when they come to be examined, may justly be called INSIGNIFICANT TERMS. For,

having either had no determinate collection of ideas annexed to them when they were first invented;

or at least such as, if well examined, will be found inconsistent, it is no wonder, if, afterwards,

in the vulgar use of the same party, they remain empty sounds, with little or no signification,

amongst those who think it enough to have them often in their mouths,

as the distinguishing characters of their Church or School, without much troubling their heads to examine

what are the precise ideas they stand for. I shall not need here to heap up instances;

every man’s reading and conversation will sufficiently furnish him. Or if he wants to be better stored,

the great mint-masters of this kind of terms, I mean the Schoolmen and Metaphysicians

(under which I think the disputing natural and moral philosophers of these latter ages may be comprehended)

have wherewithal abundantly to content him.

34.Seventhly, Language is often abused by Figurative Speech.

Since wit and fancy find easier entertainment in the world than dry truth and real knowledge,

figurative speeches and allusion in language will hardly be admitted as an imperfection or abuse of it.

I confess, in discourses where we seek rather pleasure and delight than information and improvement,

such ornaments as are borrowed from them can scarce pass for faults.

But yet if we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that all the art of rhetoric,

besides order and clearness; all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented,

are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment;

and so indeed are perfect cheats: and therefore, however laudable or allowable oratory may render

them in harangues and popular addresses, they are certainly, in all discourses that pretend to inform or instruct,

wholly to be avoided; and where truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault,

either of the language or person that makes use of them. What and how various they are,

will be superfluous here to take notice; the books of rhetoric which abound in the world,

will instruct those who want to be informed: only I cannot but observe how little the preservation

and improvement of truth and knowledge is the care and concern of mankind;

since the arts of fallacy are endowed and preferred. It is evident how much men love to deceive and be deceived,

since rhetoric, that powerful instrument of error and deceit, has its established professors,

is publicly taught, and has always been had in great reputation:

and I doubt not but it will be thought great boldness, if not brutality, in me to have said thus much against it.

Eloquence, like the fair sex, has too prevailing beauties in it to suffer itself ever to be spoken against.

And it is in vain to find fault with those arts of deceiving, wherein men find pleasure to be deceived.

OF THE REMEDIES OF THE FOREGOING IMPERFECTIONS AND ABUSES OF WORDS.

8.Remedies.

First Remedy: To use no Word without an Idea annexed to it.

First, A man shall take care to use no word without a signification,

no name without an idea for which he makes it stand. This rule will not seem altogether needless to

any one who shall take the pains to recollect how often he has met with such words as INSTINCT,

SYMPATHY, and ANTIPATHY, &c., in the discourse of others,

so made use of as he might easily conclude that those that used them had no ideas in their minds to

which they applied them, but spoke them only as sounds, which usually served instead of reasons

on the like occasions. Not but that these words, and the like, have very proper significations in

which they may be used; but there being no natural connexion between any words and any ideas,

these, and any other, may be learned by rote, and pronounced or writ by men who have no ideas

in their minds to which they have annexed them, and for which they make them stand;

which is necessary they should, if men would speak intelligibly even to themselves alone.

9.Second Remedy: To have distinct, determinate Ideas annexed to Words, especially in mixed Modes.

Secondly, It is not enough a man uses his words as signs of some ideas: those he annexes them to,

if they be simple, must be clear and distinct; if complex, must be determinate, i.e.

the precise collection of simple ideas settled in the mind, with that sound annexed to it,

as the sign of that precise determined collection, and no other. This is very necessary in names of modes,

and especially moral words; which, having no settled objects in nature, from whence their ideas are taken,

as from their original, are apt to be very confused. JUSTICE is a word in every man’s mouth,

but most commonly with a very undetermined, loose signification; which will always be so,

unless a man has in his mind a distinct comprehension of the component parts

that complex idea consists of and if it be decompounded,

must be able to resolve it still only till he at last comes to the simple ideas that make it up:

and unless this be done, a man makes an ill use of the word, let it be justice, for example, or any other.

I do not say, a man needs stand to recollect, and make this analysis at large,

every time the word justice comes in his way: but this at least is necessary,

that he have so examined the signification of that name, and settled the idea of all its parts in his mind,

that he can do it when he pleases. If any one who makes his complex idea of justice to be,

such a treatment of the person or goods of another as is according to law, hath not a clear and distinct idea

what LAW is, which makes a part of his complex idea of justice,

it is plain his idea of justice itself will be confused and imperfect. This exactness will, perhaps,

be judged very troublesome; and therefore most men will think they may be excused

from settling the complex ideas of mixed modes so precisely in their minds. But yet I must say,

till this be done, it must not be wondered,

that they have a great deal of obscurity and confusion in their own minds,

and a great deal of wrangling in their discourse with others.

BOOK IV. OF KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITY SYNOPSIS OF THE FOURTH BOOK.

OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL.

9.Habitual Knowledge is of two degrees.

Of habitual knowledge there are, also, vulgarly speaking, two degrees:

First, The one is of such truths laid up in the memory as,

whenever they occur to the mind, it ACTUALLY PERCEIVES THE RELATION is between those ideas.

And this is in all those truths whereof we have an intuitive knowledge; where the ideas themselves,

by an immediate view, discover their agreement or disagreement one with anotherSecondly,

The other is of such truths whereof the mind having been convinced,

it RETAINS THE MEMORY OF THE CONVICTION, WITHOUT THE PROOFS.

Thus, a man that remembers certainly that he once perceived the demonstration,

that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, is certain that he knows it,

because he cannot doubt the truth of it. In his adherence to a truth,

where the demonstration by which it was at first known is forgot, though a man may be thought

rather to believe his memory than really to know,

and this way of entertaining a truth seemed formerly to me like something between opinion and knowledge;

a sort of assurance which exceeds bare belief, for that relies on the testimony of another;

— yet upon a due examination I find it comes not short of perfect certainty, and is in effect true knowledge.

That which is apt to mislead our first thoughts into a mistake in this matter is,

that the agreement or disagreement of the ideas in this case is not perceived, as it was at first,

by an actual view of all the intermediate ideas whereby the agreement or disagreement

of those in the proposition was at first perceived; but by other intermediate ideas,

that show the agreement or disagreement of the ideas contained in the proposition

whose certainty we remember. For example: in this proposition,

that ‘the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones,’

one who has seen and clearly perceived the demonstration of this truth knows it to be

true, when that demonstration is gone out of his mind; so that at present it is not actually in view,

and possibly cannot be recollected: but he knows it in a different way from what he did before.

The agreement of the two ideas joined in that proposition is perceived;

but it is by the intervention of other ideas than those which at first produced that perception.

He remembers, i.e. he knows (for remembrance is but the reviving of some past knowledge)

that he was once certain of the truth of this proposition,

that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones.

The immutability of the same relations between the same immutable things is now the idea that shows him,

that if the three angles of a triangle were once equal to two right ones,

they will always be equal to two right ones. And hence he comes to be certain,

that what was once true in the case, is always true; what ideas once agreed will always agree;

and consequently what he once knew to be true, he will always know to be true;

as long as he can remember that he once knew it. Upon this ground it is,

that particular demonstrations in mathematics afford general knowledge. If then the perception,

that the same ideas will ETERNALLY have the same habitudes and relations,

be not a sufficient ground of knowledge, there could be no knowledge of general propositions in mathematics;

for no mathematical demonstration would be any other than particular:

and when a man had demonstrated any proposition concerning one triangle or circle,

his knowledge would not reach beyond that particular diagram. If he would extend it further,

he must renew his demonstration in another instance, before he could know it to be true in another like triangle,

and so on: by which means one could never come to the knowledge of any general propositions.

Nobody, I think, can deny, that Mr. Newton certainly knows any proposition that he now

at any time reads in his book to be true; though he has not in actual view that admirable chain

of intermediate ideas whereby he at first discovered it to be true. Such a memory as that,

able to retain such a train of particulars, may be well thought beyond the reach of human faculties,

when the very discovery, perception, and laying together that wonderful connexion of ideas,

is found to surpass most readers’ comprehension.

But yet it is evident the author himself knows the proposition to be true,

remembering he once saw the connexion of those ideas; as certainly as he knows such a man wounded another,

remembering that he saw him run him through.

But because the memory is not always so clear as actual perception,

and does in all men more or less decay in length of time, this, amongst other differences,

is one which shows that DEMONSTRATIVE knowledge is much more imperfect than INTUITIVE,

as we shall see in the following chapter.

OF THE DEGREES OF OUR KNOWLEDGE.

1.Of the degrees, or differences in clearness, of our Knowledge: I. Intuitive

All our knowledge consisting, as I have said, in the view the mind has of its own ideas,

which is the utmost light and greatest certainty we, with our faculties, and in our way of knowledge,

are capable of, it may not be amiss to consider a little the degrees of its evidence.

The different clearness of our knowledge seems to me to lie in the different way of

perception the mind has of the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas.

For if we will reflect on our own ways of thinking, we will find,

that sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of

two ideas IMMEDIATELY BY THEMSELVES, without the intervention of any other:

and this I think we may call INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE.

For in this the mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but perceives the truth as the eye doth light,

only by being directed towards it. Thus the mind perceives that WHITE is not BLACK,

that a CIRCLE is not a TRIANGLE, that THREE are more than TWO and equal to ONE AND TWO.

Such kinds of truths the mind perceives at the first sight of the ideas together, by bare intuition;

without the intervention of any other idea: and this kind of knowledge is the clearest and most certain

that human frailty is capable of. This part of knowledge is irresistible, and, like bright sunshine,

forces itself immediately to be perceived, as soon as ever the mind turns its view that way;

and leaves no room for hesitation, doubt, or examination,

but the mind is presently filled with the clear light of it.

IT IS ON THIS INTUITION THAT DEPENDS ALL THE CERTAINTY AND EVIDENCE

OF ALL OUR KNOWLEDGE; which certainty every one finds to be so great, that he cannot imagine,

and therefore not require a greater: for a man cannot conceive himself capable

of a greater certainty than to know that any idea in his mind is such as he perceives it to be;

and that two ideas, wherein he perceives a difference, are different and not precisely the same.

He that demands a greater certainty than this, demands he knows not what,

and shows only that he has a mind to be a sceptic, without being able to be so.

Certainty depends so wholly on this intuition, that, in the next degree of knowledge

which I call demonstrative, this intuition is necessary in all the connexions of the intermediate ideas,

without which we cannot attain knowledge and certainty.

2.II. Demonstrative.

The next degree of knowledge is, where the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of any ideas,

but not immediately. Though wherever the mind perceives the agreement

or disagreement of any of its ideas, there be certain knowledge; yet it does not always happen,

that the mind sees that agreement or disagreement, which there is between them,

even where it is discoverable; and in that case remains in ignorance,

and at most gets no further than a probable conjecture.

The reason why the mind cannot always perceive presently the agreement or disagreement of two ideas,

is, because those ideas, concerning whose agreement or disagreement the inquiry is made,

cannot by the mind be so put together as to show it. In this case then,

when the mind cannot so bring its ideas together as by their immediate comparison,

and as it were juxta-position or application one to another,

to perceive their agreement or disagreement, it is fain, BY THE INTERVENTION OF OTHER IDEAS,

(one or more, as it happens) to discover the agreement or disagreement

which it searches; and this is that which we call REASONING. Thus,

the mind being willing to know the agreement or disagreement in bigness

between the three angles of a triangle and two right ones, cannot by an immediate view

and comparing them do it: because the three angles of a triangle cannot be brought at once,

and be compared with any other one, or two, angles; and so of this the mind has no immediate,

no intuitive knowledge. In this case the mind is fain to find out some other angles,

to which the three angles of a triangle have an equality; and, finding those equal to two right ones,

comes to know their equality to two right ones.

14.III. Sensitive Knowledge of the particular Existence of finite beings without us.

These two, viz. intuition and demonstration, are the degrees of our KNOWLEDGE;

whatever comes short of one of these, with what assurance soever embraced, is but FAITH or OPINION,

but not knowledge, at least in all general truths. There is, indeed, another perception of the mind,

employed about THE PARTICULAR EXISTENCE OF FINITE BEINGS WITHOUT US, which,

going beyond bare probability, and yet not reaching perfectly to either of the foregoing degrees of certainty,

passes under the name of KNOWLEDGE. There can be nothing more certain than that the idea we

receive from an external object is in our minds: this is intuitive knowledge.

But whether there be anything more than barely that idea in our minds;

whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of anything without us, which corresponds to that idea,

is that whereof some men think there may be a question made; because men may have such ideas in their minds,

when no such thing exists, no such object affects their senses.

But yet here I think we are provided with an evidence that puts us past doubting. For I ask any one,

Whether he be not invincibly conscious to himself of a different perception, when he looks on the sun by day,

and thinks on it by night; when he actually tastes wormwood, or smells a rose,

or only thinks on that savour or odour?

We as plainly find the difference there is between any idea revived in our minds by our own memory,

and actually coming into our minds by our senses, as we do between any two distinct ideas.

If any one say, a dream may do the same thing, and all these ideas may be produced,

in us without any external objects; he may please to dream that I make him this answer:

— I. That it is no great matter, whether I remove his scruple or no: where all is but dream,

reasoning and arguments are of no use, truth and knowledge nothing.

2.That I believe he will allow a very manifest difference between dreaming of being in the fire,

and being actually in it. But yet if he be resolved to appear so sceptical as to maintain,

that what I call being actually in the fire is nothing but a dream; and that we cannot thereby certainly know,

that any such thing as fire actually exists without us: I answer,

That we certainly finding that pleasure or pain follows upon the application of certain objects to us,

whose existence we perceive, or dream that we perceive,

by our senses; this certainty is as great as our happiness or misery,

beyond which we have no concernment to know or to be. So that, I think,

we may add to the two former sorts of knowledge this also,

of the existence of particular external objects,

by that perception and consciousness we have of the actual entrance of ideas from them,

and allow these three degrees of knowledge, viz. INTUITIVE, DEMONSTRATIVE,

and SENSITIVE; in each of which there are different degrees and ways of evidence and certainty.

OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

13.We have no perfect knowledge of their Primary Qualities.

That the size, figure, and motion of one body should cause a change in the size, figure,

and motion of another body, is not beyond our conception; the separation

of the parts of one body upon the intrusion of another; and the change from rest to motion upon impulse;

these and the like seem to have SOME CONNEXION one with another.

And if we knew these primary qualities of bodies, we might have reason to hope we might

be able to know a great deal more of these operations of them one upon another:

but our minds not being able to discover any connexion betwixt these primary qualities of bodies

and the sensations that are produced in us by them, we can never be able to establish certain

and undoubted rules of the CONSEQUENCE or CO-EXISTENCE of any secondary qualities,

though we could discover the size, figure, or motion of those invisible parts

which immediately produce them. We are so far from knowing WHAT figure, size,

or motion of parts produce a yellow colour, a sweet taste, or a sharp sound,

that we can by no means conceive how ANY size, figure, or motion of any particles,

can possibly produce in us the idea of any colour, taste, or sound whatsoever:

there is no conceivable connexion between the one and the other.

14.And seek in vain for certain and universal knowledge of unperceived qualities in substances.

In vain, therefore, shall we endeavour to discover by our ideas

(the only true way of certain and universal knowledge) what other ideas are to be found constantly

joined with that of OUR complex idea of any substance: since we neither know the real constitution

of the minute parts on which their qualities do depend; nor, did we know them,

could we discover any necessary connexion between them and any of the secondary qualities:

which is necessary to be done before we can certainly know their necessary co-existence.

So, that, let our complex idea of any species of substances be what it will, we can hardly,

from the simple ideas contained in it, certainly determine the necessary co-existence

of any other quality whatsoever. Our knowledge in all these inquiries reaches very little further

than our experience. Indeed some few of the primary qualities have a necessary dependence

and visible connexion one with another, as figure necessarily supposes extension;

receiving or communicating motion by impulse, supposes solidity.

But though these, and perhaps some others of our ideas have:

yet there are so few of them that have a visible connexion one with another,

that we can by intuition or demonstration discover the co-existence of very few of the qualities

that are to be found united in substances: and we are left only to the assistance of our senses

to make known to us what qualities they contain. For of all the qualities that are co-existent in any subject,

without this dependence and evident connexion of their ideas one with another,

we cannot know certainly any two to co-exist, any further than experience, by our senses, informs us.

Thus, though we see the yellow colour, and, upon trial, find the weight, malleableness, fusibility,

and fixedness that are united in a piece of gold; yet, because no one of these ideas

has any evident dependence or necessary connexion with the other, we cannot certainly know

that where any four of these are, the fifth will be there also, how highly probable soever it may be;

because the highest probability amounts not to certainty, without which there can be no true knowledge.

For this co-existence can be no further known than it is perceived;

and it cannot be perceived but either in particular subjects, by the observation of our senses,

or, in general, by the necessary connexion of the ideas themselves.

23.First, One Cause of our ignorance Want of Ideas.

I. Want of simple ideas that other creatures in other parts of the universe may have.

FIRST, There are some things, and those not a few, that we are ignorant of, for want of ideas.

First, all the simple ideas we have are confined (as I have shown) to those we receive

from corporeal objects by sensation, and from the operations of our own minds as the objects of reflection.

But how much these few and narrow inlets are disproportionate to the vast whole extent of all beings,

will not be hard to persuade those who are not so foolish as to think their span the measure of all things.

What other simple ideas it is possible the creatures in other parts of the universe may have,

by the assistance of senses and faculties more or perfecter than we have, or different from ours,

it is not for us to determine. But to say or think there are no such, because we conceive nothing of them,

is no better an argument than if a blind man should be positive in it,

that there was no such thing as sight and colours,

because he had no manner of idea of any such thing, nor could by any means frame

to himself any notions about seeing. The ignorance and darkness that is in us no more hinders nor confines

the knowledge that is in others, than the blindness of a mole

is an argument against the quicksightedness of an eagle. He that will consider the infinite power, wisdom,

and goodness of the Creator of all things will find reason to think it was not all laid out upon so inconsiderable,

mean, and impotent a creature as he will find man to be;

who in all probability is one of the lowest of all intellectual beings. What faculties, therefore,

other species of creatures have to penetrate into the nature and inmost constitutions of things;

what ideas they may receive of them far different from ours, we know not. This we know and certainly find,

that we want several other views of them besides those we have, to make discoveries of them more perfect.

And we may be convinced that the ideas we can attain to by our faculties are very disproportionate

to things themselves, when a positive, clear, distinct one of substance itself, which is the foundation of all the rest,

is concealed from us. But want of ideas of this kind, being a part as well as cause of our ignorance,

cannot be described. Only this I think I may confidently say of it, That the intellectual and sensible world

are in this perfectly alike: that that part which we see of either of them holds no proportion with

what we see not; and whatsoever we can reach with our eyes or our thoughts

of either of them is but a point, almost nothing in comparison of the the rest.

OF THE REALITY OF KNOWLEDGE.

13.In our inquiries about Substances, we must consider Ideas, and not confine our Thoughts to Names,

or Species supposed set out by Names.

This, if we rightly consider, and confine not our thoughts and abstract ideas to names, as if there were,

or could be no other SORTS of things than what known names had already determined, and, as it were,

set out, we should think of things with greater freedom and less confusion than perhaps we do.

It would possibly be thought a bold paradox, if not a very dangerous falsehood,

if I should say that some CHANGELINGS, who have lived forty years together,

without any appearance of reason, are something between a man and a beast:

which prejudice is founded upon nothing else but a false supposition, that these two names, man and beast,

stand for distinct species so set out by real essences, that there can come no other species between them:

whereas if we will abstract from those names, and the supposition of such specific essences made by nature,

wherein all things of the same denominations did exactly and equally partake;

if we would not fancy that there were a certain number of these essences, wherein all things, as in moulds,

were cast and formed; we should find that the idea of the shape, motion, and life of a man without reason,

is as much a distinct idea, and makes as much a distinct sort of things from man and beast,

as the idea of the shape of an ass with reason would be different from either that of man or beast,

and be a species of an animal between, or distinct from both.

16.Monsters

But it is the issue of rational parents, and must therefore be concluded to have a rational soul.

I know not by what logic you must so conclude. I am sure this is a conclusion that men nowhere allow of.

For if they did, they would not make bold, as everywhere they do to destroy ill-formed and mis-shaped productions.

Ay, but these are MONSTERS. Let them be so: what will your drivelling, unintelligent, intractable changeling be?

Shall a defect in the body make a monster; a defect in the mind (the far more noble, and, in the common phrase,

the far more essential part) not? Shall the want of a nose, or a neck,

make a monster, and put such issue out of the rank of men; the want of reason and understanding, not?

This is to bring all back again to what was exploded just now: this is to place all in the shape,

and to take the measure of a man only by his outside.

To show that according to the ordinary way of reasoning in this matter,

people do lay the whole stress on the figure, and resolve the whole essence of the species of man

(as they make it) into the outward shape, how unreasonable soever it be, and how much soever they disown it,

we need but trace their thoughts and practice a little further, and then it will plainly appear.

The well-shaped changeling is a man, has a rational soul, though it appear not: this is past doubt, say you:

make the ears a little longer, and more pointed, and the nose a little flatter than ordinary,

and then you begin to boggle: make the face yet narrower, flatter, and longer, and then you are at a stand:

add still more and more of the likeness of a brute to it, and let the head be perfectly that of some other animal,

then presently it is a monster; and it is demonstration with you that it hath no rational soul,

and must be destroyed. Where now (I ask) shall be the just measure; which the utmost bounds of that shape,

that carries with it a rational soul? For, since there have been human foetuses produced,

half beast and half man; and others three parts one, and one part the other;

and so it is possible they may be in all the variety of approaches to the one or the other shape,

and may have several degrees of mixture of the likeness of a man, or a brute;

— I would gladly know what are those precise lineaments, which, according to this hypothesis,

are or are not capable of a rational soul to be joined to them. What sort of outside is the certain sign

that there is or is not such an inhabitant within? For till that be done, we talk at random of MAN:

and shall always, I fear, do so, as long as we give ourselves up to certain sounds,

and the imaginations of settled and fixed species in nature, we know not what. But, after all,

I desire it may be considered, that those who think they have answered the difficulty,

by telling us, that a mis-shaped foetus is a MONSTER, run into the same fault they are arguing against;

by constituting a species between man and beast. For what else, I pray, is their monster in the case,

(if the word monster signifies anything at all,) but something neither man nor beast,

but partaking somewhat of either? And just so is the CHANGELING before mentioned.

So necessary is it to quit the common notion of species and essences,

if we will truly look into the nature of things, and examine them by what our faculties can discover

in them as they exist, and not by groundless fancies that have been taken up about them.

OF TRUTH IN GENERAL.

4.Mental Propositions are very hard to be treated of.

And that which makes it yet harder to treat of mental and verbal propositions separately is, that most men,

if not all, in their thinking and reasonings within themselves, make use of words instead of ideas;

at least when the subject of their meditation contains in it complex ideas.

Which is a great evidence of the imperfection and uncertainty of our ideas of that kind, and may,

if attentively made use of, serve for a mark to show us what are those things we have clear

and perfect established ideas of, and what not. For if we will curiously observe the way our mind

takes in thinking and reasoning, we shall find, I suppose, that when we make any propositions

within our own thoughts about WHITE or BLACK, SWEET or BITTER, a TRIANGLE or a CIRCLE,

we can and often do frame in our minds the ideas themselves, without reflecting on the names.

But when we would consider, or make propositions about the more complex ideas, as of a MAN,

VITRIOL, FORTITUDE, GLORY, we usually put the name for the idea:

because the ideas these names stand for, being for the most part imperfect, confused, and undetermined,

we reflect on the names themselves, because they are more clear, certain, and distinct,

and readier occur to our thoughts than the pure ideas: and so we make use of these words

instead of the ideas themselves, even when we would meditate and reason within ourselves,

and make tacit mental propositions. In substances, as has been already noticed,

this is occasioned by the imperfections of our ideas: we making the name stand for the real essence,

of which we have no idea at all. In modes, it is occasioned by the great number of simple ideas

that go to the making them up. For many of them being compounded, the name occurs much easier

than the complex idea itself, which requires time and attention to be recollected,

and exactly represented to the mind, even in those men who have formerly been at the pains to do it;

and is utterly impossible to be done by those who, though they have ready in their memory

the greatest part of the common words of that language, yet perhaps never troubled themselves

in all their lives to consider what precise ideas the most of them stood for. Some confused

or obscure notions have served their turns; and many who talk very much of RELIGION

and CONSCIENCE, of CHURCH and FAITH, of POWER and RIGHT, of OBSTRUCTIONS

and HUMOURS, MELANCHOLY and CHOLER, would perhaps have little left in their thoughts

and meditations, if one should desire them to think only of the things themselves,

and lay by those words with which they so often confound others, and not seldom themselves also.

7.Objection against verbal Truth, that thus it may all be chimerical.

But here again will be apt to occur the same doubt about truth, that did about knowledge:

and it will be objected, that if truth be nothing but the joining and separating of words in propositions,

as the ideas they stand for agree or disagree in mBut here again will be apt to occur the

same doubt about truth, that did about knowledge: and it will be objected,

that if truth be nothing but the joining and separating of words in propositions,

as the ideas they stand for agree or disagree in men’s minds,

the knowledge of truth is not so valuable a thing as it is taken to be, nor worth the pains

and time men employ in the search of it: since by this account it amounts to no more

than the conformity of words to the chimeras of men’s brains.

Who knows not what odd notions many men’s heads are filled with,

and what strange ideas all men’s brains are capable of? But if we rest here,

we know the truth of nothing by this rule, but of the visionary words in our own imaginations;

nor have other truth, but what as much concerns harpies and centaurs, as men and horses.

For those, and the like, may be ideas in our heads, and have their agreement or disagreement there,

as well as the ideas of real beings, and so have as true propositions made about them.

And it will be altogether as true a proposition to say ALL CENTAURS ARE ANIMALS,

as that ALL MEN ARE ANIMALS; and the certainty of one as great as the other.

For in both the propositions, the words are put together according to the agreement of the ideas

in our minds: and the agreement of the idea of animal with that of centaur is as clear

and visable to the mind, as the agreement of the idea of animal with that of man;

and so these two propositions are equally true, equally certain. But of what use is all such truth to us?

OF UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS: THEIR TRUTH AND CERTAINTY.

8.Instance in Gold.

‘All gold is fixed,’ is a proposition whose truth we cannot be certain of, how universally soever it be believed.

For if, according to the useless imagination of the Schools, any one supposes the term gold to stand

for a species of things set out by nature, by a real essence belonging to it, it is evident he knows not

what particular substances are of that species; and so cannot with certainty affirm anything universally of gold.

But if he makes gold stand for a species determined by its nominal essence, let the nominal essence,

for example, be the complex idea of a body of a certain yellow colour, malleable, fusible,

and heavier than any other known; — in this proper use of the word gold, there is no difficulty to know

what is or is not gold. But yet no other quality can with certainty be universally affirmed or denied of gold,

but what hath a DISCOVERABLE connexion or inconsistency with that nominal essence. Fixedness,

for example, having no necessary connexion that we can discover, with the colour, weight,

or any other simple idea of our complex one, or with the whole combination together;

it is impossible that we should certainly know the truth of this proposition, that all gold is fixed.

9.No discoverable necessary connexion between nominal essence gold, and other simple ideas.

As there is no discoverable connexion between fixedness and the colour, weight, and other simple ideas

of that nominal essence of gold; so, if we make our complex idea of gold, a body yellow, fusable,

ductile, weighty, and fixed, we shall be at the same uncertainty concerning solubility in AQUA REGIA,

and for the same reason. Since we can never, from consideration of the ideas themselves,

with certainty affirm or deny of a body whose complex idea is made up of yellow, very weighty,

ductile, fusible, and fixed, that it is soluble in AQUA REGIA: and so on of the rest of its qualities.

I would gladly meet with one general affirmation concerning any will, no doubt, be presently objected,

Is not this an universal proposition, ALL GOLD IS MALLEABLE? To which I answer,

It is a very complex idea the word gold stands for. But then here is nothing affirmed of gold,

but that that sound stands for an idea in which malleableness is contained:

and such a sort of truth and certainty as this it is, to say a centaur is four-footed.

But if malleableness make not a part of the specific essence the name of gold stands for, it is plain,

ALL GOLD IS MALLEABLE, is not a certain proposition. Because,

let the complex idea of gold be made up of whichsoever of its other qualities you please,

malleableness will not appear to depend on that complex idea,

nor follow from any simple one contained in it: the connexion that malleableness has (if it has any)

with those other qualities being only by the intervention of the real constitution of its insensible parts;

which, since we know not, it is impossible we should perceive that connexion,

unless we could discover that which ties them together.

14.What is requisite for our Knowledge of Substances.

Before we can have any tolerable knowledge of this kind,

we must First know what changes the primary qualities of one body do regularly produce

in the primary qualities of another, and how. Secondly, We must know what primary qualities

of any body produce certain sensations or ideas in us. This is in truth no less

than to know ALL the effects of matter, under its divers modifications of bulk, figure, cohesion of parts,

motion and rest. Which, I think every body will allow, is utterly impossible to be known

by us without revelation. Nor if it were revealed to us what sort of figure, bulk,

and motion of corpuscles would produce in us the sensation of a yellow colour, and what sort of figure,

bulk, and texture of parts in the superficies of any body were fit to give such corpuscles their

due motion to produce that colour; would that be enough to make universal propositions with certainty,

concerning the several sorts of them; unless we had faculties acute enough to perceive the precise bulk,

figure, texture, and motion of bodies, in those minute parts, by which they operate on our senses,

so that we might by those frame our abstract ideas of them. I have mentioned here only corporeal substances,

whose operations seem to lie more level to our understandings. For as to the operations of spirits,

both their thinking and moving of bodies, we at first sight find ourselves at a loss; though perhaps,

when we have applied our thoughts a little nearer to the consideration of bodies and their operations,

and examined how far our notions, even in these, reach with any clearness beyond sensible matter of fact,

we shall be bound to confess that, even in these too,

our discoveries amount to very little beyond perfect ignorance and incapacity.

OF MAXIMS.

12.Maxims, if care be not taken in the Use of Words, may prove Contradictions.

One thing further, I think, it may not be amiss to observe concerning these general maxims,

That they are so far from improving or establishing our minds in true knowledge that if our notions be wrong,

loose, or unsteady, and we resign up our thoughts to the sound of words, rather than

[fix them on settled, determined] ideas of things; I say these general maxims will serve to confirm us in mistakes;

and in such a way of use of words, which is most common, will serve to prove contradictions: v.g.

he that with Descartes shall frame in his mind an idea of what he calls body to be nothing but extension,

may easily demonstrate that there is no vacuum, i.e. no space void of body, by this maxim, WHAT IS, IS.

For the idea to which he annexes the name body, being bare extension, his knowledge

that space cannot be without body, is certain. For he knows his own idea of extension clearly and distinctly,

and knows that it is what it is, and not another idea, though it be called by these three names,

— extension, body, space. Which three words, standing for one and the same idea, may, no doubt,

with the same evidence and certainty be affirmed one of another, as each of itself: and it is as certain,

that, whilst I use them all to stand for one and the same idea,

this predication is as true and identical in its signification, that ‘space is body,’

as this predication is true and identical, that ‘body is body,’ both in signification and sound.

19.Little use of these Maxims in Proofs where we have clear and distinct Ideas.

So that, if rightly considered, I think we may say, That where our ideas are determined in our minds,

and have annexed to them by us known and steady names under those settled determinations,

there is little need, or no use at all of these maxims, to prove the agreement or disagreement of any of them.

He that cannot discern the truth or falsehood of such propositions,

without the help of these and the like maxims, will not be helped by these maxims to do it:

since he cannot be supposed to know the truth of these maxims themselves without proof,

if he cannot know the truth of others without proof, which are as self-evident as these.

Upon this ground it is that intuitive knowledge neither requires nor admits any proof,

one part of it more than another. He that will suppose it does,

takes away the foundation of all knowledge and certainty; and he that needs any proof to make him certain,

and give his assent to this proposition, that two are equal to two,

will also have need of a proof to make him admit, that what is, is.

He that needs a probation to convince him that two are not three,

that white is not black, that a triangle is not a circle, &c.,

or any other two [determined] distinct ideas are not one and the same,

will need also a demonstration to convince him that

IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME THING TO BE AND NOT TO BE.

OF TRIFLING PROPOSITIONS.

6.Instance, Man and Palfrey.

‘Every man is an animal, or living body,’ is as certain a proposition as can be;

but no more conducing to the knowledge of things than to say, a palfrey is an ambling horse,

or a neighing, ambling animal, both being only about the signification of words,

and make me know but this — That body, sense, and motion, or power of sensation and moving,

are three of those ideas that I always comprehend and signify by the word man:

and where they are not to be found together, the NAME MAN belongs not to that thing:

and so of the other — That body, sense, and a certain way of going, with a certain kind of voice,

are some of those ideas which I always comprehend and signify by the WORD PALFREY;

and when they are not to be found together, the name palfrey belongs not to that thing.

It is just the same, and to the same purpose, when any term standing for any one or more of the simple ideas,

that altogether make up that complex idea which is called man, is affirmed of the term man:

— v.g. suppose a Roman signified by the word HOMO all these distinct ideas united in one subject,

CORPORIETAS, SENSIBILITAS, POTENTIA SE MOVENDI, RATIONALITAS, RISIBILITAS;

he might, no doubt, with great certainty, universally affirm one, more,

or all of these together of the word HOMO, but did no more than say that the word HOMO,

in his country, comprehended in its signification all these ideas. Much like a romance knight,

who by the word PALFREY signified these ideas: — body of a certain figure, four-legged,

with sense, motion, ambling, neighing, white, used to have a woman on his back

— might with the same certainty universally affirm also any or all of these of the WORD palfrey:

but did thereby teach no more, but that the word palfrey, in his or romance language,

stood for all these, and was not to be applied to anything where any of these was wanting

But he that shall tell me, that in whatever thing sense, motion, reason, and laughter,

were united, that thing had actually a notion of God, or would be cast into a sleep by opium,

made indeed an instructive proposition: because neither having the notion of God,

nor being cast into sleep by opium, being contained in the idea signified by the word man,

we are by such propositions taught something more than barely what the word MAN stands for:

and therefore the knowledge contained in it is more than verbal.

9.General Propositions concerning Substances are often trifling.

We having little or no knowledge of what combinations there be of simple ideas

existing together in substances, but by our senses, we cannot make any universal

certain propositions concerning them, any further than our nominal essences lead us.

Which being to a very few and inconsiderable truths, in respect of those

which depend on their real constitutions, the general propositions that are made about substances,

if they are certain, are for the most part but trifling; and if they are instructive, are uncertain,

and such as we can have no knowledge of their real truth, how much soever constant observation

and analogy may assist our judgment in guessing. Hence it comes to pass,

that one may often meet with very clear and coherent discourses, that amount yet to nothing.

For it is plain that names of substantial beings, as well as others,

as far as they have relative significations affixed to them, may, with great truth, be joined negatively

and affirmatively in propositions, as their relative definitions make them fit to be so joined;

and propositions consisting of such terms, may, with the same clearness, be deduced one from another,

as those that convey the most real truths: and all this without any knowledge of the nature

or reality of things existing without us. By this method one may make demonstrations

and undoubted propositions in words, and yet thereby advance not one jot in the knowledge

of the truth of things: v. g. he that having learnt these following words,

with their ordinary mutual relative acceptations annexed to them; v. g. SUBSTANCE, MAN, ANIMAL,

FORM, SOUL, VEGETATIVE, SENSITIVE, RATIONAL, may make several undoubted propositions

about the soul, without knowing at all what the soul really is: and of this sort,

a man may find an infinite number of propositions, reasonings, and conclusions, in books of metaphysics,

school-divinity, and some sort of natural philosophy; and, after all, know as little of God, spirits,

or bodies, as he did before he set out.

OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF A GOD.

18.Matter not co-eternal with an Eternal Mind.

SECONDLY, Others would have Matter to be eternal, notwithstanding that they allow an eternal,

cogitative, immaterial Being. This, though it take not away the being of a God, yet,

since it denies one and the first great piece of his workmanship, the creation, let us consider it a little.

Matter must be allowed eternal: Why? because you cannot conceive how it can be made out of nothing:

why do you not also think yourself eternal? You will answer, perhaps, Because,

about twenty or forty years since, you began to be. But if I ask you, what that YOU is,

which began then to be, you can scarce tell me. The matter whereof you are made began not then to be:

for if it did, then it is not eternal:

but it began to be put together in such a fashion and frame as makes up your body;

but yet that frame of particles is not you, it makes not that thinking thing you are;

(for I have now to do with one who allows an eternal, immaterial, thinking Being,

but would have unthinking Matter eternal too;) therefore, when did that thinking thing begin to be?

If it did never begin to be, then have you always been a thinking thing from eternity;

the absurdity whereof I need not confute, till I meet with one who is so void of understanding as to own it.

If, therefore, you can allow a thinking thing to be made out of nothing, (as all things that are not eternal must be,)

why also can you not allow it possible for a material being to be made out of nothing by an equal power,

but that you have the experience of the one in view, and not of the other? Though, when well considered,

creation [of a spirit will be found to require no less power than the creation of matter. Nay, possibly,

if we would emancipate ourselves from vulgar notions, and raise our thoughts, as far as they would reach,

to a closer contemplation of things, we might be able to aim at some dim and seeming conception

how MATTER might at first be made, and begin to exist, by the power of that eternal first Being:

but to give beginning and being to a SPIRIT would be found a more inconceivable effect

of omnipotent power. But this being what would perhaps lead us too far from the notions

on which the philosophy now in the world is built, it would not be pardonable to deviate so far from them;

or to inquire, so far as grammar itself would authorize, if the common settled opinion opposes it:

especially in this place, where the received doctrine serves well enough to our present purpose,

and leaves this past doubt, that] the creation or beginning of any one [SUBSTANCE]

out of nothing being once admitted, the creation of all other but the Creator himself, may,

with the same ease, be supposed.

19.Objection: Creation out of nothing.

But you will say, Is it not impossible to admit of the making anything out of nothing,

SINCE WE CANNOT POSSIBLY CONCEIVE IT? I answer, No.

Because it is not reasonable to deny the power of an infinite being, because we cannot comprehend its operations.

We do not deny other effects upon this ground, because we cannot possibly conceive

the manner of their production. We cannot conceive how anything but impulse of body can move body;

and yet that is not a reason sufficient to make us deny it possible, against the constant experience

we have of it in ourselves, in all our voluntary motions; which are produced in us only

by the free action or thought of our own minds, and are not, nor can be, the effects of the impulse

or determination of the motion of blind matter in or upon our own bodies;

for then it could not be in our power or choice to alter it. For example: my right hand writes,

whilst my left hand is still: What causes rest in one, and motion in the other? Nothing but my will,

— a thought of my mind; my thought only changing, the right hand rests, and the left hand moves.

This is matter of fact, which cannot be denied: explain this and make it intelligible,

and then the next step will be to understand creation. [For the giving a new determination

to the motion of the animal spirits (which some make use of to explain voluntary motion)

clears not the difficulty one jot. To alter the determination of motion, being in this case no easier nor less,

than to give motion itself: since the new determination given to the animal spirits

must be either immediately by thought, or by some other body put in their way by thought

which was not in their way before, and so must owe ITS motion to thought:

either of which leaves VOLUNTARY motion as unintelligible as it was before.]

In the meantime, it is an over-valuing ourselves to reduce all to the narrow measure of our capacities;

and to conclude all things impossible to be done,

whose manner of doing exceeds our comprehension. This is to make our comprehension infinite,

or God finite, when what He can do is limited to what we can conceive of it.

If you do not understand the operations of your own finite mind, that thinking thing within you,

do not deem it strange that you cannot comprehend the operations of that eternal infinite Mind,

who made and governs all things, and whom the heaven of heavens cannot contain.

OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER THINGS.

Folly to expect Demonstration in everything.

Whereby yet we may observe how foolish and vain a thing it is for a man of a narrow knowledge,

who having reason given him to judge of the different evidence and probability of things,

and to be swayed accordingly; how vain, I say,

it is to expect demonstration and certainty in things not capable of it;

and refuse assent to very rational propositions, and act contrary to very plain and clear truths,

because they cannot be made out so evident, as to surmount every the least (I will not say reason, but)

pretence of doubting. He that, in the ordinary affairs of life,

would admit of nothing but direct plain demonstration, would be sure of nothing in this world,

but of perishing quickly. The wholesomeness of his meat or drink would not give him reason

to venture on it: and I would fain know what it is he could do upon

such grounds as are capable of no doubt, no objection.

11.Past Existence of other things is known by Memory.

As WHEN OUR SENSES ARE ACTUALLY EMPLOYED ABOUT ANY OBJECT,

we do know that it does exist; so BY OUR MEMORY we may be assured,

that heretofore things that affected our senses have existed. And thus we have knowledge

of the past existence of several things, whereof our senses having informed us,

our memories still retain the ideas; and of this we are past all doubt, so long as we remember well.

But this knowledge also reaches no further than our senses have formerly assured us. Thus,

seeing water at this instant, it is an unquestionable truth to me that water doth exist:

and remembering that I saw it yesterday, it will also be always true, and as long as my memory retains

it always an undoubted proposition to me, that water did exist the 10th of July, 1688;

as it will also be equally true that a certain number of very fine colours did exist,

which at the same time I saw upon a bubble of that water: but, being now quite out of sight

both of the water and bubbles too, it is no more certainly known to me that the water doth now exist,

than that the bubbles or colours therein do so: it being no more necessary that water should exist to-day,

because it existed yesterday, than that the colours or bubbles exist to-day, because they existed yesterday,

though it be exceedingly much more probable; because water hath been observed

to continue long in existence, but bubbles, and the colours on them, quickly cease to be.

12.The Existence of other finite Spirits not knowable, and rests on Faith.

What ideas we have of spirits, and how we come by them, I have already shown.

But though we have those ideas in our minds, and know we have them there,

the having the ideas of spirits does not make us know that any such things do exist without us,

or that there are any finite spirits, or any other spiritual beings, but the Eternal God.

We have ground from revelation, and several other reasons, to believe with assurance

that there are such creatures: but our senses not being able to discover them,

we want the means of knowing their particular existences. For we can no more know

that there are finite spirits really existing, by the idea we have of such beings in our minds,

than by the ideas any one has of fairies or centaurs,

he can come to know that things answering those ideas do really exist.

And therefore concerning the existence of finite spirits, as well as several other things,

we must content ourselves with the evidence of faith; but universal,

certain propositions concerning this matter are beyond our reach. For however true it may be, v.g.,

that all the intelligent spirits that God ever created do still exist,

yet it can never make a part of our certain knowledge. These and the like propositions we may assent to,

as highly probable, but are not, I fear, in this state capable of knowing.

We are not, then, to put others upon demonstrating,

nor ourselves upon search of universal certainty in all those matters;

wherein we are not capable of any other knowledge, but what our senses give us in this or that particular.

OF THE IMPROVEMENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE.

1.Knowledge is not got from Maxims.

IT having been the common received opinion amongst men of letters, that MAXIMS were

the foundation of all knowledge; and that the sciences were each of them built upon certain PRAECOGNITA,

from whence the understanding was to take its rise, and by which it was to conduct itself in its inquiries

into the matters belonging to that science, the beaten road of the Schools has been,

to lay down in the beginning one or more GENERAL PROPOSITIONS, as foundations whereon

to build the knowledge that was to be had of that subject. These doctrines,

thus laid down for foundations of any science, were called PRINCIPLES,

as the beginnings from which we must set out, and look no further backwards in our inquiries,

as we have already observed.

14.Clear and distinct Ideas with settled Names, and the finding of those intermediate

ideas which show their Agreement or Disagreement, are the Ways to enlarge our Knowledge.

But whether natural philosophy be capable of certainty or no, the ways to enlarge our knowledge,

]as far as we are capable, seems to me, in short, to be these two: —

First, The first is to get and settle in our minds [determined ideas of those things

whereof we have general or specific names; at least, so many of them as we would consider

and improve our knowledge in, or reason about.] [And if they be specific ideas of substances,

we should endeavour also to make them as complete as we can, whereby I mean,

that we should put together as many simple ideas as, being constantly observed to co-exist,

may perfectly determine the species; and each of those simple ideas

which are the ingredients of our complex ones, should be clear and distinct in our minds.]

For it being evident that our knowledge cannot exceed our ideas; [as far as] they are either imperfect,

confused, or obscure, we cannot expect to have certain, perfect, or clear knowledge.

Secondly, The other is the art of finding out those intermediate ideas,

which may show us the agreement or repugnancy of other ideas, which cannot be immediately compared.

15.Mathematics an instance of this.

That these two (and not the relying on maxims, and drawing consequences from some general propositions)

are the right methods of improving our knowledge in the ideas of other modes besides those of quantity,

the consideration of mathematical knowledge will easily inform us.

Where first we shall find that he that has not a perfect and clear idea of those angles or figures of

which he desires to know anything, is utterly thereby incapable of any knowledge about them.

Suppose but a man not to have a perfect exact idea of a right angle, a scalenum, or trapezium,

and there is nothing more certain than that he will in vain seek any demonstration about them.

Further, it is evident, that it was not the influence of those maxims

which are taken for principles in mathematics, that hath led the masters of that science into those

wonderful discoveries they have made. Let a man of good parts know all the maxims generally

made use of in mathematics ever so perfectly, and contemplate their extent and consequences

as much as he pleases, he will, by their assistance, I suppose, scarce ever come to know

that the square of the hypothenuse in a right-angled triangle is equal to the squares of the two other sides.

The knowledge that ‘the whole is equal to all its parts,’ and ‘if you take equals from equals,

the remainder will be equal,’ &c., helped him not, I presume, to this demonstration: and a man may,

I think, pore long enough on those axioms, without ever seeing one jot the more of mathematical truths.

They have been discovered by the thoughts otherwise applied: the mind had other objects,

other views before it, far different from those maxims, when it first got the knowledge

of such truths in mathematics, which men, well enough acquainted with those received axioms,

but ignorant of their method who first made these demonstrations, can never sufficiently admire.

And who knows what methods to enlarge our knowledge in other parts of science may hereafter be invented,

answering that of algebra in mathematics,

which so readily finds out the ideas of quantities to measure others by;

whose equality or proportion we could otherwise very hardly, or, perhaps, never come to know?

OF JUDGMENT.

1.Our Knowledge being short, we want something else.

The understanding faculties being given to man, not barely for speculation,

but also for the conduct of his life, man would be at a great loss if he had nothing to direct him

but what has the certainty of true knowledge. For that being very short and scanty,

as we have seen, he would be often utterly in the dark, and in most of the actions of his life,

perfectly at a stand, had he nothing to guide him in the absence of clear and certain knowledge.

He that will not eat till he has demonstration that it will nourish him; he that will not stir till

he infallibly knows the business he goes about will succeed, will have little else to do but to sit still and perish.

OF PROBABILITY

5.In this, all the Arguments pro and con ought to be examined, before we come to a Judgment.

Probability wanting that intuitive evidence which, infallibly determines the understanding

and produces certain knowledge, the mind, if it WILL PROCEED RATIONALLY,

ought to examine all the grounds of probability, and see how they make more or

less for or against any proposition, before it assents to or dissents from it; and,

upon a due balancing the whole, reject or receive it, with a more or less firm assent,

proportionably to the preponderancy of the greater grounds of probability on one side or the other.

For example: —

If I myself see a man walk on the ice, it is past probability; it is knowledge.

But if another tells me he saw a man in England, in the midst of a sharp winter,

walk upon water hardened with cold, this has so great conformity with what is usually observed to happen,

that I am disposed by the natures of the thing itself to assent to it; unless some manifest suspicion

attend the relation of that matter of fact. But if the same thing be told to one born between the tropics,

who never saw nor heard of any such thing before, there the whole probability relies on testimony:

and as the relators are more in number, and of more credit, and have no interest to speak contrary to the truth,

so that matter of fact is like to find more or less belief. Though to a man whose experience

has always been quite contrary, and who has never heard of anything like it, the most untainted credit

of a witness will scarce be able to find belief. As it happened to a Dutch ambassador,

who entertaining the king of Siam with the particularities of Holland, which he was inquisitive after,

amongst other things told him, that the water in his country would sometimes, in cold weather,

be so hard, that men walked upon it, and that it would bear an elephant, if he were there.

To which the king replied,

HITHERTO IHAVE BELIEVED THE STRANGE THINGS YOU HAVE TOLD ME,

BECAUSE ILOOK UPON YOU AS A SOBER FAIR MAN, BUT NOW IAM SURE YOU LIE.

OF REASON

5.Syllogism helps little in Demonstration, less in Probability.

But however it be in knowledge, I think I may truly say, it is OF FAR LESS,

OR NO USE AT ALL IN PROBABILITIES. For the assent there being to be

determined by the preponderancy, after due weighing of all the proofs, with all circumstances on both sides,

nothing is so unfit to assist the mind in that as syllogism; which running away with one assumed probability,

or one topical argument, pursues that till it has led the mind quite out of sight of the thing under consideration;

and, forcing it upon some remote difficulty, holds it fast there; entangled perhaps, and, as it were,

manacled, in the chain of syllogisms, without allowing it the liberty, much less affording it the helps,

requisite to show on which side, all things considered, is the greater probability.

6.Serves not to increase our Knowledge, but to fence with the Knowledge we suppose we have.

But let it help us (as perhaps may be said) in convincing men of their errors and mistakes:

(and yet I would fain see the man that was forced out of his opinion by dint of syllogism,)

yet still it fails our reason in that part, which, if not its highest perfection, is yet certainly its hardest task,

and that which we most need its help in; and that is THE FINDING OUT OF PROOFS,

AND MAKING NEW DISCOVERIES.

The rules of syllogism serve not to furnish the mind with those intermediate ideas

that may show the connexion of remote ones. This way of reasoning discovers no new proofs,

but is the art of marshalling and ranging the old ones we have already.

The forty-seventh proposition of the first book of Euclid is very true; but the discovery of it,

I think, not owing to any rules of common logic. A man knows first and then he is able to prove syllogistically.

So that syllogism comes after knowledge, and then a man has little or no need of it.

But it is chiefly by the finding out those ideas that show the connexion of distant ones,

that our stock of knowledge is increased, and that useful arts and sciences are advanced. Syllogism,

at best, is but the art of fencing with the little knowledge we have, without making any addition to it.

And if a man should employ his reason all this way, he will not do much otherwise than he who,

having got some iron out of the bowels of the earth, should have it beaten up all into swords,

and put it into his servants’ hands to fence with and bang one another.

Had the King of Spain employed the hands of his people, and his Spanish iron so,

he had brought to light but little of that treasure that lay so long hid in the dark entrails of America.

And I am apt to think that he who shall employ all the force of his reason only in brandishing of syllogisms,

will discover very little of that mass of knowledge which lies yet concealed in the secret recesses of nature;

and which, I am apt to think, native rustic reason (as it formerly has done) is likelier to open a way to,

and add to the common stock of mankind,

rather than any scholastic proceeding by the strict rules of MODE and FIGURE.

24.Reason and Faith not opposite, for Faith must be regulated by Reason.

There is another use of the word REASON, wherein it is OPPOSED TO FAITH: which,

though it be in itself a very improper way of speaking, yet common use has so authorized it,

that it would be folly either to oppose or hope to remedy it. Only I think it may not be amiss to take notice,

that, however faith be opposed to reason, faith is nothing but a firm assent of the mind: which,

if it be regulated, as is our duty, cannot be afforded to anything but upon good reason;

and so cannot be opposite to it. He that believes without having any reason for believing,

may be in love with his own fancies; but neither seeks truth as he ought,

nor pays the obedience due to his Maker,

who would have him use those discerning faculties he has given him, to keep him out of mistake and error.

He that does not this to the best of his power, however he sometimes lights on truth,

is in the right but by chance; and I know not whether the luckiness of the accident

will excuse the irregularity of his proceeding. This at least is certain, that he must be accountable

for whatever mistakes he runs into: whereas he that makes use of the light and faculties

God has given him, and seeks sincerely to discover truth by those helps and abilities he has,

may have this satisfaction in doing his duty as a rational creature, that, though he should miss truth,

he will not miss the reward of it. For he governs his assent right, and places it as he should,

who, in any case or matter whatsoever, believes or disbelieves according as reason directs him.

He that doth otherwise, transgresses against his own light, and misuses those faculties

which were given him to no other end, but to search and follow the clearer evidence and greater probability.

But since reason and faith are by some men opposed, we will so consider them in the following chapter.

OF FAITH AND REASON, AND THEIR DISTINCT PROVINCES.

8.Or not contrary to Reason, if revealed, are Matter of Faith; and must carry it against probable conjectures of Reason.

But since God, in giving us the light of reason, has not thereby tied up his own hands from affording us,

when he thinks fit, the light of revelation in any of those matters

wherein our natural faculties are able to give a probable determination; REVELATION,

where God has been pleased to give it,

MUST CARRY IT AGAINST THE PROBABLE CONJECTURES OF REASON.

Because the mind not being certain of the truth of that it does not evidently know,

but only yielding to the probability that appears in it, is bound to give up its assent to such a testimony which,

it is satisfied, comes from one who cannot err, and will not deceive. But yet,

it still belongs to reason to judge of the truth of its being a revelation,

and of the signification of the words wherein it is delivered. Indeed, if anything shall be thought revelation

which is contrary to the plain principles of reason, and the evident knowledge the mind has of its own clear

and distinct ideas; there reason must be hearkened to, as to a matter within its province.

Since a man can never have so certain a knowledge, that a proposition which contradicts the clear principles

and evidence of his own knowledge was divinely revealed, or that he understands the words rightly

wherein it is delivered, as he has that the contrary is true, and so is bound to consider

and judge of it as a matter of reason, and not swallow it, without examination, as a matter of faith.

11.If the Boundaries be not set between Faith and Reason, no Enthusiasm or Extravagancy in Religion can be contradicted.

If the provinces of faith and reason are not kept distinct by these boundaries, there will,

in matters of religion, be no room for reason at all; and those extravagant opinions and ceremonies

that are to be found in the several religions of the world will not deserve to be blamed. For,

to this crying up of faith in OPPOSITION to reason, we may, I think, in good measure ascribe those absurdities

that fill almost all the religions which possess and divide mankind.

For men having been principled with an opinion,

that they must not consult reason in the things of religion,

however apparently contradictory to common sense and the very principles of all their knowledge,

have let loose their fancies and natural superstition; and have been by them led into so strange opinions,

and extravagant practices in religion, that a considerate man cannot but stand amazed, at their follies,

and judge them so far from being acceptable to the great and wise God,

that he cannot avoid thinking them ridiculous and offensive to a sober good man. So that,

in effect, religion, which should most distinguish us from beasts, and ought most peculiarly to elevate us,

as rational creatures, above brutes, is that wherein men often appear most irrational,

and more senseless than beasts themselves. CREDO, QUIA IMPOSSIBILE EST: I believe,

because it is impossible, might, in a good man, pass for a sally of zeal;

but would prove a very ill rule for men to choose their opinions or religion by.

OF ENTHUSIASM.

1.He that would seriously set upon the search of truth, ought in the first place to prepare his mind

with a love of it. For he that loves it not, will not take much pains to get it, nor be much concerned

when he misses it. There is nobody in the commonwealth of learning,

who does not profess himself a lover of truth; and there is not a rational creature that would not

take it amiss to be thought otherwise of. And yet for all this, one may truly say,

that there are very few lovers of truth for truth-sake, even amongst those

who persuade themselves that they are so. How a man may know whether he be so in earnest,

is worth inquiry: and I think there is one unerring mark of it, viz.

the not entertaining any proposition with greater assurance, than the proofs it is built upon will warrant.

Whoever goes beyond this measure of assent, it is plain, receives not truth in the love of it;

loves not truth for truth-sake, but for some other by-end. For the evidence that any proposition is true

(except such as are self-evident) lying only in the proofs a man has of it,

whatsoever degrees of assent he affords it beyond the degrees of that evidence,

it is plain that all the surplusage of assurance is owing to some other affection, and not to the love of truth:

it being as impossible, that the love of truth should carry my assent

above the evidence there is to me that it is true,

as that the love of truth should make me assent to any proposition for the sake of that evidence,

which it has not, that it is true; which is in effect to love it as a truth,

because it is possible or probable that it may not be true. In any truth that gets not possession of our minds

by the irresistible light of self-evidence, or by the force of demonstration,

the arguments that gain it assent are the vouchers and gage of its probability to us;

and we can receive it for no other, than such as they deliver it to our understandings.

Whatsoever credit or authority we give to any proposition, more than it receives from the principles

and proofs it supports itself upon, is owing to our inclinations that way, and is so far a derogation

from the love of truth as such: which, as it can receive no evidence from our passions or interests,

so it should receive no tincture from them.

Firmness of persuasion no proof that any proposition is from God.

This cannot be otherwise, whilst firmness of persuasion is made the cause of believing,

and confidence of being in the right is made an argument of truth. St. Paul himself believed he did well,

and that he had a call to it when he persecuted the Christians,

whom he confidently thought in the wrong: but yet it was he, and not they, who were mistaken.

Good men are men still, liable to mistakes; and are sometimes warmly engaged in errours,

which they take for divine truths, shining in their minds with the clearest light.

OF WRONG ASSENT, OR ERROR.

1.Causes of Error, or how men come to give assent contrary to probability.

KNOWLEDGE being to be had only of visible and certain truth,

ERROR is not a fault of our knowledge, but a mistake of our judgment giving assent to that which is not true.

But if assent be grounded on likelihood, if the proper object and motive of our assent be probability,

and that probability consists in what is laid down in the foregoing chapters,

it will be demanded HOW MEN COME TO GIVE THEIR ASSENTS CONTRARY TO PROBABILITY.

For there is nothing more common than contrariety of opinions;

nothing more obvious than that one man wholly disbelieves what another only doubts of,

and a third steadfastly believes and firmly adheres to.

The reasons whereof, though they may be very various, yet, I suppose may all be reduced to these four:

I. WANT OF PROOFS.
II. WANT OF ABILITY TO USE THEM.
III. WANT OF WILL TO SEE THEM.
IV. WRONG MEASURES OF PROBABILITY.

9.Instilled in childhood.

There is nothing more ordinary than children’s receiving into their minds propositions

(especially about matters of religion) from their parents, nurses, or those about them:

which being insinuated into their unwary as well as unbiassed understandings, and fastened by degrees,

are at last (equally whether true or false) riveted there by long custom and education,

beyond all possibility of being pulled out again. For men, when they are grown up,

reflecting upon their opinions, and finding those of this sort to be as ancient in their minds as their very memories,

not having observed their early insinuation, nor by what means they got them,

they are apt to reverence them as sacred things, and not to suffer them to be profaned, touched, or questioned:

they look on them as the Urim and Thummim set up in their minds immediately by God himself,

to be the great and unerring deciders of truth and falsehood, and the judges to

which they are to appeal in all manner of controversies.

10.Of irresistible efficacy.

This opinion of his principles (let them be what they will) being once established in any one’s mind,

it is easy to be imagined what reception any proposition shall find, how clearly soever proved,

that shall invalidate their authority, or at all thwart with these internal oracles;

whereas the grossest absurdities and improbabilities, being but agreeable to such principles,

go down glibly, and are easily digested. The great obstinacy that is to be found in men firmly

believing quite contrary opinions, though many times equally absurd, in the various religions of mankind,

are as evident a proof as they are an unavoidable consequence of this way of reasoning

from received traditional principles. So that men will disbelieve their own eyes,

renounce the evidence of their senses, and give their own experience the lie,

rather than admit of anything disagreeing with these sacred tenets. Take an intelligent Romanist that,

from the first dawning of any notions in his understanding, hath had this principle constantly inculcated,

viz. that he must believe as the church (i.e. those of his communion) believes, or that the pope is infallible,

and this he never so much as heard questioned,

till at forty or fifty years old he met with one of other principles: how is he prepared easily to swallow,

not only against all probability, but even the clear evidence of his senses,

the doctrine of TRANSUBSTANTIATION? This principle has such an influence on his mind,

that he will believe that to be flesh which he sees to be bread.

And what way will you take to convince a man of any improbable opinion he holds, who,

with some philosophers, hath laid down this as a foundation of reasoning,

That he must believe his reason (for so men improperly call arguments drawn from their principles)

against his senses? Let an enthusiast be principled that he or his teacher is inspired,

and acted by an immediate communication of the Divine Spirit,

and you in vain bring the evidence of clear reasons against his doctrine. Whoever, therefore,

have imbibed wrong principles, are not, in things inconsistent with these principles,

to be moved by the most apparent and convincing probabilities,

till they are so candid and ingenuous to themselves, as to be persuaded to examine even those very principles,

which many never suffer themselves to do.

---

休谟:人性论

论知性

论人类观念的起源

我们的全部简单观念在初出现时都是来自简单印象，这种简单印象和简单观念相应，
而且为简单观念所精确地复现。

在搜罗种种现象来证明这个命题时，我只发现两种现象；但是每种现象都是很明显的，
数量很多的，而且是没有争论余地的。我首先通过一个新的审查，来确定我前面所作的断言，
即每个简单印象都伴有一个相应的观念，每个简单观念都伴有一个相应的印象。
根据类似的知觉之间这种恒常的结合，我立刻断言，
我们的相应的印象和观念之间有一种极大的联系，
而且一种的存在对另一种的存在具有重大的影响。
这样无数的例子中的这样一种恒常的结合决不会出于偶然，
而是清楚地证明了不是印象依靠于观念，
就是观念依靠于印象。为了要知道哪一种依靠于哪一种，我就研究两者初次出现时的次序，
并由恒常的经验发现，简单印象总是先于它的相应观念出现，
而从来不曾以相反的次序出现。
要给一个儿童以深红和橙黄或甜味和苦味的观念，我就把这些对象呈现于他，换句话说，
就是把这些印象传达给他；但我不会荒谬地试图通过激起这些观念来产生这些印象。
我们的观念在出现时并不产生它们的相应的印象，
我们也不能单借思维任何颜色或其他的东西，
就知觉到那种颜色或感到其他的感觉。在另一方面，我们却发现，
不论心灵或身体的任何印象，都永远有一个和它类似的观念伴随而来，
而且观念与印象只在强烈和生动程度方面有所差别。
我们的类似知觉的恒常的结合就令人信服地证明了，其中之一是另外一种的原因，
而印象所占的这种优先性也同样地证明了，我们的印象是我们的观念的原因，
而我们的观念不是我们的印象的原因。

为了证实这一点，我又研究另一个明显而令人信服的现象；就是，在任何情况下，
只要产生印象的那些官能由于事故而使它们的作用受到了妨碍，
例如一个生来就是盲人或聋子的那种情形；那么，不但没有了印象，
而且相应的观念也就没有了，因而在心灵中两者都没有丝毫的痕迹。
不但在感觉器官完全毁坏时是这种情形，
就是在从未进行活动去产生一个特殊印象这种情况下，
也是如此。我们如果不曾真正尝过菠萝，我们对于菠萝的滋味，便不能形成一个恰当的观念。

但是有一个与此矛盾的现象，可以证明观念不是绝对不可能出现于它们的相应的印象之前。
我相信，人们会毫不迟疑地承认，通过眼睛进入心中的各别的颜色观念，
或是通过听觉传入心中的各种声音的观念，实在是各不相同的，虽然同时它们是类似的。
各种颜色既然是这种情形，那么同一颜色的各种深浅程度也必然有同样的情形，也就是说，
各个色调都产生一个和其他色调的观念不同的另一个观念。如果否认这点，
我们就可以将色调继续逐渐推移，
使一种颜色在不知不觉之中推移到和它距离最远的一种色调；
你如果不承认任何中间色调各不相同，那么你如果再否认两极色调相同，便不能不陷入谬误。
因此，假设有一个人三十年来视觉正常，并完全熟悉各种颜色，只有一种特殊的蓝色色调，
偏是不幸没有遇到过。现在，把这种颜色的全部色调都放在那个人的面前，
从最深的色调开始，逐渐降到最浅的色调，中间单缺那个特殊的色调；
显然，他在没有那个色调的地方，将会看到一片空白，并且觉察到，在那个地方、
两个互相邻接的色调要比在其他地方有较大的距离。现在我就问，
那个人是否可以凭他的想象来补充这个缺陷，并使那个特殊色调的观念呈现在他的心中，
虽然那种色调从未被他的感官传入到他的心中。我相信，很少有人会以为他不能做到这点。
这一点可以用来证明简单观念并非总是从相应的印象得来的；但这种例子极为特殊和稀少，
几乎不值得我们注意，也不值得单为它而改变我们的概括准则。

除了这个例外，我们不妨就这个题目附带说明一下，印象先于观念的这个原则，
还要加上另外一条限制，即正如我们的观念是印象的意象一样，我们也能够形成次生观念，
作为原始观念的意象，这在我们当前对于观念所作的推理中就可以看到。但恰当地说，
这个限制与其说是那个规则的一个例外，不如说是那个规则的一个说明。
观念可以在新观念中产生自己的意象；但原始观念既经假设为由印象得来；
所以我们的一切简单观念或是间接地或是直接地
从它们相应的印象得来的这个说法仍然是正确的。

论抽象观念

我们先从第一个命题开始，即心灵对于任何数量或质量的程度，
如果没有形成一个明确的概念，
那就无法对这个数量或质量形成任何概念。我们可以用下面三个论证来证明这点。
第一，我们已经说过，一切差异的对象都是可以区别的，
而一切可以区别的对象都是可以被想象和思想分离的。而且，我们在这里还可以附加说，
这些命题逆转来说也同样是真实的：即一切可以分离的对象都是可以区别的，
而一切可以区别的对象也都是差异的。因为，我们如何能够把不可区别的事物加以分离，
把没有差异的事物加以区别呢？因此，为了要知道抽象作用是否包含着分离作用，
我们只须在这个观点下加以考究，并且考察，
我们从一般观念中抽去的一切细节
是否和我们保留下来作为它们的本质部分的那些细节可以区别、
并且是差异的。但是一看就可了然，一条线的确切长度和那条线本身既没有差异，
也不可区别；而任何质量的确切程度和那个质量也是既没有差异、也不可区别的。
因此，这些观念是不容分离的，正像它们不容区别、没有差异一样。
所以，这些观念是互相结合在概念中的；一条线的一般观念，不论我们如何进行抽象和分辨，
当它出现于心灵中时，总是具有在数量上和质量上的一个确切程度，
不论它怎样可以被用来表象其他一些具有各种不同程度的线条。

第二，大家承认，凡出现于感官前面的对象，换句话说，即凡出现于心中的印象，
总是在数量和质量的程度上是确定的。印象有时变得混淆，那只是由于它们的微弱和不稳定，
并非由于心灵有任何能力可以接受在实际存在中，没有特殊程度或比例的任何印象。
这是一个矛盾的说法，甚至涵摄着一个极度的矛盾，即同一件事物既可以是存在的，
同时又可以是不存在的。

第三，哲学中有一个公认的原理，即自然界一切事物都是特殊的；
要假设一个没有确切比例的边和角的三角形真正存在，那是十分谬误的。
因此，如果这种假设在事实上和实际上是谬误的，那么它在观念上也必然是谬误的；
因为，我们对之能够形成一个清楚和明晰的观念的任何东西，
有一个是不合理的和不可能的。
但形成一个对象的观念和单是形成一个观念，是同一回事；把观念参照一个对象，
只是一种外加的名称，观念本身并不具有对象的任何标志或特征。
我们既然不能形成一个只具有数量和质量、而不具有数量和质量的确切程度的对
象观念，所以我们同样也就不能形成在这两方面没有限制和界限的任何观念。
因此，抽象观念本身就是特殊的，不论它们在表象作用上变得如何的一般。
心中的意象只是一个特殊对象的意象，
虽然在我们的推理中应用意象时好像它具有普遍性似的。

一个特殊观念附在一个一般名词上以后，就成为一般的了，这就是说，
附在这样的一个名词上，这个名词由于一种习惯的联系，
对其他许多的特殊观念都有一种关系，并且很容易把那些观念唤回想象中来。

第一，我可以说，当我们提到任何一个大数字时，例如一千，心灵对它一般没有恰当的观念，
心灵只有能力，借着形成包括那个数字的一些十进数的恰当观念来产生那样一个观念。
但是我们观念中的这个缺点，在我们的推理中却从来感觉不到，
这是和现在所研究的普遍观念的例子似乎是平行的一个例子。

第二，有些习惯可以被一个单个字唤起，我们有不少这种的例子：
例如，一个人原会背诵一篇论文或若干首诗，一时记忆不起，
只要一经提及篇首的一个字或一个词句，他便会记起全文来。

第三，我相信，任何人只要一考察自己在推理时的心境，都会同我一致主张：
我们在我们所应用的每个名词上并不总是附有明晰和完整的观念；
在谈到政府、教会、谈判、征服时，
我们很少会在自己心中展开这些复合观念所由组成的一切简单观念。
但是我们可以注意到，虽然有这种缺陷，我们仍然可以对这些题材避免胡说乱谈，
并且可以觉察观念之间的任何矛盾，就像我们对它们有充分的理解一样。
例如，我们如果不说在战争中弱者总是选择谈判的途径，而却说他们总是采取征服的方式，
那么，由于我们一向惯于把某些关系附在某些观念，那种习惯仍然随着那些名词而来，
并使我们立刻觉察这个命题是谬误的，
这正像一个特殊观念可以被我们用来对其他的观念进行推理一样，
即使这些其他观念在某些细节上和那个观念是很不相同的。

第四，由于个体被集合起来、并根据它们的互相类似关系被归纳在一个一般名词之下，
这种关系必然会使这些观念易于进入想象之中，而在需要时更为迅速地呈现出来。
的确，我们只要研究一下我们在思考或推理时的通常思维过程，
我们就会发现可以相信这种说法的充分理由。想象极为敏捷地体现它的观念，
并且在需要或有用的时刻，立刻把这些观念显现出来：这种敏捷程度真是十分奇异的。
想象在收集属于任何一个题材的观念时，可以从宇宙的一端搜索到宇宙的另外一端。
可以认为，由观念所组成的这个理智世界全部被展现在我们的眼前，
我们只要拣出最适合于我们目的的那些观念。
但是，除了灵魂中那种魔术般的能力所收集的那些观念之外，心中没有任何其他的观念；
这种魔术般的能力在最伟大的天才心中虽然总是最为完善的，而且也正是我们所称的天才，
但它是人类理智的最大努力也无法加以解释的。

论空间和时间观念的无限可分性

感官的印象也和想象的观念情形相同。试在纸上画一墨点，凝神注视那个点，
然后退往远处，直到最后看不见那一点为止；显然，在它即将消失之前的一刹那，
那个映象或印象是完全不可分割的。
远处物体的微小部分所以传达不来任何可以感觉到的印象，
并非由于缺少刺激我们眼睛的光线，而是因为物体在某种距离上、
它们的印象便缩小到了最小限度，不能再行缩小。而它们现在却已被移到那个距离以外了。
显微镜或望远镜虽然能使这些对象可以看见，可是它们并不产生任何新的光线，
只是扩展了那些永远由物体发出的光线，
并通过这个方法使肉眼看来是简单而不复合的印象呈现出各个部分，
并且把先前不可知觉的东西提升到最小点。

由此我们就可以发现通常的意见的错误，即认为心灵的能力在两方面都受到限制，
而且想象对于超过某种微小程度东西，正像对于超过某种巨大程度的东西一样，
都不能形成一个恰当的观念。
我们在想象中所形成的某些观念和呈现于感官的某些映象可以达到最小的限度，
没有东西能够比它们更小，因为有些观念和映象是完全简单而不可分的。
我们感官的惟一缺点在于：它们给予我们以一些和物体本身不成比例的物体的映像，
并且把实际上是巨大的、并由许多部分组成的东西表象为微小的和单纯的。
这种错误，我们觉察不到；我们把呈现于感官的那些微小对象的印象，
认为就等于或差不多等于那些对象，随后又依据理性发现还有其他远为微小的对象，
因此就遽然断言，这些对象比我们的想象的任何观念或我们的感官的任何印象都更为微小。
但是，可以确定，我们可以形成一些观念，不大于一个较蛆虫小一千倍的虫子的元气
（animal spirits）的最小的原子；我们其实应该这样断言：困难在于如何扩大我们的概念，
以便形成一个正确的蛆虫概念，或者甚至形成比蛆虫小一千倍的一个虫子的正确概念。
因为要对这样微小的动物形成一个正确的概念，
我们必须有一个表象它们每一部分的明晰的观念；
根据无限可分说，这是完全做不到的，而根据不可分的部分或原子这个理论，
这又是极为困难的，因为这些部分数目太大，而且是过于繁复了。

论空间和时间的无限可分性

形而上学中有一条确立的公理，就是：凡心灵能够清楚地想象的任何东西，
都包含有可能存在的观念，换句话说，凡我们所想象到的东西都不是绝对不可能的。
我们能形成一座黄金色的山的观念，由此就可断言，这样一座山可能真正存在。
我们不能形成一座没有山谷的山的观念，因此就认为这样的山是不可能的。

确实，我们有一个广袤观念，否则我们为什么对它进行谈论和推理呢？
同样确实的一点是：想象所设想的这样一个观念虽然可以分为部分或较小的观念，
却不是无限可分的，也不是由无数的部分组成的；
因为那就超出了我们的有限的理解能力。
那么，这里既然有一个由完全不可分的部分或较小的观念组成的广袤观念，
所以这个观念并不含有矛盾，因此广袤可能是符合这个观念而真正存在的，
因此所有为反驳数学点的可能性而提出的一切论证只是经院哲学的诡辩，
不值得我们的注意。

我们可以将这些结论更推进一步，并且断言，
关于广袤的无限可分说的一切所谓理证同样都是一些诡辩；因为我们确知，
如果不先证明数学点是不可能的，那么这些理证都不可能是正确的：
而要想证明数学点的不可能，那显然是一种荒谬的企图。

论感官印象和记忆印象

一个要想描摹任何一种情感或情绪的画家，总要设法去看一看被同样情绪所激动的人，
以便使他的观念生动活泼，并使它们比那些只是想象中的虚构的观念更为强烈和活泼。
这种记忆越是新近，观念也就越是清楚；在隔了一个长时间以后，
他如果再返回来思维他那个对象，他总是会发觉那个对象的观念衰退了，
即使不是完全消灭的话。当我们的记忆观念变得十分微弱的时候，
我们对它们时常发生怀疑；当任何一个意象不是表现得色彩鲜明、
足以表明记忆官能的特征时，我们就难以断言，那个意象还是来自想象，
还是来自记忆。一个人说，我想我记得那样一件事情，
不过我没有把握。漫长的时间几乎把它消磨于我的记忆之外，
使我不能确定它是否是我的想象的纯粹产物。

一个记忆观念既然可以由于失去它的强力和活泼性而衰退到那样一个程度，
以致被认为是一个想象观念；同样地，在另一方面，
一个想象观念也可以获得那样一种强烈和活泼程度，以致被认作一个记忆观念，
并且对信念和判断起着和记忆观念相似的作用。这种情形可以在撒谎的人身上看到；
这些人由于一再撒谎，最后终于对谎话产生了信念和记忆，就像它们是实在的事情一样。
习惯在这种情形下也像在其他情形下一样，对心灵产生了和自然对心灵的同样的影响，
并且给观念注入了同样的强力和活力。

论理性方面的怀疑主义

一切理证性的科学中的规则都是确定和无误的。但是当我们应用它们的时候，
我们那些易误的、不准确的官能便很容易违背这些规则，而陷于错误之中。
因此，我们在每一段推理中都必须形成一个新的判断，作为最初的判断或信念的检查或审核；
而且我们必须扩大视野去检视我们的知性曾经欺骗过我们的一切例子的经过，
并把这些例子和知性的证据是正确而真实的那些例子进行比较。
我们的理性必须被视为一个原因，而真理为其自然的结果；但是理性是那样一个原因，
它可以由于其他原因的侵入，由于我们心理能力的浮动不定，而往往可以遭到阻碍。
这样，全部知识就降落为概然推断。随着我们所经验到的知性的真实或虚妄，
随着问题的单纯或复杂，这种概然性也就有大有小。

没有一个代数学家或数学家，在他的科学中造诣到那样精深的程度，
以至于他刚一发现一条真理，就完全深信不疑，而不把它看作只是一个单纯的概然推断。
当他每一次检视他的证明时，他的信心便有所增加；
他这种信心更因为他的朋友们的赞许而有所增加，
并由于学术界的一致同意和赞美而提高到最高的圆满程度。
但是，这种信念的逐步增加显然只是若干新的概然性的积累，
并且是根据过去经验和观察由因果的恒常结合得来的。

在我们所能形成的关于概然推断的每一个判断中，如同在关于知识的每一个判断中一样，
我们应当永远把从知性本性得来的另一个判断，来校正那个从对象本性得来的最初判断。
可以确定，具有确实见解和长期经验的人比起一个愚昧无知的人来，对他自己的意见应该有、
并且也通常有较大的信念，而且我们的意见，也随着我们的理性和经验程度，
甚至对自己说来也有不同的威信程度。即在具有最高的见识和最长的经验的人，
这种威信也决不是完整的，因为甚至那样一个人也必然自觉到过去许多错误，
而不得不恐怕将来仍有类似的事情。
因此，这里就发生了一个新的概然推断来校正和调节第一次的概然推断，
而确定其正确的标准和比例。正如理证受到概然推断的审核一样，
概然推断也借心灵的反省作用得到一种新的校正；
这种反省作用的对象就是人类的知性的本性和根据第一次概然推断而进行的推理。

我们既然在每一个概然推断中，除了那个研究对象所固有的原始不确定性以外，
已经发现了由判断官能的弱点发生的一种新的不确定性，并且已经把这两者一起调整，
现在我们就被我们的理性所强迫，再加上一种新的怀疑，
这种怀疑的发生是由于我们在评价我们官能的真实可靠性时所可能有的错误。
这是立刻出现于我们面前的一种怀疑，而且我们如果紧密地追随我们的理性，
我们对这种怀疑不能避免要给以一个解决。不过这种解决虽然有利于前面的判断，
可是因为它只是建立在概然性之上，所以必然更加减弱我们的原始的证据，
而其本身也必然被同样性质的第四种怀疑所减弱，并照这样一直无限地推下去，
直至最后原来的概然性丝毫不存在为止，不论我们假设它原来是如何之大，
不论每一次新的不确定性所造成的减少是如何之小。任何有限的对象在无数次一再减少以后，
都不能继续存在；即使是人类想象所能设想的最大的数量，照这样下去也必然会归于无有。
我们原来的信念不论是多么强，它由于经过那样多次的新的考察，
并且每一次考察又多少要削减它的强力和活力，所以它必然不可避免地会消灭了。
当我反省我的判断的自然的易误性时，比在我只考究我对它进行推理的那个对象时，
我对我的意见的信心就更小了；当我再往前进，
细细检查我对我的官能所作的一次接一次的评价时，
于是全部逻辑规则都要求不断的减低信念，而最后把信念和证据都完全消灭了。

论近代哲学

但是这里，有人或许会反驳说，依照我的自白，想象既是一切哲学体系的最后裁判者，
而我却斥责古代哲学家们利用那个官能、并在他们的推理中完全听任想象去支配自己，
那就不公平了。为了辩明我的理由起见，我必须分别想象中的两种原则：一种原则是恒常的、
不可抗拒的、普遍的，就如由因到果和由果到因的那种习惯性的推移；另一种原则是变化的、
脆弱的、不规则的，就如我方才提到的那些。前者是我们一切思想和行动的基础，
所以如果除去了那些原则，人性必然立即要毁坏、消灭。
后一种原则对人类并不是不可避免的，
也不是必然的，甚至也不是生活过程中所需用的；正相反，
我们只看到这些原则发生于脆弱的心灵，并且因为它们违反其他习惯原则及推理原则，
很容易会被适当的对比和对立所推翻。因为这个缘故，所以前面的原则被哲学所信奉，
而后面的原则却遭到排斥。当一个人在黑暗中听到清晰的语音时，断言说有一个人在其近处，
他的推理是正确而自然的，虽然那个结论只是由习惯推得的，
这种习惯由于“人”的观念和现前的印象经常结合在一起，把一个人的观念灌输于心灵，
并使那个观念生动起来。但是一个人如果在黑暗中没来由地被恐惧幽灵的心理所苦恼，
那他或者也可以说是在进行推理，并且也是很自然地在推理；不过说这种推理是自然的，
其含义正如说一种疾病是自然的一样；因为疾病是由自然的原因发生的，
虽然疾病正与健康——人的最愉快、最自然的状况相反。

古代哲学家们的意见，他们的实体和偶有性那两种虚构，
和他们关于实体形式及奥秘性质的推理，正如黑暗中的幽灵，并且是由虽是通常、
而并非人性中普遍而不可避免的原则得来的。近代哲学自认是完全摆脱了这个缺点，
是由坚实、永恒和一致的想象原则产生的。这种自负究竟建立在什么基础上，
正是我们现在所要研究的题目。

那个哲学的基本原则就是关于颜色、声音、滋味、气味、冷和热的那个意见；
那个意见断言，这些性质都只是心中的印象，是由外界对象的作用而发生，
但与对象的性质并无任何类似。在经过考察之后，
我发现人们平常给这个意见所举出的理由中只有一条令人满意，那个理由的根据就是：
即使外界对象在一切外表上都继续同一不变，那些印象却常有变化。
这些变化决定于各种各样的条件：决定于我们不同的健康状况，
犹如一个患病的人对于一向最喜欢的肉类会感到一种恶味；
决定于各人的不同的脾性和体质，犹如一人所尝着是甜的东西，在别人会尝到是苦的。
这些变化也决定于外界情况和位置的差别；云反射回来的彩色，随着云的距离，
随着云与眼和发光体所形成的角而有变化。火也在隔着某种距离时传来快乐感觉，
而在隔着另一种距离时则传来痛苦感觉。这一类例子很多，而且是常见的。

论情感

论骄傲与谦卑；它们的对象和它们的原因

显而易见，骄傲与谦卑是恰恰相反的，可是它们有同一个对象。这个对象就是自我，
或我们所亲切记忆和意识到的接续着的一串相关观念和印象。
当我们被这些情感之一所激动时，我们的观点总是固定在自我。
我们的自我观念有时显得优越，有时显得不够优越，
我们也就随着感到那些相反感情中的这一种或那一种，或因骄傲而兴高采烈，
或因谦卑而抑郁沮丧。心灵不论接纳其他什么对象，而在考虑这些对象时，
总要着眼于我们自己；否则这些对象便永远不能刺激起这些感情，
或者使它们有些微的增减。当自我不被考虑到时，便没有骄傲或谦卑的余地。

先从骄傲与谦卑的原因谈起；我们可以说，它们的最明显而可注目的特性，
就是这两种情感可以由此而发生的那些主体的极大多样性。心灵的每一种有价值的性质，
不论其属于想象，属于判断，属于记忆，或属于性情，如机智、见识、学问、勇敢、
正义、正直，所有这些都是骄傲的原因，而其反面则是谦卑的原因。
这些情感并不限于发生在心灵方面，而也将它们的观点扩展到身体方面。
一个人也可以由于美貌、体力、敏捷、体态、熟练的舞术、骑术、剑术，
以及他在任何体力劳动和技艺方面的灵巧而感到骄傲。但是还不止这些。
这些情感在往远处看时，还包括了一切与我们有丝毫联系或关系的任何对象。
我们的国家、家庭、儿女、亲戚、财富、房屋、花园、犬马、衣服，
任何一样都可以成为骄傲或谦卑的原因。


由于考虑到这些原因，所以看来就必须对这种情感的原因作一个新的区别，
即区别那种发生作用的性质和那种性质所寓存的主体。
例如，一个人对属于自己的美丽的房屋，或自己所建筑和设计的美丽的房屋，
感到得意。这里，情感的对象就是他自己，而其原因则是那所美丽的房屋：
这个原因又再分为两个部分，即作用于情感上的那个性质，
和那个性质所寓存的那个主体。性质就是那种美，
而主体即是视为他的财产或由他所设计的那所房屋。这两个部分都是要素，
而它们之间的区别也不是虚幻不实的。美如果不寓存于和我们有关系的某种东西，
而单就其自身来考虑，永不能产生任何骄傲或虚荣；
但如果没有美或可以代替美的其他某种事物，单靠最强的关系也很少影响到那种情感的。
这两个项目既然很容易分开，而且两者必须结合起来才能产生那种情感，
所以我们应该把两者看作那个原因的组成部分，
并在自己心中确定一个这种区别的精确观念。

这些对象和原因是从哪里来的

第一，这些情感显然不但是被一种自然的特性，
而且还是被一种原始的特性所决定来把自我作为它们的对象的。
这种特性的作用既是恒常而稳定的，所以没有人能够怀疑它们不是自然的。
骄傲与谦卑的对象永远是自我；每当这些情感向外观察的时候，它们总要着眼于我们自己，
否则任何人或对象都不能对我们发生任何影响。

这个情形也是由一种原始的性质或最初的冲动发生的；
我们如果考虑到这种性质是区别这些情感的特征，这一点就将显得明白无疑。
自然若不是给予心灵以某些原始的性质，心灵便永不能有任何次生的性质；
因为在那种情形下，心灵就没有行动的基础，也永不能开始发挥它的作用。
但是我们所必须认为原始的这些性质，是和灵魂最不可分离的，
而且不能还原到其他性质的那样一些性质。
而决定骄傲和谦卑的对象的正是这样一种性质。

产生那种情感的原因和那种情感所指向的那个对象是否是同样自然的，
而且那么许多的原因还是由心灵的任意的妄想得来的，还是由它的素质得来的：
我们或许可以把这一问题看作一个更重大的问题。这个疑惑是可以立刻消除的，
如果我们观察一下人性，并且考虑一下，在一切民族和时代中，
同样的对象永远产生骄傲与谦卑，而且甚至当我们看到一个素不相识的人的时候，
我们也能相当知道，什么将增加或减少他的这一类的情感。在这一方面，
如果有任何差异，那也只是由于人类性情和脾气的差异，并且这种差异也不甚大。
只要人性保持同一不变，我们能不能想象，人们对于他们的权力、财富、
美貌或个人的优点会完全漠不关心，而他们的骄傲和虚荣也不会被这些优点所影响呢？

但是，虽然骄傲与谦卑的原因显然是自然的，可是我们在考察之后，
将会发现这些原因并不是原始的，
而且这些原因绝对不可能各自借着自然的一种特殊规定和原始结构适合于这些情感。
这些原因除了它们的极大的数量以外，许多都是艺术的产品，一部分来自人的勤劳，
一部分来自各人的爱好，一部分来自人的幸运。勤劳产生了房屋、家具、衣服。
爱好决定这些东西的特殊种类和性质。幸运显示了物体的不同的混合和组合所产生的结果，
因而往往有助于上述一切的制作。因此，不能设想，
所有这些每一种都由自然所预见和规定；不能设想，引起骄傲或谦卑的每一种新的艺术品，
不是因为具有自然地影响心灵的某种共同的性质，才适合于这些情感，
而是其本身就是一个原始原则的对象，那个原则在此以前一向隐藏在灵魂以内，
只是由于偶然才终于被人发现出来的；这样设想是荒谬的。
因为要是这样，那么发明精美盖式办公桌的第一个工匠，
使得到这种办公桌的人心中产生出骄傲来时，
其所凭借的原则便不同于使他因华丽的桌椅而自傲的那些原则了。
这种说法既然显得分明是可笑的，所以我们必须断言，骄傲和谦卑的每一个原因，
并不是借着一种个别的、原始的性质适合于这些情感，
而一定有或多或少的条件是这些情感所共有的，并且是它们的效能所依据的。

因此，精神哲学在这里所处的情况正和哥白尼时代以前的自然科学所处的情况一样。
古代的人们虽然知道自然无妄作的那个格言，
可是仍然设计了与真正哲学不相符合的那样繁复的天体体系，
而最后那些体系却不得不让位于一个比较简单而自然的体系。
倘使我们毫不犹豫地给每一个新现象都发明一个新的原则，而不使它适合于旧的原则；
倘使我们以叠床架屋的原则充塞在我们的假设之内；那就确实地证明了，
这些原则中没有一条是正确的，
而我们只是想借一大批伪说来掩盖自己对于真理的无知罢了。

论印象与观念的关系

我在人类心灵中所观察到的第二种特性就是与此类似的印象的联结。
所有类似的印象都联系在一起，一个印象一发生，其余的就立刻随之而来。
悲伤和失望产生愤怒，愤怒产生妒忌，妒忌产生恶意，恶意又产生悲伤，
一直完成整个一周为止。同样，当我们的性情被喜悦鼓舞起来时，
它自然而然地就进入爱情、慷慨、怜悯、勇敢、骄傲和其他类似的感情。
心灵在被任何情感激动时，就难以限定在那种单独的情感，没有任何变化或变异。
人性是十分无常的，不可能有任何那样的规律性。易变性是人性的要素。
既是这样，那么人性不是极其自然地要向着那些适合于人的性情、
符合于当时占着优势的那一套情感的感情或情绪而变化么？
因此，在印象间也和在观念间一样，显然都有一种吸引作用或联结作用；
不过两者之间有这样一种显著的差别，即观念是被类似、接近和因果关系所联结的，
而印象却只是被类似关系所联结的。

第三，我们可以观察到，这两种联结关系是十分互相协助、互相促进的，
两种联结如果会合于同一个对象上，推移过程便更加容易完成。
例如一个人因为受到他人侵害，性情变得非常紊乱和暴躁的时候，
就容易找到几百种引起不满、焦急、恐惧和其他不安情感的东西，
特别是当他能够发现这些东西就在于引起他的最初情感来的那个人身上，
或是在这个人的附近。
促进观念推移的那些原则在这里和影响情感的那些原则会合在一种活动里面，
使心灵上起了双重的冲动。因此，那个新的情感必然以更大的猛烈程度发生出来，
而向这种情感的推移也必然变得更加顺利而自然。

在这个场合下，我可以援引一个优秀作家的高论；他是以下述方式发表他的感想的。
“想象对于一切伟大、奇异而美丽的事物都感到愉快，
而且想象在同一对象中所发现的这些优点越多，它就越感到愉快，
因为这个缘故，它也能够借另一个感官的帮助，得到新的快乐。
例如任何连续的声音，如鸟鸣的声音或瀑布倾泻的声音，
每一刹那都激发观赏者的心灵，使他更加注意他眼前那个地方的各种美景。
又如有一个地方发出了一阵香气，那种香味也提高想象的快乐，
使当前景色中的色彩和青绿显得分外怡人；因为两种感官的观念都在互相促进，
而且在互相结合起来时，比在分别进入心中时，更加令人愉快；
正如一幅画中的各种颜色如果调配得很好，便可以互相衬托，因而相得益彰，
增添了它的美。”在这个现象中，我们可以注意到印象和观念的联结，
以及它们交互的协助。

这个体系的限制

第二种限制是：愉快的或不愉快的对象，不但要与我们自己有密切关系，
而且要为我们所特有，或者至少是我们少数人所共有的。在人性中可以观察到一种性质，
即：凡时常呈现出来的、而为我们所长期习惯的一切事物，在我们看来就失掉了价值，
很快就被鄙弃和忽视；这个性质，我们以后将力求加以说明。
我们判断对象时也是大多根据于比较，而较少根据其实在的、内在的优点；
我们如果不能借对比增加对象的价值，那么我们就容易忽略甚至其本质的优点。
心灵的这些性质对骄傲与喜悦都有一种影响；可以注目的一点是，人类所共有、
并为我们所习见的东西，很少给予我们任何愉快，
虽然这些东西比我们由于它们的独特性而加以珍视的那些物品来也许更为优越。
不过这个条件对这两种情感虽然都起作用，可是对于虚荣感的影响却更大一些。
许多东西因为时常出现，不使我们感到骄傲，可是我们仍然喜欢享有。
在长时期失去健康以后，康复就给予我们以很明显的快乐；
不过人们很少把健康当作虚荣的对象，因为享有健康的人为数是那样多的。

在这一点上，骄傲所以比喜悦更多要求的理由，我认为是这样的。为了刺激起骄傲来，
我们总要想到两个对象，即产生快乐的原因或对象，和作为那种情感的真正对象的自我。
但是喜悦的产生只需要一个对象，即给人快乐的那个对象；
这个对象虽然需要对自我有某种关系，可是这种关系的需要，
只是为了使那个对象成为愉快的；至于自我，恰当地说，并不是这个情感的对象。
因此，骄傲既然可说是有两个使我们着眼的对象，所以结果就是，
这两个对象如果都没有任何独特性，那么这种情感比起单有一个对象的情感来，
必然因此更加减弱。如果在把自己同别人比较起来（这是我们往往时刻都在进行的），
我们发现自己丝毫没有突出的地方；而在比较我们所占有的对象时，
我们仍然发现有同样不幸的情况；那么由于这两种不利的比较，
骄傲情感必然会完全消灭了。

Ⅳ.第四种限制是根据这些情感的原因的变化无常，
以及这种原因和我们自己联系的时期的短暂得来的。
一切偶然而易变的事物给予人们很少的喜悦，更少的骄傲。
我们对于那个事物自身就不甚满意，更不会因为这个事物而感到任何更进一步的自满程度。
我们在想象中预见和预料到它的变化，这就使我们对那个事物不甚满意；
我们把它和存在时期较长久的我们自己加以比较，因而它的变化无常就显得更大了。
一个对象的存在时间既然比我们短了那么多，
并且只在我们一生中那样短暂的时间内伴随我们，
所以如果由于这样一个对象而设想我们自己的优越性，那就似乎可笑了。
我们不难理解这个原因对喜悦的作用何以不如对骄傲的作用那样有力的理由，
因为自我观念对前一种情感并不如对后一种情感那样必要。

我还可以再加上第五种限制，这种限制倒不如说是这个体系的一种扩充，就是：
通则不但在其他一切情感上有极大的影响，就是对骄傲和谦卑也有极大影响。
因此，我们就依据各人所占有的权力或财富，而形成他们的不同等级的概念；
那些人的健康或性情纵有任何特点，足以剥夺去他们对于他们的所有物的一切享受，
我们也不因此而改变这个概念。前面在说明通则对知性的影响时所用的那些原则，
也可用来说明通则在这里的影响。在我们的情感方面，也像在我们的推理方面一样，
习惯都很容易地使我们超出确当的范围以外。

我将以根据这五种限制所得的感想，结束这个题目。这个感想就是，
那些最骄傲而在世人看来也最有骄傲理由的人，并不永远是最幸福的，
而最谦卑的人也并不永远是最可怜的人，虽然根据这个体系初看起来也许会这样想象的。
一种祸害，虽然它的原因和我们没有关系，仍然可以是实在的；虽然不是个人所特有的，
也仍然可以是实在的；虽然不表现出来被别人所见到，也仍然可以是实在的；
虽然不是经常的，也仍然可以是实在的；虽然不归纳在通则之下，也仍然可以是实在的。
像这一类的祸害，虽然没有减少骄傲的倾向，也总会使我们处于可怜的状况。
而最实在、最顽强的人生祸害或许是属于这种性质的。

论恶与德

因为假设道德没有自然的基础，我们仍然必须承认，恶和德，
不论是由于自利或是由于教育的偏见，总是使我们产生一种实在的痛苦和快乐。
我们可以看到，拥护这个假设的人是竭力主张这种说法的。
他们说，每一种对我们有有利倾向或有害倾向的情感、
习惯或性格的倾向都产生一种快乐或不快；赞许或谴责就是由此而发生。
由于他人的慷慨，我们就容易有所获得，但是他们如果贪婪，我们就永远有损失的危险；
勇敢防卫我们，但是怯懦却使我们随时易于遭受攻击；正义是社会的维系力量，
而非义若不加以遏制，便迅速招致社会的沉沦；〔别人的〕谦卑使我们感到高兴，
而〔别人的〕骄傲则使我们感到耻辱。因为这些理由，所以前一类性质就被认为是德，
而后一类性质则被认为是恶。这里既然承认，每一种优点或缺点都伴有一种愉快或不快，
那就是我的目的所要求的一切了。

不过我还要进一步说，这个道德假设和我现在的体系不但互相符合，
而且如果承认前者是正确的，那么它就成了后者的一个绝对的和不可抗拒的证明。
因为一切道德如果都是建立在痛苦或快乐之上，而痛苦或快乐的发生，
又都是由于我们预料到我们自己的或别人的性格所可能带来的任何损失或利益，
那么道德的全部效果必然都是由这种痛苦或快乐得来的，
其中骄傲和谦卑的情感也是由此而来的。依据这个假设来说，德的本质就在于产生快乐，
而恶的本质就在于给人痛苦。德与恶又必须是我们的性格的一部分，
才可以刺激起骄傲或谦卑。关于印象和观念的双重关系，
我们还希望有什么进一步的证明呢？

从那些主张道德是一种实在的、本质的、基于自然的东西的人们的意见，
也可以得出同样没有疑问的论证来。
在说明恶和德的区别和道德的权利与义务的起源方面所提出来的最可能的假设就是：
根据自然的原始结构，某些性格和情感在一经观察和思维之下，就产生了痛苦，
而另外一些的性格和情感则在同样方式下刺激起快乐来。
不快和愉快不但和恶和德是分不开的，而且就构成了两者的本性和本质。
所谓赞许一种性格，就是面对着这种性格感到一种原始的快乐。所谓谴责一种性格，
也就是感到一种不快。因此，痛苦和快乐既是恶和德的原始原因，
也就必然是它们一切结果的原因，因而也是骄傲和谦卑的原因，
这两者乃是那种区别的不可避免的伴随物。

但是假设这个道德哲学的假设被承认是虚妄的，可是仍然显而易见，
痛苦和快乐即使不是恶和德的原因，至少也是与两者分不开的。
一个慷慨和高尚的性格，在观察之下就给人以愉快；
这种性格即使只在一首诗或一个故事中呈现于我们，总也不会不使我们感到喜悦和愉快。
在另一方面，残忍和奸诈也因其本性而使人不悦；
而且我们也永远不能容忍我们或他人有这些性质。
由此可见，一个道德假设是前面体系的不可否认的证明，
而另一个假设至少也是与之符合的。

但是骄傲与谦卑并不单是发生于心灵的这些性质
（通俗的伦理学体系把这些性质包括在道德义务中间，作为道德义务的一些部分），
而且也发生于凡与快乐和不快有关联的其他任何一种性质。能够以我们的机智、
幽默或其他任何才艺使人喜欢的才能，是最能投合我们的虚荣心的；
而在这一方面的任何企图如果遭了挫折，也最能给我们以明显的耻辱。
但是从来没有人能够说出什么是机智，并且指出，
为什么那样一个思想方式必须被认为是机智；而另一个思想方式就被排斥了不算是机智。
我们只有凭鉴别力才能对它有所决定，我们也没有其他任何标准，可据以形成这种判断。
这种鉴别力可说是确定了真的和假的机智的存在，而且离开了它，
任何思想便都不能被称为真的或假的机智，那么，这种鉴别力是什么呢？
它显然只在于由真机智所得到的一种快乐感觉，和由假机智所得到的一种不快感觉，
不过我们在这里并不能说出那种快乐或不快的理由。
因此，以这些相反感觉给予人们的那种能力，就是真的和假的机智的本质所在，
因而也就是由真假机智发生的那种骄傲或谦卑的原因。

也许有人习惯于经院和讲坛的讲解方式，只能用他们观察人性的观点，
而不能用其他观点来考察人性，
所以当他们在这里听到我说德可以刺激起他们所视为恶的骄傲来，
而恶可以产生他们被教导而视为德的谦卑来，他们也许会感到惊讶。
不过为了不作词语上的争论，我要提出来说，我所谓骄傲是指我们在观察德、美貌、
财富或权力时，由于对自己满意而心中发生的那种愉快的印象而言；
而所谓谦卑，则是指相反的印象而言。前一个印象显然并非总是恶劣的，
后一个印象也并不总是善良的。
最严格的道德学也允许我们在反省一个慷慨的行为时感到一种快乐；
而人们在想到过去的卑鄙和奸恶时所产生的那种无益的悔恨感觉，
也没有人会认为是一种德的。因此，让我们考察这些印象的本身，
并探究它们的原因（不论它们是在心灵中或在身体中），
暂且不管可能伴随这些印象的功过。

论美与丑

容貌和体态的性质的这种作用，
不但表明骄傲和谦卑两种情感在具备了我所要求的全部条件以后才能在这种情形下发生，
从而证明我现在这个体系，而且这种作用还可以用作一个更有力的、更有说服力的论证。
如果我们考察一下哲学或常识所提出来用以说明美和丑的差别的一切假设，
我们就将发现，这些假设全部都归结到这一点上：美是一些部分的那样一个秩序和结构，
它们由于我们天性的原始组织，或是由于习惯，或是由于爱好、
适于使灵魂发生快乐和满意。这就是美的特征，并构成美与丑的全部差异，
丑的自然倾向乃是产生不快。因此，快乐和痛苦不但是美和丑的必然伴随物，
而且还构成它们的本质。的确，如果我们考虑到、
我们所赞赏的动物的或其他对象的大部分的美是由方便和效用的观念得来的，
那么我们便将毫不迟疑地同意这个意见。在一种动物方面产生体力的那个体形是美的；
而在另一种动物方面，则表示轻捷的体形是美的。一所宫殿的式样和方便对它的美来说，
正像它的单纯的形状和外观同样是必要的。
同样，建筑学的规则也要求柱顶应比柱基较为尖细，
这是因为那样一个形状给我们传来一种令人愉快的安全观念，
而相反的形状就使我们顾虑到危险。这种顾虑是令人不快的。根据这一类无数的例子，
并由于考虑到美和机智同样是不能下定义的，而只能借着一种鉴别力或感觉被人辨识：
我们就可以断言，美只是产生快乐的一个形象，正如丑是传来痛苦的物体部分的结构一样；
而且产生痛苦和快乐的能力既然在这种方式下成为美和丑的本质，
所以这些性质的全部效果必然都是由感觉得来的；这些效果中主要有骄傲与谦卑，
这在其全部效果中乃是最通常而最显著的。

这个论证我认为是正确而有决定性的；但是为了使现在的推理具有更大的权威起见，
我们可以权且假设其为虚妄，并看看有什么结果产生。产生快乐和痛苦的能力，
即使不形成美与丑的本质，这些感觉和这些性质确实至少是不可分离的，
而且我们甚至难以分别加以思考。
可是自然的美和道德的美（两者都是骄傲的原因）所共有的因素，
只有这种产生快乐的能力；
而共同的效果既然总是以一个共同的原因为前提，那么显然，在两种情形下，
快乐必然是那种情感的实在的、有影响的原因。
其次，我们的身体的美和外在对象的美所有的惟一原始差异只是：
一种美和我们有亲近的关系，另一种则没有。
因此，这种原始差异必然是它们的其他所有差异的原因，
其中尤其是两种美在骄傲情感上所以有不同的影响的原因；
骄傲情感可以被我们的美貌所刺激起，但是丝毫不受外界对象的美所影响。
如果把这两个结论结合起来，我们就发现两者综合起来组成了前面的体系，
即快乐作为一个与这种情感相关的或类似的印象寓存于一个与自我相关的对象上时，
就借着一种自然的推移产生了骄傲；而它的反面就产生了谦卑。
因此，这个体系似乎已被经验充分加以证实，虽然我们的全部论证还不止这些。

关于身体方面所有的其他优点，我们可以概括地说，凡我们自身所有的有用的、
美丽的或令人惊奇的东西，都是骄傲的对象；与此相反的，则都是谦卑的对象。
显而易见，凡有用的、美丽的或令人惊奇的事物的共同点，只在于各自产生一种快乐，
此外再无其他共同之点。因此，快乐和它对自我的关系，必然是骄傲情感的原因。

关于我们的身体方面，对于这个体系只有一种反驳的理由，就是：
健康虽然是最令人愉快的东西，疾病虽然是最令人痛苦的东西，
可是人们普遍既不因前者而感到骄傲，也不因后者而感到耻辱。
我们如果考虑到前面给我们的体系所提出的第二和第四两条限制，
这种现象便很容易加以说明。我曾经说过，任何对象如果没有一种为我们自己所特有的东西，
就不能产生骄傲和谦卑；还有：那种情感的每个原因都必须是相当恒久的，
并且与构成骄傲的对象的“自我”的存在时期成某种比例。
健康与疾病对一切人既是不断地变化的，
而且也没有人是专一地或确实地固定于两种状态之一的，
所以这些偶然的幸福和灾难就可说是与我们分离的，
而从不被认为是与我们的本身和存在关联着的。这个说明的正确性，
可以由下面一种情形看出来，就是：如果有任何一种疾病在我们的体质中成为根深蒂固，
使我们不再抱有痊愈的希望，从那个时刻开始，那种疾病便成为谦卑的对象；
这在老年人方面可以明显地看到，
因为老年人一想到自己的年老多病时，总是感到极大的耻辱。
他们总要尽力掩藏他们的耳聋眼花，他们的风湿病和痛风症；
他们即使在承认这些疾患的时候，也总是带着十分勉强和不快的心情。
青年人虽然对于他们所患的每次头痛或伤风并不感觉耻辱，
可是倘使我们一生中时时刻刻都受到这种疾病的侵袭，
那么没有任何话题更能够那样挫伤我们的骄傲心，使我们对自己的天赋抱有那样的自卑感。
这就充分地证明，身体的痛苦和疾患本身就是谦卑的恰当的原因；
不过因为我们习惯于借比较而不借事物的内在价值来评价一切事物，
这就使我们忽略了我们发现为每个人可以遭遇到的这些灾难，
并使我们不把这些灾难估计在内，而对自己的优点和性格形成一个观念。

论外在的有利条件与不利条件

但是骄傲与谦卑虽以我们身心（即自我）的各种性质作为它们自然的和较为直接的原因，
可是我们凭经验发现，还有产生这些感情的许多其他的对象，
而且原始的对象也在某种程度上被多种多样的外在的、外来的对象所掩没了。
房屋、花园、家具，也像自身的优点和才艺一样，成为我们自负的依据；
这些外在的有利条件本身和思想或人格虽然相距甚远，
可是这些有利条件却大大影响了甚至那个原以人格为其最后对象的情感。
当外界对象对我们获得了任何特殊关系而与我们结合或联系起来时，就有这种情形发生。
大洋中一条美丽的鱼，荒野中一个野兽，以及任何既不属于我们、也和我们无关的事物，
不论赋有什么样的奇特性质，不论它们自然地激起多大程度的惊奇和赞羡，
都对我们的虚荣心没有任何影响。任何事物必须和我们有某种关系，才能触动我们的骄傲感。
这个事物的观念必须可说是系属于自我的观念；
而且由一个观念到另一观念的推移过程也必须是容易的和自然的。

人们因为在容貌、体态、丰度或对他的声名没有丝毫贡献的其他细节方面和一个大人物类似，
而感到一种虚荣；这些例子诚然是有的。不过我们必须承认，这种情形并不能扩展得很远，
而且在这类感情中也没有任何重要性。对于这个现象，我举出下列的理由来加以说明。
任何人如果没有若干辉煌的性质使我们对他表示尊敬和景仰，
那么我们不会因为在琐细情节方面与他类似，而感到自负的。因此，恰当地说，这些性质，
是因为与我们有关，才成为我们自负的原因。
那么，这些性质是在什么方式下与我们发生关系的呢？
这些性质是我们所重视的那个人的一些部分，因此是与这些细节相关联的；
而这些细节，也被假设为他的一些部分。这些细节和我们所有与他类似的性质又有关系；
而我们的这些性质因为是我们的一些部分，所以又与整体有关；
因此在我们与我们所类似的那个人的辉煌性质之间形成了包含若干环节的一个连锁。
不过这个多重关系必然削弱那种联系，除此以外，心灵在由辉煌的性质转到琐细的性质时，
显然一定会因为那种对比而觉察到后一种性质的细微琐屑，
并在某种程度上由于这种比较和类似而感到羞惭。

因此，骄傲与谦卑的原因和对象两者之间的接近关系
或因果关系是产生这些情感的惟一的必需条件；
而这些关系只是使想象借以由一个观念转移到另一个观念的那些性质。
现在让我们考察一下，这些关系在心灵上可能有什么作用，
并且借着什么方法成为产生那两种情感的那样必需的条件。
显而易见，观念的联结是那样默然地和不知不觉地进行的，以致我们很难加以觉察，
而我们只是借其效果，而不是借任何直接的感觉或知觉来发现这种联结的。
这种联结并不产生任何情绪，也不产生任何一种新的印象，
而只是改变心灵先前所具有而可以临时唤起的那些观念。
根据这种推理，并根据无可怀疑的经验，我们可以断言，观念的联结不论如何必要，
它本身单独不足以产生任何情感。

因此，显而易见，当心灵遇到一个与己有关的对象出现因而感到骄傲或谦卑情感的时候，
除了思想的关系或推移之外，还有被其他原则所产生的一种情绪或某种原始印象。
问题在于，最初产生的情绪是那种情感自身呢，还是与这种情感有关系的其他某种印象呢？
这个问题不难解决。因为除了这个论题所富有的所有其他论证以外，
有一件事情看来是必然很明显的，就是：
经验所指出是产生这种情感的那样一个必要条件的那种观念间的关系，
倘使不是辅助感情间的关系，并促进由一个印象到另一个印象的推移，
它便成为完全多余的了。如果自然直接产生了骄傲或谦卑的情感，
那么骄傲或谦卑便该是自足的了，不需要从其他任何感情方面得到进一步的增加或补充。
但是假使最初的〔苦乐〕情绪只是与骄傲或谦卑相关的，那么就容易设想，
对象间的关系可以达成什么目的，
而且印象和观念的这两种不同的联结如何通过它们力量的结合而互相促进它们的作用了。
这不但是容易设想的，而且我敢说，这是我们所能够设想这个题目的惟一方式。
观念间的顺利推移本身并不引生情绪，这种推移若不是通过促进某些相关印象之间的推移，
那么它对于这种情感就决不能是必然的，甚至不能是有用的。
而且，同一个对象不但随其性质的增减，并且也随其关系的远近，引起或大或小的骄傲。
这就清楚地证实感情是沿着观念间的关系而推移的，因为在这个关系方面的每一种变化，
都在情感方面产生一种与之成比例的变化。由此可见，在上述体系中，
论究观念关系的那一部分就充分证明了论究印象关系的另一部分；
而那一部分的本身又是那样明显地建立在经验上的，如果再要力图进一步去加以证明，
那就是浪费时间了。

在特殊例子中，这一点将显得更加明白。人们对于他们的国家、州郡、教区的美景，
都感到自豪。在这里，美的观念显然产生了一种快乐。这种快乐是和骄傲关联的。
依照假设来说，这种快乐的对象又是与自我相关的。借着印象间和观念间的这个双重关系，
由一个印象到另一个印象的推移就形成了。

人们也因其故乡气候的温度而感到自豪，因其本乡土壤的肥沃而感到自豪，
因其本土所产的酒、水果或粮食的精美而感到自豪，因其语言的柔和或雄壮而感到自豪，
也因其他同类事情而感到自豪。这些对象显然都和感官的快乐有关，
并且原来只被认为对触觉、味觉或听觉是愉快的。
那么这些对象除了借上述的那种推移之外，如何能成为骄傲的对象呢？

有些人表现了一种相反的虚荣心，故意贬低本国而夸示他们游历过的那些国土。
这些人们在本国时，看到了周围都是本国人，
就觉得他们和他们祖国的强烈关系是有许多人和他们共享的，
所以这种关系对他们反而无所谓了；至于他们因观光外国、
居住外国而与外国形成的那种疏淡关系因为他们考虑到曾经观光异国的人是如何之少，
反而加强了。因为这个缘故，所以他们才总是赞赏外国事物的美丽、
有用和珍奇，而贬抑本国的事物。

我们既然能够对一个国家、气候或与我们有关系的任何无生物感到虚荣，
无怪我们对于那些因血统或友谊而与我们有联系的人们的品质也感到虚荣了。
因此，我们就发现，那在我们自己方面产生骄傲的品质，
当其在与我们有关的人身上被发现出来时，也产生较小程度的同样感情。
骄傲的人们对于他们的亲戚的美貌、谈吐、优点、声望、尊荣，总是极意渲染，
作为他们虚荣心的一些最重要的来源。

我们既然因为自己的财富而感到骄傲，所以为了满足我们的虚荣心，我们就希望，
一切与我们有任何关系的人也都占有财富，并且因为自己亲友中，
有任何一个贫贱的人而感到羞耻。因为这个缘故，我们就尽量把贫穷的人推得远些；
而且因为有些远亲难免贫穷，而我们的祖先又被认为我们的最近的亲属，
因此每一个人都装作出身名门，由世代相承的富贵祖先一脉相传下来的。

我常常观察到，那些自夸家世久远的人们，如果能再加上下面这个条件，
他们就更加高兴，这就是：他们的祖先多少代以来曾经连续不断地是某块土地的业主，
而且他们的家从来不曾出让财产或移居其他郡县或省份。我还观察到，
当他们能够自夸说，这些财产完全由男性家系一脉相传，
而其尊荣和财富从不曾经过任何女性承继，那么这也就成为他们虚荣心的附加的题材。
让我们试图用前述的体系来说明这些现象。

显然，当任何人自夸他的家世久远时，他的虚荣心的对象就不但是时间的悠久和祖先的众多，
而且还有他们的财富和声望，这些都被假设为由于与他相关而给他反映了一种光辉。
他首先考虑这些对象，并得到一种愉快的感受；而当他经过亲、子关系返回到自己身上时，
就借着印象间与观念间的双重关系，发生了骄傲情感，因而兴高采烈起来。
骄傲情感既然依靠于这些关系，所以凡增强任何一种关系的东西，也必然增强那种情感，
而凡减弱那些关系的东西，也必然减低那种情感。但是所有权的同一，
确是加强了由血统和亲属而发生的观念关系，使想象更加顺利地由一代转到另一代，
由最远的祖先转到他们的后代，这些后代既是他们的继承人，又是他们的子孙。
借着这种顺利的推移，那个印象便比较完整地传递下去，
并刺激起较大程度的骄傲和虚荣心来。

论财产权与财富

属于爱虚荣的人的每样东西，都是世界上最好的。他的房屋、设备、家具、衣服、犬马，
在他的自负的心目中都以为是超过其他一切人的；我们很容易看到，
从这些东西中任何一个的些小的优点，他都可以得出一个骄傲和虚荣的新对象。
如果你肯相信他的话，他的酒比任何其他种的酒都有一种更好的美味，
他的烹调也是更为精美，他的餐桌更为整齐，他的仆役更为伶俐，
他住的地方的空气更为有益于健康，他所耕的土壤更为肥沃，他的水果成熟得较早、
而且质量也更好。家中某种东西因其新奇而值得叹赏，另一种东西则因其古老而令人注目。
这一个东西是一个著名艺术家的作品，那一个东西曾有一度属于某个王子或伟人：
总而言之，凡有用的、美丽的或令人惊奇的一切对象，或与这些对象有关的对象，
都可以借着财产权产生这种骄傲情感。这些东西的共同点只在于产生快乐，
并无其他共同之点。只有这一点是这些对象所共有的，
因此也必然就是产生这种情感的那种性质，因为这种情感是它们所共有的效果。
每一个新的例子既然都是一个新的论证，而这里的例子又是无数的，所以我敢大胆地说，
几乎没有任何体系能像我在这里所提出的这个体系那样充分地被经验所证明的了。

由于其效用、美丽或新奇而给人以快乐的任何事物的财产权，
如果也借着印象间和观念间的双重关系，都产生了骄傲；那么我们就不必惊异，
获得这种财产权的能力也会有同样的效果了。
但是财富被认为是获得令人快乐的任何事物的财产权的一种能力；
而且也只有在这个观点下，财富才对情感有任何影响。票据在许多场合下被认为是财富，
这是因为票据可以提供获得货币的能力；而货币所以是财富，
也并非因为它是赋有某些性质，如坚固性、重量和可熔性等的一种金属，
而是因为它对人生的快乐和方便有一种关系。
因此，我们如果承认这个本身已是极为明显的一点，
我们就可以从其中推出我所用以证明双重关系对骄傲和谦卑的影响的最强有力的论证之一。

但是显然，任何时候，一个人如果对我处于那样一个地位，
没有什么很强的动机阻止他来侵害我，因而他是否会侵害我是不确定的；
那么当我处于那种地位时，必然感到不安，而一考虑到那种侵害的可能性或概然性，
就不能不发生明显的关切。情感不但被确定的和必然的事情所影响，
而且也在较小程度上被可能的或偶然的事情所影响。即使我也许从来不曾感到任何危害，
并借着这个结果发现出（用哲学的说法来讲），
那个人永不曾有侵害我的任何能力（因为他不曾发挥过任何能力），
可是这并不阻止我由于前面所说的不确定的情形而感到不安。当我看到，
一个人先前所有阻止他对我给予恩惠的强烈动机消除去了，
有可能或很可能要赐给我这种恩惠，因而这种恩惠就成为可能的或很可能会有的时候：
那么在这里，愉快的情感也可以和前面所说的不快的情感一样起着作用，并传来一种快乐。

但是我们还可以进一步说，当任何福利来临的时候，我们自己有能力随意取舍，
而且没有任何物理的障碍或很强的动机妨害我们的享受，那么上述的那种快乐便更为增加。
既然一切人都希望得到快乐，当没有外在的阻碍防止快乐的产生而且人们也看到遵循他们的
〔爱好快乐的〕倾向毫无任何危险，那么那种快乐总是很可能会实现的。
在那种情形下，他们的想象便容易预期快乐，并且传来同样的愉快，
正如他们相信快乐有实在的和现实的存在时一样。

财富产生快乐和骄傲，贫穷引起不快和谦卑，由于同样理由，权力必然产生前一种情绪，
而奴役就产生后一种情绪。控制他人的权力或权威使我们能够满足我们的全部欲望，
而奴役却使我们服从他人的意志，使我们会遭受无数的缺乏和耻辱。

这里值得提出的是：当我们考虑到我们对他们行使权威的那些人，
或对我们行使权威的那些人时，那么对于权威的虚荣感和对于奴役的羞耻感便大为增加了。
因为假使我们能够制造一些具有十分灵巧的机械结构的机器人，
可以听从我们的意志而运动和行动，那么我们如果占有这些机器人，
显然也可以给我们以一种快乐和骄傲，
不过这种快乐和骄傲的程度不及那种权威行使于有感觉的、有理性的人的时候那样的大，
因为这些人的情况，如果与我们的情况比较起来，就使我们的情况显得更为愉快、更加尊贵。
在任何情形下进行比较，总是使我们对任何事物增加重视的一种可靠方法。
一个富人如果把他的境况与一个乞丐的境况相比，他就更加感觉到他的幸福。
但是若把我们和我们所支配的人作一对比，那么权力便因此占到一种特有的优势，
因为这种对比可以说是直接呈现于我们面前的。

这里的比较是明显而自然的：想象在其对象本身就看到这种比较：
思想进入这种比较的想象进程是顺利而方便的。
这种条件在增加比较作用的影响方面有很大效果，
这一点在以后考察恶意和妒忌的本质时将会清楚地显出。

论名誉的爱好

人性中任何性质在它的本身和它的结果两方面都最为引人注目的，
就是我们所有的同情别人的那种倾向，
这种倾向使我们经过传达而接受他们的心理倾向和情绪，
不论这些心理倾向和情绪同我们的是怎样不同，或者甚至相反。
这一点不但在儿童方面是显著的（他们盲目地接受给他们提出来的任何意见），
而且在判断力和理解力最强的人们方面，也是很明显的，
他们也觉得很难遵从他们自己的理性或心理倾向，
以反对他们的朋友和日常伴侣的理性或心理倾向。
我们在同一民族的人们的性情和思想倾向方面所观察到的一致性，就应当归之于这个原则；
这种类似关系更可能是发生于同情心，而不是发生于土壤和气候的任何影响，
因为土壤和气候虽然继续保持同一不变，
却不能使一个民族的性格在一个世纪的时间中保持同一。
一个性情和善的人立刻就会和他的同伴们性情相投；就是最骄傲的、
最倔强的人也会沾染上他的本国人和相识的人的一点性情。
愉快的面容注入我心中一种明显的满意和宁静，
而愤怒或悲哀的面容却投给我一种突然的沮丧。
憎恨、愤怒、尊重、爱情、勇敢、欢乐、忧郁，所有这些情感，我大都是由传达、
而很少是由我自己的天性或性情感觉到的。这样一个显著的现象值得我们注意，
必须把它推溯到它的第一原则。

当任何感情借着同情注入心中时，那种感情最初只是借其结果，
并借脸色和谈话中传来的这个感情观念的那些外在标志，而被人认知的。
这个观念立刻转变为一个印象，得到那样大的程度的强力和活泼性，
以至变为那个情感自身，并和任何原始的感情一样产生了同等的情绪。
不论那个观念是在怎样短暂的一刹那内转变为一个印象，
这种变化总是由于某种观点和反省而发生的，
这些观点和反省逃脱不掉一个哲学家的严密的观察，
即使产生这种观点和反省的那人自己也许观察不到。

在本书开始时已经说过，一切观念都是由印象复现而得来的，
而且这两类知觉的差异只在于它们刺激灵魂时的强烈和活泼程度的不同。
观念和印象的组成部分完全都是相同的。两者出现的方式和秩序可能是同一的。
因此，两者的强烈和活泼程度的差别是区别两者的惟一条件：
这种差别既然在某种程度上可以被印象和观念的关系所消除，
无怪对于一个情绪或情感的观念可以借此而大大地活跃起来，
以至变成那个情绪或情感的自身。任何对象的生动观念总是接近于它的印象；
而且我们确实可以单凭想象的力量就感觉疾病和痛苦，而由于常常在想一种病变得真病了。
但是在意见和感情方面，这种情形最为显著；一个生动的观念主要是在这里转变为一个印象。
我们的感情比其他任何印象更为依靠于我们自己和心灵的内部活动；
因为这种缘故，这些感情就更为自然地由想象发生，
由我们对这些感情所形成的每个生动的观念发生。这就是同情的本性和原因；
每当我们发现其他人的意见和感情以后，
我们就以这个方式那样地深入到这些意见和感情中去。

在这个全部过程中，最可注目的就是：这些现象强有力地证实了前面关于知性的理论体系，
因而也证实了现在这个有关情感的理论体系；因为这两个体系是互相类似的。
显然，当我们同情别人的情感和情绪时，这些心理活动在我们心中首先出现为单纯的观念，
并且被想象为属于他人的，正如我们想象其他事实一样。其次，还有很明显的一点是，
对别人感情所发生的观念被转化为这些观念所表象的那些印象本身，
而且那些情感就照着我们对那些感情所形成的意象发生起来。
所有这些都是最明显的经验的对象，而不依靠于任何哲学的假设。
我们只允许哲学来说明这些现象，虽然同时我们必须承认，这些现象本身已经那样明显，
几乎无需再应用哲学了。因为我们不但凭因果关系相信我们所同情的那种情感的实在性，
除此而外，我们还必须有类似关系和接近关系的协助 ，才能充分完满地感觉到同情。
这些关系既然能够把一个观念完全转化为一个印象并把印象的活泼性传达于观念，
而且传达到那样完善的程度，以致这种活泼性在推移过程中毫无减损，
所以我们很容易设想，因果关系单独也足以强化并活跃一个观念。
在同情中，一个观念显然转化为一个印象。这种转化发生于对象与我们自己的关系。
我们的自我永远密切地呈现于我们。让我们比较一下所有这些条件，我们将会发现，
同情和我们知性的作用恰恰相应，甚至还包括着某种更惊人、更奇特的现象。

现在我们就该由概括地考究同情，转而观察，当骄傲和谦卑两种情感由称赞和责备、
由美名和丑名发生起来时，同情对于这些情感起着什么影响。我们可以说，
任何人如果因为某种性质被人称赞，那么那种性质（如果是实在的）
本身就不会不在具有它的人内心产生一种骄傲。颂词总是赞美人的权力、财富、
家世或美德；所有这些都是虚荣心的对象，这一点我们已经加以说明和解释。
因此，可以确定，当一个人在钦佩他的人的观点下考虑自己时，依照上面所说明的假设，
他首先会发生一种单独的快乐，随后又感到一种骄傲或自满。
在这一点上，我们接受他人的意见是最为自然的：一方面是由于同情，
因为同情使他们的全部情绪亲切地呈现于我们之前，另一方面是由于推理，
因为推理使我们认为他们的判断就是他们所肯定的事实的一种论证。
权威和同情这两种原则几乎影响了我们一切的意见；而当我们判断我们自己的价值和性格时，
这两个原则必然有一种特殊的影响。这一类判断永远伴有情感 ；
最能干扰我们的知性并使我们陷入任何意见（不论如何不合理）中的，
就是这些意见与情感的联系；这种情感弥漫于想象中，给每个相关的观念加上一种力量。
此外，我们还可以附加说，我们由于意识到自己对自己极大的偏向，
所以我们对于任何证实我们对自己的好评的事物都感到特别高兴，
而对于任何反对这种好评的任何事物都容易感到震惊。

所有这些在理论上都似乎是很可能的；但为了使这个推理有充分的确实性起见，
我们必须考察情感所表现的现象，并研究它们和这个推理是否符合。

这些现象中有一种，我们可以认为是最有利于说明现在的目的，就是：
美名虽然一般说来是令人愉快的，可是我们从我们自己所尊重和赞许的人的赞美方面，
比从我们所憎恨和鄙视的人的赞美方面，得到更大的快乐。
同样，我们对他们的判断十分重视的那些人，如果对我们表示轻蔑，
我们就要感到极大的耻辱。但我们对其余的人们的意见，则大部分是漠不关心的。
但是如果心灵本来由于任何原始的本能得到一种对美名的欲望和对丑名的厌恶，
那么美名和丑名就该毫无区别地影响我们，而任何意见随其对我们是有利的或不利的，
应该同等地刺激起欲望或厌恶来。
一个傻瓜的判断正像一个智者的判断一样是别人对自己的一种判断，
只是它对我们的自我判断的影响较小一些。
我们不但对于智者的赞许比对于傻瓜的赞许更加感到快乐，
而且当我们与智者有了长期亲密的相识以后，我们会从他的赞许中得到一种附加的愉快。
这可以用同样方式加以说明。

其他人的称赞若不是和我们自己的意见相合，
并且他们所赞美的若不是我们所主要擅长的性质，便决不能给予我们很大的快乐。
军人不重视雄辩的能力，法官不重视勇敢，主教不重视幽默，商人不重视学问。
一个人对于任何抽象考虑下的品质，不论如何加以重视，
而当他自觉到自己并无这种品质时，那么全世界的人的对他的赞许，
也不会在这一点上给他以多大的快乐，这是因为他们永不能使他同意他们的缘故。

出身名门而境况贫乏的人们，总是喜欢抛弃了他们的亲友和故乡，宁愿投身生人中间，
从事低贱的和手艺的工作去谋生，而不愿在素知其门第和教育的人们中间生活。
他们说，我们走到那里，人们都将不知道我们的底细。没有人会料想到，
我们出身于什么门第。我们将远离我们的亲友，
这样我们的贫贱境况就使我们较为坦然自在。在考察这些情绪时，
我们将发现它们对我现在的目的提供了许多非常令人信服的论证。

第一，我们可以从这些情绪推断说，由于被人轻贱而感到的不快感依靠于同情，
而同情又依靠于对象与我们的关系；
因为我们在与我们有血统关系并居住接近的人们的轻视之下，是最感到不快的。
因此，我们就竭力设法断绝这些关系，使自己与异乡人接近，
而与亲戚远隔，以便减弱这种同情和不快。

第二，我们可以断言，关系对同情是必需的，但不是绝对就其是关系而说的，
而是由于这些关系有一种影响，
促使我们把自己对别人的情绪所产生的观念转化成那些情绪自身——
这种转化是通过别人人格的观念和自我的观念之间的一种联结。
因为在这里，亲戚和接近关系两者都仍然存在；
不过这些关系因为不是结合在同一些人的身上，所以它们促进同情的程度就较小。

第三，割断关系而减弱同情这一个情况，值得我们注意。
假如我在陌生人中间处于贫乏状况，因而受到轻视；可是我觉得在那种境况下生活，
要比我每天遭受我的亲戚和本国人的轻蔑，还较为自在些。这里我感到双重的轻视；
一是来自我的亲戚方面，不过他们并不在场；一是来自周围的人，不过他们是陌生人。
这种双重轻蔑，同样也被亲戚和接近两种关系所加强。
不过借着那两种关系和我发生联系的那些人不是兼有两种关系的人，
所以这种观念方面的差异就把发生于轻视的两个印象加以隔离，不使它们互相混合。
邻人的轻蔑有某种影响，亲戚的轻蔑也有某种影响；但是这些影响互相独立，
永不联合起来；而当轻蔑来自既是邻人、又是亲戚的人时，这两种影响便联合起来了。
这个现象类似于前述的骄傲和谦卑的体系——那个在一般人看来可能显得是那样奇特的体系。

第四，处于这种情况下的一个人在他生活周围的人们中间自然要隐瞒他的出身，
而且如果任何人猜疑他原来出身于远远高出于现在的景况和生活方式的一个家庭，
他便会感到极为不安。这个世界上的每样事物都是通过比较加以判断的。
对一个普通绅士来说是一个极大的财富，对一个国王来说简直就像乞丐的生活。
在不能供给一个绅士以必需品的境况下，一个农夫会认自己是幸福的。
当一个人无论是习惯于比较豪华的生活方式，
或是自以为按照他的门第和品质应该享受这种生活的时候，
一切低于这种身份的事情都成为不愉快的，甚至是可耻的了；
他总是以极大的努力来掩盖他对于更大财富的权利要求。他在这里自己知道自己的不幸，
但是在他生活周围的人既然不知道他的不幸，因而他的不愉快的回顾和比较，
只是由他自己的思想所提示出来，而绝不是从和他人有同情而发生的；
这就必然使他大为自在和满意了。

我们的假设是：我们由赞美所获得的快乐发生于情绪的传导。
对于这个假设如果有人提出任何反驳，那么我们在考察之后，将会发现这些反驳，
在恰当的观点之下看来，反足以证实这个假设。
广泛的名声甚至对于一个轻视世俗人们的人也是愉快的；
但这是因为人数众多给予世俗人们以一种附加的重要性和权威。剽窃者在得到称赞时，
虽然自己知道不配这种赞美，也仍然感到高兴。不过这是一种空中楼阁，
想象在这里只是以自己的虚构使自己高兴，
并力图借着对他人意见表示同情来使这些虚构变得较为巩固和稳定。
骄傲的人遇到轻蔑，就感到震惊，虽然他们并不立即加以同意；
这是因为他们的自然情感和他们由同情得到的情感发生冲突的缘故。
一个正在热恋中的人，如果你责备或谴责他的爱人，他也同样会大为不快；
虽然显而易见，你的反对所以能够对他有任何影响，只是因为你的反对把握住了他，
并由于他对你发生的同情。如果他轻视你，或者看到你是在开玩笑，
那么，你不论说什么，对他都不会发生作用。

论动物的骄傲与谦卑

显而易见，几乎在每一类动物方面，特别是在高等动物方面，
都有骄傲和谦卑的许多明显的标志。天鹅、火鸡或孔雀的姿态和步伐，
表示它们对自己的自负和对其他动物的轻蔑。这一点更可注目的是：在后两类动物方面，
骄傲永远伴随着美丽的羽毛，并且只在雄性方面显现。夜莺在啼叫中表示的自夸和争胜，
是人们所通常注意到的；马在迅疾，猎犬在机敏和嗅觉，公牛和公鸡在体力，
以及其他各种动物在其各自的优点方面的好胜，也同样是常见的事实。
此外，一切常和人类接近、并和人类熟习的各种动物，
对人类给自己的赞许都表示一种明显的骄傲，而对于人的夸奖和抚爱感到欢喜，
并无其他任何考虑。但也并非任何人的抚爱都毫无区别地使动物感到得意，
使它们得意的、主要只有它们所认识的、所爱的人的抚爱；
正像人类的那种情感被刺激起来的方式一样。所有这些都显然证明，
骄傲与谦卑不但是人类所有的情感，而且是推广到全部动物界的。

这些情感的原因，在动物方面也和在人类方面一样，
只要我们适当地估计到人类的较高的知识和知性。例如，动物没有德或恶的意识；
它们很快忘掉了血统关系；它们没有权利和财产权的关系。因为这个缘故，
动物的骄傲和谦卑的原因，只在于身体方面，决不能寓存于内心或外界对象。
但是在身体方面，同样的性质在动物方面也像在人类方面一样产生出骄傲来。
这种骄傲情感永远是建立在美丽、体力、敏捷和其他某种有用的或愉快的性质上面的。

其次的问题就是：在全部动物界，那些情感既然相同，并且都由同样原因发生的，
那么，那些原因发生作用的方式是否也是同样的。依据一切类比推理的规则，
这一点是可以正确地预期的。如果我们在试验以后发现，
我们在一类方面所应用的对于现象的说明，并不能应用于其他一些类上，
那么我们就可以认为，那种说明无论怎样动听，实际上是没有基础的。

为了决定这个问题，让我们来考虑这一点：就是在动物的心中，也像在人类的心中一样，
显然有同样的观念关系，并且也由同样的原因得来的。一条狗在掩藏起一根骨头之后，
往往忘记了地方；但是你如果把狗带到那个地方，
那么狗的思想借着接近关系很容易转到先前所掩藏的东西上，
因为这种接近情况在它的观念之间产生了一种关系。同样，狗如果在任何地方曾被痛打一顿，
它在走近那个地方时，便会战栗发抖，即使它在那里并不发现任何先前危险的标志。
类似关系的效果并不那样明显；
但是那种关系在一切动物对之表现出那样明显的判断的因果关系中既然是一个重要的因素，
所以我们可以断言，类似、接近和因果三种关系，对于动物也像对于人类一样，
都以同一的方式起着作用。

还有一些印象关系的例子，也足以使我们相信，在较低级的动物方面和在高等动物方面一样，
某些感情彼此之间也有一种关联，
而且这些动物的心灵往往也是通过一系列互相关联的情绪推移下去的。
一条狗在由于欢乐而高兴起来的时候，自然就发生爱情和仁慈，
不论对它的主人或是对于异性。同样，当它充满痛苦和悲哀的时候，就变得好斗而暴躁；
那种原来是悲伤的情感，稍有触动就转变为愤怒了。

由此可见，人类方面产生骄傲或谦卑所必需的一切内在的原则，是一切动物所同有的；
而刺激起这种情感来的原因既然也是相同的，所以我们可以正确地断言，
这些原因在整个动物界是以同样方式起作用的。我的假设是那样的简单，
并且所要求的反省和判断也是那样的少，所以是可应用于每一种感情动物的。
这不但必须被承认为证明我的假设是真实的一个令人信服的证据，
而且我自信将被发现为对每一个其他的理论体系的一个反驳。

论爱与恨的对象和原因

骄傲和谦卑的直接对象是自我，或是我们亲切地意识到它的思想、
行为和感觉的那个同一的人格；
而爱和恨的对象则是我们意识不到他的思想、行为和感觉的某一个其他的人。
这一点在经验中就表现得充分的明显。
我们的爱和恨永远指向我们以外的某一个有情的存在者。
当我们谈及自爱时，那不是就爱的本义而言，
而且自爱所产生的感觉和一个朋友或情人所刺激起的柔情也并无共同之点。憎恨也是如此。
我们可以因为我们自己的过失和愚蠢而感到耻愧；
但是只有由于他人所加的侵害才会感到愤怒或憎恨。

爱和恨的对象虽然永远是其他某一个人，可是显而易见，
那个对象恰当地说并不是这些情感的原因，而且单独也不足以刺激起这些情感。
因为爱和恨在它们所引起的感觉方面既是恰恰相反的，并且有着一个共同的对象，
所以那个对象如果也是它们的原因，那么它就会产生同等程度的两种相反的情感，
这两种情感从最初一刹那起必然就会互相消灭，于是任何一种情感便都无法出现。
因此，必然有异于那个对象的某种原因。

我们如果考究爱和恨的原因，我们就将发现这些原因是多种多样的，
并且没有许多共同的东西。任何人的德行、知识、机智、见识和风趣，
都引起爱和尊重；相反的性质便引起憎恨和鄙视。身体方面的优点，如美丽、体力、
敏捷、灵巧和它们的反面都引起同样的爱和恨的情感；而由家庭、财产、衣服、
民族和气候等外在的优点和缺点，同样也引起那些情感。
这些对象中没有一个不可以借其不同的性质引起爱和尊重，或是憎恨和鄙视。

关于骄傲和谦卑我们所曾作的种种讨论，同样地适用于这两组情感，
但是要把这些讨论在爱和恨的情感方面重新加以陈述，那就未免腻烦了。
我们只消作一个概括的评述就够了，就是：爱和恨的对象显然是一个有思想的人，
而前一种情感的感觉 永远是愉快的，后一种情感的感觉则永远是不快的。
我们还可以大概地假设说，这两种情感的原因永远是和一个有思想的存在者相关的，
而且前者的原因产生一种独立的快乐，而后者的原因则产生一种独立的不快。

这些假设之一，即爱和恨的原因必然与一个人或有思想的存在者相关、
才能产生这些情感，不但是很可能的，而且是非常明显，不容争论的。
德和恶，如果抽象地加以考虑；美与丑如果寓存于无生物；贫与富如果是属于第三人：
则对于和它们没有关系的人，便产生不了任何程度的爱或恨，尊重或轻视。
一个人如果向窗外观望，看到我在街上行走，在我以外又有一所美丽宫殿，
与我毫无关系；我相信，没有人会妄说，这个人会对我表示尊敬，
就像我是那座宫殿的所有主一样。

初看之下，并不能那样明显地看到，这些情感需要一种印象关系，
这是因为在推移过程中一个印象与另一个印象那样地互相混淆，
以致可以说是无法区别的了。不过在骄傲和谦卑方面，我们既然能够很容易地分辨出来，
并且证明，这些情感的每一种原因都各自产生一种独立的痛苦或快乐，
所以我在这里详细考察爱和恨的各种原因时，如果采用同样的方法，也许会有同样的成功。
不过因为我急于要给这些体系作一个充分的、确定的证明，
所以我暂且把这种考察搁置一下；同时，
我将力图通过一个建立于毫无疑问的经验之上的论证，
使我关于骄傲和谦卑的全部推理都服务于我现在的目的。

凡对自己的性格、天才、财富感到满意的人，很少有不想在世人面前显露自己，
并取得人们的爱和赞美的。显而易见，成为骄傲或自负的原因的那些性质和条件，
也就是虚荣心或名誉欲的原因；我们自己最为得意的那些特点，我们总是要炫耀于人。
但是假设爱与尊重不是和骄傲一样由同一性质产生的
（它们的不同点只在于这些性质或是与我们有关，或是与他人有关），
那么这种进行方法将是非常荒谬的，
而且人们也不能期望每一个其他人的情绪和他们自己所有的情绪互相对应。
诚然，很少有人能够形成精确的情感体系，或是考究它们一般的本质和类似关系。
但是我们纵然在哲学中没有多大的进展，我们在这一方面也不会有很多错误，
通常的经验和一种预感就给予我们充分的指导；
这种经验和预感就借着我们自己内心的直接感受告诉我们，什么东西将会对别人发生作用。
产生骄傲或谦卑的那些性质既然也引起爱或恨，
所以在证明前面一组情感的原因产生一种独立于情感以外的痛苦或快乐时所用的全部论证，
也将可以同样明显地应用于后面一组的情感。

证实这个体系的几种实验

第一实验。 为了更有条理地进行这些实验起见，让我们首先假设，
当自己处在上述的那种情况下，即与另一个人处在一起，这时有一个对象呈现出来，
那个对象和这些情感中的任何一种，既无印象关系，也无观念关系。
假如我们一同观察一块普通的石头，或其他不属于我们中任何一个人、
并且其本身也不引起情绪或独立苦乐来的普通对象：那么显然，
这样一个对象将不产生这四种情感中的任何一种。
我们可以把这个对象在四种情感上依次做一个试验。让我们把这个对象应用于爱、恨、
谦卑、骄傲；其中任何一种都丝毫发生不起来。让我们还任意尽量改换对象；
假定我们所选择的是没有这两种关系之一的一个对象。
让我们在心灵所能发生的一切心理倾向方面来重复这种实验。
自然界中那么一大批的对象中的任何一个对象，如果没有这些关系，
则在任何心理倾向中都将产生不出任何情感来。

第二实验。 没有这两种关系的一个对象既然永远不能产生任何情感，
那么让我们把这两种关系之一加在它上面，看看有什么结果发生。
例如，假设我看到一块石头或任何一个普通对象，那块石头或是属于我的，
或是属于我的同伴的，并借此与情感的对象获得了一种观念关系；那么显然，
先验地考察起这件事来，任何一种情绪按理都不能期望其出现。
因为这个观念关系只是隐蔽地、平静地在心灵上起着作用，除此以外，
这个关系又随着那个对象之属于我们或属于别人、而以一种相等的冲动给予骄傲和谦卑、
爱和恨这些对立的情感；这种情感上的对立必然使两者互相抵消，
而使心灵完全没有任何感情或情绪。这种先验的推理又被经验所证实了。
凡不产生一种独立于情感之外的痛苦或快乐的任何平凡的或一般的对象，
都不能借其对我们或对其他人的财产权关系或其他关系产生骄傲或谦卑、
爱或恨这些感情。

第三实验。 因此，显而易见，单有一种观念关系并不足以产生这些感情。
现在让我们把这种关系除去，而代之以一种印象关系，即呈现出一个令人愉快或不快的、
但与我们或同伴都没有关系的对象来；让我们来观察其结果如何。
如果首先先验地来考究这件事，像在前一个实验中那样；那么我们可以断言，
那个对象和这些情感将有一种微细的但是不确定的联系。这个对象与情感有微细的联系，
乃是因为这个关系不是一种冷淡而不可觉察的关系，而且也没有观念关系的那种缺点，
也不以相等的力量指使我们趋向那两种由于对立而互相抵消的相反情感。
但是我们如果在另一方面考虑一下，
这种由感觉到感情的推移是没有一种产生观念推移的任何原则加以推进的，正相反，
一个印象虽然很容易转移到另一个印象，
可是对象的变化不定却和引起这种推移的一切原则抵触；那么我们就可以由此断言，
任何东西如果只借一个印象关系与情感发生联系，
仍然不可能成为那种情感的稳定的或持久的原因。在衡量了这些论证以后，
我们的理性依照类比推理规则所可断言的就是：一个产生快乐或不快、
但与我们自己或其他人都没有任何联系的对象，可以给予人的心情以那样一种倾向，
以至它自然地流入骄傲或爱、谦卑或恨这些情感，并使它找寻别的对象，
以便依据了双重关系而在其上能够建立这些感情；不过一个只具有这些关系之一
（即使是最有利的关系）的对象，永不能产生任何恒久而确定的情感。

最幸运的是，所有这套推理都被发现为恰恰与经验符合，并与情感的现象符合。
假设我和一个同伴在我们两人从来未曾到过的一个国家中旅行，那么，风景如果美丽，
道路如果平坦，旅馆如果舒适，这种环境显然会使我对自己和同伴都感到心情愉快。
但是我们既然假设，这个国家对我自己或我的朋友都无关系，
所以它就不能成为骄傲或爱的直接原因；
因此，我如果不把情感建立在与我或与他有比较密切关系的其他某种对象上，
那么我的情绪宁可以视为一种舒畅的心情的流露，而不是一种确定的情感。
当对象引起了不快情绪时，情形也是一样。

第四实验。 我们既然发现，一个毫无观念关系或印象关系的对象，
或是一个只有一项关系的对象，都不能引起骄傲或谦卑、爱或恨来；
那么，无需进一步的实验，单是理性就可以使我们相信，凡有双重关系的对象，
都必然刺激起这些情感来；因为这些情感的发生，显而易见必然有某种原因。
但是为了尽量消除怀疑的余地起见，让我们重做几次实验，看看在这一种情形下，
结果是否符合我们的期望。我选定一个能够引起独立快感来的对象，例如美德；
在这个对象上，我加上一种对自我的关系；结果发现，由于这样的事情安排，
立刻发生了一种情感。但是什么情感呢？正是骄傲情感，这个对象对它是有双重关系的。
关于对象的观念和关于自我（情感的对象）的观念发生了一种关联：
那个对象所产生的感觉和那种情感的感觉相类似。
为了确定自己在这个实验中不发生错误起见，我首先除去一项关系，
随后又除去另一项，结果发现每一次除去以后，都消灭了那个情感，
而使那个对象成为完全漠然无关的。但是我还不以此为足。我还更进一步从事实验；
我不把关系除去，而只代之以另一种关系。我假设那种美德属于我的同伴，
而不属于我自己；并且观察这样改变之后，会有什么结果。我立刻看到感情转了方向，
离开了单有一种印象关系的骄傲，而落到了爱的一方面去，在这一方面，
感情就被印象和观念的双重关系所吸引住了。再重复同一个实验，
把观念关系重新变化一下，我又把感情带回骄傲方面；再重做一次，
我又把感情置在爱或好感方面。在彻底相信了这个关系的影响之后，
我又试验另一对象的结果，把德换成了恶，
这样就把由前者所产生的愉快印象转变为由后者所产生的不快印象。
结果仍然符合于预期。恶存在于他人身上时，就借其双重关系刺激起憎恨情感来，
而刺激不起那个由于同样理由从德所产生的爱来。为了继续实验，
我又重新改变观念关系，假设恶属于我自己。结果如何呢？仍然和往常一样。
结果是情感由憎恨转成谦卑了。我若把印象重新改变一下，就又把这种谦卑转为骄傲；
结果我发现，我绕完了一个圈子，
并借这些变化把情感带回到我最初发现其所处的那种位置中。

不过为了使这个问题更加确定，我又把对象加以改变；我舍去恶和德，
而在美和丑、贫和富、权力和奴役方面进行实验。所有这些对象都各自通过它们关系的改变，
以同一方式转了一个情感的圈子：不论我们依什么秩序进行，不论是通过骄傲、爱、恨、
谦卑，或是通过谦卑、恨、爱、骄傲，实验丝毫不发生变化。
的确，尊重和鄙视在某种情形下代替了爱和恨而发生，不过这些归根到底是同样的情感，
只是由于某些原因才有一些变化（这些原因我们将在以后加以说明）。

第五实验。 为了给予这些实验以更其大的权威，我们可以尽量变化情况，
把各个情感和对象置于它们可能处在的各种不同的位置中。让我们假设，
除了上述的种种关系之外，
我和他一起进行所有这些实验的那个人由于血统关系或友谊关系和我有密切的关系。
假设他是我的儿子或兄弟，或是和我有长期熟识的关系。其次，让我们再假设，
情感的原因对这个人获得了印象和观念的双重关系；让我们看一下，
所有这些复杂的吸引关系有些什么样的结果。

在我们考究实际上有什么样的结果之前，我们可先推断，依据我的假设来说，
这些结果应该是什么样的。显然，随着印象是愉快的或是不快的，
我对于那个借着这双重关系（我一向要求这两种关系）而与印象的原因联系着的人，
必然有爱或恨发生。一个兄弟的德必然使我爱他，
正如他的恶或丑名必然刺激起相反的情感来一样。不过如果单是根据这个情况来判断，
则我不应该期望感情停止在那里，而永不再转移到其他的印象。
这里这个人既然借着双重关系成为我的情感的对象，
所以这个同一的推理就导使我想到那个情感会向前推进。依据假设，
那个人和我自己有一种观念关系；以他为对象的那种情感，随着它是愉快的或不快的，
对于骄傲或谦卑又有一种印象关系。因此显然，骄傲和谦卑情感之一，
必然会由爱或恨发生起来。

这是依照了我们的假设我所形成的推理；而我在试验以后，
很愉快地发现一切都恰恰符合于我的期望。一个儿子或兄弟的德或恶不但刺激起爱或恨来，
而且借着一个新的推移过程，由于相似的原因，产生了骄傲或谦卑。
没有东西能比我们亲戚的任何辉煌的品质引起更大的虚荣，
正像没有东西比他们的恶或丑名更加令人感到耻辱。经验和我们的推理的这种精确的符合，
就令人信服地证明了、我们所据以进行推理的那个假设的可靠性。

第六实验。 我们如果把实验倒转一下，并仍旧保持着同样的关系，
只是从另一种不同的情感着手：这就更会增加我们的理论的明白性。
上面说过，一个儿子或兄弟的德或恶先引起爱或恨，随后又引起骄傲或谦卑，
现在假设我们把这些好的或坏的品质置于我们自己身上，
使它们与那个和我们有关系的人没有任何直接联系：那么，经验告诉我们，
这样把情况改变以后，整个连锁就被打断了，心灵不再从一个情感转移到另一个情感，
如像在前一个例子中那样。
我们从来不会因为我们在自身所发现的德或恶而去爱或恨一个儿子或兄弟，
虽然他自己的这些品质显然会使我们感到明显的骄傲或谦卑。由骄傲或谦卑转移到爱或恨，
不像由爱或恨转移到骄傲或谦卑那样地自然。这在初看之下似乎与我的假设相反；
因为印象关系和观念关系在两种情形下恰恰是同样的。骄傲和谦卑是与爱和恨相关的印象。
我自己又与那个人相关。因此，我们应当期望，类似的原因必然产生类似的结果，
并且一个完善的转移过程会由这个双重关系产生，正像在其他一切情形下一样。
通过下面的考虑，我们可以顺利地解决这个困难。

显而易见，我们在任何时候既然都亲切地意识到自我，意识到我们的情绪和情感，
所以关于它们的观念必然比关于任何别人的情绪
和情感的观念要以一种较大的活泼性刺激着我们。但是任何以活泼性刺激我们，
并且出现于充分的、强烈的观点下的东西，可以说是强迫我们去加以考虑，
并且借着最小的暗示和最细微的关系就呈现于心中。由于同一理由，
当那个东西一经呈现出来，它就吸引住我们的注意，并使注意不至于飘荡到其他的对象上去，
不论那些对象与我们第一个对象有多么强烈的关系。想象容易由晦暗的观念转到生动的观念，
却不容易由生动的观念转到晦暗的观念。在前一个情形下，
那种关系得到另一个原则的帮助；在后一个情形下，那种关系却遭到另一个原则的反对。

我已经说过，心灵的那两个官能，即想象和情感，在它们的倾向互相类似、
并且作用于同一对象上时，是互相促进它们的作用的。
心灵永远有由一种情感转到其他任何与之相关的情感上的一种倾向；
而当一种情感的对象和另一种情感的对象相关的时候，这种倾向就被推进了。
那两种冲动互相会合起来，使得整个推移过程变得更加方便和顺利。
但是如果观念关系严格地说继续同一不变，而且失去了引起想象转移的那种影响，
于是这种关系在情感上的影响显然也必然要停止，因为那种影响是完全依靠于那种转移的。
因为这种缘故，所以骄傲或谦卑转移到爱或恨，
就不如后一组情感转变为前一组情感那样容易。
如果一个人是我的兄弟，我当然也是他的兄弟；但是这些关系虽是交互的，
而它们在想象上却有很不相同的作用。先考虑与我们有关系的任何人，
再进而考虑我们时时刻刻所意识到的自我，这个过程是顺利而通畅的。
但是当感情一旦转向我们的自我时，则想象便不能同样顺利地由那个对象过渡到其他任何人，
不论那个人和我们有多么密切的关系。想象的这种顺利的或困难的推移，
对情感起着影响，推进或阻止情感的转移；这就清楚地证明，
情感和想象这两种官能是互相联系着的，而且观念间的关系对于感情具有一种影响。
除了可以证明这点的无数实验之外，我们在这里还发现，即使关系继续存在，
而如果由于某种特殊情况，它对想象的通常的影响受到了阻碍，
不能产生观念间的联结或转移；那么它对情感所有的通常的影响也同样受了阻碍，
能使我们由一种情感转到另一种的情感。

有人或许会在这种现象与同情现象之间发现一种矛盾，因为在同情现象方面，
心灵很容易由“我们自己”的观念转到和我们相关的其他任何对象的观念。
但是我们如果考虑到下面一点，这种困难便会消除，就是：在同情方面，
我们自己并非任何情感的对象，而且也没有任何东西使我们的注意固定在自我身上；
而在我们被假设为受到骄傲或谦卑的推动的现在这种情形下，却是这种情形。
我们的自我，如果离开了对其他任何对象的知觉，实际上就毫无所有：
因为这个缘故，所以我们就一定要把观点转向外界对象，
并且也很自然地以极大的注意去考虑那些与我们接近或类似的对象。
但当自我成为一种情感的对象时，那么在那种情感消竭之前，
对自我停止考虑便是不自然的；只有在情感消竭的情形下，
印象和观念的双重关系才不再起作用了。

第七实验。 为了进一步试验这个全部推理，让我们再做一次新的实验。
我们前面已经看到各种相关情感和观念的结果，
现在让我们在这里假设有同一情感和一种观念关系，并考究一下这种新的情况的结果。
显而易见，我们在这里有全部理由预期那些情感要由一个对象转移到另一个对象；
因为根据假设，两个观念间的关系仍然继续不变，
而且同一个印象（印象的同一性）
必然比最完善的类似关系还要能够产生一种更加强烈的联系。
印象间和观念间的双重关系如果能够产生由一个到另一个的一种转移，
那么同一个印象再加上一个观念关系就当然更可以产生这种转移了。
因此，我们发现，当我们爱或恨任何人时，那些情感很少继续停留于它们最初的界限以内，
总要扩展到一切接近的对象，而包括我们所爱或所恨的那个人的朋友和亲属。
我们如果同一个人是朋友，那么对他的兄弟很自然地产生好感，
不再进一步去考察他的性格。我们如与某一个人吵架，则对其全家都发生憎恨，
虽然其全家从未参加过使我们不快的那件事情。这一类例子是到处可以遇到的。

这个实验中只有一个困难；在我们进行下去之前，必须先加以说明。
显而易见，一切情感虽然都容易由一个对象转到与之相关的另一个对象，
可是在较重要的对象先呈现出来、然后次要的对象随着而来时，比在这种秩序颠倒过来、
当次要的对象先出现时，这种转移更加容易。例如我们因父而爱其子，
比因子而爱其父，较为自然。因主而爱其仆，比因仆而爱其主，较为自然。
因国王而爱其臣民，比因臣民而爱其国王，较为自然。
同样，当我们先与一家家长发生争吵时，也比当我们厌恶一家的儿子或仆人，
或其他地位较低的家人时，更容易对其全家发生憎恨。简而言之，
我们的情感也和其他对象一样，容易下降，难以上升。

为了要了解、说明这种现象有什么困难，我们必须考虑，决定想象易于由远及近、
而不易由近及远的那个理由，也使想象易于由小及大，而不易于由大及小。
凡影响最大的东西也最容易被人注意，而凡最被人注意的东西，也最容易呈现于想象中。
我们容易忽略任何事物中细微的东西，而不容易忽略其重要的成分；
当后者先行出现、首先引起我们的注意时，情形更是如此。
例如，假使有任何偶然事件使我们考究到木星的卫星，
我们的想象就自然被决定要去形成那个行星的观念，但是我们如果首先考虑那个主要行星，
我们便比较自然地忽略它的卫星。一提到任何帝国的省份，
就使我们进而想到那个帝国的京城；但是我们的想象却不能同样容易地返回来考虑各个省份。
关于仆人的观念使我们想到他的主人，关于臣民的观念使我们进而想到国王。
但是同样的关系却没有同样影响把我们的思想倒转过来。科尼利亚所以责斥她的儿子们说，
她如果以西皮奥之女的名义见闻于世，不以格拉奇弟兄之母的名义见称于世，
他们应当引以为耻，其故即在于此。换句话说，
这就是督促他们也像他们的外祖父那样显赫有名，否则人们的想象在由她这个居于中
间而对两方有同样关系的人往前推溯时，总是会离开她的儿子们，而以更伟大、
更重要的父亲来称呼她。习惯所以使妻子用丈夫的姓，而不使丈夫用妻子的姓，
也是根据于这个原则；而我们对自己所尊崇和敬仰的人，所以依礼让先，其故也在于此。
如果这个原则不是已经充分明显的话，我们还可以找到其他许多例子来加以证实。


想象在由小及大时既然也像在由远及近时、同样地感到容易，那么，
观念间这种顺利的转移在前一种情形下为什么不像在后一种情形下那样帮助情感的推移呢？
一个朋友或兄弟的美德首先产生了爱，随后产生骄傲，因为在那种情形下，
想象依照其倾向是由远处转到近处的。我们自己的美德并不先产生骄傲，
随后又产生对朋友或兄弟的爱，因为在那种情形下，是由近处过渡到远处，
那是违反想象的倾向的。
但是对于一个身份较低者的爱或恨并不容易产生对于身份较高者的任何情感，
虽然那也是想象的自然倾向：而对身份较高者的爱或恨则引起对于身份较低者的那种情感，
这是和想象的倾向相反的。简而易之，
那种顺利的转移在尊卑关系方面和在远近关系方面所有的方式并不一样。
这两种现象似乎互相矛盾，需要稍加注意，才能加以调和。

在这里，观念的转移既然变得违反想象的自然倾向，
那个官能（想象）必然被另外一种比较强烈的原则控制住了；
但是呈现于心灵之前的既然只有印象和观念，所以这个原则必然在于印象方面。
但是我们已经说过，印象或情感只是被它们的类似关系联系着的，
当任何两种情感使心灵处于同样或类似的心理倾向中时，
心灵就很自然地由这一个过渡到那一个；相反地，种种心理倾向的矛盾就使情感难以推移。
但是我们可以看到，这种矛盾既可以由种类的差别而发生，也可以由程度的差别而发生。
我们经验到，由较小程度的爱突然转到较小程度的恨，
比由较小程度的爱或恨转到较大程度的爱或恨，也并不更为困难。
一个人如果处于平静状态，或者只受到轻微的激动，
则与他在受到猛烈情感的干扰时截然两样，
前后判若两人；而且在两个极端之间若非隔着相当长的时间，
则由一个极端过渡到另一极端是很不容易的。

假如一种情感一出现就消灭了另一种情感，而且两者不能同时并存，
那么由强烈情感转到微弱情感，比由微弱情感进到强烈情感，困难也并不较小，
即使不是更大一些。但是当两种情感联合起来同时激动心灵时，那么情形就完全改变了。
一个微弱的情感加到一个强烈的情感上时，不及一个强烈情感加到一个微弱情感上时，
能够在心理倾向中造成那样大的变化；因为这种缘故，
所以较大程度对较小程度的联系比较小程度对较大程度的联系较为密切一些。

任何情感的程度都决定于对象的本性；一种情感在指向我们所认为重要的人物上时，
比一种以我们所认为较不重要的人作为对象的感情时，以更大的程度充满着心灵、
控制着心灵。因此在这里，想象的倾向和情感的倾向之间的矛盾便呈现出来了。
当我们的思想转向大小两个对象时，想象感到由小及大比由大及小较为容易，
但是感情则发现有较大的困难。而且感情既然比想象是一个较强的原则，
所以无怪感情战胜了想象，而把心灵拉到了自己一方面。
由较大对象的观念虽然难以转到较小对象的观念，
可是指向较大对象的情感永远产生指向较小对象的一种类似的情感，
如果较大对象与较小对象有着一种关系。关于仆人的观念最容易把我们的思想传到主人身上，
但是对于主人的恨或爱则较为迅速地产生对于仆人的愤怒或好感。
在这种情形下，最强的情感占先；加上一个微弱情感，既然使心理倾向不发生重大的变化，
所以它们之间的过渡就因此变得较为容易、较为自然了。

第八实验。 我已经说过，由爱或恨转移到骄傲或谦卑比由骄傲或谦卑转移到爱或恨，
要较为容易一些；而我们所以难以遇到后面这种感情的转移的例子，
原因就在于想象不容易由近的转到远的。但是我必须提出一个例外，
这就是当骄傲和谦卑的原因本身存在于他人身上时。因为在那种情形下，
想象就必须考虑那个人，并且也不能把它的观点限制于我们自己身上。
例如，一个人对我们的行为和性格的赞许最容易使我们对他发生好感和喜爱；
在另一方面，他的谴责或鄙视就使我们发生最强烈的憎恨。
这里，显而易见，原始的情感是骄傲或谦卑，它的对象是自我；这个情感又转移到了爱或恨，
而爱或恨的对象却是另外一个人，
虽然这是违反了我所已经确立的“想象难以由近的转到远的”
那个规则。不过在这种情形下的转移，不单是根据于我们自己同那个人之间的关系，
而且是因为那个人是我们第一种情感的实在原因，因而与那种情感是密切相关的。
产生骄傲的就是他的赞许，产生谦卑的就是他的谴责。
所以无怪想象又带着相关的爱和恨的情感、而返回转来。这与那个规则并不抵触，
而是那个规则的一个例外；而且这个例外与那个规则自身是由同样理由发生的。

因此，这样一个例外宁可说是那个规则的一种证实。
的确，我们如果考究我所说明的全部这八个实验，
我们就将发现，同一原则都出现于全部实验中，
而且骄傲与谦卑，爱与恨都是借着由印象和观念的双重关系发生的那种转移而产生出来的。
没有任何一个关系(第一实验)
或只有一个关系(第二第三实验)的对象永不能产生这些情感之一，
而且我们发现(第四实验) ，情感永远随着关系而变化。不但如此，而且我们还可以说，
当一种关系由于任何特殊情况而没有通常的作用，
即不能产生观念间或印象间的推移(第六实验)时，
那么它也就不再对情感起作用，既不产生骄傲或爱，也不产生谦卑或憎恨。
即使在显得相反的情形下，我们也发现这个规则仍然有效(第七第八实验) 。
在经验中，关系虽然往往没有效果，但经过考察之后，我们发现，
这是由于某种特殊情况阻碍了那种转移；
同样，即使在那个情况存在而并不阻止转移过程的例子中，
我们也发现，那是因为有其他某种情况加以抵消的缘故。
由此可见，不但各种变化还原到一般原则，而且这些变化的变化也是还原到一般原则。

论对于亲友的爱

依据前面的体系来说，要产生爱或恨，总是需要原因与结果之间有着印象和观念的双重关系。
这种说法虽然是普遍真实的，可是可以注意的是：爱可以单独地被另外一种关系，
即我们自己和对象之间的关系，刺激起来；或者更恰当地说，
这种关系是永远伴有其余两种关系的。谁要是借任何关系与我们联系起来，
谁就总是会依其关系的远近得到我们一份的爱，我们并不考察他的其他性质如何。
例如血统关系在亲、子之爱方面产生了心灵所能发生的最强的联系，关系减弱，
这种感情的程度也就减弱。不但血族关系有这种效果，任何关系也都无例外。
我们爱同国人，爱我们的邻人，爱同行、同业，甚至爱与己同名的人。
这些关系中每一种都被认为是一种联系，并给予人以要求我们一份爱的权利。

还有与此平行的另外一种现象，就是相识，相识虽然没有任何一种关系，也能产生爱和好感。
当我们和任何人相处得熟悉和亲密以后，虽然在和他经常相处之中，
并没有发现出他具有任何有价值的品质，
可是我们若是把他和我们所充分相信其具有较大优点的陌生人比较的时候，
我们总不免要褊袒他。亲戚的作用与相识的作用这两种现象可以互相阐明，
都可以用同一原则加以说明。

喜欢攻击人性的人们曾经说过，人类完全不足以支持自己，
当你解除去他和外界对象的一切联系时，他立刻便陷入最深的忧郁和绝望之中。
他们说，因为这个缘故，人们才不断地在赌博、打猎、实业方面找寻消遣，
力求借此忘掉自己，而把我们的精神刺激起来，
摆脱去他们不被某种活泼和生动情绪所支持时便要陷入的那种无精打采的状态。
我十分同意这个想法，我承认心灵本身不足以自寻娱乐，而自然要寻求可以产生生动感觉、
并刺激起精神的外界对象。在这样一个对象出现时，心灵就好像从梦中觉醒：
那时血液流入一个新的高潮，心情激发：整个人的精神焕发，
这是他在孤独和平静的时候所做不到的。因此，同伴是自然令人非常愉快的，
因为他呈现出一切对象中最生动的一个对象，即是与我们自己相似的一个有理性、
有思想的存在者；他把他内心的全部活动传达于我们，
使我们知道他的内心深处的情绪和感情；
使我们在任何对象所引起的一切情绪最初产生的刹那，就看到它们。
每一个生动的观念都是令人愉快的，而我们对于别人的情感所抱有的生动观念，
尤其是如此，因为那样一个观念变成了一种情感，
并且比其他任何意象或概念都能给心灵以一种更为明显的激动。

这一点一经承认，其余一切便可迎刃而解。因为与陌生人相处，尚且可以活跃我们的思想，
因而使我们暂时感到愉快，那么与亲友和相识者做伴，必然特别令人愉快，
因为在这里它有较大程度的这种活跃思想的效果，和更为持久的影响。
凡与我们有关系的任何东西，由于自我和相关对象间有一种顺利的推移，
就在一个生动的方式下被我们所想象。习惯或相识也使任何对象易于进入心中，
并加强关于这个对象的概念。第一种情形与我们从因到果的推理相平行，
第二种则与教育相平行。推理和教育的共同点既然只在于产生任何对象的生动而强烈的观念，
那么这也就是亲友和相识惟一的共同点。
因此，这一定是两者产生它们一切共同结果的那种具有影响的性质。
爱或好感既然是这些结果之一，所以那个情感必然是由于那种想象的强力和生动性得来的。
那样一种想象特别令人愉快，并使我们对于一切产生这种想象的东西都发生一种厚爱，
如果那种东西是好感和善意的恰当的对象。

显然，人们依照他们的特殊性气和性情互相结合，性情快活的人自然喜爱快活的人，
正如性情庄重的人喜爱庄重的人一样。不但在人们看到他们和别人之间有这种类似关系时，
发生这种同类相求的情形，而且由于心情的自然进程和类似的性格之间经常发生的某种同情，
也发生这种声气相投的情形。当他们看到类似关系时，这种关系就产生了观念间的联系，
而按照亲友关系的方式发生作用。当他们看不到这种类似关系时，
它就根据另一个原则发生作用；后面这个原则如果和前面的原则类似，
我们必须认为这个原则是前面推理的一个证实。

人类所有的强烈的骄傲倾向，可以看作另一个类似的现象。往往有这种事情发生，就是：
任何城市在最初虽然使人感到非常不快，可是当我们在其中住了一个很长的时期，
熟悉了各种对象，哪怕只是熟识了街道和楼房以后，于是厌恶情感就逐渐减退，
而终于转变成相反的情感。心灵在观察熟习的对象时，感到愉快、舒适，
而自然地偏爱那些对象，超过了其他虽然也许本身较有价值可是不大熟悉的对象。
心灵的这种性质诱导我们对自己和属于我们的一切对象都有良好的看法。
这些对象出现于比较强烈的观点之下，较为令人愉快，因而比起其他对象来，
更是骄傲和虚荣的较为合适的对象。

在论究我们对于亲友和相识所抱有的爱的时候，
我们不妨观察一下与它伴随着的某种颇为奇特的现象。在平常生活中我们很容易注意到，
当母亲再婚之后，子女们便认为他们对她的关系大为削弱，
不再以在她继续寡居时看待她的眼光来看待她。这种情形的发生，
不但是当他们感到由于她的再嫁所引起的不便，或是当她的新夫身份远较她为低，
而（即使没有任何这一类的考虑）单是因为她变成了另一个家庭的一个成员。
当父亲再婚时，也有这种情形，但是程度却轻了许多；而且父亲的再娶，
确实也远不及母亲的再嫁那样地削弱血统关系。这两种现象本身已经可以令人注意，
但是一经比较，则更其显得如此。

为了产生两个对象间的一种完善的关系，不但需要类似、
接近或因果关系把想象由一个对象传到另一个对象，
而且还需要想象同样顺利和容易地由第二个对象返回到第一个对象。
初看起来，这似乎是一个必然而不可避免的结果。一个对象既然与另一个对象类似，
后一个对象就必然与前一个对象类似。如果一个对象是另一个对象的原因，
第二个对象就一定是它的原因的结果。接近关系也是这样：关系既然永远是交互的，
所以人们会这样想，想象由第二个对象返回到第一个对象的过程，在任何情形下，
也一定和它由第一个对象到第二个对象的过渡一样，同样是自然的。
但是在进一步考察之下，我们将很容易发现我们的错误。
因为假设第二个对象除了它与第一个对象的交互关系外，又和第三个对象有强烈的关系：
在那种情形下，当思想由第一个对象转到第二个对象之后，
便不能同样顺利地返回去（虽然那种关系仍然继续不变）、而是由于有一种新的关系出现，
给予想象以一种新的推动力，思想因此就迅速地被传到那第三个对象上。
因此，这个新的关系便削弱了第一和第二对象之间的联系。想象的本性就是动摇而不稳定的；
当它发现两个对象间一往一还的推移同样顺利时，
它就总是认为那两个对象比那种推移只在一个方向运动中是容易的时候，有较为强烈的关系。
双重运动是一种双重联系，并且以最密切、最亲切的方式把两个对象结合起来。

母亲的再婚并不曾打破亲、子的关系；
那种关系就足以使我的想象最为方便和顺利地由我传到她。但是当想象一达到这个观点之后，
它就发现它的对象被那么多的需要它注意的其他关系所包围起来，以至使它无所适从，
不知道停落在哪一个对象上是好。利害关系和义务把她束缚在另一个家庭上，
阻止想象由她再返回到我自己，而这种返回是支持这种关系所必需的。
思想已不再有使它完全方便自在任意变化的那种必需的摆动了。
思想在前进时是顺利的，但是返回来时，却感到困难；并且由于这种中断，
就发现那种关系比起那种推移在两方面都是通畅和顺利时，已经大为削弱了。

现在可以再举理由阐明，为什么当父亲再娶时，并不发生同样程度的效果呢？
我们可以回顾一下前面所作的证明，就是：
想象虽然容易由较小对象的观点转到较大对象的观点，
可是却不能同样顺利地由较大对象的观点回到较小对象的观点。
当我的想象由我自己转到我的父亲时，并不那样迅速地再由他转到他的第二个妻子，
也不认为他进入了另一个家庭，而还是认为他继续是一家之主，而我自己仍是这一家的成员。
他的优越性阻止思想由他顺利地推移到他的配偶，而是使我顺着亲、
子关系返回到我自己的通路仍然畅通无阻。他并不沉没于他所获得的那个新的关系中；
所以思想的双重运动或摆动仍然是顺利而自然的。想象由于这样的任意变化，
所以亲、子关系仍然保留其充分的力量和影响。

一个母亲并不认为她对儿子的联系因为是与她丈夫分享着的，而就有所减弱；
一个儿子也并不以为他对其双亲的联系，因为是与一个兄弟分享着的，而就遭到削弱。
这里，第三个对象不但和第二对象有关系，也和第一对象有关系；
所以想象是极为顺利地在一切这些对象间来来往往的。

论我们对于富人与权贵的尊重

没有东西比一个人的权力和财富更容易使我们对他尊视；
也没有东西比他的贫贱更容易引起我们对他的鄙视。尊视与鄙视既然被视为爱和恨的一种，
所以在这里应当说明这些现象。

这里最幸运的一点是：最大的困难并不在于发现可以产生那样一种效果的一个原则，
而是在于由呈现出的几个原则当中选择那个最主要、最有势力的原则。
我们对他人财富所感到的愉快，我们对财富所有者所发生的尊视，可以归于三个原因。
第一，归之于他们所有的财物，如房屋、花园、设备；这些东西因为本身就是令人愉快的，
所以在每一个考虑或观察它们的人的心中必然产生一种快乐的情绪。
第二，归之于希望分享富贵的人的财物而沾到利益的心理。第三，归之于同情，
这种心理使我们分享每一个和我们接近的人的快乐。
这三个原则可以联合起来产生现在这个现象。问题在于：
我们应当把这个现象主要归于哪一条原则。

此外，我们如果考虑到那个官能的本性和一切关系对它所有的那种巨大影响，
那么我们就将很容易地相信，对于富人所享受的美酒、音乐或花园的观念，
不论怎样会变得生动而令人愉快，想象总不会局限于那些观念上，
而一定会把它的观点带到相关的对象上面，尤其是带到享有那些东西的人身上。
使这一点成为尤其自然的是：那个令人愉快的观念或意象，
借着那个人对那个对象的关系，在这里产生了对那人的一种情感；
所以那个人不可避免地要进入最初的概念中，因为他成了那个派生情感的对象。
但是他如果进入最初的概念中，并且被认为享有这些令人愉快的财物，
那么恰当地说同情就成为那种情感的原因，因而第三原则就比第一原则更为有力、
更为普遍了。

此外，还可以再加上一点，就是：财富和权力即使不被使用也自然会引起尊重和尊敬：
因而这些情感并不发生于任何美丽的或愉快的对象的观念。
固然，金钱借着它所提供的可以得到那样一些对象的那种能力，
因而就涵摄着那些对象的一种表象，并且因为这个缘故，
仍然可以被认为是足以传来产生那种情感的那些愉快的意象。但是由于这个前景是辽远的，
所以我们就比较自然地要取一个接近的对象，
这个对象就是这种能力给予拥有这种能力的那个人所提供的快乐。
我们还可以进一步在这一点上得到满足，如果我们考虑，
财富只是借着运用财富的意志才代表人生的福利，因而它的本性就涵摄着关于那个人的观念，
并且在被人考虑时总不能不对那个人的感觉和快乐发生一种同情。

起来说，除了同情原则之外，不再有什么其他东西使我们尊重权力和财富，
鄙视卑贱和贫困；借着同情作用，我们才能体会富人与贫人的情绪，
而分享他们的快乐与不快。财富给予其所有主以一种快乐；这种快乐通过想象传给旁观者，
因为想象产生了一个在强力和活泼性方面都与原始印象相似的观念。
这个愉快的观念或印象与爱、这个愉快的情感是联系着的。
这个观念或印象来自一个能思想的、
有意识的存在者，而这个存在者恰好是爱的对象。依照我的假设来说，
情感就是由这种印象关系和观念的同一而发生的。

使我们接受这个意见的最好方法，就是对宇宙作一个总的观察，
观察一下全部动物界的同情作用的力量，和有思想的存在者彼此间的情绪的迅速传递。
在不掠捕其他动物而且不受凶猛情感激动的一切动物中，都有一种显著的合群的欲望，
使它们聚集在一起，而它们并不想在这种合群中沾到任何利益。
这一点在人类方面更为显著，
人类是宇宙间具有最热烈的社会结合的欲望的动物，
并且有最多的有利条件适合于社会的结合。我们每有一个愿望，总不能不着眼于社会。
完全孤独的状态，或许是我们所能遭到的最大惩罚。
每一种快乐，在离群独享的时候，便会衰落下去，
而每一种痛苦也就变得更加残酷而不可忍受。
不论我们可以被其他任何情感所推动，如骄傲、野心、贪婪、好奇心、复仇心或性欲等，
这些情感的灵魂或鼓动原则，都只是同情作用；如果我们完全除去了别人的思想和情绪，
这些情感便都毫无力量。自然界一切能力和元素纵然都联合起来服务并服从于一个人；
太阳的升降纵然都听他的命令；河浪海潮纵然由他随意支配；
大地纵然自发地把对他有用或使他愉快的一切东西供给于他：可是你至少要给他一个人，
可以和他分享幸福，使他享受这个人的尊重和友谊，否则他仍然是一个十分可怜的人。

由对于人性的总的观察所得的这个结论，
我们可以用同情作用的力量十分显著的一些特殊例子加以证实。
大多数种类的美都是由这个根源发生的；我们的第一个对象即使是一块无知觉、
无生命的物质，可是我们很少停止在那里，而不把我们的观点扩展到那个对象对有感觉、
有理性的动物所有的影响。一个以其房屋或大厦向我们夸耀的人，除了其他事情以外，
总要特别注意指出房间的舒适，它们的位置的优点，隐藏在楼梯中间的小室、接待室、
走廊等等，显然，美的主要部分就在于这些特点。一看到舒适，就使人快乐，
因为舒适就是一种美。但是舒适是在什么方式下给人快乐的呢？
确实，这与我们的利益丝毫没有关系；而且这样美既然可以说是利益的美，
而不是形相的美，所以它之使我们快乐，必然只是由于感情的传达，由于我们对房主的同情。
我们借想象之力体会到他的利益，并感觉到那些对象自然地使他产生的那种快乐。

这种说法也可以推广到桌子、椅子、写字桌、烟囱、马车、马鞍、犁，的确，
可以推广到每一种工艺品；因为它们的美主要由于它们的效用而发生，
由于它们符合于它们的预定的目的而发生；这是一条普遍的规则。
不过这只是关于物主的一种利益，旁观者只有借着同情才能发生兴趣。

总而言之，我们可以说，人们的心灵是互相反映的镜子，
这不但是因为心灵互相反映它们的情绪，而且因为情感、心情和意见的那些光线，
可以互相反射，并可以不知不觉地消失。例如一个富人由于他的财产所得的快乐，
在投射于旁观者心中时，就引起快乐和尊重；这种情绪在被知觉到并同情之后，
又增加所有主的快乐；在再一度反射之后，又成为旁观者方面快乐和尊重的新的基础。
财富有使人享受人生一切乐趣的能力，由于这种能力，
人们对于财富确实有一种原始的快乐。这种能力既是财富的本性和本质，
所以它必然是由财富发生的一切情感的最初来源。
这些情感中最重要的一种就是别人的爱或尊重的情感，
因此这种情感是因为对于所有主的快乐发生同情而发生的。
不过所有主既然因其财富而获得他人的爱和尊重，因而也就对于财富感到一种次生的快乐，
而这种快乐只是由他自身发生的那种原始快乐的再度反射。
这种次生的快乐或虚荣感成为财富的一种主要的可取之点，
并且也是我们自己希图得到财富或是尊重他人财富的主要理由。
在这里原来的快乐便经过了第三度的反射；在此以后，
意象和反映就因为微弱和混乱而难以区别了。

论怜悯

一个悲剧诗人通过他所介绍进来的角色，表象出一长串的悲伤、恐怖、义愤和其他感情来，
而悲剧的观者也就随着经历了这一长串的感情。由于许多悲剧有幸运的结尾，
而且任何精彩悲剧的写作总不免要包含运气的转变，所以观者必然同情所有这些变化，
而体会到那种虚构的喜悦以及其他各种的感情。因此，我们除非说，
个别的情感都是被个别的原始性质传来，而不是由上述的一般的同情原则得来的；
我们就必须承认，这些情感全部都是由那个原则发生的。要特殊地把任何一种除外，
必然要显得极不合理。这些情感既是首先出现于一个人的心中，然后才出现于别人的心中，
而且就这些情感的出现方式而论，它们在各种情形下都同样地先是观念，
后是印象，所以那种推移必然是由同一原则发生。我至少确信，
这种推理方法不论在自然哲学中，或在日常生活中，都会被认为是确实可靠的。

还有一点：怜悯在很大程度上依靠于接近关系，甚至要见到对象才能引起：
这就证明它是由想象发生的。且不用说妇女和孩子们，因为最受想象官能的指导，
所以是最受怜悯心理的支配的。当他们一见到白刃时，纵然刀是操在最好的朋友手里，
他们也会晕倒，这种弱点也使他们极端怜悯他们所看到的那些处于任何悲伤和苦恼中的人们。
有些哲学家们把这种情感推源于人们对命运的变幻所作的令人不解的那些微妙的反省，
和我们也容易遭到我们所看到的那种苦难的可能性：这些哲学家们将会看到，
我这种实例以及还可以很容易地举出的其他许多实例，都是和他们相反的。

现在我们只须再注意一下这种情感的一种相当显著的现象，就是：
传来的同情的情感有时由于它的原来情感的微弱而获得力量，
甚至由于本来不存在的感情的推移而发生出来。例如一个人获得任何显要的职位，
或承继得一宗大的财富，他越是显得不觉得什么突出，
他对于享有这种显位或巨富越是表示泰然和淡漠，则我们对他的昌盛便越是感到高兴。
同样，一个不因不幸而感到沮丧的人，也因其忍耐而更为人所悲叹；
如果那种美德扩大到完全消除了不快感的时候，那就更加增加我们的怜悯的心情。
当一个有价值的人陷入世俗所谓极大的不幸中的时候，我们对他的处境就形成一个概念；
我们把想象由原因带到它通常的结果上，首先对他的悲哀发生一个生动的观念，
随后对它感到一个印象，完全忽略了使他超越于那一类情绪的那种伟大心情，
或者只在其能增加我们对他的钦佩、敬爱和怜惜的限度内来考虑他。
我们根据经验发现，那样一种程度的情感通常与那样一种的不幸联系着；
在现在的情形下虽然有了一个例外，可是想象受了通则的影响，
使我们想到那个情感的生动的观念，或者不如说是感到了那个情感本身，
正如那个人真被那种情感所激动时一样。根据同样原则，
人们如果在我们面前作出愚蠢的行为时，我们也由于他们的行为而感到羞耻，
即使他们不表示任何羞耻感，或者丝毫也不意识到自己的愚蠢。所有这些都由同情发生；
不过这只是片面的同情心，只观察它的对象的一面，而不考虑它的另一面，
这个另一面却有相反的效果，它会完全消灭那个由于同情初次出现时而发生的那种情绪。

论恶意与妒忌

人类在其情绪和意见方面很少受理性的支配，
所以他们总是借比较而不借其内在的价值来判断各个对象。当心灵考虑、
或是习惯于任何程度的完善性时，则任何东西虽然实际上是可以尊重的，
如果达不到这种完善程度，它对情感的作用便和它是残阙和拙劣的时候一样。
这是灵魂的一种原始性质，类似于我们在自己身体方面日常的经验。让一个人烘热一只手，
冷却另一只手，那么同样的水在同时会随着两个不同器官的倾向显得既热而又冷。
程度较小的任何性质如果继程度较大的性质而来，
它所产生的感觉便好像小于其实在性质的感觉，有时甚至正好像是相反性质的感觉。
跟着剧痛而来的任何轻微的疼痛，似乎毫无所有，甚至成为一种快乐；
正如在另一方面继微痛而来的任何剧痛、使人加倍感到痛苦和难堪一样。

我们可以因他人的幸福和苦难而感到相反的感觉，这也并不显得奇怪；
因为我们发现这种比较可以使我们对自己发生一种恶意，使我们对自己的痛苦感到愉快，
对自己的快乐感到悲伤。例如当我们满意我们现在的状况时，
过去痛苦的回忆便令我们感到愉快；正如在另一方面，当我们的享受今非昔比时，
以往的快乐就使我们感到不快。这种比较既然和我们考虑别人的情绪时一样，
所以它也必然伴有同样的结果。

不但如此，一个人还可以把这种恶意推及到他自身，甚至推及到他现在的好运，
而且可以把恶意加深到这样程度，以致故意找寻苦恼，增加自己的痛苦和悲哀。
这种情形可以发生于下面两种情形。第一，发生于朋友或亲人遭遇折磨和不幸的时候。
第二，发生于他对自己所犯的罪恶感到悔恨的时候。
这两种不正常的追求祸害的欲望是由比较原则发生的。一个纵情享受任何快乐的人，
当他的朋友处于苦恼中时，如果把这种苦恼与自己所享受的原始快乐比较一下，
就更加明显地从他的朋友那里感觉到一种反射回来的不快。
的确，这种对比也应当使现前的快乐显得格外活跃。不过在这里既然假设悲伤是主导的情感，
所以每一度的增加都落到悲伤的一方面去，
并被吞没于其中，而在相反的感情上丝毫不起作用。
人们因为自己过去的罪恶和过失而加于自己身上的苦行，情形与此相同。
当一个罪人反省他所应得的惩罚时，惩罚的观念如果与现在的舒适和快乐相比，
那个观念便益加增大，并且在某种方式下强使他自寻不快，
借以避免那样一种令他不愉快的对比。

这个推理也可以说明妒忌的起源，一如其说明恶意的起源一样。
这两种情感之间的惟一差异只在于，妒忌是由别人现时的某种快乐刺激起来的，
那种快乐在比较之下就削弱了我们自己快乐的观念。而恶意是不经挑拨而想嫁祸于人、
以便由此较获得快乐的一种欲望。成为妒忌对象的快乐往往比我们所有的快乐占着优势。
一种优势自然似乎使我们相形见绌，并呈现出令人不愉快的比较来。
但是甚至就在他处于劣势的情形下，我们仍然希望有一种较大的距离，
以便更加增大自我的观念。当这个距离减小时，那种比较对我们的利益就要小些，
因而使我们感到较小的快乐，并且甚至是令人不愉快的。
因此，人们在看到比他们低微的人在追求光荣或快乐方面接近他们或赶上他们时，
他们就感觉到那种妒忌。在这种妒忌心理中我们看到比较作用的效果重复了两次。
一个人和比他低微的人比较，由这种比较得到一种快乐：当那个比自己低微的人上升起来、
因而其劣势减低的时候，于是原来仅仅应该是快乐的减低，
这时由于与先前状况重新比较一下，那种快乐的减低就变为真正的痛苦了。

关于由他人优势而发生的那种妒忌，有一点值得提出，就是：
产生这种妒忌的不是自己与他人之间的远远不成比例，反而是我们的互相接近。
一个普通的士兵对他的将领不如对军曹或班长那样妒忌，
一个卓越的作家遭不到一般平庸的小文人的多大妒忌，而却遭到和他地位相近的作家的妒忌。
的确，人们也许会以为越是不成比例，则在比较之下所感到的不快必然越大。
但是我们可以在另一方面考虑，远远的不成比例、就切断了关系，
或者使我们根本不与我们距离很远的人物比较，或者就减弱了比较的效果。
类似和接近总是产生观念关系；你如果消灭了这些联系，
其他偶然事件即使可以把两个观念结合在一起，
但由于没有任何链索或起联系作用的性质在想象中把它们结合起来，
所以两个观念便不能长期结合在一起，或彼此互相有重大的影响。

论慈善和愤怒与怜悯和恶意的混杂

假设有两个同行业的人在一个城市中找寻职业，而这个城市却不能容纳两个人，
那么显然，一个人的成功是和另一个人的成功完全不相容的，
而且凡可以促进一个人的利益的事情都是和他的对手的利益相抵触的，反过来说，
也是一样。再假设两个商人虽然居住在世界上不同的地方，可是合股经营，
于是一个人的利益或损失便立刻成为其伙伴的利益或损失，两人必然遭受同样的命运。
显然，在第一种情形下，由于利害冲突，总是要发生憎恨，而在第二种情形下，
由于利害一致，总是要发生爱的情感。让我们考究，我们能把这些情感归于什么原则。

显然，如果我们只考虑现前的感觉，这些情感并不是由印象和观念的双重关系发生的。
因为，以第一种竞争情形而论，对手的快乐和利益虽是必然引起我的痛苦和损失，
可是还有一点可以抵消这点，即他的痛苦和损失也给我带来快乐和利益；假如他不成功，
我就可以因此由他得到一种较高程度的快乐。同样，一个伙伴的成功虽然使我感觉高兴，
可是他的不幸则以同样的比例使我苦恼，
而且我们很容易想象后一种情绪在许多情形下会占到优势。
但是不论一个对手或伙伴的运气是好是坏，我永远憎恨前者，而喜爱后者。

为了明白什么情感和这些种类不同的同情是关联着的，我们必须考虑，
慈善是由所爱的人的快乐而发生的一种原始的快乐和由他的痛苦而发生的一种痛苦：
由于这些印象间这种相应关系，
就连带发生了一种希望他快乐的欲望和不愿他痛苦的厌恶心理。
因此，要想使一种情感同慈善平行，
我们就必须感觉到这些和我们所考虑的那个人的双重印象相应的双重印象；
任何一个印象单独并不足以达成这个目的。
当我们只同情于一个印象并且所同情的是一个痛苦印象时，
这种同情由于它给我们传来的不快便与愤怒和憎恨发生关联。
但是由于广泛的同情或狭隘的同情决定于第一次同情的力量的大小，
因此，爱和恨的情感也就依靠于同一原则。一个强烈的印象在传来的时候，
就产生双重的情感倾向；这种倾向借着方向的类似关系而与慈善和爱发生关联，
不论第一个印象可能是如何痛苦的。一个微弱的痛苦印象，
则因感觉的类似而与愤怒和憎恨发生关联。
因此，慈善是发生于巨大程度的苦难或是发生于受到强烈同情的任何程度的苦难：
憎恨或鄙视则发生于一种轻微程度的苦难，或是得到微弱同情的苦难；
这正是我原来企图证明和说明的那条原则。

关于这个原则，我们不但有理性可以信赖，而且还有经验可以信赖。
某种程度的贫困引起鄙视，但是过度的贫困则引起怜悯和善意。
我们可能轻视一个农夫或仆役；但是当一个乞丐的苦难显得过大，
或者被生动地描写出来时，我们就同情他的苦恼，
并且在我们心中感到明显的怜悯和慈善的激动。同一个对象，随其不同的程度，
就引起相反的情感。因此，依照我的假设来说，
各种情感必然是决定于那些随着高低不同的程度而起作用的原则的。
同情的增加显然和苦难的增加有同样的效果。

一片荒芜贫瘠的土地，永远显得是丑陋而令人不快的，
并且往往引起我们鄙视那里的居民的心理。
但这种丑陋感在很大程度上是由于同情居民而发生的，正如前面所说；
不过这种同情只是一种微弱的同情，不超出令人不快的那个当前感觉之外。
但是一座烧毁的城市的景象却传来慈善的情绪，因为我们深深体会到那些可怜居民的利益，
以至感觉到他们的艰苦，并希望他们的繁荣。

不过印象的力量虽然一般产生怜悯和慈善，但如果印象达到了太强的程度，
它一定就不再有这种效果。这一点或许值得我们注意。
当不快感本身就很微弱或是与我们远隔的时候，就吸引不住想象，而且对于将来的、
偶然的福利所传来的关切，也和对现在实在的祸害的关切不能相等。
在这种不快获得较大的力量时，我们对于那个人的遭遇就感到非常关心，
因而体会到他将来的好运和厄运；由这种完全的同情就发生了怜悯和慈善。
但是我们很容易想象，当现前的祸害以超出平常的力量激动我们时，
它就可以完全吸引住我们的注意，阻止上述的那种双重同情。例如我们发现，
每一个人，尤其是妇女，虽然都容易对于押赴断头台的犯人发生好感，
想象他们长得非常俊秀和匀称，可是一个目击刑架和残酷的行刑状况的人，
并不感到这种怜惜的情绪，而是可以说是被恐怖所控制住了
，再无闲暇以任何与此相反的同情来调和这种不快的感觉。

不过有一个例子最清楚地证明了我的假设，在那个例子中，我们把对象改变一下，
就把双重的同情甚至与中度的情感分开，在那种情形下，
我们发现怜悯并不像通常那样地产生爱和怜惜，反而总是引起相反的感情来。
当我们看到一个人处于不幸中时，我们被怜悯和爱所感动；
但是造成那种不幸的人却成为我们最强烈的憎恨的对象，
而且随着我们的怜悯程度而更加受到憎恨。那么为什么理由，
同一种怜悯情感产生对于受害者的爱和对于造成不幸者的恨呢？
那只是因为在后一种情形下，造成不幸者只对不幸有一种关系，而在考虑受害者时，
我们便把观点转到每一方面，不但体会到他的苦难，而且还希望他的昌盛。

论尊敬和鄙视

我曾一向假设，爱和骄傲这两种情感，谦卑和恨这两种情感，在它们的感觉方面是类似的，
前两种永远是令人愉快的，后两种永远是令人痛苦的。这虽然是普遍真实的，
可是我们注意到，两种令人愉快的情感，也和两种令人痛苦的情感一样，
其间有某些差异，甚至有相反的性质加以区别。
没有东西能够像骄傲和自负那样地鼓舞和振奋心灵，而在同时，
爱或柔情却被发现为可以使心灵软弱无力的。这种差异，
也可以在令人不快的情感方面观察到。
愤怒和憎恨给我们的全部思想和行动增添一种新的力量，
而谦卑和羞耻则令人沮丧和气馁。对于各种情感的这些性质，必须形成一个明晰的观念。
让我们记住，骄傲和憎恨使灵魂振奋，而爱与谦卑却使灵魂变得软弱。

由此得出的结论就是：爱和骄傲在它们愉快感觉方面的一致性，
虽然使它们永远被同一的对象刺激起来，可是这另外一种的相反性，却是它们所以
在非常不同的程度内被刺激起来的原因。天才和学问是愉快而辉煌的对象，
并且借这两个条件而适合于骄傲和自负；
但是它们只是因为它们所给人的快乐而与爱情有一种关系。愚蠢和无知是令人不快的、
鄙贱的，这在同样方式下使它们与谦卑发生双重联系，和憎恨发生单一关系。
因此，我们就可以认为这是确实无疑的，就是：同一个对象虽然随着不同的情况，
永远产生爱和骄傲，恨和谦卑，可是很少以同一比例产生前两种或后两种的情感。


正是在这里，我们必须找寻上述困难的解决，即为什么有些对象永远只刺激起纯粹的爱或恨，
而并不总是通过与谦卑或骄傲的混杂而产生尊敬或鄙视。
一种性质除非是在我们身上时可以产生骄傲，
它在他人身上时就不能借比较作用使我们感到谦卑；反过来说也是一样，
任何对象除非在直接观察时产生谦卑，它也不能借比较作用刺激起骄傲。
显然，各种对象永远借着比较产生一种和它们的原来感觉恰好相反的感觉。
因此，假如有一个特别适合于产生爱而不完全适合于刺激起骄傲来的对象呈现出来，
这个对象在属于他人时，便借比较而直接产生一种较大程度的爱，和较小程度的谦卑；
因而后一种情感在那个混合感情中就几乎觉察不到，也不足以把爱转变为尊敬。
好性情，幽默、机敏、慷慨、美以及许多其他的品质就是这样。
这些品质特别适宜于在他人心中产生爱，
不过在刺激我们自己的骄傲方面却没有那样大的倾向：
因为这个理由，一看到他人有这种品质时，虽然就产生了纯粹的爱，
可是其中只掺杂着很少的谦卑和尊敬。这个推理很容易推广到其他与此相反的情感。

在我们结束这个题目之前，我们不妨说明一下那个颇为奇特的现象，就是：
我们通常为什么和我们所鄙视的人保持一定的距离，
不使那些比我们低微的人甚至在场所和位置方面过于接近我们。我们已经说过，
几乎每一种观念都伴有某种情绪，甚至数目和广袤的观念也是一样，
至于那些被认为与人生有重要关系并且吸引我们注意的对象的观念，则更是如此。
我们观察一个富人或一个贫人，总不能完全漠然，
而必然要在前一种情形下感到一种微弱的尊敬，在后一种情形下感到一种微弱的鄙视。
这两种情感是相反的，但是为了使这种相反性被感觉到，那些对象必然要有某种关联，
否则各种感情将是完全分离的、各别的，永不会互相会合。当人们一接近以后，
就发生了那种关系；这就是一个概括的理由，说明我们在看到一个富人和一个贫人、
一个贵族和一个守门人那样不相称的一些对象处于那种接近状况下时，为什么要感觉不快。

论动物的爱与恨

动物的爱并不以同种的动物为惟一对象，而且扩展到更大的范围，
包括了几乎每一种有感情、有思想的存在者。一条狗很自然地爱人甚于爱它的同种，
并且也往往得到爱的报答。

动物既然不易感受想象中的苦乐，所以就只能借对象所产生的感性的祸福来判断对象，
并且必然根据这些祸福来调整它们对那些对象的感情。因此，我们发现，
我们通过给予利益或侵害就引起动物的爱或恨来；通过饲养和抚育任何动物，
我们很快就得到它的依恋，而通过打骂，我们总是会招来它的敌意和恶感。

动物的爱并不完全是由关系引起的，如在我们人类方面那样；
这是因为它们的思想并不是那样活跃，以至能够推溯出各种关系，
除了在很明显的例子中。但是我们也很容易看到，在某些场合下，
关系对于动物也有一种重大的影响。例如和关系有同样的结果的相识，
总是使动物对人或对它们的同种发生爱的情感。由于同样原因，
动物之间的任何类似关系也是爱的来源。一头牛如果和一些马关在一个圈内，
自然就加入马群，但是当其能在牛马之间随意选择时，它就离开马群，而去加入牛群。

母畜对于仔畜的爱发生于动物的一种特殊本能，和人类一样。

而易见，同情，或情感的传导，也发生于动物方面，正如在人类方面一样。
恐惧、愤怒、勇敢和其他感情，往往由一个动物传给另一个动物，
而它们却并不知道产生原始情感的那个原因。动物也可以借同情感到悲伤，
而且悲伤所产生的全部结果和它所刺激起的情绪，和在我们人类方面几乎完全一样。
一条狗的哀嗥和悲鸣在其同伴中引起明显的关切。可注意的是：
几乎一切动物在其游戏时和在其争斗时都用着同样的肢体，进行着同样的动作：
狮、虎、猫使用它们的爪子；牛使用它的犄角；狗使用它的牙齿；马使用它的后蹄：
可是它们都极为小心地提防伤害它们的同伴，虽然它们并不怕后者的恼怒；
这就显然地证明，畜类感到彼此的苦乐。

每个人都曾观察到，狗在成群行猎时，比在单独追赶猎物时，更加精神奋发；
显然，这种情形只能是由同情发生。猎人们也很熟悉，当两队素来生疏的猎犬联成一队时，
这种效果就达到更大的程度，甚至达到了太大的程度。
我们如果在人类自身不曾有过类似的经验，对于这个现象或许无法说明。

论自由与必然

在苦乐的一切直接结果中最为显著的就是意志（will）；严格地说，
意志虽然并不包括在情感之列，可是为了说明这些情感起见，
必须对意志的本性和特性要有充分的理解，所以我们在这里将把意志作为我们研究的主题。
我所要说的就是：我所谓意志只是指我们自觉地发动自己身体的任何一种新的运动，
或自己心灵的任何一个新的知觉时、所感觉到和所意识到的那个内在印象。
这个印象正和前述的骄傲和谦卑、爱和恨一样，是不可能下定义的，
也无需再进一步描述的。因为这个缘故，
我们将略去哲学家们常用以使这个问题变得更加糊涂而未能真正加以澄清的那些定义和区别；
我们在一开始研究这个题目之初，便将考察那个长时期来争论着的自由（liberty）
和必然（necessity）问题。在论述意志时，这个问题是极为自然地出现的。

疯人们一般被认为是没有自由的。但是如果我们根据他们的行为加以判断，
这些行为比理智清楚的人的行为有较小的规则性和恒常性，因而是较为远离于必然性的。
因此，我们在这一点上的思想方式是绝对矛盾的，但它只是我们在自己的推理中
（尤其是在现在这个问题上）通常所运用的这些糊涂的观念和含混的名词的自然结果。

现在我们必须表明，动机和行为之间的结合既然像任何一些自然活动的结合一样、
具有同样的恒常性，
所以它在决定我们由一项的存在推断另一项的存在方面对于知性的影响也是一样的。
如果这一点显得是对的，那么凡是加入各种物质活动的联系和产生中的任何已知的条件，
没有不可以在心灵的一切活动中发现出来的；因此，我们如果认为物质方面有必然性，
而认为心灵方面没有必然性，那就不能不陷于明显的矛盾。

没有一个哲学家的判断是那样地完全牢守在这个狂妄的自由体系上面，
以至不承认人事证据的力量，并在思辨和实践方面依此进行，
就像依据着一个合理的基础一样。
但是所谓人事证据只是由于考虑了人的动机、性情和境况后、对人的行为所作的一个结论。
例如，当我们看到某些字母或符号书写在纸上，我们就推断说，
书写这些字母的人要肯定某些事实，如恺撒的死亡、奥古士都的成功、尼罗皇帝的残忍；
当我们记起许多其他互相符合的证据时，我们就断言，那些事实曾有一度实际存在过，
而且那么多的人，毫无任何利益，也不会联合了来欺骗我们；何况他们要作这种企图，
就不得不亲身遭到他们所有的同时人的嘲笑，因为这些事实当时都被肯定为是新近发生的，
每个人都知道的。同样的推理也贯穿于政治、战争、商业、经济中间，
并且完全参与在人生中间，以至人类如果不采用这种推理，就一刻也不能行动或生存。
一个国王在向他的臣民征税时，就预期他们的遵从。一个将军在率领军队作战时，
就估计到他的军队有某种程度的勇气。一个商人指望他的代理人或货物管理人的忠实和技巧。
一个人在吩咐开饭时，毫不怀疑他的仆人的服从。
简而言之，既然没有事情比我们自己的和他人的行为更与我们那样密切相关，
所以我们的绝大部分推理就都运用在对于这些行为的判断。现在我可以肯定说，
谁要是以这个方式进行推理，他就在事实上相信意志的活动是由必然发生的；
如果他否认这一点，他就自己也不知道自己的意义是什么。

我们所称为一因一果的一切那些对象，就其本身而论，都是互相分别、互相分离的，
正如自然界中任何两个事物一样，而且我们即使极其精确地观察它们，
也不能由这一个的存在推出另一个的存在。
我们只是由于经验到、观察到两个事物的恒常结合，
才能形成这种推断；就是这样，推断也只是习惯在想象上的结果。
我们在这里必须不要满足于说，因果观念发生于恒常结合着的对象，而还必须肯定说，
这个观念就是这些对象的观念，而且必然的联系不是被知性的结论所发现的，
而只是心灵的一个知觉。因此，什么地方我们看到同样的结合，
什么地方这种结合以同一方式影响信念和意见，我们就在那里有了原因和必然的观念，
虽然我们也许可以避去不用这些表达方式。在我们所观察到的一切过去例子中，
一个物体的运动总是经过撞击而跟着有另一个物体的运动的。心灵再不能进一步深入了。
心灵由这个恒常的结合形成原因和结果的观念，并借这个观念的影响感觉到必然性。
在我们所谓人事证据中既然有同样的恒常性、同样的影响，我就再不要求别的了。
剩下的就只能是词语上的争执了。

的确，当我们考虑到自然的和人事的证据如何恰当地互相结合、而形成一个推理连锁时，
我们将毫不迟疑地承认，两者是性质相同的，并且是由同一原则得来的。
一个狱囚既无金钱，又无人情，他就不但会从环绕他的墙壁和铁栏，
而且也会从狱吏的顽强性，发现他不可能逃跑；在他的一切逃跑的企图中，
他宁可从事破坏石墙和铁栏，而不肯试图去转移狱吏的顽强的本性。
这个狱囚在解赴刑场时，不但会由铁斧的挥动或绞轮的转动预见到他的死亡，
而且也可以从他的监守者的坚定和忠实预见他的死亡。他的心灵循着一串的观念活动：
士兵们的不允许他逃脱，行刑人的动作，身首的分离，流血、抽搐和死亡。
这里，自然原因和有意的行动形成了一个关联的连锁；
但是心灵在由一个环节过渡到另一个环节时，并不感到任何差异；心灵确信那个将来的结果，
就像它被我们所谓物理的必然所结合起来的一串原因
把它和现在的记忆印象和感官印象联系起来一样。
同样的被经验过的结合在心灵上有同样的效果，
不论那些被结合的对象是动机、意志和行为，还是形状和运动。
我们可以改变事物的名称，但是事物的本性和它们对知性的作用却永不改变。

论自由与必然（续）

如果把神当作一位立法者，并假设他根据要求人们服从的意图进行赏罚，
那么上述推理在应用于神的法律上时，也是同样坚实的。不过我还主张，
甚至当他不以他的主宰身份行事、
而被看作只是因为罪行的丑恶可憎而是一个罪行的报复者时：
如果人类行为中没有因果的必然联系，那么不但所加的惩罚不可能合乎正义和道德上的公平，
而且任何有理性的存在者也不可能会想到要加罚于人。憎恨或愤怒的恒常的和普遍的对象，
是赋有思想和意识的一个人或动物；当任何罪恶的或侵害的行为刺激起那种憎恨情感来时，
那只是因为那些行为和那个人有一种关联。但是依照自由或机会学说来说，
这种关联就变得不存在了，而且人对于那些有意图的、预谋的行为，也像对于偶发的、
偶然的行为一样，不负有任何责任了。行为就其本性来说是短暂的、易逝的，
如果这些行为不是发生于作出这些行为的人的性格和性情中的某种原因，
就不能固定在他的身上，如果是善行，也不能给予他光荣，如果是恶行，
也不能给予他丑名。行为本身也许是可以责备的，它可能是违反道德和宗教的一切的规则，
不过那个人对它并不负责；行为既然不是发生于他的性格中任何持久的或恒常的性质，
并且在事后也不留下这一种性质的痕迹，所以他就不可能因此成为惩罚或报复的对象。
因此，依照自由的假设来说，一个人在犯了极恶的罪行以后，
就像他在刚出生时一样的纯洁无污，而且他的性格也和他的行为丝毫无关；
因为他的行为并不由他的性格发生，因而行为的恶劣绝不能作为性格败坏的证明。
只有根据必然原则，一个人才会由于他的行为而有功过，
不论一般的意见怎样倾向于相反的说法。

不过人们是那样地自相矛盾，以致他们虽然常常说，
必然性完全消灭了一切对于人类或神的功过，
可是他们在有关这个问题的一切判断中仍然继续依据这些必然原则本身进行推理。
人们由于无知或偶然而作出的那些恶行，无论有什么样的结果，他们都不因此而受到责备。
为什么呢？那只是因为这些行为的原因是短暂的，并且是终止于这些行为的本身。
人们由于仓促地、未经预谋而作出的恶行，比起由于通过深思熟虑而作出的恶行，
受到较少的责备。为什么呢？那只是因为急躁的性情虽然是心灵中恒常的原因，
可是它只是间歇地发作，并不玷污整个的性格。其次，悔改也消除各种罪行，
尤其是在悔改以后，生活和举动方面有了明显的改善。这又该如何说明呢？
我们只能说，行为所以使一个人成为罪恶的，
只是因为行为是心灵中罪恶的情感或原则的证明；当这些原则有了任何改变、
以致行为不再是正确的证明时，行为就也不再是罪恶的了。
但是依照自由或机会学说来说，行为永不能是正确的证明，因而也永远不是罪恶的。

因此，我在这里转向我的论敌，希望他使他自己的体系摆脱这些可憎的结果，
然后再把它们来责难别人。如果他认为，
这个问题应该在哲学家们面前通过公正的论证来加以决定，而不可以通过在人民面前的雄辩，
那么就让他回到我前面在证明自由和机会是同义词时所举出的论证上，
并回到我关于人事证据的本性和人类行为的规则性所提出的论证上。
在回顾这些推理时，我确信得到了完全的胜利；因此，我既已证明、
意志的所有这些活动都有特殊的原因，我现在就要进而说明这些原因是什么，
并且它们是如何活动的。

论影响意志的各种动机

在哲学中，甚至在日常生活中，最常见的事情就是谈论理性和情感的斗争，
就是重视理性，并且说，人类只有在遵循理性的命令的范围内，才是善良的。
人们说，每一个理性动物都必须根据理性来调整他的行为；
如果有任何其他动机或原则要求指导他的行为，他应该加以反对，一直要把它完全制服，
或者至少要使它符合于那个较高的原则。
古今精神哲学的大部分似乎都建立在这个思想方法上；
而且不论在形而上学的辩论中，或是在通俗的讲演中，
都没有比这个所谓理性超过于情感的优越性成为更加广阔的争论园地。理性的永恒性、
不变性和它的神圣的来源，已经被人渲染得淋漓尽致：情感的盲目性、变幻性和欺骗性，
也同样地受到了极度的强调。为了指出一切这种哲学的谬误起见，我将力求证明，
第一，理性单独决不能成为任何意志活动的动机，
第二，理性在指导意志方面并不能反对情感。

显而易见，当我们预料到任何一个对象所可给予的痛苦或快乐时，
我们就随着感到一种厌恶或爱好的情绪，并且被推动了要去避免引起不快的东西，
而接受引起愉快的东西。同样显然的是：这个情绪并不停止在这里，
而要使我们的观点转到各个方面，
把一切通过因果关系与原始对象有关的一切对象都包括无余。
这里就有推理发生，以便发现这种关系；随着我们的推理发生变化，
我们的行为也因此发生变化。但是显然，在这种情形下，冲动不是起于理性，
而只是受着理性的指导。我们由于预料到痛苦或快乐，才对任何对象发生厌恶或爱好；
这些情绪就扩展到由理性和经验所指出的那个对象的原因和结果。
如果我们对原因和结果都是漠不关心，我们就丝毫不会关心去认识某些对象是原因，
某些对象是结果。对象本身如果不影响我们，它们的联系也不能使它们有任何影响；
而理性既然只在于发现这种联系，所以对象显然就不能借理性来影响我们。

单是理性既然不足以产生任何行为，或是引起意志作用，所以我就推断说，
这个官能〔理性〕同样也不能制止意志作用，或与任何情感或情绪争夺优先权。
这个结论是必然的。理性若非朝着相反的方向给予我们的情感以一种冲动，
它就不可能产生后面这种制止意志作用的效果；可是如果那种冲动单独活动，
本来就能够产生意志作用的。除了相反的冲动而外，没有东西能反对或阻挡情感的冲动；
这种相反的冲动如果真是发生于理性，那么理性对于意志必然有一种原始的影响，
并且必然能够引起和阻止任何意志的作用。但是理性如果没有那种原始的影响，
它便不能抵拒具有那样一种效能的任何原则，或使心灵略有片刻的犹疑。
由此可见，反对我们情感的那个原则不能就是理性，而只是在不恰当的意义下被称为理性。
当我们谈到情感和理性的斗争时，我们的说法是不严格的、非哲学的。
理性是并且也应该是情感的奴隶，除了服务和服从情感之外，再不能有任何其他的职务。
由于这个意见看来也许有些离奇，我们如果通过其他一些考虑来加以证实，
也许不是不适当的。

情感是一种原始的存在，或者也可以说是存在的一个变异，并不包含有任何表象的性质，
使它成为其他任何存在物或变异的一个复本。当我饥饿时，我现实地具有那样一种情感，
而且在那种情绪中并不比当我在口渴、疾病或是五英尺多高时和其他任何对象有更多的联系。
因此，这个情感不能被真理和理性所反对，或者与之相矛盾，因为这种矛盾的含义就是：
作为复本的观念和它们所表象的那些对象不相符合。

在这个问题方面，首先可能出现的一点就是：
既然只有联系真理或理性的东西才能违反真理或理性，
而且只有我们知性的判断才有这种联系，
所以必然的结论就是：情感只有在伴有某种判断或意见的范围内，才能违反理性。
依照这个原则来说（这个原则是那样地明显而自然的），
任何感情只有在两种意义下可以称为不合理的。第一，当不存在的对象被假设为存在时，
那么在这个假设上建立的情感（如希望或恐惧、悲伤或喜悦、绝望或安心）是不合理的。
第二，当我们将任何情感发挥为行动时，我们所选择的方法不足以达到预定的目的，
我们在因果判断方面发生了错误，这时那个情感可以说是不合理的。
当一个情感既不建立在虚妄的假设上、也没有选择达不到目的的手段时，
知性就不能加以辩护或谴责。人如果宁愿毁灭全世界而不肯伤害自己一个指头，
那并不是违反理性。如果为了防止一个印第安人或与我是完全陌生的人的些小不快，
我宁愿毁灭自己，那也不是违反理性。我如果选择我所认为较小的福利而舍去较大的福利；
并且对于前者比对于后者有一种更为热烈的爱好，那也同样不是违反理性。
一种微细的福利由于某种情况，可以比最大而最有价值的快乐产生一种更高一级的欲望；
这一点也没有什么离奇之处，
这正像我们在力学中看到一磅重的东西由于占着有利的位置举起一百磅重的东西来一样。
简而言之，一种情感必然要伴有某种虚妄的判断，然后才可以说是不合理的；
甚至在这时候，确当地说，不合理的也不是情感，而是判断。

形而上学家们的一般错误就在于：他们只认为这些原则之一可以指导意志，
而假设另外一种原则没有任何影响。人们往往有意地作出违背自己利益的行为；
因为这个缘故，所以最大可能的福利的观点并不永远影响他们。
人们也往往抑制猛烈的情感，以达到自己的利益和意图：
因此，也并不单单是现在的不快决定他们的行为。我们可以概括地说，
这两个原则对意志都起作用，而当它们是相反的时候，
两者之一就根据那个人的一般的性格和现前的心情而占到优势。
我们所谓心志坚强的含义，就是指平静情感对于猛烈情感的优势；
虽然我们很容易观察到，没有人能够经常具有这种德性，
以至在任何情形下永远不服从情感和欲望的要求。由于性情有这些变化，
所以在动机和情感互相反对时，就很难断定人类的行为和决心。

论猛烈情感的原因

一个人一旦处于热恋之中，他的情人的一些小的过错和任性，
恋爱中容易发生的嫉妒和争吵，虽然都是不愉快的，并且与愤怒和憎恨是关联着的，
可是却被发现为给予优势的情感一种附加的力量。政治家们想以一种事实告诉任何人、
以便使他大受激动时，他们常用的手段就是先刺激起他的好奇心来，尽量迟延不予满足，
借此使他的渴望和焦急达到了顶点，然后才使他彻底知道事情的底细。
他们知道，他的好奇心会使他堕入他们所想要激起的那种情感中间，
并帮助那个对象来影响心灵。一个走向战场的士兵在想起他的朋友和战友们时，
自然就被勇气和信心鼓舞起来；而当他想到敌人时，他就会受到恐惧和恐怖的袭击。
因此，从前者所发生的任何新的情绪，都自然而然地增加勇气，
正如由后者所发生的同样的情绪都会增加恐惧一样。
这种情形的发生是由于观念关系和低弱的情绪转变为优势的情感的缘故。
因此，在军事训练中，制服的统一和辉煌，姿态和动作的整齐，以及军容的威武和庄严，
都给我们和盟军增加勇气；而同样的对象若出现于敌人方面，
就引起我们的恐惧，虽然它们本身是令人愉快而美观的。

情感虽然是各自独立的，而当它们同时存在时，就会自然地互相融合；
因此，当福或祸被置于那样一种情况之下，以至除了直接的欲望情感或厌恶情感之外，
还引起了任何特殊的情绪，那么欲望情感或厌恶情感必然获得新的力量和猛烈程度。

除了其他的情况以外，任何对象在刺激起相反的情感来时，就有这种情形发生。
因为我们可以观察到，两种情感的对立通常在精神中产生一种新的情绪，
而且比势力均等的任何两个感情的并发能够产生更大的纷乱。
这种新的情绪很容易地转化为那个主导的情感，
而把它的猛力增加到超过那种情感在不遇抵抗时所能达到的程度。
因此，我们自然而然地希望得到被禁止的东西，
并且仅仅因为某些行为是不合法的而喜欢去做它们。义务概念在和情感相反时，
很少能够克服情感；而且当这个概念产生不出那个效果来时，
它就反而在我们的动机和原则之间产生了一种对立，因而增强了那些情感。

论习惯的效果

当灵魂致力去完成它所不熟悉的任何行为或想象它所不熟习的任何对象时，
各种官能就有某种倔强性，而且精神在新的方向中运动时，也有些困难。
由于这种困难刺激起精神，所以就成了惊异、惊讶、和由新奇而产生的一切情绪的来源；
而且它本身是很令人愉快的，正如把心灵活跃到某种适当程度的每种事物一样。
但是惊异虽然本身是令人愉快的，可是因为它把精神激动起来，
所以它就不但增强我们的愉快感情，而且也增强我们的痛苦感情，
这是符合于前述的原则的，就是：
凡先行于或伴随着一个情感的每一种情绪都容易转变成那种情感。
因此，每一种新的事物都是最能感动人的，
并且给予我们以比它（严格地说）原来所能引起的苦、
乐更大的苦、乐。当这个东西一再向我们返回来时，新奇性就逐渐消逝了，情感低落下去，
精神的激动已经过去，我们就较为平静地观察那些对象了。

重复作用逐渐地产生了一种顺利之感。顺利是心灵中另外一个非常有力的原则，
并且是快乐的一个必然的来源，如果顺利不超过一定程度以外。这里可以注意的是：
由新奇而来的快乐，不但有增强苦感的倾向，而且还有增强快感的倾向，
而由适当程度的顺利所发生的快乐则没有这种倾向。
顺利所给予的快乐并不在于精神的激动，而在于精神的顺畅的活动；
这种活动有时会成为非常有力，以至把痛苦转变为快乐，
并且在相当时候以后使我们对原来是极为生硬、令人不快的事物感到一种兴趣。

但是还有一点：顺利虽然把痛苦转化为快乐，可是当顺利程度太大，
使心灵的活动变得微弱无力、不足以再使心灵继续感到兴趣并提起精神来时，
它就把快乐转变为痛苦了。的确，只有自然地伴有某种情绪或情感的对象，
才会因为过多的重复，以致那种情绪或情感消失去了，
其他任何对象却很少会由于习惯而变得令人不快的。云、天、树、石，
不论如何重复出现，一个人在思考它们时，永远不会发生厌恶。但是当女性、音乐、
宴会或本来应该是愉快的任何东西，变得淡漠起来时，就容易产生相反的感情。

但是习惯不但使人顺利完成任何行为，而且还使人有完成那种行为的倾向和趋向，
如果那种行为并不是完全令人不愉快的，同时也决不能成为倾向的对象的。
依照一位已故的卓越哲学家的说法，这就是习惯所以增强一切积极习性，
而减弱消极习性的理由所在。顺利的习惯由于使精神的活动成为微弱无力，
因而消除了消极习性的势力。但是在积极习性中，由于精神足以充分地维持自己，
所以心灵的倾向就使精神增添新的势力，促使精神更有力地倾向于那种行动。

论想象对情感的影响

一个适合于我们生活方式的快乐比起对我们的生活方式是陌生的快乐来，
更能刺激起我们的欲望和爱好。这个现象可以由同一原则加以说明。

最能把任何情感灌注于心灵中的，就是雄辩，
雄辩能够以最强烈的和最生动的色彩把对象表象出来。
我们自己也可以承认那样一个对象是有价值的，那样一个对象是可憎的；
但是在一位演说家刺激起想象、并给这些观念增添力量之前，
这些观念对于意志或感情也许只有一种微弱的影响。

但是雄辩并非总是必需的。别人的单纯意见，尤其是在情感增添它的势力时，
会使一个关于祸福的观念对我们发生影响，那种影响在其他情形下是会完全被忽略掉的。
这是发生于同情或传导原则；而同情正如我前面所说，
只是一个观念借想象之力向一个印象的转化。

值得注意的是：生动的情感通常伴随着生动的想象。在这一方面，正像在其他方面一样，
情感的力量一方面决定于对象的本性或情况，一方面也决定于人的性情。

我已经说过，信念只是与现前印象相关的生动的观念。这种活跃性对于刺激我们的全部情感，
不论平静的或猛烈的，都是一个必要的条件；至于想象的单纯虚构，
则对于两者并没有任何重大影响。虚构过于微弱，不能把握心灵，或引起任何情绪。

论直接的情感

当福利是确定的或很可能的时候，它就产生了喜悦。
当祸害处于同样情况时，就发生了悲伤或悲哀。
当福利或祸害不确定时，于是随着这两方面的不确定的程度，发生了恐惧或希望。
欲望发生于单纯的福利，厌恶发生于祸害。
当身心的行动可以达到趋福避祸的目的时，意志就发动起来。

如果我们考究人类心灵，我们将发现，就情感而论，心灵并不如管乐器似的，
在依次吹出各个音调时，吹气一停，响声就停顿了；心灵倒像一具弦乐器，
在每次弹过之后，弦的振动仍然保留某种声音，那个声音是不知不觉地逐渐消逝下去的。
想象异常敏捷而迅速，但是情感却迟缓而顽强；因为这种理由，当任何对象呈现出来，
给予想象以许多不同的观点，给予情感以许多不同的情绪，
这时想象虽然迅速地改变它的观点，可是每一次弹动并不都产生一个清楚而明晰的情感调子，
而是一种情感永远要与他种情感混杂在一起。随着概然性之倾向于福或祸，
喜悦或悲哀的情感就在心情中占了优势，
因为概然性的本性就在于在一个方面投以多数的观点或机会，
或者投以（这也是同样的说法）一种情感的较多次的重复，或者投以那种情感的较高程度，
因为它把若干分散的情感集合为一个情感。换句话说，
悲伤和喜悦既然借着想象的两个相反观点而互相混合起来，
所以它们就通过它们的结合产生了希望和恐惧两种情感。

已经确定的祸害有时也和可能的或不可能的祸害一样，有产生恐惧的同样效果。
例如，处于铜墙铁壁、禁卫森严的监狱中，毫无逃脱方法的人，一想到他所判处的酷刑时，
就要战栗发抖。这只是由于那种确定的祸害是可怖的、骇人的；在那种情形下，
心灵由于恐怖不断地排斥那种祸害，而那种祸害却不断地挤入思想中来。
祸害已经确定无疑，不过心灵却不能忍受这种祸害的确定；由于这种变动不定，
就产生了外表与恐惧完全相同的一种情感。

不但在祸福的存在是不确定的时候，就是在其种类不确定时，也有恐惧或希望发生。
假如有一个人由他素来相信的人告诉他说，他的一个儿子突然被杀，那么显然，
他一定要在得到究竟哪个儿子被杀的确息以后，
这个事件所引起的情感才会确定成为纯粹的悲伤。这里一种祸害是确定了，
不过祸害的种类还未确定。因此，在这种场合下，
我们所感到的恐惧并不混杂着任何喜悦在内，
而其发生只是由于想象在各个对象之间来回摇摆的缘故。
问题的每一方面在这里虽然都产生同样的情感，可是那种情感并不能确定下来，
而却从想象得到一种惶惑而不定的活动，
那种活动在其原因和在其感觉方面都是与悲伤和喜悦之间的混合和斗争互相类似。

根据这些原则，我们就可以说明情感中的一个初看起来似乎很奇特的现象，
就是惊讶容易变为恐惧，一切出乎意料的事情都使我们惊恐。
由这一点所得出的最明显的结论就是，人性一般是怯懦的；因为当任何对象突然出现时，
我们就立刻断言它是一种祸害，而不等到我们考察它的本性是善是恶，
一下子就感到了恐惧。我说这是最明显的结论，不过在进一步考察之下，
我们将发现，这个现象需要用其他理由加以说明。
一个现象的突然性和奇特性都在心灵中自然地产生一种纷扰，正如我们所没有料到的、
不熟悉的每样事物一样。其次，这种纷扰自然地产生一种好奇心或求知欲，
这种好奇心由于对象的冲击强烈而突然，因而是很猛烈的，使人感到不快，
在它的动摇不定方面正类似于恐惧情感的感觉或悲喜的混合情感的感觉。
恐惧的这个影像自然地就转变为恐惧本身，使我们真正害怕祸害的发生，
因为心灵形成它的判断，总是根据现前的心情，而很少根据于对象的本性的。

由此可见，一切种类的不确定，都与恐惧有一种强烈的联系，
即使它们并不由于它们所呈现于我们的相反的观点和考虑而产生了情感之间的任何对立。
一个人在他的友人患病时离开了友人，比他在其身边时对友人感到较大的焦虑，
虽然他就是在身边或许也无能为力，也不能判断病情的结果。在这种情形下，
情感的主要对象，即友人的生死，虽然不论他在旁或不在旁，都是同样地不确定；
可是他的友人的病况中有千万种细微情节，使他在确知之后，可以把观念固定起来，
而阻止那种与恐惧密切相关的动摇不定。不确定在一个方面说来，
对希望的关系的确也像对恐惧的关系一样，因为不确定在希望情感的组成中也是一个要素；
但是它所以不倾向于那一面，则是因为不确定本身单独就是令人不快的，
并与种种不快情感发生一种印象关系。

因此，我们对于一个人的细微情节的不确定，就增加了我们对于他的死亡或不幸的忧惧。
霍拉斯曾经提到过这个现象：
雏鸟在巢中，羽毛未丰满，
母鸟离巢时，惴惴心不安，
惟恐长蛇至，蜿蜒来侵犯；
虽则身在旁，无能为力焉。

不过我还要把恐惧与不确定互相关联的这个原则再推进一步，而主张说：
任何一种怀疑都产生那种恐惧情感，即使它不论在那一方面都呈现出好的、合意的东西来。
一个处女在新婚之夜就寝时，充满了恐惧与忧虑，虽然她所期待的事情只是最高的快乐，
是她久已渴望的事情。但是这种事的新奇和重大、愿望和喜悦的混乱，使心灵非常惶惑，
不知道应该固定在哪一种情感上；因此，精神便发生一种忐忑不安，
这种忐忑不安在某种程度上是令人不快的，所以就自己地蜕变成为恐惧。

这样，我们仍然发现，凡是使情感动摇或混杂、并附带有任何程度的不快感觉的东西，
总是产生恐惧，或者至少产生一种十分类似恐惧而难以和它区别的情感。

论好奇心或对真理的爱

真理有两种，一种是对于观念本身互相之间的比例的发现，
一种是我们的对象观念与对象的实际存在的符合。确实，第一种真理之所以被人追求，
并不是单纯因为它是真理，而且给予我们快乐的也不单是结论的正确性。
因为不论我们是用两脚规来发现两个物体的相等，或是借数学的证明来发现它，
结论同样是正确的。在一种情形下，证明虽然是理证性的，而在另一种情形下，
证明虽然只是感性的，可是一般地说，心灵对于两种证明都有同样的信念。
在一种算术演算中，真理和信念虽然也和在最深奥的代数演算中是一样性质，
可是在演算中的快乐是极小的，如果它不至于陷入痛苦：这就显然证明，
我们有时从真理的发现所感到的愉快不是由真理本身得来，
而是由于它赋有的某些性质得来的。

使真理成为愉快的首要条件，就是在发现和发明真理时所运用的天才和才能。
任何容易的和明显的道理永远不被人所珍贵的；甚至本身原是困难的道理，
而我们在得到关于它的知识时，如果毫无困难，没有经过任何思想或判断方面的努力，
那种道理也不会被人重视。我们喜爱追溯数学家们的理证过程；
但是一个人如果仅仅是把线和角的比例告诉我们，我们也不会由此得到多大的愉快，
虽然我们深信他的判断和诚实。在这种情形下，我们只要长着耳朵，就足以听到真理。
我们无须集中注意，或运用天才；
而天才的运用是心灵的一切活动中最令人愉快而乐意的。

不过天才的运用虽然是我们由科学所获得的快乐的主要来源，可是我怀疑，
单是这一点是否就能给予我们以很大的快乐。我们所发现的真理必须还要有相当的重要性。
我们很容易把代数问题增加到无穷，锥线的比例的发现也是无尽的；
可是很少数学家们喜欢做这类的研究，他们总是把思想转向较有用、较重要的问题上面。
现在的问题是，这种效用和重要性是以什么方式在我们心理上起作用的呢？
在这个问题方面，困难发生于这一点上，即：
许多哲学家们为了寻找他们所认为对世人重要而有用的真理，消耗了他们的时间，
损毁了他们的健康，忽略了他们的财富，可是由他们的全部行为看来，
他们却没有任何为公众服务的精神，丝毫也不关怀人类的利益。如果他们相信，
他们的发现没有任何重要性，那么他们就完全会失掉研究的兴趣，
虽然他们对研究的结果实际上是毫不关心的：这似乎是一种矛盾。

为了消除这个矛盾，我们必须考究：有些欲望和爱好不超出想象的范围以外，
而只是情感的微弱的影子和影像，并不是任何实在的感情。
例如，假设有一个人观察任何一个城市的防御工事，
考虑它们的天然的或人工的巩固性和有利条件，观察棱堡、壁垒、
坑道和其他军事建筑的配置和设计；显然，随着这些设施适合于达到它们的目的的程度，
他将感到一种相应的快乐和满意。这种快乐既然是发生于对象的效用，
而不是发生于它们的形式，所以它只能是对于居民的一种同情，
因为所有这些筑城技术都是为了居民的安全而采用的；
虽然这个人可能是一个陌生人或是一个敌人，他的心中可能对居民毫无好感，
甚至还对他们怀着憎恨。

不过心灵的活动固然是快乐的主要基础，可是除此以外，
我们还需要在达到目的方面或发现我们所考察的真理方面有某种程度的成功。
关于这一点，我将仅仅提出一个在许多场合下都有用的概括说法，就是：
当心灵带着一种情感追求任何目的时，那个情感虽然原来不是由那个目的发生，
而只是由那种活动和追求发生，可是由于感情的自然过程，
我们对于那个目的自身也发生了关切，而在追求目的的过程中如果遭到任何失望，
便要感到不快。这种情况发生于前述的本情感间的关系和平行方向。

为了用一个相似的例子来说明这一番道理起见，我将要说，
再没有任何两种情感比打猎和哲学这两种情感更为密切地类似的了，虽然在初看起来，
两者好像是不能相比的。显而易见，打猎的快乐在于身心的活动：运动、注意、
困难、不确定。同样显然的是：这些活动必须伴有一个效用观念，
然后才能对我们发生任何作用。一个拥有巨大的财富、丝毫没有贪心的人，
虽然对猎取鹧鸪和山鸡感到快乐，可是对于捕打乌鸦和野鹊，却不感兴趣；
这是因为他认为前两种适于餐用，后两者则完全无用。
这里，效用或重要性本身确是并不引起任何真正情感，而只是需要它来支持想象；
同样的这一个人在其他任何事情方面虽然会忽略十倍大的利益，
可是在打了几点钟猎以后带回家一打山鹬或其他鹬类，他会感到高兴。
为了使打猎和哲学的平行关系更加显得完全起见，我们可以说：
在两种情形下，我们的活动的目的本身虽然可以是被鄙视的，
可是当活动在热烈进行的时候，我们就集中注意于这个目的，以致在遭到任何失望时，
就会感到非常不快，而当我们失去猎物或在推理中陷于错误时，都会感到懊丧。

如果我们还要给这些感情找寻另外一个平行的感情，那么我们可以考究赌博的情感，
赌博的给人快乐，正如打猎和哲学一样，也是根据于同样的原则。
前已说过，赌博的快乐不单是发生利益，因为许多人抛弃了必得的利益，
而去从事这种娱乐。这种快乐也并不是单由赌博而来，因为这些人如果不赌金钱输赢，
他们也就感不到快乐。这种快乐是由两种原因的结合而得来的，
虽然这些原因在分开的时候便不起作用。这里的情况正像某些化学作用一样，
两种清澈和透明液体混合起来以后，就产生了第三种不透明的和有色的液体。

我们对于赢得赌注的关切吸引住了我们的注意，如果没有这种关切，
我们对于那种活动或其他任何活动，就都不能感到快乐。我们的注意被吸住以后，
于是困难、变化、运气的突然转变就更进一步地使我们发生兴趣；
我们的快感就是由这种关切而发生。人生是那样一个令人厌腻的场面，
而人们又多半是具有懒散的性情，所以任何对他们提供消遣的东西，
虽然它所凭借的情感掺杂着一种痛苦，大体上会给人以一种明显的快乐。
这种快乐在这里又被对象的本性所增加了，这些对象既是可感知的，
而且范围又是狭窄的，所以容易吸引注意并使想象感到愉快。

可以说明数学和代数学中真理的爱好的那个理论，也可以推广到道德学、政治学、
自然哲学和其他一些的科学，这里我们不考究观念的抽象关系，
而考究它们的实际联系和存在。但是除了表现于各种科学中的知识的爱好以外，
人性中还赋有一种好奇心，这是由完全另外一种原则得来的一种情感。
某些人有一种要想知道邻人的活动和情况的永不满足的欲望，
虽然他们的利益与邻人毫无关系，而且他们也必须完全依靠别人，
才能得到消息，因而没有研究或努力的余地。让我们来找寻这个现象的原因。

道德学

道德的区别不是从理性得来的

一切深奥的推理都伴有一种不便，就是：它可以使论敌哑口无言，而不能使他信服，
而且它需要我们作出最初发明它时所需要的那种刻苦钻研，才能使我们感到它的力量。
当我们离开了小房间、置身于日常生活事务中时，我们推理所得的结论似乎就烟消云散，
正如夜间的幽灵在曙光到来时消失去一样；
而且我们甚至难以保留住我们费了辛苦才获得的那种信念。在一长串的推理中，
这一点更为显著，因为在这里，我们必须把最初的一些命题的证据保持到底，
可是我们却往往会忘掉哲学或日常生活中的一切公认的原理。不过我仍然抱着这样的希望：
现在这个哲学体系在向前进展的过程中，会获得新的力量；
而且我们关于道德学的推理会证实前面关于知性和情感所作的论述。
道德比其他一切是更使我们关心的一个论题：我们认为，
关于道德的每一个判断都与社会的安宁利害相关；并且显而易见，
这种关切就必然使我们的思辨比起问题在很大程度上和我们漠不相关时，
显得更为实在和切实。我们断言，一切影响我们的事物决不能是一个幻象；
我们的情感既然总要倾注于这一面或那一面，所以我们自然就认为，
这个问题是在人类所可理解的范围以内；而在其他同类性质的一些情形下，
我们对这个问题就容易发生怀疑。如果没有这个有利的条件，
我在这样一个时代决不敢再给那样深奥的哲学写第三卷，因为在这个时代里，
大部分人们似乎都一致地把阅读转变为一种消遣，
而把一切需要很大程度注意才能被人理解的事物都一概加以摒弃。

前面已经说过，心灵中除了它的知觉以外，永远没有任何东西存在；视、听、判断、
爱、恨、思想等一切活动都归在知觉的名称之下。心灵所能施展的任何活动，
没有一种不可以归在知觉一名之下；因此，
知觉这个名词就可以同样地应用于我们借以区别道德善恶的那些判断上，
一如它应用于心灵的其他各种活动上一样。赞许这一个人，谴责另一个人，
都只是那么许多不同的知觉而已。

但是知觉既然分为两类，即印象和观念，这个区别就又产生了一个问题，就是：
我们还是借我们的观念，还是借印象，来区别德和恶，
并断言一种行为是可以责备的或是可以赞美的呢？
我们将从这个问题开始我们关于道德学的现在这种研究。
这个问题将立刻斩除一切不着边际的议论和雄辩，
而使我们在现在这个题目上归结到一种精确和确切的论点。

有人主张，德只是对于理性的符合；事物有永恒的适合性与不适合性，
这对于能够思考它们的每一个有理性的存在者是完全同一的；
永恒不变的是非标准不但给人类、并且也给“神”自身，加上了一种义务：
所有这些体系都有一个共同的意见，即道德也和真理一样，
只是借着一些观念并借着一些观念的并列和比较被认识的。
因此，为了评判这些体系，我们只须考究，我们是否能够单是根据理性来区别道德上的善恶，
或者还是必须有其他一些原则的协助，才使我们能够作出这种区别。

如果道德对于人类的情感和行为不是自然地具有影响，
那么我们那样地费了辛苦来以此谆谆教人，就是徒劳无益的了，
而且没有事情再比一切道德学者所拥有的大量规则和教条那样无益的了。
哲学普通分为思辨的和实践的两部分；道德既然总是被归在实践项下，
所以就被假设为影响我们的情感和行为，而超出知性的平静的、懒散的判断以外。
这一点被日常经验所证实了，日常经验告诉我们，人们往往受他们的义务的支配，
并且在想到非义时，就受其阻止而不去作某些行为，而在想到义务时，
就受其推动而去作某些行为。

道德准则既然对行为和感情有一种影响，所以当然的结果就是，这些准则不能由理性得来；
这是因为单有理性永不能有任何那类的影响，这一点我们前面已经证明过了。
道德准则刺激情感，产生或制止行为。理性自身在这一点上是完全无力的，
因此道德规则并不是我们理性的结论。

我相信，没有人会否认这个推论的正确性；而且除非先否认作为这个推论基础的那个原则，
也就没有可以逃避这个推论的其他方法。我们只要承认、
理性对于我们的情感和行为没有影响，那么我们如果妄称道德只是被理性的推论所发现的，
那完全是白费的。一个主动的原则永远不能建立在一个不主动的原则上；
而且如果理性本身不是主动的，它在它的一切形象和现象中，也都必然永远如此，
不论它是从事研究自然的或道德的问题，
不论它是在考虑外界物体的能力或是有理性的存在者的行为。

我们已经说过，理性，在严格的哲学意义下，只有在两个方式下能够影响我们的行为。
一个方式是：它把成为某种情感的确当的对象的某种东西的存在告诉我们，
因而刺激起那种情感来；另一个方式是：它发现出因果的联系，
因而给我们提供了发挥某种情感的手段。只有这两种判断能够伴随我们的行为，
并可以说在某种方式下产生了行为；同时我们必须承认，
这些判断往往可以是虚妄的和错误的。
一个人可以因为误认一种痛苦或快乐存在于一个对象之中，因而发生了情感，
事实上那个对象并没有产生苦乐感觉的倾向，或者所产生的结果恰好和所想象的情形相反。
一个人也可以在求得达到他的目的时、采取了错误的手段，而由于他的愚蠢的行为妨害了，
而不是促进任何计划的执行。
我们可以认为这些虚妄的判断影响了与之有关的那些情感和行为，
并且可以用一种不恰当的比喻说它们使行为成为不合理的。不过这一点虽然可以被承认，
我们仍然很容易看到，这些错误远远不是一切不道德的源泉，它们往往是清白无罪的，
而对于不幸陷入错误中的人们并不带来任何罪过。这些错误仅仅是事实的错误，
道德学家一般都不认为这种错误是有罪的，因为它完全是无意的。
如果我在对象产生痛苦或快乐的影响上发生了错误的认识，
或者不知道满足我的欲望的恰当方法，那么人们应该惋惜我，而不该责备我。
任何人都不能认为那些错误是我的道德品格中的一种缺陷。
例如一个实际上是不好吃的果子在相当距离以外出现于我面前，
我由于错误而想象它是甜美可口的。这是一个错误。
我又选择了不适于达到取得这个果子的某种手段。这是第二个错误。
除此以外，在我们关于行为的推理中再也没有第三种错误可能发生。
因此，我就问，一个人如果处在这种情况下，犯了这两种错误，
是否不管这些错误是多么不可避免，都应把他认为是恶劣的和罪恶的呢？
我们能不能想象，这类错误是一切不道德的源泉呢？

这里我们也许应该提出，如果道德上的善恶区别是由那些判断的真伪得来的，
那么不论在什么地方我们只要形成那些判断，就必然有善恶的区别发生；
而且不论问题是关于一个苹果或关于一个王国，也不论错误是可避免的或是不可避免的
，就都没有任何差异了。因为道德的本质既然被假设为在于对理性的符合或不符合，
那么其他的条件就都完全是可有可无的，永远不能赋予任何行为以善良的或恶劣的性质，
也不能剥夺它的那种性质。还有一点，这种符合或不符合既然不能有程度的差别，
那么一切德和恶当然就都是相等的了。

有人或许这样说：事实的错误虽然不是罪恶的，可是是非的错误却往往是罪恶的，
而这就可以成为不道德的源泉。我的答复是：这样一种错误不可能是不道德的原始源泉，
因为这种错误以一种实在的是非作为前提，
也就是以独立于这些判断之外的一种实在的道德区别作为前提。
因此，是非的错误可以成为不道德的一种，不过它只是次生的一种不道德，
依据于在它以前就存在的别的一种不道德上面的。

在人类可能犯的一切罪恶中，最骇人、最悖逆的是忘恩负义，
特别是当这种罪恶犯在父母的身上，表现在伤害和杀害的尤其罪恶昭彰的例子里面。
一切人，不论哲学家和一般人，都承认这一点；只有在哲学家们中间发生了这样一个问题，
就是：这种行为的罪恶或道德上丑恶还是被理证的理性所发现的呢？
还是被一种内心的感觉、通过反省那样一种行为时自然地发生的某种情绪、所感到的呢？
我们如果能够指出，其他对象中虽然也有同样的关系，
而却并不伴有任何罪恶或非义的概念，那么这个问题就立刻被决定了，
而前一个意见就被否定了。理性或科学只是观念的比较和观念关系的发现；
如果同样的关系有了不同的性质，那么明显的结果就是：那些性质不是仅仅由理性所发现的。
因此，为了试验这个问题，让我们选定任何一个没有生命的对象，例如一棵橡树或榆树；
让我们假设，那棵树落下一颗种子，在它下面生出一棵树苗来，那棵树苗逐渐成长，
终于长过了母株，将它毁灭；那么我就问，
在这个例子中是否缺乏杀害父母或忘恩负义行为中所发现的任何一种关系呢？
老树不是幼树的存在的原因么？幼树岂不是老树的毁灭的原因、
正如一个儿子杀死他的父母一样吗？如果仅仅回答说，这里缺乏选择或意志，那是不够的。
因为在杀害父母的情形下，意志并不产生任何不同的关系，
而只是那种行为所由以发生的原因，因此，
它产生的关系是和橡树或榆树方面由其他原则所发生的关系是相同的。
决定一个人杀害父母的是意志或选择；
决定一棵橡树幼苗毁灭它所由以生长的老树的是物质和运动的规律。
因此在这里，同样的关系具有不同的原因，但是那些关系仍然是同一的；
这些关系的发现在两种情形下既然并不都伴有不道德的概念，所以结果就是，
那种概念并不发生于那样一种发现。

不过我们还可以选出一个更加类似的例子；我请问任何人，
为什么血族通奸在人类方面是罪恶的，
为什么同样行为和同样关系在动物方面就丝毫也不算是道德上的罪恶和丑恶呢？
如果有人答复说，这种行为在动物方面所以是无罪的，
乃是因为动物没有足够的理性来发现它是罪恶的，至于人则赋有理性官能，
应该约束他遵守义务，所以同样行为对他来说立刻成为是罪恶的了；如果有人这样说，
则我可以答复说，这显然是一种循环论证。因为在理性能够觉察罪恶之前，
罪恶必然先已存在；因此，罪恶是独立于我们理性的判断之外的，
它是这些判断的对象，而不是它们的结果。因此，依照这个体系来说，
凡有感觉、欲望和意志的动物，也就是每一个动物，
必然都有我们所赞美和责备于人类的一切的那些德和恶。所有的差异只在于，
我们的高级理性足以发现恶或德，并借此可以增加责备或赞美；
不过这种发现仍然假设这些道德区别以一个独立的存在者作为前提，
这个存在者仅仅依靠于意志和欲望，而且在思想和现实中都可以和理性分开。
动物彼此之间也和人类一样有同样的关系，因而道德的本质如果就在于这些关系，
则动物也和人类一样、可以有同样的道德。动物缺乏足够程度的理性，
这或许阻止它们觉察道德的职责和义务，但是永不能阻止这些义务的存在，
因为这些义务必须预先存在，然后才能被知觉。理性只能发现这些义务，
却永不能产生这些义务。这个论证值得衡量，因为据我看来它是完全有决定性的。

道德的区别是由道德感得来的

还有一点：如果我在和邻人的妻子尽情淫乱的时候，小心地先把窗子关住，
那么我就不犯不道德的罪了；这是因为我的行为既然完全掩藏起来，
就该没有产生任何错误结论的倾向了。

由于同样理由，一个窃贼如果登着梯子从窗户里进来，并且极其小心地不惊动人，
那他就完全无罪了。因为他或者是不被人发觉，或者是如果被人发觉，
他也不会引起任何错误，任何人在这种情况下也不会错认了他的身份。

大家都熟知，斜眼的人们很容易使人发生错误。
我们很容易认为他们是在向某人打招呼或谈话，而事实上他们是在和另外一个人交谈。
那么他们就能因此而算是不道德的吗？

一个对恩人负义的人，就在某种意义下表明他不曾由他受过任何恩惠。
但是在什么意义下呢？是不是因为感恩是他的义务呢？不过这就假设，
在此以前已有一种义务和道德的规则。那么，这是不是因为人性一般是感恩的，
并使我们断言，一个伤害人的人永不会由他所伤害的人得到过任何恩惠呢？
不过人性并不是那样一般地是感恩的，以至可以证明这样一个结论。
即使人性一般是感恩的，那么一个一般原则的例外是否仅仅由于它是一个例外，
而就总是罪恶的呢？

但是有一点就足以彻底粉碎这个荒唐的体系，就是：
它使我们同样难以说明为什么真实是善良的，谬误是恶劣的，
正如它不能说明其他任何行动的功罪一样。我倒愿意承认，
一切不道德都是由行为中这种假设的谬误得来的，
假如你能给我举出任何说得通的理由来说明，为什么那种谬误是不道德的。
如果你把这个问题正确地考虑一番，你将发现自己仍然处于最初那样的困难境地。

最后这个论证是很有决定性的；因为假如在这类真伪上没有附着一种明显的功或罪的话，
则真伪对我们的行为决不能发生任何影响。
因为谁曾因为怕别人可能由某种行为得出错误的结论，而不去作那种行为呢？
或者谁曾为了要别人得出正确结论，才作出任何行为呢？

为了证明我们在这个论题上的思想方式通常是如何的混乱，我们可以说：
那些主张道德是可以理证的人们并不说，道德就存在于关系中间，
以及那些关系是可以被理性所区别的。他们只是说：理性能够发现，
那样一种行为在那样一些关系中是善良的，而另一种行为则是恶劣的。
他们似乎以为，他们只要能把关系这个名词放进他们的命题中就够了，
而不再费心思去考虑它是否切合于命题。不过我想这里有一个明显的论证。
理证的理性只发现关系。但是依照这个假设来说，那个理性也发现恶和德。
因此，这些道德的性质必然就是关系。当我们责备任何情况下的任何行为时，
行为和情况的全部复杂对象必然形成恶的本质所在的某些关系。
这个假设在其他方式下是不能理解的。因为当理性断言任何行为是恶劣的时候，
它所发现的是什么呢？它发现了一种关系呢？还是一个事实呢？
这些问题是有决定性的，不容任何人逃避的。

正义是自然的还是人为的德

我已经提过，我们对于每一种德的感觉并不都是自然的；有些德之所以引起快乐和赞许，
乃是由于应付人类的环境和需要所采用的人为措施或设计。我肯定正义就属于这一种；
我将力求借一种简短和（我希望）有说服力的论证，来为这个意见进行辩护，
然后再来考察那种德的感觉所由以发生的那种人为措施的本性。

显而易见，当我们赞美任何行为时，我们只考虑发生行为的那些动机，
并把那些行为只认为是心灵和性情中某些原则的标志或表现。外在的行为并没有功。
我们必须向内心观察，以便发现那种道德的性质。我们并不能直接发现这种性质，
因此，我们就把行为作为外在的标志、而集中注意于其上。
不过这些行为仍然被视为标志，
而我们称赞和赞许的最后对象仍然是产生这些行为的那个动机。

同样，当我们要求任何行为，或责备一个人没有作出那种行为时，我们总是假设，
处于那种情况之下的一个人应当被那种行为的固有动机所影响，
并且我们认为他没有顾到这点是恶劣的。如果我们在探索之后发现，
他内心中的善良的动机仍然占着优势，可是被我们所不知道的一些条件阻碍了它的作用，
于是我们便取消我们的责备，而对他仍然表示尊重，
就像他真正作出了我们所要求于他的那种行为似的。

因此，我们的一切德行看来只是由于善良的动机才是有功的，
并且只被认为是那些动机的标志。根据这个原则我就断言，
使任何行为有功的那个原始的善良动机决不能是对于那种行为的德的尊重，
而必然是其他某种自然的动机或原则。
要假设对于行为的德的单纯的尊重可以是发生那个行为，并使它成为善良的原始动机，
那就是一种循环推理。在我们能发生那种尊重之前，那种行为必须真正是善良的，
而这个行为的德又必须是由某种善良的动机所发生；因此，
善良的动机就必然不同于对于行为的德的尊重。
一个善良的动机是使一种行为成为善良的必要条件。一种行为必须先是善良的，
然后我们才能对它的德表示敬意。因此，在那种尊重之前，必然先有某种善良的动机。

但是道德感或义务感离开了任何其他动机就不可以产生一种行为么？我回答说，
可以：不过这并不是对于我现在的学说的一个反驳。
当任何善良的动机或原则是人性中共同具有的时候，
一个感到心中缺乏那个动机的人会因此而憎恨自己，并且虽然没有那种动机，
而也可以由于义务感去作那种行为，以便通过实践获得那个道德原则，
或者至少尽力为自己掩饰自己的缺乏那个原则。一个在自己性情中真正感不到感恩心的人，
仍然乐于作出感恩的行为，并且以为他借此就履行了他的义务。
行为在最初只被认为是动机的标志；不过在这种情形下，也和在其他一切情形下一样，
我们往往集中注意于标志，而在相当程度上忽略了被标志的事物。不过在某些场合下，
一个人虽然可以单纯由于考虑到一种行为的道德义务而作出那种行为，
可是这仍然以人性中某些独立的原则为前提，这些原则能够产生那种行为，
并且它们的道德之美也使那种行为成为有功的。

我们可以把所有这些理论应用到现在这样一个例子：假如一个人借给我一笔钱，
条件是我必须在几天以内归还他这笔钱；还可以假设在到了约定的期限之后，
他索还那一笔钱；那么我就问，我有什么理由或动机要还这笔钱呢？
人们或许说，假如我有丝毫的诚实或责任感和义务感，
那么我对于正义的尊重以及对于奸诈和无赖行为的憎恨，便足以成为我的充分理由。
对于一个在文明状态中而又依照某些训练和教育培养出来的人来说，
这个答复无疑地是正确的、满意的。但是在他的未开化的、
较自然的状态下（如果你愿意称那种状态是自然的），这个回答会被认为是完全不可理解的、
诡辩的，而遭到排斥。因为处在那样情况下的一个人立刻会问你，
你在还债和戒取别人的财产这件事中间所发现的那种诚实和正义究竟是由什么而成立的呢？
它一定不存在于外表的行为中。因此，它必然存在于外表的行为所由发生的那个动机中。
这个动机决不能是对于行为的诚实性的一种敬意。
因为要说一个善良的动机是使一种行为成为诚实的必要条件，
而同时又说对于诚实的尊重是那种行为的动机，那显然是一种谬论。
一种行为若非先是善良的，我们就永不能对它的德表示敬意。
任何行为都只是因为它是发生于一个善良的动机，才能是善良的。
因此，一个善良的动机必然先于对德行的尊重；善良的动机和对于德的尊重不可能是一回事。

因此，对于正义的和诚实的行为，我们必须发现不同于对诚实的尊重的某种动机。
重大的困难就在这里。因为假使我们说，
对于自己的私利或名誉的关怀是一切诚实行为的合法动机，那么那种关怀一旦停止，
诚实也就不再存在了。但是利己心，当它在自由活动的时候，
确是并不促使我们作出诚实行为的，而是一切非义和暴行的源泉；
而且人如果不矫正并约束那种欲望的自然活动，他就不能改正那些恶行。

一个人的财产被假设为在一切可能的情形下都是受到保障，不受任何人侵犯的。
不过对私人的慈善是、并且也应当是在一切人中间有强有弱的，
而在很多人中间（或者说在大多数人中间），必然是根本没有的。
因此，对私人的慈善并不是正义的原始动机。

由这一切所得出的必然结论就是：我们并没有遵守公道法则的任何真实的或普遍的动机，
除了那种遵守的公道和功德自身以外；但是因为任何行为如不能起于某种独立的动机，
就不能成为公道的或有功的，所以这里就有一种明显的诡辩和循环推理。
因此，我们除非承认，自然确立了一种诡辩，并使诡辩成为必然的和不可避免的，
那么我们就必须承认，正义和非义的感觉不是由自然得来的，
而是人为地（虽然是必然地）由教育和人类的协议发生的。

对于这个推理，我还要加上一个系论，就是：
离开了别于道德感的某些动机或有推动力的某些情感，
既然就没有任何行为是可以赞美的或可以责备的，
所以这些各别的情感对那种道德感必然有一种巨大的影响。我们的责备或赞美，
都是依据于这些情感在人性中的一般的势力。在判断动物身体之美时，
我们总是着眼于某一个种类的构造；当肢体和姿态符合于那个种类的共同的比例时，
我们就断言它们是美好的。同样，当我们断定恶和德的时候，
我们也总是考虑情感的自然的和通常的势力；如果情感在两方面离开共同的标准都很远，
它们就总是被认为恶劣的而遭到谴责。一个人自然爱他的子女甚于爱他的侄儿，
而爱他的侄儿甚于爱他的表兄弟，爱他的表兄弟又甚于爱陌生人，如果其他条件都相等的话。
这样，在取舍之间，我们就发生了一个共同的义务标准。
我们的义务感永远遵循我们情感的普通的、自然的途径。

为了避免得罪人起见，我在这里必须声明：当我否认正义是自然的德时，
我所用自然的一词，是与人为的一词对立的。在这个词的另一个意义下来说，
人类心灵中任何原则既然没有比道德感更为自然的，所以也没有一种德比正义更为自然的。
人类是善于发明的；在一种发明是显著的和绝对必要的时候，那么它也可以恰当地说是自然
的，正如不经思想或反省的媒介而直接发生于原始的原则的任何事物一样。
正义的规则虽然是人为的，但并不是任意的。称这些规则为自然法则，用语也并非不当，
如果我们所谓“自然的”一词是指任何一个物类所共有的东西而言，
或者甚至如果我们把这个词限于专指与那个物类所不能分离的事物而言。

论正义与财产权的起源

在栖息于地球上的一切动物之中，初看起来，最被自然所虐待的似乎是无过于人类，
自然赋予人类以无数的欲望和需要，而对于缓和这些需要，却给了他以薄弱的手段。
在其他动物方面，这两个方面一般是互相补偿的。我们如果单纯地考虑狮子是贪食的食肉兽，
我们将容易发现它的生活是很困难的；可是我们如果着眼于狮子的身体结构、
性情、敏捷、勇武、雄壮的肢体、猛力等等，那么我们就将发现，
狮子的这些有利条件和它的欲望恰好是成比例的。羊和牛缺乏这些有利条件，
不过牛羊的食欲不是太大，而它们的食物也容易取得。只有在人一方面，
软弱和需要的这种不自然的结合显得达到了最高的程度。
不但人类所需要的维持生活的食物不易为人类所寻觅和接近，
或者至少是要他花了劳动才能生产出来，而且人类还必须备有衣服和房屋，
以免为风雨所侵袭；虽然单就他本身而论，他既然没有雄壮的肢体，也没有猛力，
也没有其他自然的才能，可以在任何程度上适应那么多的需要。

人只有依赖社会，才能弥补他的缺陷，
才可以和其他动物势均力敌，甚至对其他动物取得优势。
社会使个人的这些弱点都得到了补偿；在社会状态中，他的欲望虽然时刻在增多，
可是他的才能却也更加增长，
使他在各个方面都比他在野蛮和孤立状态中所能达到的境地更加满意、更加幸福。
当各个人单独地、并且只为了自己而劳动时，
（1）他的力量过于单薄，不能完成任何重大的工作；
（2）他的劳动因为用于满足他的各种不同的需要，
所以在任何特殊技艺方面都不可能达到出色的成就；
（3）由于他的力量和成功并不是在一切时候都相等的，所以不论哪一方面遭到挫折，
都不可避免地要招来毁灭和苦难。社会给这三种不利情形提供了补救。
借着协作，我们的能力提高了；借着分工，我们的才能增长了；
借着互助，我们就较少遭到意外和偶然事件的袭击。
社会就借这种附加的力量、能力和安全，才对人类成为有利的。

但是为了组成社会，不但需要社会对人们是有利的，而且还需要人们觉察到这些利益；
人类在其未开化的野蛮状态下，不可能单凭研究和思索得到这个知识。
因此，最幸运的是，对于那些补救方法原是辽远的和不清楚的需要，
恰好有另一种需要与之结合，那种需要有一种当时可以满足并较为明显的补救方法，
因而可以正确地被认为是人类社会成立的最初的原始原则。
这种需要就是两性间的自然欲望，这种欲望把两性结合起来，并维系他们的结合，
以后由于对他们的子女的共同的关切，又发生了一种新的联系。
这种新的关切又变成亲子之间的联系原则，并形成了一个人数较多的社会。
在这个社会中，父母凭其优越的体力和智慧这个有利条件，管理着家务，
同时又因为他们对子女有一种自然的爱，所以他们在对其子女行使权威时，
就受了限制。不久，习惯因为在子女的幼小心灵上起了作用，
使他们感到他们由社会方面所可获得的利益，并且使他们磨去棱角，
以及妨害他们的团结的倔强感情，而借此把他们逐渐培养成适宜于社会生活。

因为我们必须承认，人性的各种条件不论如何使人类的结合成为必要的，
而且性欲和自然爱情不论如何可以似乎使这种结合成为不可避免的：
可是在我们的自然性情中和我们的外界条件中还有其他一些特点，
它们对于那种必需的结合是很不利的，甚至是相反的。在自然性情方面，
我们应当认为自私是其中最重大的。我很知道，一般地说，
自私这个性质被渲染得太过火了，而且有些哲学家们所乐于尽情描写的人类的自私，
就像我们在童话和小说中所遇到的任何有关妖怪的记载一样荒诞不经，与自然离得太远了。
我远不认为人类除了对自己以外，对其他事物没有任何爱情；我相信，
我们虽然极少遇到一个爱某一个人甚于爱自己的人，可是我们也同样很少遇到一个人，
他的仁厚的爱情总加起来不超过他的全部自私的感情的。参考一下通常的经验：
你不是看到，家庭的全部开支虽然一般是在家长的支配之下，
可是很少有人不把他的家产的绝大部分用在妻子的快乐和儿女的教育上面，
而只留极小的一部分供自己的享用和娱乐。
这是我们在那些有爱情上的联系的人们方面所可看到的，而且我们也可以推测，
其他没有这种联系的人们如果处在同一情况下，也会是一样的。

但是我们虽然必须承认人性中具有慷慨这样一种美德，可是我们同时仍然可以说，
那样一种高贵的感情，不但使人不能适合于广大的社会，反而和最狭隘的自私一样，
使他们几乎与社会互相抵触。因为每个人既然爱自己甚于爱其他任何一个人，
而且在他对其他人的爱中间，对于自己的亲戚和相识又有最大的爱，
所以这就必然要产生各种情感的对立，因而也就产生了各种行为的对立；
这对于新建立起来的结合不能不是有危险的。

但是还有一点值得提出，就是各种情感的这种冲突情形，
倘使没有我们外界条件中的一个特点和它联合起来、并为它提供了一个发作的机会，
它也只会带来很小的危险。人类所有的福利共有三种：一是我们内心的满意；
二是我们身体的外表的优点；三是对我们凭勤劳和幸运而获得的所有物的享用。
对于第一种福利的享受，我们是绝对安全无虑的。第二种可以从我们身上夺去，
但是对于剥夺了我们这些优点的人们却没有任何利益。只有最后的一种，
既可以被其他人的暴力所劫取，又可以经过转移而不至于遭受任何损失或变化；
同时这种财富又没有足够的数量可以供给每个人的欲望和需要。
因此，正如这些财物的增益是社会的主要有利条件一样，
它们的占有的不稳定和它们的稀少却是主要的障碍所在。

正像公众的称赞和责备增加我们对于正义的尊重，私人的教育和教导也有助于同样的效果。
因为父母们既然容易观察到，一个人越是正直和高尚，他就越是对自己和他人有利，
而且他们也观察到，当习惯和教育对利益和反省加以协助的时候，那些原则便越有力量：
由于这些理由，他们就乐于从他们的子女的最初婴儿时起，把正直的原则教导他们，
教导他们把维持社会的那些规则的遵守看成是有价值的、光荣的，
而把那些规则的破坏看成是卑鄙的、丑恶的。通过这个方法，
荣誉感就可以在他们的幼嫩的心灵中扎根，并且长得极为坚实而巩固，
以至它们与人性中那些最主要的原则以及我们天性中最根深蒂固的那些原则可以等量齐观。

当主张正义有功和非义有过的这个意见一经在人类中间确立以后，人们对名誉就发生了关切，
这就使荣誉感更进一步巩固了起来。感动我们最深切的就是我们的名誉，
而我们的名誉在最大程度上是决定于我们对他人财产的行为。由于这个缘故，
顾到自己的品格或想与他人和好相处的人们，都必须给自己立一条不可违犯的法则，
即不受任何诱惑的驱使、去违犯一个正直而高尚的人所必须具备的那些原则。

在结束这个题目之前，我只想再提出一点，就是：我虽然说，在自然状态下，
或在社会以前的那种假想的状态下，没有正义和非义，可是我并不说，
在那样一种状态下可以允许侵犯他人的财产。我只是主张，那时候没有财产权这一回事，
因而也就不能有正义或非义那一回事。在讨论许诺时，
我还有机会要对许诺作与此类似的考虑；我希望这里所作的考虑在适当衡量以后，
足以消除人们对于前面关于正义和非义的意见的一切反感。

论确定财产权的规则

不过最初占有权往往因为时间长久而成为暧昧不明，而且关于财产权所可能发生的许多争执，
也就无法解决。在那种情况下，长期占有或时效（prescription）就自然地发生了作用，
并且使一个人对于他所享有的任何东西获得充分的财产权。
人类社会的本性不允许有任何很大程度的精确性；我们也不能永远追溯事物的最初起源，
以便判定它们的现状。任何很长的一段时间把一些对象放在那样辽远的距离之外，
以致那些对象在某种意义上似乎失去了它们的实在性，并且对心灵几乎是没有什么影响了，
就像它们从来没有存在过一样。一个人的权利在现时是清楚而确定的，可是过了五十年以后，
就似乎是模糊和可疑的了，即使它所根据的事实是可以千真万确地被证明的。
同样的事实在隔着那样长的时间以后就没有同样的影响。
这可以作为我们前面关于财产和正义的学说的一个令人信服的论证。
长时期占有可以给人以对于任何对象的一种权利。但是，一切东西虽然都是在时间中产生的，
可是时间所产生的一切东西确是没有一件是实在的；由此而得的结论就是：
财产权既然是被时间所产生的，所以它并不是对象中存在着的任何实在的东西，
而是惟一可以受时间影响的情绪的产物。

现实占有显然是一个人和一个对象之间的一种关系；
不过除非它是长期的、不间断的，它不足以抵消最初的占有。在长期的、
不间断的占有的情况下，由于时期的长久，现实占有关系就增强了，
而最初占有的关系却因时间久远而减弱了。关系方面的这种变化，
结果在财产方面产生了相应的变化。

当某些对象和已成为我们财产的对象密切联系着、而同时又比后者较为微小的时候，
于是我们就借着添附关系（accession）而对前者获得财产权。例如我们的花园中的果实，
我们的牲畜的幼畜，我们的奴隶的作品，即使在占有之前就已被认为是我们的财产。
当各种对象在想象中联系起来的时候，它们就容易被置于同一地位上，
并且通常被假设为赋有同样的性质。我们由一个对象迅速地转到另一个对象，
我们在判断它们时并不加以分别；尤其当后一个对象比前一个对象为微小的时候，
更是如此。

假设一个德国人、一人法国人、一人西班牙人走进一个房间，房间内的桌子上放着三瓶酒，
一瓶是德国的白葡萄酒，一瓶是法国的红葡萄酒，一瓶是葡萄牙的红酒；
假设他们对于分酒发生争吵；一个被选为公断人的人，为了表示他的没有偏见起见，
自然会把各人本国的产品分给各人；他所根据的原则，
在某种程度上也就是将财产权归于占领、时效和添附的那些自然法则的来源。

在所有这些情形下，尤其是在添附的情形下，
最初在那个人的观念与那个对象的观念之间有一种自然的结合，
后来我们又赋予那个人以一种权利或财产权，这就又产生了一种新的、道德的结合。
但是这里发生了一个困难，值得我们注意，并给予我们以一个机会，
使我们把已经用于现在这个题目上的那个独特的推理方法检验一下。
我已经说过，想象由小及大比由大及小较为容易，
并且观念的推移在前一种情形下比在后一种情形下总是较为容易和顺利。
那么，添附权既然发生于各个相关对象借以联系起来的那种观念的顺利推移，
所以我们自然会想象，添附权必然随着观念推移的较大顺利程度而增加力量。
因此，人们或许会认为，当我们获得任何小的对象的财产权时，
我们就容易设想与之相关的任何大的对象是一种添附，并属于小的对象的所有主；
因而在那种情形下，由小的对象到大的对象的推移应该是很容易的，
并应该把它们非常密切地联系起来。但事实上，情形却永远是另外一个样子。
大不列颠帝国似乎带来对奥克尼岛、海卜利德岛、人岛、威特岛的统治权，
但是对于这些小岛的统治权却并不自然地含有对大不列颠的任何权利。简而言之，
一个小的对象自然地伴随着一个大的对象，而成为它的添附；
但是一个大的对象却永不会被假设为属于与之相关的小的对象的所有主，
仅仅由于小的对象的财产权和关系。可是在后面这种情形下，
观念由所有主推移到作为他的财产的小的对象，再由小的对象推移到大的对象，
比在前一种情形下，由所有主推移到大的对象，再由大的对象推移到小的对象，
要较为顺利一些。因此，人们或许认为，这些现象就反驳了前面的假设，即：
以财产权加于添附物，只是观念关系的结果，只是想象顺利推移的结果。

如果我们考虑到想象的敏捷与不稳定，
以及想象不断地把它的对象放在各种不同的观点之下，那么我们就容易解答这个反驳。
当我们以两个对象的财产权归于一个人的时候，我们并不总是由那个人转到一个对象，
随后再由那个对象转到与之相关的另一个对象。
这两个对象在这里既然被认为是那个人的财产，我们就容易把它们结合起来，
置在同一观点之下。因此，假如一个大的对象与一个小的对象关联在一起，
而一个人如果与那个大的对象有强烈的关系，那么他与两个对象全体必然也有强烈的关系，
因为他与最重大的部分发生了关系。相反，如果他只和小的对象发生关系，
他就不会与两者全体发生强烈的关系，因为他的关系只存在于最微小的部分方面，
而当我们考虑全体时，那个部分是不容易在任何重大程度上刺激我们的。
这就是小的对象成为大的对象的添附物，而大的对象不成为小的对象的添附物的理由所在。

哲学家们和民法学者们的一致的意见是：海洋不能成为任何民族的财产。
这是因为对于海洋不能占有，
或者说对于海洋不能形成可以成为财产权基础的那样明确的关系。
在这个理由不适用的时候，立刻就发生了财产权。
例如，力主海洋自由的人们也都普遍地承认，
河口和海湾作为一种添附物自然地属于周围大陆的所有主。河口和海湾恰当地说，
比起太平洋来和陆地之间并没有更大的联系或结合；不过它们在想象中却有一种结合，
而且同时又因为是较为微小的，所以自然被认为是一种添附物。

继承权（succession）是一种很自然的权利，这是由于一般所假设的父母或近亲的同意，
并由于人类的公益，这种同意和公益都要求人们的财物传给他们最亲近的人，
借以使他们成为更加勤奋和节俭。这些原因或许又被亲属关系的影响或观念的联结所协助，
因为在一个人的父亲死后，这种关系就自然地导使我们考虑他的儿子，
并给他以他的父亲的财产的权利。那些财物必然要成为某人的财产；但是应当属于谁，
却是问题所在。在这里，显而易见，那个人的子女自然而然地呈现于心灵之前；
他们既然借其已故的父母而与那些所有物联系起来，
所以我们就容易以财产权的关系使他们更进一步地和那些所有物联系起来。
关于这一层，有许多平行的例子。

在考察对于政府统治权的各种权利时，我们将发现有许多理由使我们相信，
继承权在很大程度上依靠于想象。在这里，我将只满足于观察属于现在题目的一个例子。
假设一个人死了，没有子女，他的亲戚们关于他的继承问题发生了争执；
显而易见，假如他的财富一部分得自父方，一部分得自母方，
那么解决那样一个争端的最自然的方法就是把他的所有物划分，
而将每一部分分给原来所由得来的那一家。
但是那个人既被假设为曾经是那些财物的充分而十足的所有主，我就要问，除了想象以外，
还有什么东西使我们在这种分配方面发现某种公道和自然理性呢？
他对于这些家庭的爱并不依靠于他的所有物；因为这个理由，
我们永不能推定他恰好同意于那种分配。至于公益，则不论就哪一方面说，
它似乎都是漠不相关的。

论依据同意而进行的财产转移

财产的稳定对于人类社会不论如何是有用的，甚至是必要的，可是它却伴有重大的不便。
在分配人类的财产时，适合性或适应性永远不该在考虑之列；
我们必须遵循那些可以较为一般地应用的、而又较少怀疑和不定的规则。
属于这一类的是社会初成立时的现实占有；后来又有占领、时效、添附和继承。
这些规则既然在很大程度上决定于机会，所以往往与人类的需要和欲望都发生矛盾；
而人和所有物的关系必然往往调整得很不好。这是一种极大的不便，需要加以补救。
如果采取直接的补救方法，让每一个人用暴力夺取他认为对于自己是合适的东西，
那就会毁灭社会；因此，正义的规则就要在僵硬的稳定性和这种变化不定的调整办法之间、
找寻一种中介。但是最合适的中介就是那个明显的方法，即：
除了所有主同意将所有物和财产给予另外一个人之外，财物和财产永远应当是稳定的。
这个规则不会有引起争斗和纷扰的恶果，因为这种割让是得到惟一当事人，
即所有主的同意的。这个规则在按人调整财产方面可以达成许多良好的目的。
地球上各地产生不同的商品；不但如此，而且不同的人的天性适宜于不同的工作，
并且在专门从事于一种工作时会达到更大的完善程度。所有这些都需要互相交换和交易；
因此，根据同意转移财产这件事、是根据于自然法的，正如不经同意、
财产就该是稳定的一样。

在这个范围内，一切是决定于明显的效用和利益的。不过或许由于较为浅薄的理由，
民法和自然法普通都要求物品的交付手续或有形转移、作为财产转移的一种必要手续，
如许多作者所说。
对于一个对象的财产权如果被看作一种与道德或心灵的情绪无关的实在的东西，
它就是一种完全不可觉察的甚至是不可设想的性质；
而且我们对于这种财产权的稳定性或其转移，
也不能形成任何明晰的概念。在财产权的稳定方面，
我们的观念的这种缺陷不很明显地被感觉到，
因为它不甚引起我们的注意，容易被心灵忽略过去，
而不详细地加以考察。
但是各人之间的财产转移既是一种较为显著的事情，
所以我们的观念的缺点在那种场合下就变得较为明显，迫使我们在各方面找寻某种补救方法。
但是使任何观念生动起来的既然没有超过于一个现前印象，以及那个印象对一个观念的关系：
所以我们自然要从这个方面寻求某种虚妄的观点。为了帮助想象来设想财产权的转移起见，
我们就拿了有形的对象，现实地把它的占有转移给我们愿意把财产权交给他的那个人。
这两种行为的假设的类似关系和这种有形交付的现前实施，欺骗了心灵，
使它想象它体会到了财产权的神秘的转移。对于这件事所作的这种解释是正确的，
这可以由下面一事看出，就是在无法交付实在物时，
人们就发明了一种象征的交付方法来满足想象。例如把谷仓的钥匙交出去，
就被看作是把仓中的谷物交付出去；石和土的交付，就表示把一座庄园交付出去。
这在民法和自然法方面是一种迷信惯例，类似于宗教中罗马天主教的种种迷信一样。
罗马天主教借一支小蜡烛、一套祭衣、一幅画像，来表象基督教的种种不可思议的神秘，
使它们显现于心灵之前，因为这些东西是被假设为和这些神秘事迹类似的；
同样，法律家们和道德学家们也由于同样理由作出了同样的发明，
并力图通过那些方法使自己对于根据同意而作的财产转移一事得到满意。

论许诺的约束力

我还要进一步说，每一个新的许诺既然对作出许诺的人加了一种新的道德义务，
而且这种义务既然发生于他的意志；
所以它就成了我们所可能想象到的最为神秘而不可解的一种作用，
甚至可以比之于化体（transubstantiation）
或圣职(本书中的含义是指国王、国家统治者或团体)，
在这种情形下，某种语言形式加上了某种意向，就完全改变了外物的甚至一个人的本性。
不过这些神秘活动虽然那样地相似，可是很可注意的是，它们在其他一些点上却大为差异，
而且这种差异就可以认为是它们来源不同的一个有力的证明。
许诺所加于人的义务既然是为了社会的利益而作的一种发明，所以随着那种利益的要求，
它就被纳入许多不同的形式，甚至陷于直接的互相矛盾，而也不肯忘掉它的目的。
而宗教方面的那些荒诞学说、既然只是僧侣们的捏造，而不着眼于公共的利益，
所以即使有新的障碍，它们的进程也很少受到打扰；我们必须承认，
在建立了第一个荒谬前提以后，那些学说就比较直接地遵从理性和常识的趋势。
神学家们清楚地看到，外在的语言形式仅仅是一种声音，需要一种意向，才能有任何效果；
并且这种意向一旦被认为是一个必需条件以后，则在没有意向的时候，
就必然会同样地阻碍效果的发生，不论是明白表示的或隐藏的，不论是诚恳的或欺骗的。
因此，他们通常就断定，僧侣的意向才构成圣礼，他如果暗中取消意向，
他自己就犯了重罪，不过同时也仍然使洗礼、圣餐或圣职归于无效。
这个学说的可怖结果并不曾能够阻止它的成立，
而关于许诺的一个类似的学说则因其杆格不通而阻止了那个学说的成立。
人类对现世比对来世总是更为关心，
而容易认为现世方面的些小祸害比来世方面的最大祸害更为重要。

关于许诺的起源，我们也可以由暴力得出同样的结论；
人们假设暴力可以使一切契约归于无效，
而使我们摆脱其所加于我们的义务。这样一个原则就证明，许诺没有自然的义务，
只是为社会的方便和利益而作的一些人为的设计。如果我们正确地考虑这件事，
则暴力与希望或恐惧等任何其他动机并没有本质上的差异，
而后面这些动机却可以诱导我们作出诺言，并使自己受其约束。
一个受了重伤的人如果许给医治他的外科医生以一笔巨款，他一定就有践约的义务；
这个情形与一个许给强盗以款项的人的情形本来没有那样大的差别，
以至于在我们的道德感中产生那样大的差异，其所以产生这种差异的缘故，
乃是因为这些道德感完全建立在公益和方便上面的。

论政府的起源

人类在很大程度上是被利益所支配的，并且甚至当他们把关切扩展到自身以外时，
也不会扩展得很远；在平常生活中，他们所关怀的往往也不超出最接近的亲友和相识：
这一点是最为确实的。但是同样确实的是：人类若非借着普遍而不变地遵守正义规则，
便不能那样有效地达到这种利益，因为他们只有借这些规则才能保存社会，
才能不至于堕入人们通常所谓的自然状态的那种可怜的野蛮状态中。由一切人维护社会、
遵守正义规则所得到的这种利益既然是巨大的，
所以它甚至对最粗野和未受教化的种族也是明白而显然的；
任何经验过社会生活的人在这一点上几乎都不可能发生错误的。因此，
人类既然那样真诚地依恋自己的利益，他们的利益又是那样有赖于正义的遵守，
而且这个利益又是那样确实而为大家所公认的：那么人们就会问，
社会中为什么竟然还能发生纷乱，而且人性中有什么原则是那样地有力，
以至克服了那样强的一种情感，并且是那样地猛烈，以至蒙蔽了那样清楚的一种认识呢？

在论述情感时，我已经说过，人类是大大地受想象所支配的，
而且他们的感情多半是与他们对任何对象的观点成比例的，而不是与这个对象的真实的、
内在的价值成比例的。凡以一种强烈和生动的观念刺激人们的对象，
普通总是超越于出现在较为模糊的观点下的对象；必须有大得很多的价值，
才足以抵消这种优势。凡在空间或时间上与我们接近的东西既然以那样一个观念刺激我们，
所以它在意志和情感上也有一种与此成比例的效果，而比处于较远、
较模糊的观点下的任何对象通常都有一种力量较强的作用。我们虽然可以充分地相信，
后一个对象较前一个对象更为优越，可是我们却不能以这种判断来调整我们的行为。
我们总是顺从我们的情感的指示，而情感却总是为接近的东西辩护的。

这就是人们的行为所以那样常常和他们所明知的利益相抵触的缘故，
尤其是他们所以宁取任何现实的些小利益、而不顾到维持社会秩序的缘故；
虽然社会的秩序是那样地依赖于正义的遵守的。每一次破坏公道的后果似乎是辽远的，
不足以抵消由破坏公道所可能获得的任何直接利益。
不过这些结果并不因辽远而减少其实在性；
而一切人类既然都在某种程度上受同一弱点的支配，所以必然发生这样一种现象；
就是，公道的破坏在社会上必然会成为非常频繁，
而人类的交往也因此而成为很危险而不可靠的了。你和我一样都有舍远而图近的倾向。
因此，你也和我一样自然地容易犯非义的行为。你的榜样一方面推动我照样行事，
一方面又给了我一个破坏公道的新的理由，因为你的榜样向我表明，
如果我独自一个人把严厉的约束加于自己，而其他人们却在那里纵所欲为，
那么我就会由于正直而成为呆子了。

因此，人性的这种性质，不但可以危害社会，而且粗看起来还似乎是不可补救的。
补救的方法只能来自人类的同意；如果人们不能自行舍近图远，
那么他们便永不会同意于强使他们作出那种选择的任何事情，
不会同意于那样显然与他们的自然原则和倾向相冲突的任何事情。
谁要选择了手段，也就选择了目的；我们如果不可能舍近求远，
那么我们也就同样不可能顺从强使我们采取那种行为方法的任何必然性。

不过这里我们可以看到，人性的这个缺点就成为它本身的一种救药，
而且我们所以采取措施来防止我们对辽远的对象的疏忽，
只是因为我们自然地倾向于那样一种疏忽。当我们考虑任何远隔的对象时，
它们的一切细小区别就消失了，而且我们总是偏重本身是可取的任何东西，
而不考虑它的境况和条件。这就产生了我们不确当地称为理性的那种东西，
这种理性就是和对象在接近时人们所表现出来的那些倾向往往相矛盾的一个原则。
在思考十二个月以后我将要作的一种行为时，我总是决意选择那个较大的善，
不论到了那时，它将是较近的还是较辽远的；
在那个细节方面的任何差异都不能使我现在的意向和决心有所改变。
我与最后决定因为距离辽远，所以就使所有那些细微的差异都消失了，
而且影响我的只有那些一般的、比较可以辨识的善和恶的性质。但当我在较为接近的时候，
我原来所忽略了的那些条件就开始出现了，并且对我的行为和感情有了一种影响。
对于现前的善发生了一种新的倾向，使我难以不变地坚持我的最初目的和决心。 
对于这个自然的缺点，我也许会很抱憾，我也许力图要尽一切可能去摆脱它。
我也许求助于研究和反省，求助于朋友的指教，求助于经常的思索和不断重复的决心。
但是当我经验到这些办法都是无效的时候，我也许乐意接受其他任何方策，
以便约束自己，防止这个弱点。

因此，惟一的困难就在于找寻出这个方策来，好使人们借以克制他们的自然的弱点，
使自己处于不得不遵守正义和公道法则的必然形势之下，
虽然他们原来有舍远求近的一种猛烈倾向。显而易见，这个补救方法如果改正不了这个倾向，
它便永远不能是有效的；而我们既然不能改变或改正我们天性中任何重要的性质，
所以我们所能做到的最大限度只是改变我们的外在条件和状况，
使遵守正义法则成为我们的最切近的利益，而破坏正义法则成为我们的最辽远的利益。
但是，这事对全人类来说既是行不通的，所以只有在少数人方面才可能办得到，
因而我们就使这些人和执行正义发生了直接的利害关系。这些人就是我们所谓民政长官、
国王和他的大臣、我们的长官和宪宰；这些人对于国内最大部分的人既然是没有私亲关系的，
所以对于任何非义的行为，都没有任何利益可图，或者只有辽远的利益；
他们既然满足于他们的现状和他们的社会任务，所以对于每一次执行正义都有一种直接利益，
而执行正义对于维持社会是那样必需的。这就是政府和社会的起源。
人们无法根本地救治自己或他人那种舍远图近的褊狭心理。他们不能改变自己的天性。
他们所能做到的就是改变他们的境况，使遵守正义成为某些特定的人的直接利益，
而违反正义成为他们的辽远利益。因此，这些人不但在自己的行为方面乐于遵守那些规则，
并且还要强制他人同样地遵守法度，并在全社会中执行公道的命令。
如果必需的话，他们还可以使其他一些人对于执行正义发生较为直接的利害关系，
而创设若干文武官员，来协助他们的统治。

不过这样的执行正义虽然是政府的主要优点，却不是它惟一的优点。
猛烈的情感既然会妨害人们清楚地看到对他人采取公道行为的利益；
所以，这种情感也会阻止他们清楚地看到那种公道自身，
而使他们对自己的爱好有显著的偏私。这种弊害也是以上述的方式而得到改正。
执行正义法则的那些人们也解决关于这些法则的一切争论；
他们对于社会上大部分人既然是没有私亲关系的，
所以他们的判决就比各人自己的判决较为公道。

论忠顺的起源

政府对人类虽然是很有利的，甚至在某些条件下还是绝对必需的一种发明；
但它并不是在一切条件下都是必需的，而且人类即使不求助于那样一种发明，
也不是不可能在某一段时期以内维持社会的。自然，人类总是极其爱取现前利益、
而舍去辽远的利益的；而且他们也不容易因为担心一种辽远的灾祸，
而抵拒他们所可以立即享受的任何利益的诱惑。不过当所有物和人生乐事是稀少的、
并且没有多大价值的情形下（在社会初期就是这种情形），这种弱点是不很显著的。
一个印第安人很少受到诱惑，要想抢夺另一个印第安人的茅屋或偷窃他的弓，
因为他已经备有同样的便利；至于一个人在渔猎时所可能遇到的优于他人的运气，
那只是偶然而暂时的，很少有扰乱社会的倾向。我不但不像某些哲学家们那样，
认为人类离了政府就完全不能组织社会，而且我还主张，
政府的最初萌芽不是由同一个社会中的人们的争端而发生，
而是由几个不同的社会中的人们的争端而发生的。较少量的财物就足以引起后一种争端，
虽然还不足以引起前一种的争端。人们在公共的战争和殴斗中所恐惧的，
只有他们所遇到的抵抗，这种抵抗因为是他们所共同遭遇的，所以它的恐怖程度似乎较小；
并且又因为来自外人，所以它的结果似乎不是那样有害；
相反，如果各人间的交往是互有利益的，
而且断绝交往就会使他们不可能存在的，那么他们若是互相敌对起来，
其结果便是非常有害的了。
但是对于一个没有政府的社会，一次对外的战争必然会产生内战。把一大批财物投入人群，
他们就会立刻争吵起来，这时各人都力求占有他所喜欢的东西，而不顾有什么后果了。
在对外战争中，最重要的所有物——生命和肢体——都处于危险之中；
而且由于每个人都逃避危险的地点，抢夺最好的武器，稍为受伤就找到了借口，
所以人们在平静时候所遵守得很好的那些法律，
到了他们处于那样纷扰的情形下时，就不复存在了。

我们发现，美洲各个部族证实了这一点；在那里，人们和睦友好地生活在一处，
并没有任何确立的政府；他们也从来不服从本部族中的任何人；只有在战时，
他们的首领享有一点点的权威，但从战场上归来，并与邻族建立了和平关系以后，
他就失掉了这点权威。但是这种权威把政府的优点教给了他们，教他们求助于它，
当因为战争的劫掠，或因为通商，
或因为偶然的发现，他们的财富和所有物变得那样庞大起来，
致使他们在每个紧急关头忘掉了维持和平与正义的利益。因此，我们就可以在其他理由之外，
再举出一个很好的理由来说明，为什么一切政府最初都是君主的，没有任何掺杂和变化；
为什么共和国只是由于君主制和专制权被人滥用才发生出来的。军营是城市的真正母亲。
战争中的每个危机都是突然发生的，所以如果不把权威集中于一人，就不能指挥作战；
因此，继军事政府而来的民事政府自然也就具有同样的权威。我认为说明政府起源，
这个理由要比人们通常由家长统治或父权所推得的理由更为自然一些——人们通常认为，
这种权威首先发生于一个家庭之中，使家庭成员习惯于一个人的统治的。
没有政府的社会状态是人类的最自然的状态，并且在许多家族聚居、
远在第一代以后的一个长时期中，必然是继续存在的。只有财富和所有物的增加，
才会迫使人们脱离这个状态；而因为一切社会在初成立时既然都是那样野蛮而不开化的，
所以一定要过了许多年以后，这些财富才会增加到那样大的程度，
以致扰乱人们对和平与和睦的享受。

不过人类虽然可以维持一个没有政府的小规模的不开化的社会，可是他们如果没有正义，
如果不遵守关于稳定财物占有、根据同意转让所有物和履行许诺的那三条基本法则，
他们便不可能维持任何一种社会。因此，这三条法则是在政府成立以前就已存在，
并被假设为在人们还根本没有想到对民政长官应该有忠顺的义务之前，
就给人们加上了一种义务。
不但如此，我还要进一步说，政府在其初成立时，自然被人假设为是由那些法则，
特别是由那个关于实践许诺的法则，得到它的约束力的。
当人们一旦看出维持和平和执行正义必须要有政府的时候，他们自然就会集合起来，
选举执政长官，规定他们的权限，并且许诺服从他们。人们既然假设，
许诺是已经通用的一种盟约或保证，并且附有一种道德的义务，
所以就把许诺认为是政府成立的原始根据和最初的服从义务的根源。
这个推理看来似乎是那样地自然，以至它已成为现代时髦的政治学体系的基础。
并且可以说是我们一个政党的信条，
这个党很有理由地以其哲学的健全和思想的自由感到骄傲。
这些人说，一切人生来都是自由和平等的；政府和权势只能借同意建立起来；
人类既然同意建立政府，因而就给他们加上自然法所没有规定的一种新的义务。
因此，人们之所以必须服从其执政长官，只是因为他们许诺了这种服从；
如果他们不曾明白地或默认地表示愿意保持忠顺，
那么忠顺永远不会成为他们道德义务的一部分。
但是这个结论如果推得太远，包括了一切时代和一切情况下的政府，
那么它就是完全错误的了。我主张，忠顺的义务虽然在最初是建立在许诺的义务上，
并在一个时期内被那种义务所支持的，可是它很快就自己扎根，
并且有一种不依靠任何契约的原始的约束力和权威。这是一个重要的原则，
我们必须细心注意地加以考察，然后再继续申论。

一个承认自己对另外一个人负有一笔款项义务的人，必然知道那是由于他自己所订的契约，
还是由于他父亲所订的契约；还是仅仅是由于自己的善意，还是为了偿还借给他的一笔款项；
并且知道他是在什么条件之下，为了什么目的使自己负有这种义务的。
同样，服从政府也确实是一种道德的义务，因为每个人都是这样想的；
因而这种义务一定不能是由许诺发生的；因为凡是不太拘泥地信从一个哲学体系、
以致使他的判断陷于错误的人，都从来不会梦想到把那种义务归于那个根源。
无论执政长官或臣民都不曾形成这样的政治义务观念。

我们发现，执政长官们不但不把他们的权威及其臣民的服从义务
归源于许诺或原始契约这样一个基础，他们反而尽量对人民，尤其是对一般的民众，
掩饰这种权威和义务是由那个根源发生的。如果这是政府的根据，
那么我们的统治者们永远不会默然接受这种根据的（人们最多也只能假设是默然接受的）；
因为任何默然地、不知不觉地给予的许诺，
永不能像明白而公开地所作的许诺对人类能有那样一种的影响。
所谓默然许诺是指用语言以外的其他种较为模糊的标志所表示的意志而言；
不过这里一定有一个意志，而发挥这个意志的人，不论他如何默然无言、
总不能不注意到这个意志。但是你如果询问国内大部分的人们，
他们是否曾经同意于他们的统治者们的权威或者曾经许诺要服从他们，
那么他们会认为你这个人很奇怪，并且一定会回答说，这件事不依靠于他们的同意，
而他们生来就是这样服从的。由于这个意见，所以我们就往往看到，
他们想象那些在当时毫无任何权威而且任何愚人都不会
自愿地选择的人们为他们的天然统治者；
这只是因为那些人是生于那个先前曾经统治过的王族，并且是依据亲等应该继承统治的；
虽然那个王族或许是在那样辽远的一个时期中实行过统治，
任何活着的人几乎都不可能曾经给它以服从的许诺。由于某些人们从未对一个政府给予同意，
并且认为那样一种自由选择是一种侮慢和大不敬的行为，
这个政府是否就对这些人们没有统治权吗？我们从经验中发现，
政府为了它所谓的叛逆和谋反是很自由地惩处他们的，
而这些事情依照这个主张许诺学说的体系来说，就降低到了一种普通的非义行为。
如果你说，他们居住在那个政府所统辖的区域以内，他们实际上就已同意于那个确立的政府，
那么我可以答复说，只有当他们认为那件事情依靠于他们自由选择的场合下，
才能如此，而这种选择，除了那些哲学家们以外，简直是没有人想象过的。
从来没有人举出这样一个理由为一个反叛者辩护说；
他在成年以后所作的第一次行为就是对国王兴兵作战；当他在儿童时期，
他不可能以自己的同意束缚自己，而当他成人之后，又以其第一次的行为明显地表示，
他无意于以任何服从的义务加在自己身上。相反，我们发现，
民法惩罚在这个年龄所犯的这种罪行，
一如其惩处不待我们同意而本身就是犯罪的其他罪行一样；
这就是说，民法在一个人达到能够充分运用理性的时候就加以惩处，
而依据公道来说，民法对这种罪行理应允许一个人至少可以有默认的同意的一个过渡时期。
此外，我们可以再加上一点，即一个生于专制政府之下的人对它应该没有忠顺的义务；
因为依其本性来说，这个政府是不依靠于同意的。
不过那个政府既然和任何政府同样是一个自然而普通的政府，所以它必然对人施加某种义务；
而我们根据经验明显地看到，隶属于那个政府之下的人们永远是这样想的。
这是一个明白的证据，证明我们平常并不认为我们的忠顺是由我们的同意或许诺而来的；
此外，它还更进一步地证明，当由于某种原因我们的许诺是明白地表示出来的时候，
我们总是精确地区别那两种义务，
而相信一种义务加于另一种义务上的力量比重复同一许诺时所有的力量为大。
在不曾作出许诺的情形下，一个人纵然发动叛乱，
而并不因此就认为自己破坏了私事方面的忠实；
他总是把信义和忠顺两种义务分得完全清清楚楚。这就令人信服地证明了，
这些哲学家们所认为这两者的结合是一种很奥妙的发明，实际上是不正确的；
因为一个人既不能作一种自己所不知道的许诺，
也不能被这种许诺的强制力和约束力所约束的。

论国际法

当人类大部分都已建立了法治政府，而且彼此接近的许多不同的社会也都形成起来的时候，
邻近各国之间便发生了适合于互相交往的性质的一套新的义务。政治学作家们告诉我们说，
在任何一种交往中，政治团体都应当被看作一个法人；这种说法在一定程度上确是正确的，
因为各国也像私人一样需要互助；同时各国的自私和野心也是战争和纷乱的永久来源。
不过各国在这一方面虽然类似个人，可是在其他方面它们既然是很不相同，
所以无怪它们就要用另一套准则来约束自己，并因而产生了我们所谓国际法的一套新的规则。
我们可以把大使人格的神圣不可侵犯、宣战、禁止使用有毒武器，
以及显然为了进行各个社会间特有的交往而规定的其他同类的义务，都归在这个项目之下。

世界上有一个十分流行的准则，就是：
为国王们所立的道德体系比支配私人行为的道德体系要自由得多；
这个准则虽然很少有政治家愿意公开承认，但它是被历代的实践所认可的。
显而易见，这并不能理解为公共职责和义务的范围较为狭小；任何人也不会狂妄地说，
最庄严的条约在各个国王之间不应该发生效力。因为国王们彼此之间既然事实上订立条约，
所以他们一定打算由于实行条约而得到某种利益；
未来的那种利益的前景必然会约束他们实践他们的义务，并且必然建立起那个自然法来。
因此，这条政治准则的含义就是：国王们的道德虽然和私人的道德有同样的范围，
可是它没有私人道德那样大的效力，而是可以因为微小的动机合法地遭到破坏的。
这样一个说法虽然在某些哲学家们看来似乎骇人听闻，
可是我们很容易地根据我们说明正义和公道的起源时所用的那些原则，来加以辩护。

当人类从经验发现，人们离了社会便不可能存在，而且人们如果放纵他们的欲望，
也就不可能维持社会；于是那样一种迫切的利益便迅速地约束住他们的行为，
而以遵守我们所谓正义法则的那些规则的一种义务加于人们。
这种基于利益的义务并不停止在这里，而且还由于情感和情绪的必然进程，
产生了履行职责的道德义务；这时我们就赞许促进社会和平的那样一些行为，
而谴责搅乱社会的那样一些行为。基于利益的自然义务也发生于各个独立的王国之间，
并且产生了同样的道德；因此，
不论怎样道德堕落的人都不会赞同一个任意地自动背弃诺言或破坏条约的国王。
不过在这里我们可以说，各国之间的交往虽然是有利的、有时甚至是必要的，
可是其必要和有利程度都没有私人之间的交往那样大，因为离开了私人的交往，
人性便完全不可能存在。
因此，各国之间履行正义的自然义务既然不及私人之间那样地强有力，
所以由此而发生的道德义务也必然具有自然义务的弱点；
而对于欺骗对方的国王和大臣，比对于破坏其诺言的一个私绅，我们也必然要更为宽容一些。

论贞操与淑德

有些哲学家们很激烈地攻击女性的德，而且当他们能够指出，在表情、衣着和行为方面、
我们所要求于女性的那种外表的淑德，在自然中都是没有基础的，
他们就想象自己已把人们通俗看法的错误发现出来了。
我相信，我可以无需费力去申论这样明显的一个题目，而且不必做更多的准备，
就可以进而考察，那些概念是在什么方式下由教育、由人类的自愿协议，
并由社会的利益而发生的。

谁要是考虑一下人类幼年期的历时漫长和软弱无能，以及两性对其子女的自然关系，
就容易看到，男女两性必须结合起来去教育子女，而且这种结合必然要有很长的时期。
不过为了促使男子以这种约束加于自己，并且甘心乐意去忍受由此所招致的一切辛苦和费用，
他们必须相信，那些子女是他们自己的，而且当他们发挥他们的爱和慈爱时，
他们的自然本能没有施加于错误的对象上。但是我们如果考察人体的结构，我们就会发现，
我们男人很难达到这种保证，而且在两性的交媾中，生殖因素是由男体进入女体的，
所以在男子方面容易有错误发生，而在女子方面则绝对不可能有错误。
从这种浅薄的解剖学的观察，就得出了两性的教育和义务方面的那种重大差异。

一个哲学家如果先验地来考察这件事，那么他会以下述方式进行推理。
男子是由于相信子女是自己的，才肯为了抚养和教育他们而进行劳动；
因此在这一方面给他们以保证是合理的，甚至是必需的。
对妻子在破坏夫妇忠贞之后给予严厉的惩罚，也还不能成为完全的保证；
因为这种公开的惩罚在没有合法的证明时、不能施加于人，
而在这个问题方面是难以得到这种证明的。那么，我们应当以什么样的约束加于女性，
才能抵消她们犯不贞行为的那样强烈的一种诱惑力呢？除了丑名或败誉那种惩罚之外，
似乎没有任何可能的约束方法。 这种惩罚对心灵有巨大的影响，
同时是由世人根据法庭上永不能接受的猜想、推测和证明而施加于人的。
因此，为了给女性施加一种适当的约束起见，除了不贞行为单纯由于违法而招致的耻辱以外，
我们还必须对这种行为再加上一种特殊程度的耻辱，并且必须对她们的贞操予以相应的赞美。

不过这虽然是保持贞操的一个很强烈的动机，可是我们的哲学家会很迅速地发现，
单有这一点还不足以达到那个目的。一切人类，尤其是女性，都容易忽略辽远的动机，
而听从于任何现实的诱惑。诱惑在这里是最强的，它的来临是不知不觉的，
并且是有勾引作用的；一个妇女很容易发现或自以为可以发现保全她的名誉的某种手段，
而防止她的快乐会带来的一切有害的后果。因此，除了那种放纵行为所引起的丑名之外，
还必须先有一种羞缩或畏惧之感，来防止这些放纵行为的发端，
并且使女性对于凡与那种享乐有直接关系的一切表情、姿态和放肆，发生一种恶感。

我们思辨哲学家的推理大概就是这样；但是我相信，如果他对于人性没有一种完善的知识，
那么他就会认为那些推理只是一些虚妄的空想，并且会认为，
不贞行为所招来的丑名和对于不贞行为的发端的羞缩，只不过是世人所能愿望的、
而不是他们所能期望的一些原则。因为他会说，有什么方法能使人们相信，
破坏夫妇义务比其他非义行为更为丑恶呢？因为，由于这种诱惑是太大了，
显然这种破坏的行为是更可以原谅的。自然既以那样强烈的倾向刺激人们去追求这种快乐，
怎么还能够使人们对那种快乐的发端感到羞缩呢？
何况这个倾向，为了绵延种族，最后还是绝对必须要加以顺从的呢？

但是哲学家们费了极大辛苦所作的思辨推理，世人却往往不经思考就自然地能够形成；
因为在理论上似乎不可克服的困难，在实践中却很容易得到解决。
那些对女子的忠贞抱有利益的人们自然不赞成她们的不贞，以及一切不贞行为的发端。
至于对此没有任何利益的人们则是随从着潮流。
教育在女性幼年时期就控制了她们驯顺的心灵。
当这样一个通则一旦确立以后，人们就容易把它扩展到它所原来由以发生的那些原则之外。
例如，单身汉不论如何淫纵，在看到妇女的任何淫荡或无耻的行为时，也会感到震惊。
所以这些准则虽然都是明显地与生育有关，可是超过生育年龄的妇女，
在这一方面比青年美貌的妇女也并没有较大的特权。人们无疑地有一种隐含的概念，
认为所有那些端庄和淑德的观念都是与生育有关；
困为他们并不以同样大的力量把同样的戒律加于男性，因为在男性方面并没有那个理由。
这个例外是明显而广泛的，并且是建立在一种显著的差别之上，
那种差别就使两种观念显然各别，没有关联。
但是妇女的不同年龄既然与性别的差异不是同样情形，
由于这个缘故，所以人们虽然知道这些贞操概念是建立在公益之上的，
可是通则却使我们超出了原来的原则之外，并使我们把淑德这个概念推广到整个女性，
由她们最早的幼年一直到她们年老衰朽为止。

论自然的德和恶的起源

如果说任何行为是善良的或恶劣的，那只是因为它是某种性质或性格的标志。
它必然是依靠于心灵的持久的原则，这些原则扩及于全部行为，并深入于个人的性格之中。
任何不由永久原则发生的各种行为本身，对于爱、恨、骄傲、谦卑，
没有任何影响，因而在道德学中从不加以考究。

这种考虑是自明的、值得注意的，因为在现在这个题目中这一点是至关重要的。
在我们关于道德起源的探讨中，我们决不应该考究任何一个单独的行为，
而只考究那种行为所由以发生的性质或性格。只有这些性质和性格才是持久的，
足以影响我们对于一个人的情绪。的确，行为比起语言、甚至比起愿望和 情绪来，
是性格的更好的表示；但是也只有在作为性格的表示的范围内，
它们才引起爱、恨、赞美或责备。

要发现道德和爱或恨发生于心理性质的真正根源，我们必须相当深入地研究这个问题，
把我们已经考察和说明过的某些原则加以比较。

我们可以由重新考察同情的性质和力量着手。一切人的心灵在其感觉和作用方面都是类似的。
凡能激动一个人的任何感情，也总是别人在某种程度内所能感到的。
正像若干条弦线均匀地拉紧在一处以后，一条弦线的运动就传达到其余条弦线上去；
同样，一切感情也都由一个人迅速地传到另一个人，而在每个人心中产生相应的活动。
当我在任何人的声音和姿态中看出情感的效果时，
我的心灵就立刻由这些效果转到它们的原因上，并且对那个情感形成那样一个生动的观念，
以致很快就把它转变为那个情感自身。同样，当我看到任何情绪的原因时，
我的心灵也立刻被传递到其结果上，并且被同样的情绪所激动。
当我亲自看到一场较为可怕的外科手术时，那么甚至在手术开始之前，医疗器具的安排，
绷带的放置，刀剪的烘烤，以及病人和助手们的一切焦急和忧虑的表情，
都确实会在我的心灵上发生一种很大的效果，刺激起最强烈的怜悯和恐怖的情绪。
别人的情感都不能直接呈现于我们的心中。我们只是感到它的原因或效果。
我们由这些原因或效果才推断出那种情感来，
因此，产生我们的同情的，就是这些原因或结果。

我们的美感也大大地依靠于这个原则；当任何对象具有使它的所有者发生快乐的倾向时，
它总是被认为美的；正像凡有产生痛苦的倾向的任何对象是不愉快的、丑陋的一样。
例如一所房屋的舒适，一片田野的肥沃，一匹马的健壮，一艘船的容量、安全性和航行迅速，
就构成这些各别对象的主要的美。
在这里，被称为美的那个对象只是借其产生某种效果的倾向，使我们感到愉快。
那种效果就是某一个其他人的快乐或利益。我们和一个陌生人既然没有友谊，
所以他的快乐只是借着同情作用，才使我们感到愉快。
因此，我们在任何有用的事物方面所发现的那种美，就是由于这个原则发生的。
这个原则是美的多么重要的一个因素，这是一经反省便可以看到的。
只要一个对象具有使它的所有者发生快乐的一种倾向，或者换句话说，
只要是快乐的确当的原因，那么它一定借着旁观者对于所有者的一种微妙的同情，
使旁观者也感到愉快。许多工艺品都是依其对人类功用的适合程度的比例，
而被人认为是美的，甚至许多自然产品也是由那个根源获得它们的美。
秀丽和美丽在许多场合下并不是一种绝对的、而是一种相对的性质，
而其所以使我们喜欢，只是因为它有产生一个愉快的结果的倾向。

一匹腰腹结实的马不只美观，而且敏捷。一个勤于锻炼、筋肉坚韧的体育家，
不但赏心悦目，而且适于比武决赛。真美与效用永不背道而驰。无需明智之才，
即可懂得这个真理。——《蒯提林》第八卷。

这个原则在许多例子中不但产生了我们的美感，也产生了道德感。
没有一种德比正义更被人尊重，没有一种恶比非义更被人厌恶；
而且在断定一个性格是和蔼的或可憎的时候，也没有任何性质比这两者的影响更为深远。
但是正义之所以是一种道德的德，只是因为它对于人类的福利有那样一种倾向，
并且也只是为了达到那个目的而作出的一种人为的发明。对于忠顺，对于国际法，
对于淑德和礼貌，也都可以这样说。所有这些都是谋求社会利益的人类设计。
在各国各代，对于这些既然都伴有一种很强的道德感，所以我们必须承认，
只要一反省性格和心理性质的倾向，就足以使我们发生赞美和责备的情绪。
达到目的的手段，既然只有在那个目的能使人愉快时，才能令人愉快；
而且和我们自己没有利害关系的社会的福利或朋友的福利，
既然只是借着同情作用才能使我们愉快的；所以结果就是：
同情是我们对一切人为的德表示尊重的根源。

由此可见，（一）同情是人性中一个很强有力的原则，
（二）它对我们的美的鉴别力有一种巨大的作用，
（三）它产生了我们对一切人为的德的道德感。由此我们可以推测，
它也产生了许多其他的德；
而且各种性质之所以获得我们的赞许，只是因为它们趋向于人类的福利。
当我们发现，我们所自然地赞许的那些性质，大多数确实具有那种倾向，
并使一个人成为社会中的一个合适的成员，而我们所自然地谴责的那些性质，
则具有一种相反的倾向，并且使我们和这样的人的交往成为危险的或不愉快的。
当我们发现了这一点时，上述的那种推测便成为确实的结论了。因为我们既然发现，
那一类的倾向具有产生最强的道德感的足够力量，那么在这些情形下，
我们就决没有理由再去找寻赞美或责备的任何其他的原因了。
因为哲学中有一条不可违犯的原理，即当任何一个特殊的原因足以产生一个结果时，
我们就应该满足于那个原因，而在不必要时不去加多原因的数目。
我们在人为的德方面已经成功地做了实验，结果发现各种性质对社会福利的倾向性、
就是我们所以表示赞许的惟一原因，我们并不再猜疑有其他的原则参与其间。
因此，我们就知道了那个原则的力量。当那个原则可能发生的时候，
当受到赞许的性质是真正有益于社会的时候，
一个真正的哲学家将永远不需要其他任何原则来说明最强烈的赞许和尊重。

许多自然的德都有这种导致社会福利的倾向，这是无人能够怀疑的。
柔顺、慈善、博爱、慷慨、仁厚、温和、公道，在所有道德品质中占着最大的比例，
并且通常被称为社会的德，以标志出它们促进社会福利的倾向。这个看法具有极大的影响，
以致某些哲学家们认为一切道德的区别都是人为措施和教育的结果，
是由于机敏的政治家们通过荣辱的概念、努力约束人类的泛滥的情感，
并使那些情感对公共利益发生促进作用而得来的结果。不过这个理论与经验不相符合。
因为，第一，除了倾向于公共利益和损害的那些德和恶以外，还有其他的德和恶。
第二，人们如果没有自然的赞许和责备的情绪，政治家们决不能刺激起这种情绪来；
而且可以夸奖的和可以赞美的、可以责备的和可以憎恶的等形容词都将成为不可理解的，
正如它们是我们完全不理解的一种语言一样，这是我们在前面所已说过的。
不过这个理论虽然是错误的，可是仍然可以教给我们一点，
就是道德的区别在很大程度上发生于各种性质和性格有促进社会利益的倾向，
而且正是因为我们关心于这种利益，我们才赞许或谴责那些性质和性格。
但是我们对社会所以发生那样广泛的关切，只是由于同情；
因而正是那个同情原则才使我们脱出了自我的圈子，
使我们对他人的性格感到一种快乐或不快，
正如那些性格倾向于我们的利益或损害一样。

一般说来，一切责备或赞美的情绪 ，都是随着我们对于所责备或赞美的人的位置远近，
随着我们现前的心理倾向，而有所变化的。但在我们的一般判断中，我们并不考虑这些变化，
我们仍然应用表示爱憎的那些名词，正如我们保持在同一个观点之下一样。
经验很快就把改正我们情绪的这个方法教给我们，或者至少是在情绪比较顽固和不变的时候、
把改正我们语言的方法教给我们。我们的仆人如果是勤恳和忠实，
可以比历史上所记载的马尔克斯·卜鲁塔斯激起我们较强的爱和好感；但是我们并不因此就说，
前者的性格比后者的性格更可以夸奖。
我们知道，我们如果与那位著名的爱国者同样地接近的话，
他会使我发生高得很多的敬爱。在一切感官方面，这类改正作用是常见的；
而且我们如果不改正事物的暂时现象，忽略我们的现前的位置，
那么我们确实也就无法使用语言，互相传达情意。

因此，我们责备或赞美一个人，
乃是根据他的性格和性质对于和他交往的人们发生的一种影响。
我们不考虑受到那些性质的影响的人是我们的相识、还是陌生人，是本国人、还是外国人。
不但如此，我们在那些一般性的判断中还忽略去我们自己的利益；
而且当一个人自己的利益特别地牵涉在内时，
我们也不因为他反对我们的任何权利要求而责备他。
我们承认人们有某种程度的自私；因为我们知道，自私是和人性不可分离的，
并且是我们的组织和结构中所固有的。通过这种考虑，我们就改正了在遇到任何反抗时、
自然地发生的那些责备的情绪。

现在我将进而讨论我原定要提出的第二个可以注目之点。
如果一个人具有自然地倾向于有益社会的一种性格，我们就认为他是善良的，
并且在观察到他的性格时就感到快乐，即使有特殊的偶然事件阻止了那个性格发生作用，
并使它不能为他的朋友和国家服务。即使在贫困之中，德仍然是德；
而且这种德所获得的敬爱还随着一个人进入牢狱中或沙漠中，
虽然德在那里已经不能表现于行为，而且一切世人也都不能享其利益了。
这一点或许会被认为是对于我现在这个体系的一种反驳。
〔人们会说〕同情使我们关心于人类的福利，因而如果同情是我们对德表示尊重的来源，
那么就只有在德现实地达到它的目的、并且是有益于人类的时候，
那种赞许的情绪才能够发生。它如果达不到它的目的，那么它就是一个不完善的手段，
因而就决不能由那个目的获得任何价值。只有当手段是圆满地、现实地产生了目的的时候，
那个目的的善才能以一种价值赋予那些手段。

如果我们考察人们对大人物们通常所作的颂扬，我们就将发现，
人们所归于他们的品质的大部分可以分为两类，一类是使他们在社会上履行职责的品质，
一类是有助于自己、使他们促进自己利益的品质。人们不但称颂他们的慷慨和仁爱，
也称赞他们的慎重、节制、节俭、勤奋、刻苦、谋略和机敏。
如果我们宽容任何使人不能在世上显露头角的性质，那就是宽容懒惰那种性质；
人们假设懒惰并不剥夺去一个人的才具和能力，而只是停止它们的发挥；
而且这对他本人并没有任何不利，因为这在某种程度上是他自己所选择的。
可是人们总是把懒惰认为是一种过失，并且在极端的时候还是一个很大的过失；
一个人的朋友们也永不承认他有这种弊病，
除非是为了掩饰他的性格中某些比较重要的方面的缺陷。他们说，他如果肯努力的话，
他是能够成为一个人物的；他的理解力是健全的，他的想象是敏捷的，
他的记忆力是持久的但是他讨厌经营，无心于事业。
有时人们甚至表面上好像是在承认过失，实际上却是以此自炫，因为他可能认为，
这种不善经营就意味着他具有更高贵的品质；例如哲学精神、精微的鉴别力、
巧妙的才智或对于乐趣和交际的爱好。不过我们可以随便再举一些其他的例子：
假如有一种性质，它并不显示出其他任何良好的品质，而是永远使一个人丧失经营的能力，
并且损害了他的利益；例如见解糊涂，对一切人事判断错误；轻浮无恒，优柔寡断；
或者待人接物都缺乏灵活：这些都被人认为是性格上的缺点；
很多人宁可承认自己犯了重大罪行，也不愿让人猜疑自己在任何程度上犯有这种的缺点。

在我们的哲学研究中有时有这样一种幸事，就是：我们发现，
同一个现象由于各种条件而有种种表现，而且我们借着发现这些条件中的共同因素，
就更可以使自己相信我们说明这个现象时所用的任何假设确是真实的。
如果除了有益于社会的行为和性质而外，再没有别的可以被认为是德，我相信，
前面对于道德感所作的说明仍然应该被接受的，并且是在充分的证据上被接受；
但是当我们发现、其他一些的德除了根据上述假设就无法说明的时候，
这个证据就对我们有更大的力量了。这里有一个人在他的社会品质方面并无显著的缺陷，
不过他的主要优点却在于他的治事机敏，借此他能够使自己脱出最大的困难，
并且能够以特有的灵活和精明处理极度微妙的事务。我对这个人立刻发生了一种尊重；
和他结交对我是一种愉快；在我和他进一步熟识之前，
我对他就比对另一个在其他方面与他相等、而在这一点上却是缺陷的人，
更愿意提供一些服务。在这种情形下，
使我感到愉快的那些品质都被认为是对那个人有用的，
并且有促进他的利益和快乐的倾向的。这些品质只被认为是达到目的的手段，
并且随其适合于那个目的的程度、而使我有不同程度的愉快。
因此，那个目的必然是令我愉快的。但是那个目的因为什么而能令人愉快呢？
那个人是一个陌生人；我对他没有任何关切，也没有任何义务；
他的幸福比任何一个人甚至任何一个感情动物的幸福，与我并无更大的关系；
换句话说，他的幸福只是通过同情来影响我的。由于这个原则，
所以每当我发现他的幸福和福利时（不论是在其原因方面或是在其结果方面发现它），
我就深深地体会到它，因而它就使我发生一种明显的情绪。
凡有促进这种幸福的倾向的那些品质的出现，都对我的想象有一种愉快的结果，
并引起我的敬爱。

这个理论也可以说明，为什么同样性质在一切情形下，总是产生骄傲和爱，或者谦卑和恨；
同一个人为什么在自己看来是善良的或恶劣的，有教养的或可鄙弃的，
在他人看来也永远是这样。
我们如果发现一个人具有原来只对他自己是不利的任何情感或习惯，
他就单是因为这一点而总是使我们感到不快；正如在另一方面，一个人的性格如
果只是对别人有危险的、令人不快的，那么他只要觉察到那种不利，他就永远不能满意自己。
不但在性格和仪态方面可以看到这一点，而且甚至在最细微的情节方面，也可以看到。
别人的一阵剧烈的咳嗽使我们感到不快；虽然咳嗽本身丝毫不影响我们。
你如果对一个人说他的呼吸发臭，他会感到耻辱；虽然口臭并不使他本人觉得讨厌。
我们的想象很容易改变它的位置；我们或者以他人对我们的看法来观察我们自己，
或者以其他人对他们自己的感觉来考虑他们，并借此体会到完全不属于我们、
而只是借同情才能使我们关心的情绪。我们有时把这种同情推得很远，
以致仅仅因为某种原来对我们是有利的性质会招致其他人的不快，
并使我们在他们眼中显得讨厌，而就不喜欢那种性质；虽然我们的讨人喜欢、
对自己也许并没有任何利益。

历代哲学家们曾经提出过许多的道德学体系；但如果严格地考察起来，
这些体系可以归结为惟一地值得我们注意的两个体系。道德上的善恶确实是被我们的情绪，
而不是被我们的理性所区别出来的；
不过这些情绪可以发生于性格和情感的单纯的影响或现象，
或是发生于我们反省它们促进人类或某些个人幸福的倾向。我的意见是，
这两个原因在我们的道德判断中都是混杂起来的；
正如它们在我们关于大多数外在的美的判断中是混杂起来的一样：虽然我同时也主张，
对于行为倾向的反省具有最大的影响，并决定我们的义务的一切重大的方向。
不过在较少重要的情形下，有一些例子表明、这种直接的鉴别力或情绪就产生了我们的赞许。
机智、某种悠闲洒脱的行为，对别人来说，是直接令人愉快的、并博得人们敬爱的性质。
这些性质中有一些性质，借着人性中一种不能说明的特殊的、原始的原则，
使他人产生一种快乐；另有一些性质，则可以归纳于较为一般的原则。
在详细考察之后，这一点将显得更为清楚。

我们可以对现在这个假设作这样一个总的回顾：心灵的任何性质，
在单纯的观察之下就能给人以快乐的，都被称为是善良的；而凡产生痛苦的每一种性质，
也都被人称为恶劣的。这种快乐和这种痛苦可以发生于四种不同的根源。
我们只要观察到一个性格自然地对他人是有用的，或对自己是有用的，或对他人是愉快的，
或对自己是愉快的，就都感到一种快乐。有人或许会感到惊讶，在所有这些利益和快乐中，
我们竟然忘记了在一切其他情况下最亲切地触动我们的自我的利益和快乐。
但是在这个问题上，我们很容易消除自己的疑虑，如果我们这样考虑：
每个特殊个人的快乐和利益既然是不同的，那么人们若不选择一个共同的观点，
据以观察他们的对象，并使那个对象在他们全体看来都显得是一样的，
那么人们的情绪和判断便不可能一致。在判断性格的时候，
各个观察者所视为同一的惟一利益或快乐，就是被考察的那个人自己的利益或快乐，
或是与他交往的人们的利益和快乐。这一类利益和快乐触动我们的程度，
虽然比我们自己的利益和快乐要较为微弱，可是因为它们是恒常的、普遍的，
所以它们甚至在实践中也抵消了后者，
而且在思辨中我们也只承认它们是德性和道德的惟一标准。
只是它们，才产生了道德的区别所依据的那种特殊的感觉或情绪。

论自然才能

智慧与见识之所以被人重视，只是因为它们对具有它们的人是有用的；
同样，机智和辩才之所以被人重视，也只是因为它们使其他人直接感到快乐。
在另一方面，舒畅的心情之所以得到别人的爱和推崇，是因为它使本人直接感到快乐。
显而易见，一个机智的人的谈话是很令人满意的；正如一个心情愉快的同伴，
因为使人同情他的欢愉，而把他的喜悦传播于全体的同伴一样。
因此，这些性质既然是使人愉快的，所以自然就得到了人们的敬爱，并符合于德的一切特点。

在许多场合下，我们难以说明，是什么使一个人的谈话那样地愉快而有趣，
而另一个人的谈话却枯燥而乏味。谈话和书籍一样，也是心灵的一个抄本，
所以那些使书籍成为有价值的性质，也必然使谈话得到我们的推崇。
这一点，我们以后将加以考察。同时，我们可以概括地说，一个人从他的谈话而具有的价值
（这种价值无疑是很大的），只是由于他的谈话给在场的那些人传来一种快乐。

在这个观点之下，清洁也可以算是一种德；因为它自然而然地使我们成为令人愉快的，
并且是爱和好感的一个很重大的来源。没有人会否认，这一方面的疏忽是一种过失；
而各种过失既然只是较小的恶，
并且这种过失的根源既然只在于它在别人心中所刺激起的一种不快，
所以我们在这个似乎是那样细微的例子中，
就清楚地发现出其他例子中恶和德之间的那种道德区别的根源。

灵魂中有一种官能比起其他一切官能来对性格的影响最小，
而且它虽然可以有许多不同的程度，
但它的各种程度却不含有丝毫的德或恶在内，这个官能就是记忆。记忆若非高到惊人的程度，
或是低到有些影响判断力的程度，则我们通常不注意它的各种差异，
而且在称赞或指责一个人的时候，也不提到它。有良好的记忆力，绝不算是一种德，
以至人们往往还故意抱怨自己的记忆不好；他们力求使世人相信，
他们所说的话完全是自己的创见，情愿牺牲了记忆来使人称赞他的天才和判断。
但是如果抽象地来考虑这个问题，我们就难以举出一个理由来说明，
真实而明确地唤起过去观念的官能，为什么不能和条理清楚地安排现前的观念、
以构成正确的命题和意见的那种官能，具有同样大的价值。两者差别的惟一理由一定是在于：
记忆的作用不带有任何苦乐的感觉，
而一些中等程度记忆力也几乎同样都足以使人很好地经营事业和处理事务。
不过判断方面的些小变化，就会在其后果中被明显地感到；
同时，那个官能在显著的程度内发挥出来的时候，总是使人感到非常愉快和满意。
我们对这种功用和快乐的同情，就赋予智力以一种价值。在记忆方面，因为没有这种同情，
所以我们便认为记忆是十分无关于责备或赞美的一个官能。

在我结束自然才能这个题目之前，我必须要说，人们所以重视这些才能，
其根源之一就在于这些才能使具有它们的人获得重要性和势力。
他在人生中就有了较大的重要性。
他的决心和行为影响着较多的人们。他的友谊和敌意都极关重要。而且我们容易看到，
谁要在这一方面高出于其余人类，他就必然刺激起我们的尊重和赞许的情绪。
一切重要的事物都吸引我们的注意，控制我们的思想，而且在思维起来时也令人愉快。
王国的历史比家庭的故事更有趣味：大帝国的历史比小城市和附属国的历史更饶兴趣；
战争和革命的历史比和平与安定时期的历史更饶兴趣。
我们同情那些遭受盛衰荣枯的种种变化的人们的心情。
心灵被一大批的对象和种种强烈情感的表现所占领了。心灵在受到这种占领或激动时，
往往感到愉快和高兴。这个理论也说明了我们给予才具和才能出众的人的尊敬和尊重。
群众的祸福与他们的行为互相关联。他们的所作所为，都是重要的，都要求我们的注意。
有关他们的事情都不应遭到忽视和鄙弃。任何人只要能刺激起这些情绪，
他就立刻得到我们的尊重，除非他的性格中有其他条件使他成为可憎的和令人不快的。

关于自然才能的一些进一步的考虑

身体和财富方面的有利条件或不利条件也是由于同样原则而产生痛苦或快乐的。
任何对象如果有对于所有者或对于其他人的有用倾向，
如果有给予他本人或给予其他人以快乐的倾向；
那么所有这些条件就都给考虑那个对象的人传来一种直接的快乐，而引起他的爱和赞许。

我们由考虑身体的有利条件时所获得的快乐的另一个来源，
就是这些有利条件对具有它们的人的效用。
确实，人类和其他动物的美很大一部分就在于其肢体的配合得当，使其力量充沛，
矫健活泼，并使那个动物足以从事任何行动或活动，这是我们凭经验所发现的。
宽阔的肩膀，细长的腹部，结实的关节，尖细的小腿：所有这些在人类方面都是美的，
因为它们都是力量和活力的标志，力量和活力既是我们所自然地同情的一些有利条件，
所以它们就把它们在具有它们的人方面所产生的那种快乐传给予旁观者。

前面所说的是关于身体的任何性质所伴有的效用。至于直接的快乐，那么，
一种健康的外表，也确是和体力与敏捷的外表一样，构成美的很大一部分；
而别人的憔悴病容，则由于其给我们传来痛苦和不快观念，总是令人不愉快的。
在另一方面，我们对自己容貌的匀称也感到一种愉快，
虽然这种匀称对自己和对他人都没有用处；我们必须在某种程度上把自己置于一定距离以外，
才能使这种匀称之美给我们传来任何快乐。在他人眼光中我们显得是什么样子，
我们往往就据此来考虑自己，并且同情他们对我们所抱的有利的看法。

财富的有利条件究竟在何种范围内由同一的原则产生了尊重和赞许，
我们只要回顾一下前面关于那个题目的推理，就可以明白了。我们说过，
我们对那些具有财富的有利条件的人们的赞许，可以归之于三个不同的原因。
第一，归之于一个富人借其所有的美丽的衣着、陈设、花园或房屋的景况、
所给予我们的那种直接的快乐。第二，归之于我们希望由他的慷慨好施而获得的那种利益。
第三，归之于他本人从他的财产获得的快乐和利益，
那种快乐和利益引起了我们的愉快的同情。
不论我们把对于富人和大人物的尊重归之于这些原因中的一个或全部原因，
我们总可以清楚地看到产生恶和德的感觉的那些原则的痕迹。
我相信，大多数人在初看之下都倾向于把对富人的尊重归之于利己心和求得利益的希望。
但是我们的尊重或恭敬既然确是超出了为自己谋求利益的希望以外，所以显而易见，
那种尊重情绪的发生，必然是因为我们同情那些依赖于我们所尊重和尊敬的那个人、
并和他有直接联系的人们。我们认为他是能够促进其他人们的幸福或快乐的一个人，
那些人们对他的情绪，是我们自然地加以接受的。这个考虑就足以说明我的假设是正确的：
我的假设是选取第三个原则，而舍去其余两个原则，
并把我们对于富人的尊重归之于对富人自己由他的财产所获得的快乐和利益的同情上面。
因为甚至其他两个原则如不求助于这种或那种的同情，它们的作用也不能达到适当的程度，
或者说明一切现象；既然如此，那么我们如果选择切近的、直接的同情，就比选择疏远的、
间接的同情，更为自然得多了。此外还可以再加上一点，就是：当财富或权力是很大的时候，
并使那个人在世上成为显要的人物，
这时我们对它们的尊重一部分也可以归于与这三个来源有区别的另一个来源，就是：
它们借其可能有的结果的众多和重要，而引起心灵对它们的关心；
不过为了说明这个原则的作用，我们也必须求助于同情，
正如我们在前一节所已经说过的那样。

本卷的结论

大多数人都容易承认，心灵的有用的性质之所以是善良的，乃是由于它们的效用。
这种思想方式是那样自然，并且发生于那样多的场合，以致很少有人会迟疑而不承认它。
这一点一经承认，同情的力量也就必须加以承认。德被认为是达到目的的一个手段。
达到目的的手段，只是在那个目的被人重视的范围以内才被人所重视。
但是陌生人的幸福，只是通过同情才影响我们。
因此，由于观察一切那些对社会有用的德或
一切那些对具有它们的人有用的德而发生的赞许情绪，
我们都应当把它归之于那个同情原则。这些德就形成了绝大部分的道德。

如果在这样一个题目方面，可以允许收买读者们的同意，或者除了坚实的论证以外，
还可以应用任何讨人喜欢的说法，那么我们在这里正有大量的话题，可以博得读者们的爱好。
一切爱好德的人（我们在思辨中都是爱好德的人，不论我们在实践上如何堕落），
在看到道德的区别起源于那样一个高贵源泉，
而且那个源泉又使我们对人性中慷慨和才具具有正确的概念时；他必然要感到高兴。
我们只须对人事稍有认识，就可以看到，道德的感觉是灵魂中一个固有的原则，
而且是心灵组织中所含有的一个最有力的原则。但是这个感觉在反省它本身时，
如果又赞许它所由得来的那些原则，
而在其起源和由来方面又发现一切东西又都是伟大和善良的；
那么这种感觉必然会获得新的力量。
把道德感觉归原于人类心灵的原始本能的那些人可以用充分根据来为德辩护；
不过他们与那些用对人类的广泛同情来说明这种感觉的人们比起来，
却没有后者所具有的那种有利条件。依照后者的体系来说，不但德应当受到赞许，
而且德的感觉也应当受到赞许；不但德的感觉应当受到赞许，
而且这种感觉所由得来的原则也应当受到赞许。因此，不论在那一方面所呈现出的原则，
都是可以赞美的，都是善良的。

人类的大部分发明都容易发生变化。它们是依人的心向和喜爱为转移的。
它们流行一个时期，随后就被人遗弃。
所以人们也许会担忧，以为如果承认正义是人类的发明，
它也必然要处于同样的地位。但是这两种情形是绝不相同的。
作为正义基础的那种利益是最大的利益，是适合于一切时间和地点的。
它不能被其他的发明所满足。它是明显的，在社会最初形成时就显现出来的。
所有这些原因就使正义的规则成为稳定而不变的；至少是和人性一样是不
变的。如果把它们说成是建立在原始本能上的，它们还能有任何更大的稳定性么？

这个体系还可以帮助我们形成关于德的幸福的正确概念，以及关于德的尊严的正确概念，
并且可以使我们天性中的每个原则都乐于怀抱那个高贵的品质。种种知识和能力的造诣，
不但直接产生利益，而且还在世人的眼光中使一个人得到一种新的光辉，
使他普遍地得到尊重和赞许；当他考虑到这一点时，那么在知识和能力的追求活动中，
谁还不会感到一种踊跃争先的干劲呢？当一个人考虑到，不但他对人的品格，
而且他内心的安宁和快乐，都完全依靠于社会道德的严格遵守；当他考虑到，
一个人如果对人类和社会的义务有所缺陷，则心灵在反观内照时便要感到内疚：
当一个人考虑到这几点时，谁还能认为、财富的利益足以补偿其对社会道德的些小破坏呢？
不过我可以不必继续申论这个问题。
这些考虑要求一部旨趣与本书的旨趣迥然不同的独立著作。
解剖学家永远不应当与画家争胜，解剖学家对人体的细微部分虽然作了精确的解剖和描绘，
却不应该自命为给了他的图像以任何优雅动人的体态或表情。在他所表现出的事物的景象中，
甚至有一种可憎的或至少是过于细微的东西；这些对象必须置于一定的距离之外，
并且对视觉要相当地掩盖起来，以便使眼睛和想象感到愉快。
不过一个解剖学家却最适宜于给画家提供意见；没有了解剖学家的帮助，
要想在绘画方面有优异的表现，那甚至是不可能的。
我们必须对于各部分以及其位置和联系有一种精确的知识，然后运笔布局，才能优雅正确。
就是这样，关于人性的最抽象的思辨，不论如何冷淡和无趣，却可以为实用道德学服务，
并且使后一种科学的教条成为更加正确，使它的劝导具有更大的说服力量。